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It is the on-purpose increase or decrease of revenues, profits, or earnings per 
share figures (income smoothing). It is a form of fraud and differs from a 
reporting error.  
Value relevance Reflects the exact economic value of the company 
Insider trading 
Trading activities of a person who is closely related to the company, such as 
directors, officers, senior managers, employees and associates, 
Fair value 
It is the opposite of the historical cost. It is the market value of a company’s 
assets. 
BIG- 4 auditors   
It refers to the four largest accounting firms in the world, meaning Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu Limited (DTTL), Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), Ernst 
and Young (E&Y) and Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG). All other 
companies are characterized as non-Big 4 auditors.  
 
Common-law 
Common-law or Market-oriented or shareholder-oriented could be 
characterised the accounting system that used to follow the Anglo-
Saxon countries (i.e. UK, US) 
Code-law 
Continental/code-law or stakeholder-oriented or tax-driven is the accounting 
sytem that used to follow European countries before IFRS (i.e. Germany, 
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This project relates to the financial effects of the official adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005. IFRS is a set of unique, high-quality 
standards that aim to increase the transparency and comparability of information in 
firms’ financial statements. However, since their implementation, issues have arisen, 
such as their introduction in the US, and the global financial crisis in 2008 which 
resulted in a huge downturn in global stock markets. There are indications that, under 
certain circumstances, firms have used earnings management to gain competitive 
advantage. Earnings management, or the deliberate misstatement of earnings figures, 
is a form of fraud. It is an important issue because firms that use such techniques 
disorientate investors and market participants, and increase market imbalances. Many 
studies have focused on the connection between earnings management and IFRS, 
provoking three core questions. Would it have been better for countries to apply their 
own national GAAP? Has acceptance of IFRS in the US improved matters? Might 
better measures have been taken to avoid or eliminate any management effects during 
the crisis? This study involved quantitative analysis of secondary numerical data, 
focusing on the Australian, German, Greek, UK and US stock markets. The findings 
reveal that IFRS has not succeeded in eliminating falsified statements entirely. 
However, this study helps market participants by developing a database of investment 
strategies based on the potential for firms to use earnings management. It contributes 
to theory by exploring additional tools and motives for earnings management, and to 
practice by analysing possible methods for investors and authorities to detect such 
practices. It is thus of interest to both academics and market professionals. 
 
Keywords: IFRS, US GAAP, Earnings Management, Insider Trading, Cost of 
Capital, Fraud Auditing, Financial Crisis, Shadow Banking 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline the basic concepts and context of my project. I describe 
the background of my research, and outline my critical theoretical learning and 
professional experiences connected with my study. I also introduce the development 
of my initial research questions, the motivation for and contributions of my research, 
and my aims and objectives, all of which explain why I chose to engage with this 
subject. Finally, I provide a brief overview of the methodology of this research. 
 
1.1 Background to the research area 
My project was conducted against a rich background of events before and after the 
adoption of official International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS; see Appendix 
I, Table 1). As Aisbitt (2006, p.118) suggests, prior to the implementation of IFRS, 
the literature concentrated on the European Council’s efforts to standardise, 
harmonise and converge accounting regulations (Mueller, 1967; Briston, 1978, 1989; 
Cairns, 1997), and afterwards on their financial effects on companies that had adopted 
IAS and IFRS (Street et al., 1999; Street and Gray, 2001; Sucher and Alexander, 
2002). As part of the broader context of social sciences (Starbuck, 2003), accounting 
and finance have always provoked interesting debates, with theoretical and practical 
implications. Their primary role is to communicate information from companies to 
shareholders and stakeholders, but as companies continue to aspire to a global 
reporting culture (Zarzeski, 1996), they must process information between different 
countries. Thus, academic interest in international accounting has increased, focusing 
on integrating accounting regimes, as frameworks have undergone huge changes in 
recent years. 
Initially, research focused on identifying groups of European countries with 
similar accounting systems (Haller, 2002). Many researchers (e.g. Nobes, 1983; 
Frank, 1979; Nair and Frank, 1980) sought to classify and adjust accounting systems 
according to each country’s financial system (bank-oriented versus market-oriented), 
legal system (code-law versus common-law) and type of ownership (Anglo-Saxon 
versus Continental). Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. the UK and the US), which are 
market- or shareholder-oriented and subject to common law, follow a substantially 
different accounting system from the traditional accounting system of 
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Continental/code-law countries (e.g. Germany and Greece), which is stakeholder-
oriented and tax-driven (Harris et al., 1994; Ball et al., 2000; Leuz and Wustemann, 
2004). In the former, firms are financed mainly by investors, while in the latter, 
capital is provided by the state, banks or owners (Ball et al., 2000; Nobes, 1998; La 
Porta et al., 1997). One of the greatest differences is the fair-value orientation, as 
analysed in greater detail below (Coopers and Lybrand, 1993; Alexander and Archer, 
2000). Most studies of IFRS still classify their samples in this way to justify their 
results on the effects of the new standards. 
However, European communities recognised a need for further cooperation in 
financial reporting, so in 1973, several professional accountancy bodies cooperated 
and established the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). The IASC 
formulated the International Accounting Standards (IAS), establishing a regime that 
improved financial and accounting regulation. Although in the medium term the 
European Council (EC) published the Fourth (78/660/EC) and Seventh (83/349/EC) 
European Union (EU) Directives,1 aiming to converge European accounting 
standards, IAS formulation was one of the most significant steps toward reducing 
accounting differences across EU countries (Haller, 2002). At the same time, large-
scale accounting scandals were revealed, such as the dot-com collapse and Enron in 
2001 (CGAA, 2003). These cases differed from reporting errors, in that these 
companies were accused of accounting irregularities. Operating in an environment in 
which firms were forced to maximise their profits and stock value, they were driven 
to satisfy conflicting interests, even by implementing practices designed to manipulate 
their financial picture (Jiraporn et al., 2008). This meant that some business insiders 
were able to modify financial reports to mislead all interested parties about the firms’ 
financial performance (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). This intentional misrepresentation 
and misquotation of accounting measures (Elliot and Willingham, 1980) involved not 
only artificial increases or decreases in revenues, profits or earnings, but also 
improper revenue recognition, inappropriate accruals and estimates of liabilities, 
excessive provisions, generous reserve accounting, and much more. The literature 
refers to such practices as ‘creative accounting’ (Schipper, 1989). Creative accounting 
is a change to a financial reporting or other measure to alter a company’s accounting 
figures and disorientate investors regarding the firm’s value (Mulford and Comiskey, 
                                                 
1 Directives are rules or regulations issued by the EU, and member states are obliged to incorporate 
them into their national laws (Roberts, 1998). 
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2002). The most common method used is income smoothing or earnings management. 
Earnings management refers to intentional increases or decreases in revenues, profits 
or earnings-per-share figures. It is a form of fraud rather than a reporting error. For 
this reason, the responsible authorities acted to prevent such cases in the future and 
created a unique framework to make features comparable across all firms. As a result, 
the US enforced protection mechanisms by introducing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002 (SEC, 2003). 
In the same year, the European Parliament approved Regulation No. 1606/2002, 
as proposed by the EC (2002). This act determined that for each financial year starting 
on or after 1 January 2005, companies traded on a regulated market in any European 
member state and governed by EU law should prepare their consolidated financial 
statements in conformity with IFRS as adopted at the European level. IFRS is ‘a 
single set of high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards 
that require transparent and comparable information in general purpose financial 
statements’ (IASB, 2006). The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
which replaced the IASC in 2001, was responsible for introducing a new accounting 
era into the EU, based on a solid plan and a series of EU directives (Christensen et al., 
2013). However, in addition to Europe, other countries such as Australia also adopted 
or permitted them, with a vision of greater transparency and integrity. Consequently, 
IFRS adoption resulted in considerable convergence of accounting regimes 
(Armstrong et al., 2010), aiming to bring balance between adopters, and improve the 
quality, comparability and transparency of financial reports. This enabled authorities, 
investors and shareholders to gain easy access to timely and accurate financial data 
from companies located in different countries. IFRS adoption was therefore one of the 
most significant events in the history of financial reporting, attracting global research 
interest (Byard et al., 2011; Zeghal et al., 2012). 
As a result, debates began around IFRS adoption. Indeed, many studies find that it 
has had substantial positive effects (Byard et al., 2011), and has reduced information 
asymmetry (Frankel and Li, 2004). Such research suggests that IFRS has ensured 
high-quality information and increased the comparability of financial reports, and has 
thus encouraged international trading and investment efficiency (Bushman et al., 
2006; Sun, 2006), and that its merits outweigh its drawbacks. On the other hand, 
many studies detect controversial effects on firms’ financial statements (Walton, 
2004). They state that cross-country differences continue following the 
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implementation of IFRS, and suggest that accounting regimes cannot overcome 
differentiation between the legal and political environments of each country 
(Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). It seems, therefore, that during the early years of IFRS 
adoption, many studies tried to illustrate their performance by focusing on their 
potential effects, which can be summarised in terms of two significant areas of 
contention: creative accounting, as previously explained (Leuz et al., 2003), and fair 
value (Ali and Hwang, 2000). Fair value differs from evaluating assets based on 
historical costs as in old national GAAP, using the cost at which assets were bought. 
In this approach, companies used to calculate depreciation on their assets up to the 
ends of those assets’ operational lives. However, IFRS requires some financial assets, 
such as fixed assets and financial instruments held for trading, including derivatives 
and available-for-sale financial assets (i.e. IAS 16, IAS 39), to be recognised at 
market value, namely fair value. As will be revealed in Chapter 2, many researchers 
claim that this may increase the volatility of accounting figures and have noticeable 
financial effects. 
In addition, over time, IFRS have been affected by many emerging events that 
have raised questions about their effectiveness, one of the most significant being the 
2008 financial crisis. This last crisis appeared in the US banking sector but soon 
spread to Europe. Many market participants blamed the nature and structure of IFRS, 
so theoretical research again focused on the fair value orientation of IFRS, seeking to 
detect any disadvantages under turbulent economic conditions (Mallet, 2008). The 
crisis tested the cohesion of IFRS, and research assessed their responses to similar 
situations in different countries. Unfortunately, IFRS appear not to have reached the 
level of harmonisation and integration needed, as countries did not present any typical 
reaction to the crisis, while some have yet to recover from its effects. Perhaps for this 
reason, the IASB has sought to reconsider some traditional accounting tools, even 
starting a debate on the structure of firms’ annual reports.2 It seems, therefore, that 
these emerging and challenging situations have prepared the ground for new changes 
to accounting rules (Hatherly and Kretzschmar, 2011). However, in making such 
improvements, consideration must also be given to the observation in recent press 
releases that warning signs went unheeded and still exist in fraudulent auditing cases, 
                                                 
2 The Federation of European Accountants (FEE) asked accountants to share their thoughts on the 
possible implications, potential changes and future perspectives and challenges of IFRS. The results 
were published in its report, The Future of Corporate Reporting (2015). 
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such as the recent case of Globo in the UK,3 and any new crises4 that might emerge. 
Overall, enhancement of accounting regimes seems always to have been regarded as a 
critical issue, but has failed to achieve the intentions of the IFRS (Weibenberger et al., 
2004). 
 
1.2 Connection between the Research Area and Myself 
Against this background, I had an opportunity to delve into core accounting 
concepts, during my studies and in my professional career. I was taught about several 
cases, including Enron, and was able to observe other equally important accounting 
events through my work. In all cases, I was amazed by the ratios and financial 
statistics derived from firms’ financial statements. I still believe that these financial 
measures help shape managers’ decisions and enable their businesses and investors to 
make choices; yet, at the same time, I constantly wonder how I might use these data to 
predict a company’s future prospects. My interest in this became even more intense as 
it was revealed that there were early warning signs before the crisis occurred. 
Therefore, I decided to combine my knowledge as an accountant and a market 
analyst, because by considering features of both the market and accounting firms, I 
might better apply my ratio analysis models. Learning gained during my studies and 
work helped me to do this. 
 
1.2.1 My study journey 
My interest in accounting arose during my bachelor’s degree in business 
administration. Although I had enrolled with the intention of following a marketing 
career, by the end of it, I realised that I had gained specific awareness and had 
achieved better performance in accounting and finance modules. I had considered 
their potential, and had become familiar with firms’ accounting values and figures. I 
had been introduced to fundamental accounting principles and the basis of the Greek 
double-entry accounting system, and had learned how to react to real financial 
problems. However, I still had second thoughts about a career in accounting. Thus, I 
                                                 
3 Globo enterprise is one of the latest cases to shock European stock markets, as the company was 
delisted from the AIM market in the UK after being accused of market abuse, falsification of accounts 
and insider dealing. US investment company, Quintessential Capital Management (QCM) was the first 
to detect this case (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/globo-sails-too-
close-to-the-wind-a6709986.html). 




decided to enrol on a master’s programme in management. This was helpful, as it 
raised my awareness of issues relating to the financial underpinnings of accounting. I 
learnt how to use and interpret information from firms’ balance sheets, cash flow 
statements and profit and loss accounts. I studied the Greek capital market and 
focused on the data provided by its quoted companies, enabling me to evaluate 
empirical data critically in order to analyse companies’ performance. 
However, my greatest achievement during my studies was my master’s 
dissertation entitled ‘The post-adoption effects of the implementation of the IFRS in 
Greece’. This research focused on the effects of IFRS adoption in Greece, where I 
was able to observe and understand fundamental IFRS concepts and principles. The 
study examined 254 firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), and was one 
of the first to describe the consequences of IFRS adoption in Greece, suggesting areas 
for future research on IFRS. This was my first attempt to conduct research, which 
enabled me to develop the capabilities necessary to accomplish similar projects. This 
first experience as a researcher helped me to understand how to operate creatively and 
make sense of data. Thus, I succeeded in producing significant outcomes that 
contributed to new knowledge creation, as examination of IFRS and their adoption by 
Greek firms was at a preliminary stage. Throughout this study, I maintained high 
ethical standards, and achieved reliability and validity. As a result of this 
methodological work, and with cooperation and guidance by my supervisor, Dr 
Iatridis, my dissertation was published in the Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation at the beginning of 2010. 
 
1.2.2 My professional journey 
This project is also relevant to my professional activities and interests. For the last 
ten years, I have straddled two professions, one as a self-employed accountant and the 
other as a stock market analyst in Greece. I am responsible for my company’s 
compliance risk, taking all necessary measures, such as due diligence on clients’ 
accounts, order recording, money laundering, and internal information detection. I am 
also responsible for executing orders to buy and sell shares listed on the ASE and 
foreign stock exchanges. In addition, my job involves carrying out financial analyses 
of firms listed on various stock markets and preparing companies’ financial 
statements. I feel privileged to have this twofold job. Working at the same time as an 
accountant and stock market analyst has many advantages. First, I am able to book-
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keep and work for firms that have implemented IFRS, making me more familiar with 
the subject of this project, and enabling me to evaluate IFRS in practice. Indeed, I 
recognise the need to regulate financial regimes and use assessment criteria for 
investment, risk analysis and decision making. I was able to check accounting figures 
to detect any practical considerations during IFRS implementation. At the same time, 
as a stock market broker, I was able to analyse the market performance of these firms 
to determine whether their accounting picture corresponded with their market 
behaviour. Therefore, I was able to implement, confirm, discover and share my 
consideration of these issues under extreme situations such as the last financial crisis. 
In this way, I have gained accounting expertise, as well as professional alertness and 
readiness for technical and fundamental analysis. All these proved to be perfect 
preparation for this project. 
Closely related was my experience of economies other than Greece. After 
graduating from university, I worked as an accounting assistant in a construction 
company in Romania, where I was able to observe differences between the national 
accounting standards of the two countries. In 2006, Romania had introduced huge 
changes to accounting legislation to create greater transparency and prepare for EU 
membership in 2007. I was thus able to see how Romanian firms reacted to these 
changes, and this prompted me to consider how this reaction would differ from that of 
other countries such as Greece. Furthermore, as a stockbroker, I started to use foreign 
platforms for trading, including Metatrader, Metastock, NinjaTrader and Trader 
Workstation by IB, so I gained access to the fundamentals and market data of the 
most significant global economies. Thus, I was able to use data analysis models to 
compare the performance of Greek and other IFRS economies, as well as between 
different regimes, such as US General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
IFRS. This was difficult at first, as these analytical tools offered countless 
possibilities, producing large volumes of information that I was unable to use. I began 
to realise that there was a world of analysis that I could add to my parameters. Thus, I 
experimented with my models. I established statistical analysis models for market 
performance, introducing additional stimulus factors such as the auditors of examined 
firms. In this way, my enjoyment of the profession increased and I became more 
confident about my perspectives, while I also gained understanding, knowledge and 
experience of financial ratios. 
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During my working career, I have enhanced my professional experience and 
capability and have become more familiar with the subject of my research area, 
deepening my knowledge of accounting and auditing issues. Thus, I have managed to 
expand my horizons in this field, and I have become an expert in cases that seem 
meaningless but are extremely important. For example, I have gained experience of 
how institutions work. As I am in frequent touch with the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, I am familiar with how this organisation works, what it demands from 
listed companies and how it responds to emergency situations. This makes it easier for 
me to understand the workings and bureaucratic procedures of the IASB. 
Furthermore, I am in daily touch with many individual clients. Most people consider 
finance to be highly complicated, but my clients are always well informed, with 
coherent opinions, giving me opportunities to experience their intentions and feelings 
about IFRS implementation. 
Overall, this seems to be a difficult area for research, but my professional career 
has enhanced my ability to scrutinise accounting problems and applications. To this 
end, I consider that my professional experience, my accounting activities and my 
research background added value to this research. 
 
1.3 Motivation for the Study 
This research was part of my doctoral project examining IFRS implementation. I 
led the study as a self-funding student at the Institute for Work-Based Learning at 
Middlesex University. The idea originated from the last financial crisis. As an 
accountant and market analyst in Greece, I had an opportunity to question the 
effectiveness of IFRS for dealing with such situations. Occasioned by this fact, I 
discovered that other issues concerning IFRS had not yet been thoroughly examined. 
Although there is no specific motivational framework for research, Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2009) suggest four potential rationales: a reaction to practical problems, a 
result of previous research, intuition based on previous experience, or a theoretical or 
conceptual framework. Three of these criteria seemed to apply in my case. 
 
1.3.1 Results of previous research 
I was initially motivated to engage in this project as a logical extension of my 
master’s dissertation. Following its publication, I discovered increased interest in 
IFRS by the accounting community, which sparked my intention to engage in 
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independent research, aiming to examine several additional cases distilled from IFRS 
adoption and to focus on more countries. Indeed, the introduction of IFRS has been 
characterised as a breaking point in accounting (Cairns, 2003), so I wished to examine 
further cases of IFRS implementation, based on accounting issues and debates. 
During my master’s programme, I noticed that IFRS does not always diffuse accurate 
information. Although the responsible authorities have developed an appropriate 
decision panel to change or enhance specific principles of IFRS to remain up to date, 
many companies take advantage of IFRS tools that allow unrealised profits or future 
losses to be recorded in their financial statements, using these to display higher gains 
or losses. This increased my general feeling that nothing has changed, which was 
confirmed by literature critical about the disclosure of information under IFRS. In 
addition to such cases, I wanted to examine other market effects resulting from 
mandatory IFRS reporting. My fundamental motivation on this front was my interest 
in exploring stock market performance. 
 
1.3.2 Intuitions based on previous experiences and reactions to practical 
problems 
As described previously, my work specialises in statistical and fundamental 
analysis of listed companies that follow IFRS and US GAAP. For this reason, after 
starting my professional career, I decided to invest in a portfolio of companies based 
on minimum criteria for selection. These criteria were based on models from my 
theoretical and practical knowledge and were input with financial statement ratios. In 
this way, I was able to identify whether a company with strong fundamentals would 
have a high stock performance, and vice versa. However, over my professional life, I 
have detected many additional factors that may affect firms’ market efficiency, such 
as earnings announcements, investors’ estimations and auditors’ evaluations. Indeed, I 
have observed several such cases that have unexpectedly affected the performance of 
my portfolio. For example, some listed companies with auditors’ opinions without 
notes collapsed. In other cases, firms made fraudulent statements, yet controlling 
mechanisms identified them only after years or, even worse, failed to regulate them at 
all. 
Similarly, companies with a high cost of capital may have better market 
performance than competitive companies with lower costs, and better statements may 
produce lower stock returns. From many examples derived from my experience as a 
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market professional, I observed investment companies that were selling while their 
reports recommended that their clients buy, as well as individual investors with 
internal information. Indeed, I once noticed that a week before a public offering 
announcement, a listed company increased its trading volume to a price 50 per cent 
higher than its market value. This may have been a case of internal information, but it 
could not be easily proved, even if someone juxtaposed the transactions. Many of my 
colleagues confirmed this and provided more cases. They noticed that in unaudited 
mid-term statements, most firms exhibited higher earnings, while in periods when the 
Greek government increased taxation for listed companies, they decreased their 
revenues. Greece has a small economy, and such phenomena can easily be revealed in 
the stock market. The difference is that under IFRS these cases seem to be fewer and 
better planned. 
However, such situations do not occur only in Greece. As mentioned in Section 
1.1, in the Enron case, a single auditing company, Arthur Andersen, was responsible 
for accounting misinterpretations, and because of this one company, a whole 
professional field in the US was found guilty. Globo is another case study of failure 
by UK auditors and analysts. Although it may seem unfair, and without ignoring the 
responsibilities of the authorities, under certain circumstances this criticism holds, 
raising questions about the implementation of IFRS. In fact, the last financial crisis 
may be another indicative example, as it proved that such professionals were 
unprepared to deal with its consequences. They did not predict any of the implications 
of the crisis, and continued to publish high ratings reports, even for companies that 
went bankrupt a few days later. These cases reveal that although both IFRS and US 
GAAP had been subject to amendments, they did not deal adequately with all the 
issues that emerged, and seemed always to be one step behind the facts, enhancing the 
vicious cycle of crisis. 
However, were the auditors solely responsible for such cases, or might Enron’s 
owners and managers, as well as market investors and analysts, have known about the 
falsified numbers? If so, why did they keep this privileged information secret? In 
many cases, accountants, auditors and even market analysts are forced by managers to 
participate in earnings management activities in order to preserve their jobs. In my 
work as an accountant, I often face such ethical dilemmas, and have had to deal with 
such issues during my professional career. However, from my point of view, creative 
accounting, as expressed in accounting misinterpretations, falsified statements, 
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earnings management and income smoothing, leads to unbalanced situations and 
provides only short-term benefits. Therefore, accountants should always protect their 
communities by refusing to participate in such activities, thereby also increasing their 
professional competency and broadening their perspectives. 
Furthermore, over the years, I have realised that, as a practitioner-researcher, I am 
better able to transform my theoretical parameters into practical concerns. Therefore, 
since I always try to detect whether a company has falsified financial statements 
before making my investment decision, I was able to examine why and how 
companies engage in earnings management. However, at this point I considered an 
additional ethical dimension: should I keep my results to myself and leave the market 
to self-regulate, as in the Enron and Globo cases, or should I disseminate my findings 
to help other investors and accountants detect any income-smoothing activities early? 
Motivated by the latter, I considered that allowing unbalanced situations created by 
falsified statements to continue would be extremely unethical, so I should use my 
findings to provide suggestions to investors, other accounting users and authorities, in 
order to improve IFRS and mitigate creative accounting practices in future. 
Therefore, this research project grew out of my professional work and a desire to 
better understand and evaluate IFRS. It offered a perfect opportunity to combine work 
and research, helping me to improve my professional investment strategy, to 
reconsider and re-evaluate my portfolio investment, and to raise the accounting 
community’s awareness of how unethical and harmful financial misinterpretation may 
be. I enrolled on this DProf programme to complete my journey and contribute my 
parameters to IFRS market examination.  
 
1.4 Brief Literature Review 
1.4.1 Moving toward harmonisation 
The need for a common accounting regime has increased, as many firms, 
especially those with an international orientation, pursue a global reporting culture 
(Zarzeski, 1996). The first comparative studies to consider international accounting 
diversity were published many years ago (Davidson and Kohlmeier, 1966). However, 
more extensive research was not undertaken until much later (Nair and Frank, 1981; 
Evans and Taylor, 1982), as globalisation of the business environment increased the 
need for harmonisation between different accounting standards (Graham and Neu, 
2003). Harmonisation is the process by which accounting standards become more 
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interconnected through the establishment of a single accounting regime (Tay and 
Parker, 1990; Choi and Mueller, 1984). In this way, their level of variation decreases 
and comparability improves (Roberts et al., 2005). Tay and Parker (1990) use the 
notions of harmony, standardisation and uniformity to better define harmonisation. 
They describe harmony in terms of a cluster of companies adopting one or a few of 
the available methods. Uniformity is a closely-related concept, as it addresses the 
clustering of harmonised companies but with fewer possible methods, while 
standardisation is conceived to be the process of moving toward uniformity (Tay and 
Parker, 1990). 
In addition to these considerations, Tay and Parker (1990) draw a further 
distinction in the harmonisation process, reaching similar conclusions to those of Van 
der Tas (1988). They classify harmonisation into formal (de jure) and material (de 
facto), distinguishing the process from the information. Formal harmonisation refers 
to legal or quasi-legal specification of the standards, while material refers to the level 
of harmonisation displayed by firms’ financial reports (Fontes et al., 2005). Having 
identified all these concepts, the literature has focused on important cases that affect 
the integration of accounting standards, such as a country’s economic, historical, 
institutional and cultural environment (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993), as well as on 
cases affected by harmonisation, such as accounting disclosures, investor protection 
and market accessibility (Hope et al., 2006). Thus, empirical studies have established 
a framework of advantages and disadvantages, as well as obstacles to implementation 
(Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Pierce and Weetman, 2000). 
 
1.4.1.1 Influential factors in harmonisation 
Previous studies have identified many obstacles to the harmonisation of financial 
reporting. These are separated into three categories (Nobes and Parker, 2002). The 
first is the extent of differences between accounting standards. Even without 
convergence, over time, countries display similarities between their accounting 
standards, which has led researchers to determine clusters of countries with related 
regimes (Mueller, 1967; Nobes, 1983; Doupnik and Salter, 1993). For economies in 
the same cluster, the challenge of developing a single set of international financial 
reporting standards is less burdensome. A closely related issue is differences between 
legal systems. A country’s legal system is highly important in international 
commercial activities, as it regulates all business practices and transactions (Hill, 
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2005). Legal systems are categorised as either common law or civil law. For example, 
the UK and the US both have a common-law system, so may find it easier to 
cooperate in their accounting standards and resolve any disputes more efficiently 
(Hill, 2005). 
The second barrier is national accountancy bodies. In some economies, 
professional organisations determine the regime, as in the UK; in other cases, the 
government is responsible, as in France; while in the US, the FASB is accountable for 
this. The degree to which each institution is involved in standard setting varies, and 
countries that have differing institutions may face coordination problems (Salin, 
2001). The last barrier to harmonisation is cultural differences (Hill, 2005). For 
example, countries’ traditional economic values vary; some practices may increase 
inflation for Germany (Wyatt, 1997) or earnings volatility for the US (Saudagaran, 
2004). 
 
1.4.1.2 Benefits and critics 
If the previously mentioned barriers can be reduced, the literature suggests some 
advantages for harmonised countries, such as time and cost savings. Companies that 
operate in different economies must consolidate different financial information to 
comply with the various national accounting regulations, whereas in a harmonised 
process, they no longer have to prepare multiple reports (Nobes and Parker 1991), 
thereby saving management costs by avoiding translation of accounting information 
(Brown and Tarca, 2001). Therefore, multinational corporations favour harmonisation 
(Cook, 1989; Choi and Levich, 1990), as communication of financial information 
between their subsidiaries becomes easier (O’Malley, 1993). Enhanced comparability 
of international financial information appears to increase foreign investors’ interest, as 
they are better able to understand the financial statements of foreign companies 
(Samuels and Piper 1985). Studies indicate that investors prefer to focus on firms that 
have similar accounting standards because this reduces their cost of acquiring and 
processing financial information (Bradshaw et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2013), and 
increases their ability to make the right investment decisions (DeFond et al., 2011). Of 
course, companies also benefit, as investors’ interest enhances their credibility (Gray, 
1980; Tweedie, 2004), and helps lower their cost of capital (Saudagaran and Meek, 
1997; Choi and Mueller, 1992) and increase their liquidity (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). 
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As a result of all these benefits, the literature suggests that countries have many 
reasons to try to harmonise their accounting standards as far as possible, given their 
local economic, legal and social conditions (Choi et al., 1999). The value-relevance of 
a less developed accounting system may also be increase more than for systems that 
already have high standards (Daske et al., 2007). On the other hand, many consider 
that stronger economies will impose their standards inflexibly, and consequently 
harmonisation will be inadequate for developing countries’ national economic, legal 
and cultural systems. Thus, companies need to be informed about any effects of 
harmonisation, such as increased volatility in balance sheet numbers, and about 
changes that it will bring to the accounting system, as in some cases negative impacts 
may emerge (Parker, 2002). Overall, considering the associated political and 
bureaucratic costs of harmonisation (Roberts et al., 1996; Brown and Tarca, 2001), 
debate continues regarding its impact on financial results (Rahman et al., 2002). 
Indeed, the literature indicates that international firms benefit greatly from 
harmonisation of accounting regimes, as transaction costs are reduced (Houston and 
Reinstein, 2001). However, not all firms operate internationally, and those that do not 
will be hard-pressed to comply with the additional complex and costly requirements 
of the convergence process without gaining any advantages from it (Choi et al., 1999). 
 
1.4.2 Harmonisation after IAS/IFRS introduction 
Adopting IFRS offer a solution to the barriers to harmonising accounting 
described previously. The IASB’s objective was to formulate a set of accounting 
standards that would enforce comparability and transparency and improve qualitative 
financial reporting information. This would reduce uncertainty and information 
asymmetry for investors, enhance financing opportunities, decrease market 
uncertainty, and lead to higher stock returns (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007). These are 
strong motives for countries to adopt IFRS (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007), and firms in 
a lower-quality information environment will gain even greater benefits (Armstrong et 
al., 2007). This may suggest that comparability of accounting reports between 
companies from different countries may increase under IFRS (De Franco et al., 2011). 
However, the heterogeneity of economies that have adopted IFRS, especially those 
outside Europe, as well as their different reactions under common rules (Daske et al., 
2007), may offer reasons for preserving accounting diversity. Therefore, recent 
literature has focused on whether IFRS adoption can achieve the desired 
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comparability across countries (Hail et al., 2010). Most researchers suggest that 
harmonisation cannot be achieved simply by implementing the new accounting 
standards (Weibenberger et al., 2004), as additional factors must be overcome. 
Basilico and Johnsen (2011, p.9) identify legal, cultural, governance and firm-level 
incentives for European countries (Nobes, 2006, 2010; Daske et al., 2008; Burgstahler 
et al., 2006; Berger, 2010). However, additional accounting issues may affect the 
level of IFRS harmonisation. The formulation process may give an advantage to 
countries that used to follow the Anglo-Saxon accounting system, as IFRS seems to 
have assimilated this framework (Nobes and Parker, 1998). Analysis of this 
environment reveals interesting results, as most EU countries follow the Continental 
accounting system (Megginson, 1997; Broomwich 1992; Damodaran, 1997), further 
influencing the harmonisation of IFRS. 
However, it is not only material harmonisation that is questioned, as many 
researchers suggest that the IASB must also continue to work toward greater formal 
harmonisation (Pascual et al., 2002). They suggest that IFRS allow too much freedom 
of judgment in the same measurements and procedures, which may have adverse 
effects, as recent studies suggest that introducing common regulations to countries, 
without common strictness of enforcement, may have the opposite effect to the 
desired harmonisation (Christensen et al., 2011). In fact, simply mandating new 
accounting standards is not sufficient to produce uniformity, if they are not backed by 
strong, centrally harmonised institutions (Ball et al., 2003), eliminating any local 
enforcement (Ball, 2006). For example, firms’ freedom of judgment in the recognition 
of provisions may affect the comparability of IFRS values. Indeed, they may classify 
provisions under IAS 12, IAS 38 as capitalisation options or IAS 11 (Hellman, 
2008).5 These options appear to be influenced by the national accounting culture and 
regulation of the countries in which companies operate. This, in turn, affects IFRS 
harmonisation (Feleaga et al., 2010). Further similar cases may relate to the fact that 
not all countries that have adopted IFRS require listed companies to complete their 
accounts according to IFRS. Furthermore, in relation to financial reporting for non-
listed companies, the IASB seems to have allowed considerable discretion for national 
                                                 
5 There is ongoing debate about the accounting conservatism of IFRS. Both the IASB and the FASB 
argue that prudence and conservatism are undesirable qualities in financial reporting information 
(IASB, 2006a, BC2.22), but as IFRS does not provide a strict framework for users, many used to 
undervalue their net assets, mainly by carrying forward tax losses and credits (IAS 12), development 
costs (IAS38) and construction contracts (IAS11) in order to gain competitive advantage (Hellman, 
2008; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247525447_Accounting_Conservatism_under_IFRS.) 
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enforcement, as some countries have already established their standards according to 
IFRS, while other economies, such as Greece, have only recently started to harmonise 
their national accounting values with IFRS for non-listed firms. Such state 
enforcement favours some countries and and companies, giving them an advantage 
over other IFRS countries and firms (Delvaille et al., 2005). Overall, the literature 
suggests a lack of consistency in accounting between member states and the standard 
rules of IFRS, just as in other harmonisation cases (Nobes, 1993). 
 
1.4.3 IFRS in Europe and abroad 
For Greece and weaker economies, adopting IFRS has been a critical factor in 
attracting investors’ interest. Many believed that these countries would not be able to 
respond to the increased disclosure requirements and procedures of the new regime, 
especially since Greece had one of the highest levels of earnings management of any 
country (Leuz et al., 2003). On the other hand, many expected that their adoption 
would improve the quality of financial reporting, as well as the reliability, 
transparency and comparability of financial statements (Ballas et al., 1998). Many 
cases examined in the literature confirm that any harmonisation in accounting 
standards may help smaller economies. Indeed, the results suggest that the value 
relevance of consolidated figures has increased under IFRS for Greek companies 
(Karampinis and Hevas, 2011). Karampinis and Hevas (2011) observed an 
unexpected improvement in consolidated accounting net income and book value after 
IFRS adoption. 
Most researchers suggest that the accuracy of Greek firms’ accounting statements 
has improved (Papadatos and Bellas, 2011), although some cases of information 
asymmetry have been identified (Negakis, 2013). These may be attributable to the fair 
value orientation of IFRS. Furthermore, IFRS seems to have resulted in differences in 
performance from country to country. Many studies have focused on the influence of 
IFRS on the value relevance of accounting information, concluding that it differs 
across jurisdictions. For example, like Greece, the UK’s accounting quality has 
strengthened, leading to more value-relevant accounting information following the 
introduction of IFRS (Iatridis, 2010; Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas, 2011). On the other 
hand, IFRS has not produced the same results in Poland, where they have not 
impacted significantly on value relevance (Dobija and Klimczak, 2010). In Spain, 
early indications suggest that the value relevance of accounting information has not 
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significantly improved as a result of IFRS (Callao et al., 2007). This is important 
because it suggests that the local accounting enforcement applied by each country in 
conjunction with IFRS values negatively affects IFRS implementation and the 
comparability of financial statements. 
Many studies have sought to examine such cases, and most findings are in line 
with those of Callao et al. (2007); however, there are cases where local enforcement 
seems to have produced benefits around IFRS adoption, suggesting that increased 
liquidity is attributable to the enforcement system of each country (Christensen et al., 
2013). This mixed evidence seems to have led to a broadening debate following IFRS 
adoption. On the one hand, researchers suggest that IFRS adoption has not instantly 
delivered improvements in earnings comparability across Europe in relation to 
accruals and cash flow (Beuselinck et al., 2010). They also suggest that harmonisation 
of accounting standards does not improve analysts’ ability to learn from inter-firm 
comparisons, as accounting comparability does not increase for IFRS adopters (Lang 
et al., 2010). On the other hand, there has been an increase in foreign investors in 
IFRS firms, which would not have occurred if comparability between these firms had 
not increased (DeFond et al., 2011). 
Finally, researchers have examined the mean of countries’ and firms’ results to 
enable better assessments of the harmonisation process. The literature suggests that 
analysts’ forecasts are more accurate since the official adoption of IFRS in the EU 
(Brown et al., 2009), while the cost of equity is lower under IFRS, especially for 
countries with strong legal enforcement (Li, 2010), as this correlates with reduced 
earnings management in both private and public firms (Burgstahler et al., 2006). 
However, in relation to sother countries beside the EU that have adopted IFRS, recent 
studies again reveal mixed results depending on the countries’ characteristics. In some 
countries, reporting quality has increased and earnings management levels have 
decreased for companies under IFRS (Cai et al., 2008; Ji and Lu, 2014), while in other 
cases IFRS have failed to increase the quality of accounting data outside the EU 
(Khanagha, 2011). 
 
1.4.4 IFRS in the US 
The process of harmonising accounting standards is an important aspect of 
globalisation. Thus, following the successful introduction of IFRS, the next step may 
be reconciliation with US GAAP (Schipper, 2005). This would further increase the 
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transparency, consistency and comparability of accounting numbers around the globe. 
The reconciliation approach that has been implemented seem to be the most effective 
process, in terms of time and cost, in moving toward complete convergence. Indeed, 
an increasing number of studies have focused on this fact. These insist that US GAAP 
is not superior to IFRS regarding value relevance (Bartov et al., 2005), and suggest 
that US GAAP does not produce higher quality information than IFRS (Leuz, 2003). 
Thus, they argue that US GAAP is not superior to IFRS, at least outside the US 
(Bartov et al., 2005). In the US, however, researchers are likely to be more sceptical 
of IFRS. The results indicate that US investors prefer accounting methods that 
conform more closely to US GAAP (Bradshaw et al., 2004), even for foreign firms in 
the US (Harris and Muller, 1999), despite the fact that some findings suggest that in 
the crucial earnings domain, US GAAP have less explanatory power than IFRS 
(Ashbaugh and Olson, 2002). 
However, previous experience indicates that any form of harmonisation between 
two strong regimes may be more complicated than anticipated, creating considerable 
difficulties. Indeed, some researchers disagree with the idea of harmonisation 
(Sunder, 2002, 2007), arguing that accounting standards should operate under 
competition. This will allow investors to choose between firms that report under 
different regimes, placing a higher value on firms that report under a set of high-
quality accounting standards. Similarly, responsible authorities would prefer to focus 
on the development and evolution of accurate regimes to attract investors and reduce 
firms’ cost of capital (Huddart et al., 1999). Furthermore, there is a need for changes 
to tax strategies and dividend policies, while all the general adjustments required for 
IFRS implementation (Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006) will increase 
transaction and operating costs, affecting firms’ financial performance. In addition, 
there are concerns about the timing of this venture, as many consider that the 
reconciliation option may result in a delay to the convergence process (Street and 
Linthicum, 2007). Finally, this venture may not only affect the US market, but Europe 
as well. This is because, in adopting IFRS, the US would have a significant influence 
on them and would be able to make changes according to its own needs. Since the 
IASB would have less power in the US, this institutional isolation might lead to the 
development of different sets of IFRS standards for the US market, while investors 
would perceive it as one common set (Ball, 2006). 
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1.4.5 Current issues 
As observed in Section 1.1, creative accounting is a problem for all accounting 
regimes. This phenomenon becomes more intense during economic downturns (Jones 
and Oldroyd, 2009), as in the last financial crisis in 2008, when the first victim was 
accounting regulations (Hughes, 2009). Both IFRS and US GAAP came under 
scrutiny, so a growing body of literature has examined references to complaints of 
accounting misconduct, which increased significantly during the credit crisis 
(Johnson, 2008). Indeed, many studies accuse both IFRS and US GAAP of failing to 
foresee the crisis, and have focused on their fair value orientation as a reason for them 
not responding appropriately to the crisis (Wallison, 2008a, 2008b; Whalen, 2008). 
Other researchers suggest that an immediate relaxation of capital requirements may 
have been a solution (Laux and Leuz, 2009). 
However, in addition to blaming accounting standards, many studies have 
examined the performance of the banking sector following the outbreak of the crisis. 
The literature has focused on the role played by banking and shadow banking in the 
financial crisis, owing to their elaborate financial measures and vagueness in 
accounting figures (Heilpern et al., 2009; Lewis, 2009). The shadow banking system 
consists of institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds that are not subject 
to the same regulations as commercial banks. They provide services and activities that 
are fully or partially outside the regular banking system (Claessens et al., 2012). 
These institutions tried to compete globally, but the results proved that the market 
participants were unprepared for this step (Claessens et al., 2012; Jackson, 2013). 
Consequently, their fragility increased (Basu, 2003), and authorities therefore initiated 
new regulations. Most researchers claim that regulating the capital structure might 
preserve it from any future crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2010), as it would reduce 
inaccuracies (Cole, 2012). 
 
1.5 Aims and Objectives 
This research is concerned primarily with experiences following IFRS adoption in 
Greece. Based on the background and existing literature, my goal was to critically 
evaluate the introduction of IFRS in Greece by investigating stock market reactions to 
events surrounding the official adoption period. These events triggered debatable 
results; therefore, I aimed to contribute to the literature by examining problems that 
needed to be answered for both financial professionals and academics. Although 
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public opinion tends to be positive, in many cases, empirical research has failed to 
confirm increased transparency and comparability of accounting figures under IFRS. 
Even when positive economic consequences have been identified, concerns remain 
about whether these might be attributable to factors other than IFRS (Brüggemann et 
al., 2013). 
For this reason, I focused on the transition to IFRS from the old GAAP, meaning 
the national regimes to which countries previously adhered. Focusing on earnings 
management, insider trading and the cost of equity, I applied both national regimes 
and IFRS to a set of emerging issues. In this way, I was able to critically explore and 
assess the effectiveness of IFRS against creative accounting techniques and cases of 
fraud. I also aimed to provide appropriate means for accounting professionals to 
detect large-scale instances of fraud, as well as the characteristics of firms that have 
used such methods. Therefore, through critical data analysis based on statistical 
methods and models, I sought to capture and investigate a range of previously 
unquestioned experiences. Indeed, my applied empirical analysis models provide 
critical evidence and interpretations of earnings management cases. However, such 
studies may lack comparability because they focus on a single country. Therefore, I 
aimed to use the same proxies and apply the same models to countries other than 
Greece. I sought to compare the performance of Greece against other indicative 
countries, such as Australia, Germany, the UK and the US. Details of the sample 
selection are provided in Section 1.7. In this way, I aimed to illuminate country risk 
and determine whether IFRS performs better in weaker countries, such as Greece. 
Thus, I compared Greece with a country that used to follow a different regime (the 
UK), with an economy with a similar accounting philosophy (Germany), and with a 
country that follows IFRS values but has its own accounting board (Australia). This 
would reveal the extent of harmonisation between different countries that follow 
IFRS. 
As most accounting researchers consider that a single accounting system enables 
high levels of accounting harmonisation, since IFRS adoption, they have taken 
harmonisation for granted. However, I aimed to provide rich empirical evidence that 
might problematise this belief. In turn, this would lead to extensive research on 
current thinking about the introduction of IFRS in the US. The research sought to 
critically evaluate the underpinnings of IFRS introduction and analyse IFRS 
performance in the US market, and provide an in-depth examination of important 
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attributes, patterns and interactions that followed this implementation. In this way, I 
would be able to evaluate the extent to which decisions by the US and the EU have 
influenced the internationalisation of accounting regimes. Hoping that my research 
would enrich the results of these decisions, I aimed to illuminate aspects of 
amendments to IFRS and US GAAP in light of the crisis. Finally, focusing on the 
banking sector, I sought to critically evaluate their reactions, and to question some of 
their fundamental rules in practice. Overall, my central concern was to highlight 
critical issues following the official introduction of IFRS in 2005, the adoption of 
IFRS in the US, and the performance of IFRS during a crisis. In brief, my aims were: 
 To explore whether IFRS introduction succeeded in decreasing firms’ earnings 
management 
 To review IFRS performance compared with US GAAP 
 To establish how IFRS and US GAAP responded to the last economic crisis 
 To combine all this information in order to develop a database of characteristics of 
firms that investors should further evaluate before investing in these companies. 
To achieve these aims, the following objectives were pursued: 
 To compare Greece’s performance with that of other economies following IFRS, 
and to assess their reactions to falsified statements, auditor changes, insider 
trading and the cost of capital 
 To assess the advantages and disadvantages of IFRS in each examined country 
compared with their previous national accounting regimes (old GAAP), and the 
effectiveness of IFRS improvements 
 To critically evaluate IFRS implementation in the US, detecting any effects on 
adopting firms 
 To illustrate the consequences of the crisis for financial markets, and to estimate 
the financial sector’s reactions to both IFRS and US GAAP 
 To provide recommendations on possible areas for improvement to IFRS, and to 
suggest a single source of guidance for market professionals based on better 
correlation of information. 
 
1.6 Initial Research Questions 
This project provides useful insights into critical elements of IFRS adoption. I 
focused on the most interesting issues arising from IFRS, as distilled from the 
literature and my working experience. In this way, I aimed to answer three broad sets 
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of questions that defined the general framework and purpose of the study. Although 
many studies have been conducted on IFRS adoption, ambiguity remains as to 
whether firms tend to engage less in earnings management and report more accurate 
accounting values. Previous studies have produced mixed results, and although the 
transition to IFRS occurred in 2005, debate continues on how firms would have 
performed under national GAAP. This scepticism was reinforced by the financial 
crisis, which added greater ambiguity to IFRS implementation. At the same time, new 
falsified statement estimation methods have been introduced during this period, but no 
research has applied these to compare old national GAAP with IFRS. Furthermore, a 
widespread belief with which I concur is that IFRS has not succeeded in dealing with 
privileged internal information and insider trading. Therefore, there are several issues 
that authorities need to address in order to eliminate any additional effects of IFRS, 
including stock market regulations. 
Furthermore, most studies have performed earnings management tests that include 
all sample firms for a year. However, my professional intuition is that firms that apply 
earnings management techniques do not do so all the time, but for a specific reason 
and within a discrete time frame. Similarly, research on this period has failed to detect 
particular standards that are more responsible for earnings management. Finally, most 
previous literature has discovered a decrease in the cost of capital, but has failed to 
determine whether this was due entirely to IFRS adoption. Although IFRS provide 
objective and reliable information, nobody can guarantee that the reduction in the cost 
of equity is not correlated with increased accruals. Consistent with all these facts, the 
research addressed the following initial set of research questions. 
Q1: Have IFRS succeeded in meeting their target for a high level of transparency 
following their compulsory adoption in Europe and Australia? To what extent do 
individual IFRS standards have a material impact on earnings management? How 
have auditors reacted during this implementation process? 
Most studies find that the level of accounting harmonisation has increased 
considerably following IFRS, despite the differing economic backgrounds of EU 
countries (Hoarau, 1995; Epps and Oh, 1997). However, this does not indicate that 
IFRS could be successfully applied in the US. There was thus a need to evaluate IFRS 
in the US using the same methods as have been used in the EU. The interest was in 
detecting how they have performed in the crucial field of earnings management, and 
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what have been the effects on firms’ statements following their adoption. This led to 
the following second set of general questions. 
Q2: Have IFRS succeeded in implementing their values and overcoming any 
difficulties in the US market? Has this venture enhanced the convergence process? 
This set of questions is vital for accounting researchers and analysts, allowing 
them for the first time to compare IFRS performance between Europe and the US, and 
make better investment evaluations. However, in order to achieve this, I also needed 
to determine the market and financial effects on reactions of IFRS to the crisis. 
Indeed, the reclassification option allowed in IFRS opens up a new debate as to 
whether this option increased the effects of the crisis and information asymmetry, 
rather than eliminating adverse consequences and protecting firms from abnormal 
stock market returns. As a market participant, I had not realised why so many 
researchers have focused on this decision, blaming the fair value orientation of IFRS. 
In my opinion, this helps both companies and accountants to present a firm’s real 
value, and the IFRS reacted appropriately and in a timely way in allowing the 
reclassification option. However, apart from this reaction, both IFRS and US GAAP 
focused on the banking and shadow banking sectors. They amended and/or introduced 
new individual standards to regulate these sectors and eliminate similar fraudulent 
auditing cases based on accounting misinterpretations in future (Nieschwietz et al., 
2000). This led to the next set of questions as follows. 
Q3: Did the fair value orientation actually contribute to the financial crisis through 
contagion effects? Have these two global accounting regimes succeeded in 
overcoming the consequences of the crisis? Have amendments and the introduction of 
new standards to IFRS and US GAAP achieved regulation of shadow banking? Which 
of the two has performed better? 
Table 1 summarises these benchmarks with related research questions. 
Table 1: Link between research questions and IFRS milestones 
Year 
Milestones after ten years of IFRS 
implementation 
Questions 
2005 Introduction of IFRS in Europe Have they eliminated falsified financial statements, 
insider, trading, and reduced the cost of capital for 
adopters? 
Are these results harmonised for all adopting 
countries? 
2007 First IFRS improvements 
2007 Reconciliation between IFRS and US GAAP Is it the right time to introduce IFRS in the US? 
2008 Outbreak of the crisis How have weaker economies responded? 
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2011 Improvements to IFRS and US GAAP relating to the 
banking sector 
How has IFRS responded compared with US GAAP? 
2013 
 
1.7 Data Sample 
Accounting studies have traditionally been preoccupied with groups of countries 
with similar accounting systems (Haller, 2002). Therefore, most research on IFRS 
implementation has focused on a very narrow sample, for example one country for a 
few years, or many years for a single country. However, I sought to differentiate and 
examine different country profiles to prove how a country’s cultural, economic and 
legal environment influences its accounting principles (Frank, 1979; Nair and Frank, 
1980). Therefore, I focused on listed firms in Australia, Germany, Greece, the UK and 
the US. During my professional career, I have worked on listed firms from these 
countries, giving me insights into their stock exchanges and the necessary competence 
to find relevant data for my analysis. Thus, this project provided me with an 
opportunity to examine countries that have a direct effect on my profession, and I was 
therefore able to apply my findings immediately. However, the selection of these 
countries was also based on theory. German firms have been the most frequently 
examined in IFRS studies, and Germany represents a code-law country. It was 
therefore appropriate to compare Germany with a country from the opposite extreme 
such as the UK (Nobes and Parker, 2000), and to combine these results with Greece, 
one of the weakest economies to adopt IFRS in EU. 
Australia, on the other hand, was selected for many reasons. First, for many years 
I had been looking to expand my professional investment in additional stock markets. 
This project revealed copious literature on Australian companies. Indeed, it seems to 
have been the first choice for research on non-EU countries, and was one of the first 
economies to follow Europe’s 2005 regulation on obligatory enforcement. Thus, I 
began to apply my professional analysis to Australian companies. Furthermore, 
Australia does not follow European IFRS, but the Australian equivalent, International 
Financial Reporting Standards (A-IFRS), as issued in 2005 by the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (AASB). Although this equates to compliance with 
IFRS, it would be useful to determine whether this compliance remains stable under 
challenging circumstances. Australia also has close historical, economic, legal and 
cultural links with the UK (Nair and Frank, 1980). This made my sample more 
balanced, as Australia and the UK are Anglo-Saxon countries, compared with the 
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Continental countries of Germany and Greece. Finally, concerning the timeframe and 
reference years for the study, I focused on the key events shown in Table 1. Based on 
the literature and my work as a stock analyst, I considered that these years covered the 
essential period between mandatory IFRS implementation and the present day. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
1.8 Significance and Possible Outcomes of the Project 
This study examines several issues relating to IFRS adoption and enhances 
previous literature, shedding light on previously untested problems concerning the 
consequences of IFRS adoption. In evaluating whether IFRS have performed better 
than national GAAP, I chose to concentrate on earnings management. On the basis of 
the literature and my working experience, I concluded that earnings management can 
be extended to all accounting functions, while the considerable number of studies 
addressing this issue testiy to its significance. However, following McNichols (2000) 
and Stolowy and Breton (2004), I determined that most researchers have focused on 
specific accruals or earnings statistics, seeking to confirm already-known motives and 
tools for earnings management. These studies have produced mixed results on 
whether IFRS have eliminated smoothing processes. Through this project, I contribute 
to this debate in determining further motives and tools for earnings management. This 
is the first study to seek to correlate earnings management and abnormal returns with 
falsified statements, insider trading and the cost of capital. However, most 
importantly, some measures may be transformed from motives into tools, and vice 
versa. For example, a manager might proceed with earnings management to increase 
the firm’s value and sell its holdings, or an insider might increase his holding to 
enable him to proceed to earnings management. I also include auditors in this process, 
and determine whether companies that manage their earnings once will always use 
such techniques. This question is crucial for market professionals, but until now has 
remained answered. 
In addition, the contribution of this doctoral research project is reflected in the 
combination of methods used. My analysis includes individual accounting standards, 
and amendments and/or restatements of accounting values, and I was able to perform 
not only cross-sectional but also, in some cases, longitudinal examinations of 
variables, according to the needs of each test. This is an innovative procedure since, to 
my knowledge, no previous empirical studies in this field have taken a similar 
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approach. Thus, I extend the IFRS research agenda by identifying interactions 
between individual IFRS standards and earnings management. In this sense, I 
contribute to this body of research by examining the overall market impact on 
earnings quality. This approach allows me to identify an imperative need for further 
IFRS enforcement. For this reason, I use indicative examples of countries covering a 
wide range of differences between common law and code law in financial reporting 
quality (Ball et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, in exploring the experience of IFRS in the US, this project 
contributes to ongoing international debate on enforcement measures for accounting 
quality and capital markets (Ball et al., 2000; Hung, 2000; DeFond et al., 2007). For 
this, I evaluate the effects of the reconciliation between IFRS and US GAAP to 
determine whether IFRS can compete in the US. Following well-established methods 
(Barth et al., 2008, Daske et al., 2007, 2008), I focus on financial statement effects 
before and after the introduction of IFRS in the US. As there appears to be increasing 
scepticism over whether the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should 
allow foreign firms to list their securities in the US market without US GAAP 
reconciliation, the results provide substantial evidence for and interesting 
contradictions to such claims. Finally, the project contributes to debate on the 
reactions of both IFRS and US GAAP during and after the economic crisis. For this, I 
investigate the performance of the financial sector under both regimes, identifying 
possible additional effects and considerations. However, unlike previous studies that 
have excluded the banking sector, I examine both the banking and shadow banking 
sectors. Overall, this project contributes valuable evidence to debates following the 
introduction of IFRS, and provides a roadmap of necessary amendments to enable 
these regimes to prevail globally. 
This work-based project will be of interest to a broad audience, especially since 
significant changes to accounting regulations are now being considered6 and there is 
increasing concern as to whether accounting professionals can effectively manage 
adjustments to IFRS. As a practitioner-researcher, I document significant market 
responses by investigating IFRS adoption from an insider perspective, as a user as 
well as a researcher. Therefore, professions that may benefit from this research 
                                                 
6 Indicative cases include the introduction of a new compliance regulation for auditors, a new training 
framework for accountants concentrating on lifelong educational preparation, and the establishment of 
new rules as proposed by the EU (2010). 
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include accountants, auditors and market analysts. Self-employed professionals in this 
field are at a disadvantage compared with big accounting firms. The latter carry out 
analysis and research to enhance their performance, while individuals have no access 
to this information. This research aims to fill this gap by providing appropriate means 
for self-employed individuals to formulate a framework of characteristics that make 
firms more prone to fraud, abnormal returns and insider trading. This will provide 
them with a better understanding of how the accounting regimes perform under 
certain circumstances, allowing them to focus on and evaluate similar situations and 
to forecast future crisis events. It is essential for analysts and accountants to be 
familiar with considerations that may affect a company’s economic performance. 
Having access to all this information will make it easier for accountants to develop, to 
save time and costs, and to compete with big accounting firms. However, even big 
corporations may benefit from this research, enabling them to devote their resources 
to assisting authorities in improving standards. 
This project thus delivers the following theoretical and practical outcomes: 
 Contributes to existing debate on the effectiveness of IFRS 
 Creates awareness of the harmonisation process under IFRS and after the crisis 
 Adds knowledge for authorities to deal with earnings management to design their 
future guidelines successfully 
 Helps accountants and market participants understand correlations between 
earnings management, market performance, insider trading and the cost of capital 
 Provides investors with practical suggestions for policy change 
 Formulates an investment framework for market participants, based on the 
financial statements of Australian, German, Greek, British and US listed firms. 
 
1.9 Brief Description of the Methodology 
The methodology is the main way to link all major parts of a study to produce a 
complete project (Mouton, 1996; Myers, 2009). I followed a quantitative 
methodology, which tends to generate data that can be collected and expressed in 
numerical form, ready for analysis and statistical presentation (Backman, 1998). As 
such an approach follows a formal structure, it was suited to the scope of the study to 
answer the research questions, examine the hypotheses and assess the effectiveness of 
IFRS. Research may also encompass other methodological approaches that use a 
common set of procedures to describe and depict the research methodology and better 
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define the link between the research philosophy and the subsequent choice of methods 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). I decided to combine an action research approach with 
an empirical survey. As a professional in the financial field, I considered myself to be 
an insider in the accounting community. Therefore, the action research approach 
offered me an opportunity to feed practical concerns into my models, and to detect 
possible improvements relating to these issues. I aimed to examine specific 
accounting issues before and after IFRS implementation as part of the general 
professional accounting context of the research and the change process examined 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). I formulated three cycles to better assess official 
adoption of IFRS, its introduction in the US and the effects of the crisis. At the same 
time, the empirical survey enabled me to apply statistical models in each research 
cycle. Therefore, I produced systematic sets of data based on highly reliable statistics 
that could be efficiently coded and processed. 
 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the general hypothesis and 
research questions, and critically evaluates the literature, focusing on essential 
theories relating to the research. Chapter 3 presents the methodological research 
design. It explains the rationale for the chosen paradigm, describes the ontological and 
epistemological considerations of the research and the methodology followed, and 
sets out the data sampling, collection and analysis methods. It also clarifies the 
limitations of this study. Chapter 4 focuses on the identification of variables and the 
primary analysis. It describes in detail the nine hypotheses of the thesis, including the 
individual tests performed to investigate each one. Chapter 5 presents the results and 
analysis based on each hypothesis, formulated in such a way as to permit the reader to 
reach accurate conclusions and comparisons. Chapter 6 summarises the conclusions 
and considers whether the research plan was successful. It also makes 
recommendations for further analysis by identifying possible ways to strengthen the 
IFRS implementation process. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the 
project for my professional learning and development, the impact of the research on 
the global literature, and the difficulties faced in writing this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
This research relates to the literature on the effects of IFRS introduction in Europe 
and Australia, engages with the introduction of IFRS in the US, and considers the 
reactions of both IFRS and US GAAP to the financial crisis. However, to provide 
valid theories and valuable practical recommendations, additional streams of literature 
relevant to this study are reviewed in this chapter. Following Haller’s (2002) 
identification of three broad periods of transformation in accounting regimes, the 
theoretical basis of my project is structured around three sequential phases that trace 
the evolution of accounting regimes, including IFRS formulation. However, earlier 
studies are reviewed than those examined by Haller (2002), as researchers have been 
seeking to identify rules that might link financial statements from different national 
accounting systems since the 1950s (Chandler, 1992). Therefore, in the first period up 
to 1994, I review the literature around the first steps taken by the EU to harmonise 
and globalise through directives. In the second phase, from 1995 to 2003, I consider 
the first steps in true IAS implementation.  
In the third period, which begins from 2004 because some firms adopted IFRS 
early, I examine IFRS as they operate today, and which I aimed to examine in my 
research (see Appendix I, Table 2). This is intended to help the reader and myself gain 
a better understanding of the evolution of IFRS over time, and gives the review 
greater clarity, separating the periods between directives, IAS and IFRS. Since most 
researchers review the literature under thematic frameworks, it is difficult for readers 
to discern whether they refer to IAS or IFRS. For example, Hung and Subramanyam 
(2007) examined IAS adoption, but many subsequent studies refer to their research as 
indicative of IFRS implementation, which is inconsistent. Finally, in reviewing the 
literature, I investigate the critical viewpoints of published researchers, focusing not 
only on their results but also on their methods, justifications and general applications. 
This enables determination and evaluation of any methodological limitations, 
overgeneralisations or omissions. Appendix I, Tables 3 and 4 give further details on 
this strategy for gathering and evaluating the literature. 
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2.1 Phase I: Accounting Harmonisation and Globalisation (up to 1994) 
As the EU project moved toward completion, it needed to consider improving its 
accounting rules. Thus, it had to discuss harmonising and globalising its accounting 
standards. This period reveals the first traces of accounting harmonisation, with the 
introduction of two significant factors for international accounting: harmonisation 
through directives from 1989 to 1994, and the introduction of IAS in early 1970. 
These two processes ran in parallel, but because few papers make a significant 
statistical contribution to the effect of IAS during this period, this review focuses on 
the directives, the EU’s first step toward harmonisation. 
 
2.1.1 Moving toward harmonisation: Accounting directives 
A fundamental consideration of the EU was to develop equality of economic 
potential. The most important step in achieving this was harmonisation of accounting 
systems across all member states. Even before 1970, the EU issued several directives 
aiming to harmonise financial reporting practices and to increase comparability 
between member states. Undoubtedly the most influential of these guidelines, which 
established the first framework for accounting regime rules, were the Fourth (Council 
of the EC, 1978) and Seventh (Council of the EC, 1983) EC Directives, known as 
Accounting Directives,7 which all members were obliged to embody in their national 
laws. Studies of this period have not focused on the rationale for these decisions, since 
it is normal for enforcement bodies like the EU to intervene in cases of public interest 
such as the dissemination of information in financial statements to foster capital 
market growth (Posner, 1974; Taylor and Turley, 1986). Rather, they have provided 
extensive descriptions of harmonisation and have sought to show the importance of 
globalising accounting regimes. Thus, both theoretical and empirical studies are 
included in this part of the literature review. 
 
2.1.1.1 Theoretical considerations in adopting directives 
Many researchers have sought to identify and define harmonisation. Research on 
this period suggests various formal definitions, but Choi and Mueller (1984) explain it 
                                                 
7 The Fourth Directive regulated the format and valuation of core accounting figures, but its main 
feature was the requirement for a ‘true and fair view’ (TFV) of a company’s assets, liabilities and 
income statements. The Seventh Directive addressed issues associated with consolidations of financial 
accounts, such as auditing and publishing obligations and methods that firms should follow to 
consolidate their figures. 
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more broadly as a process that may increase comparability of financial statements on 
various dimensions. In other words, harmonisation transforms regimes into a single 
rule in the same situation. In addition, Tay and Parker (1990) emphasise the practical 
elimination of accounting diversity, and Nobes (1991) suggests that the higher the 
limitations placed on variations in accounting practices, the better their comparability. 
Harmonisation remains a process that eliminates diversity in accounting standards 
(Roberts et al., 2005). However, early papers make a clear distinction between 
harmonisation, harmony and standardisation (Van Hulle, 1992). Harmony applies 
when companies have only one rule to follow, so it is described in the literature as 
‘standardisation’. 
Many researchers of this period chose to concentrate on these notions. Gray 
(1980) was one of the first to focus on the difference between harmonisation and 
standardisation. He claimed that their difference lies in the forces that lead the 
process. Thus, he suggested that harmonisation is a process directed by responsible 
authorities, in this case the EU, whereas standardisation is a process giving managers 
responsibility for measurement and disclosure. Of course, this approach does not 
reflect reality because, since the directives, managers and accountants have been 
obliged to implement the new accounting regulations. Some researchers (e.g. Tay and 
Parker, 1990; Nobes, 1991; Van der Tas, 1992) tried to engage with these concepts 
and offered competing views on harmonisation. Nobes (1991) accepted that 
harmonisation aims to increase financial statements’ comparability, whereas 
standardisation imposes rigid rules. However, he was one of the first to emphasise the 
methodological difficulties of measuring harmonisation and question the validity of 
data used to do so (Nobes, 1981), suggesting that any difference between 
harmonisation and standardisation is difficult to distinguish in practice. He focused 
instead on improving measurement methods. Similarly, Van der Tas (1992) supported 
abandoning the distinction between harmonisation and standardisation, and 
considered it better to consider models to measure the degree of harmonisation. He 
distinguished between formal and material harmonisation (Van der Tas, 1988). The 
former refers to official regulations issued by standard setters, while the latter 
measures actual actions taken by companies. 
On the other hand, Tay and Parker (1992) made a clear distinction between the 
two concepts. Indeed, they defined harmonisation as a process whereby a regulation 
applies to all associated companies, while standardisation refers to more specific rules 
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that address only a subset of companies. They also suggested an additional 
measurement of harmonisation (Tay and Parker, 1990), focusing on actual reporting 
practices estimated from annual statements. Similarly to Van der Tas (1988), they 
distinguished between material and formal harmonisation, emphasising the former. 
These studies may be considered to be more objective than papers from the early 
1980s that relied on researchers’ interpretations (e.g. Evans and Taylor, 1982). They 
gained broad acceptance by the accounting community, yet they were still subject to 
limits caused by sample selection, data sources and the statistical methods applied. 
However, these studies were highly ingenious, not so much in their methodology, 
but because they directed research away from trivial debates between harmonisation 
and standardisation toward an essential disagreement over how to measure the level of 
harmonisation. Thus, they revealed that the main problem was not estimating these 
notions, but measuring harmonisation levels. They moved away from useless debate, 
and introduced an appropriate path for subsequent researchers. Several indices, such 
as Benau’s (1995) global concentration index and Archer et al.’s (1995) comparability 
index, have been based on that of Van der Tas, or have contributed to its improvement 
(e.g. Taplin, 2003) to resolve significant issues. Even recent empirical studies that 
compare countries’ performance following IFRS adoption implicitly estimate 
harmonisation levels, since in most cases they use comparative indices to analyse any 
discrepancies in IFRS implementation between countries. For example, Pascual et al. 
(2002) indicate that more effort is required to achieve harmonisation. 
 
2.1.1.2 Additional considerations in adopting directives 
None of these academic studies considered alternative motives for such 
interference, such as the ‘private interest’ theory (Stigler, 1971) where the regulator 
seeks to take advantage of regulated parties. This means that some countries might 
gain competitive advantage over others on the road to harmonisation. Indeed, 
incorporating these directives into national laws had different implications for each 
member state. Consequently, researchers started to focus on these differences and 
concentrate on the advantages that some countries seemed to possess. As explained in 
Chapter 1, two systems prevailed in Europe: the Continental/code-law system which 
has a stakeholder orientation, and the Anglo-Saxon model prevalent in the UK. The 
latter insists on low levels of regulation and taxes, and low barriers to information for 
investors in capital markets (Epps and Oh, 1997). Thus, some countries may have be 
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privileged. Indeed, UK firms already had to adhere to a detailed accounts format by 
law (Thorell and Whittington, 1994), while in Italy and Spain, firms had only general 
requirements (Zambon and Saccon, 1993; Giner, 1993). Similarly, the UK and Ireland 
were familiar with consolidated financial statements, as they had extensive 
regulations on group accounts even before the Seventh Directive. On the other hand, 
most European code-law systems (Spain, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Greece and 
Germany) only offered general regulations, and therefore focused on individual 
accounts to determine earnings, taxes and dividends (Giner, 1993; Zambon and 
Saccon, 1993). However, the most prominent argument for any imbalances introduced 
by the directives was undoubtedly the introduction of the TFV, which is the 
component of fair value in IFRS. The peculiarity of this principle is that in some 
countries, as in the UK, it had already been applied some time previously (Alexander, 
1993). 
New questions then arose. Might TFV adoption result in more advantages for 
some countries than for others, endangering the harmonisation process? The 
theoretical literature of this period did not adequately answer this question. Of course, 
this period may have been too early for such considerations, as in many cases the data 
were preliminary, yet research seems to have been devoted to other issues, such as the 
motives of the Danish, Dutch and UK delegations for proposing this regulation 
(Nobes, 1986), whether TFV was similar to the ‘fair presentation’ concept of US 
GAAP (Kirk, 2001), and whether a lack of authoritative interpretation of TFV might 
lead to disagreement between investors, firms’ managers and auditors (Nobes and 
Parker, 1991; McEnroe and Martens, 1998). In addition, the literature engaged in 
extensive discussions of the legal, instrumental and political environment relating to 
the directives (see Walton, 1993). Many researchers focused on confusion about the 
content of the TFV regulation, as it was interpreted differently in countries’ national 
laws (Van Hulle, 1997). Many others detected political intentions behind the 
directives’ harmonisation, as neither national regulators nor markets were ready to 
accomplish this (Haller, 1992; Liener, 1992; Evans and Nobes, 1996). Therefore, this 
cluster of studies seems to conclude that harmonisation of accounting rules was 
necessary, but that since it had had enormous impacts on all member states, additional 
procedures needed to be established, although some researchers considered that, with 
common formal and disclosure regulations, national accounting systems had become 
similar across the EU (Thorell and Whittington, 1994). 
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What appears to be missing from this body of literature is any explanation of 
which countries took advantage of these regulations, over what period, and for how 
long they might be able to preserve any of these benefits. Similarly, it would have 
been relevant to define the parameters of their focal determinants as, although these 
studies had little practical application as they just described a state, they created a 
solid basis for both theoretical and practical investigations. Thus, they placed 
additional pressure on the EU Council, resulting in considerable opposition by 
member states to the application of the directives (Haller and Walton, 2000). This 
may have temporarily eliminated controversy over the directives (Thorell and 
Whittington, 1994), but resulted in lower levels of harmonisation. 
Similarly, a fair value orientation emerged as the most significant parameter in the 
harmonisation process. Although this is still a contemporary issue, as fresh debate has 
arisen since the last financial crisis, in my opinion and based on my professional 
experience, companies experienced little effect in transforming their assets from 
historical cost to fair value estimation. Therefore, all these papers lost the opportunity 
to focus on real issues and establish a framework within which to examine core details 
relating to the application of the directives, and later IFRS, such as accounting rules 
versus professional judgment. 
 
2.1.1.3 Practical considerations in adopting directives 
Empirical researchers have provided answers to most of the previous questions. 
This section discusses the effectiveness of the directives in practice. Empirical studies 
of this period are insufficient, and most consider that these directives did not result in 
satisfactory levels of comparability and equivalence. Joos and Lang (1994) provided 
one of the first empirical analyses concerning the effects of the two accounting 
directives. They compared firms from the UK, France and Germany, concluding that 
the enactment of the directives did little to help integration of the accounting 
environment. In other words, there were no significant differences in the accounting 
data examined prior to and after the introduction of the directives, as Germany still 
had the most conservative measurement practices, in contrast to the UK, while France 
was in the middle in most cases. Another important outcome is that they did not detect 
market advantages for the UK following the implementation of TFV, despite a 
general belief that the UK would benefit from the EU’s decision to move closer to this 
philosophy. However, these outcomes have been addressed by other researchers. 
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The noteworthy point of Joos and Lang’s (1994) research is their sample selection 
and statistical process. They analysed three countries, permitting a comparison 
between two extremes and one intermediate accounting approach. This sample 
differentiation is most common even in contemporary studies, and is used in my 
research. Furthermore, as they focused on univariate analyses of financial ratios and 
stock market valuations of accounting data (Bildersee et al., 1990), they moved away 
from prevailing comparative indices and were able to focus on separate variables in 
more detail. For example, for the same sample and the same period of the 1980s, and 
using Van der Tas’s (1988) I-index as described previously, Emenyonu and Gray 
(1992) also conclude that France, Germany and the UK differed significantly in their 
performance, and thus the level of harmonisation was relatively low. But how might 
TFV valuation or consolidated accounts affect these results? Emenyonu and Gray 
(1992) failed to answer this, but Joos and Lang (1994) identified fair value and book 
tax as crucial individual harmonisation factors. 
However, there were some omissions in their statistical approach, as they 
acknowledged in their discussion. They suggested viewing some of the coefficient 
estimates with caution, as there might be cross-correlated residuals, while their 
conclusion on the comparison of the value relevance of the accounting data should 
also be treated with care, as the R-squared value is low, raising questions about the 
accuracy of their model. Further implications that may be closely related to the 
previous faults are that their study was subject to limited data availability, with no 
reliable association between returns and earnings, and a long estimation window. The 
latter may be a disadvantage in such analyses, as explained later. Finally, another 
questionable point is that they only measured two years of the post-directive period 
1988-1990, although Germany had implemented the fourth directive in 1985 (Nobes 
and Parker, 2006). 
Despite these statistical defects, they extended the role of empirical researchers, 
from assessing the general effectiveness of efforts to increase the level of accounting 
integration to the useful separate estimation of accounting measurements that might 
influence the reported data. Harris et al. (1994) extended research on the 
harmonisation level by performing similar tests, aiming to compare the value 
relevance of German GAAP with US GAAP before and after the release of the two 
directives. Consistent with Joos and Lang (1994), they found that the explanatory 
power for German firms did not increase after the new law’s introduction, but US 
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firms appear to have been privileged by the new directives. Following this route of 
analysis, some additional studies provided empirical evidence that accounting 
harmonisation had increased among EU countries since the enforcement in national 
laws (Canibano and Mora, 2000; Aisbitt, 2001). Nevertheless, this does not negate the 
results of previous papers indicating that the directives did not provide a satisfactory 
level of comparability and equivalence, as until 1994, implementation of the 
directives into national law was influenced by the national policy of each member 
state (Haller and Walton, 2000, p.37). For example, an exception in the German law 
in 1985 allowed tax-based accounting even in cases where this conflicted with TFV 
(Harris et al., 1994). 
 
2.1.2 IAS formulation 
While the EU Commission sought to increase levels of harmonisation in 
members’ accounting regimes, the IASC proceeded to compile a set of standards that 
would improve and harmonise national regimes. Although the IASC was established 
in 1973, IAS standards were not officially accepted.8 Of course, any firm could follow 
them, but it would also have to follow its own national regulations. Only Germany 
allowed IAS from 1993, while the decision that led to change is described in Section 
2.2. As a result, the lack of empirical evidence on their performance is unsurprising. 
Only Auer (1996) tried to compare the EU directives with IAS in terms of the 
dissemination of earnings information for a sample of Swiss firms that changed their 
accounting standards from Swiss GAAP to either IAS or EC directives. Although he 
found no significant result for increased abnormal returns for firms that followed IAS 
or the directives, he revealed a considerable increase in the variance of abnormal 
returns for firms that changed from local GAAP to IAS. As a result, he concluded that 
more information was available for earnings under IAS and the directives than for 
Swiss GAAP. However, his mixed outcomes may have resulted from a small sample 
size (35 companies) and a lack of accurate sample selection procedures, as IAS firms 
were much larger in market value than firms following the directives. 
                                                 
8 The original IAS, as established in 1973, were descriptive in nature and proposed many alternative 
accounting methods. Because of this flexibility, they have been heavily criticised. In response to this 
criticism, the IASC started a Comparability Project in 1987, aiming to revise the standards to make 
them more effective. They reduced alternative treatments and increased disclosure requirements 
(Nobes, 2002), resulting in adoption in 1995. 
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2.1.3 Globalisation 
Previous studies failed to consider the implications of increased globalisation for 
firms. Indeed, during the 1990s, growing competition drove EU companies to seek 
global financial and investment activities, so they were listed on US stock markets. 
Consequently, some EU countries permitted their companies under specific 
circumstances to prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with IAS or US 
GAAP rather than national rules (Mandler, 1996). Given the previous background, the 
globalisation of capital markets, and not just their harmonisation, appears to have 
been the driving force behind the regulations that needed to be established, as 
described in the next section. However, this body of literature should answer a 
number of interesting questions. Would simply adopting the accounting directives be 
enough to globalise accounting standards? Do all firms desire globalisation, and why? 
Might this internationalisation of accounting standards help with their harmonisation, 
and vice versa? 
Most researchers in this period suggested that globalisation of accounting would 
result in increased transparency and higher-quality financial measures, leading to 
increased liquidity and lower cost of capital for companies (Choi and Meek, 2005). 
However, to reach this level, better comparability of financial statements was 
essential. Choi and Levich (1990) found that more than half of their sample, including 
the investment decisions of representatives of 51 institutions from Japan, Switzerland, 
the UK, the US and Germany, were influenced by differences between national and 
international accounting standards. They preferred the security of international 
financial figures rather than home-country accounts. Therefore, firms had to increase 
their accounts’ harmonisation with accepted regimes. Harris et al.’s (1994) empirical 
research comparing US and German GAAP after the directives is particularly 
interesting. Although their results are somewhat suggestive concerning globalisation 
and have not been replicated in other studies, this study gives a first indication that the 
directives did not help firms to compete globally. 
However, two key concerns are raised in the literature with regard to IAS 
implementation. Since firms were allowed to use IAS or US GAAP only for their 
consolidated accounts, how could they deal with the additional cost of continuing to 
report under national regimes for their individual accounts? Would this reconciliation 
between consolidated accounts in IAS or US GAAP and national accounting in 
individual statements result in essential inconsistencies? In Germany, for example, 
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accounting choices regarding recognition and measurement could be treated 
independently between consolidated financial statements and individual accounts. In 
this period, only a few studies focused on this. Examination of Daimler Benz, which 
exhibited significant differences in reported earnings between German GAAP and US 
GAAP, triggered extensive discussion in ensuing years about the consequences of 
these parallel statements (Bay and Bruns, 2000). On the other hand, most researchers 
during this period focused on the differing information that could be distilled from 
different GAAPs. Some researchers found no clear evidence of statistically significant 
differences in information content between US GAAP and other regimes, yet stated 
that any reconciliation between national GAAP and US GAAP could be eliminated 
(Meek, 1991; Pope and Rees, 1993). Their recommendations seem paradoxical and 
inconsistent with all previous considerations, both in theory and in practice. The US 
authorities did not accept IFRS without reconciliations until 2006, and this is still the 
only regime allowed. 
 
2.1.4 Gaps in the first period of literature 
Overall, this period gave rise to most of the core issues and concepts addressed by 
researchers from the beginning of international accounting until the recent IFRS 
implementation considerations. Theory on harmonisation and globalisation was at a 
preliminary stage, so researchers focused on limited considerations. However, critical 
theoretical concerns were raised, and empirical studies established an appropriate 
pathway for methods that are still in use today. Of course, additional cases might have 
been examined, such as any fraudulent auditing cases after the implementation of the 
directives, but the available samples and data appear not to have offered such 
opportunities. Such issues are discussed in the next phases, as in the ensuing period it 
seems that, after the EU’s final decision to move globally and allow IAS without 
reconciliation to national GAAP, more data became available to enable researchers to 
evaluate IAS and the disadvantages or disadvantages of harmonisation. 
Finally, it should be clarified that in reviewing globalisation, I refrained from 
using the international classification tables that prevailed during this period. This 
approach was introduced by Mueller (1967), who grouped countries according to four 
distinct patterns (macroeconomic, microeconomic, independent discipline and 
uniformity of accounting) of similar reporting systems. Many researchers adopted 
similar practices and formulated their own classifications (Nobes, 1983; Nair and 
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Frank, 1980), but both in this and the following phases, I chose to separate and 
critically evaluate the literature based on real facts, such as the TFV regulation and 
better-specified systems like the Anglo-Saxon and Continental models, as described 
above. 
 
2.2 Phase II: IAS and International Accounting (1995-2003) 
2.2.1 Official acceptance of IAS 
During this phase, there was considerable pressure from global companies that 
urgently needed to transform the de facto harmonisation process in practice that had 
dominated in the previous phase, into de jure harmony, meaning common regulations 
that countries would be required to follow. The directives appear to have been 
insufficient, as they introduced a general framework for change in accounting and 
cross-border activities, but did not address the challenge in international accounting to 
create global financial integration (Schuetze, 1994; Biener, 1994; Cairns, 1994). 
Furthermore, as previously described, their efficiency in contributing to a cost-
effective, transparent and comparable financial reporting system was questioned. For 
this reason, the EC, as a regulatory body, decided to react, and in 1995 it established 
‘Accounting Harmonization: A New Strategy vis-à-vis International Harmonization’ 
(EC, 1995). This programme introduced measures that would allow listed companies 
to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IAS or US 
GAAP (Van Hulle, 1996), with no need to follow national rules. This increased its 
influence over IAS improvements, establishing an enforcement process that would 
address the needs of member states (Lopez, 2000). 
Companies were thus allowed to prepare a single set of statements, not only at the 
European level but internationally if possible (Canibano and Mora, 2000). However, 
member states reacted differently to this decision. Some countries, like Germany, 
implemented a regulation in their national laws that excluded listed companies from 
the obligation to comply with domestic regimes if they chose to follow IAS or US 
GAAP. However, other member states decided to develop national rules closely 
related to IAS, forcing their companies to follow these national rules.9 Countries that 
followed the new legislation seemed to differ from countries facilitating IAS. Most 
                                                 
9 There is a difference between harmonisation and convergence of accounting rules. In this research, 
they are considered to be equivalent; however, many insist that there are slight differences (Chandler, 
1992), as harmonisation involves a ‘leader’ and a ‘follower’. A standard setter (leader), like the IASB, 
will design accounting rules and then permit reconciliations (followers). 
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companies using IAS were from Germany and Switzerland (Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 2003), while in the UK and Ireland, voluntary adoption of IAS was 
almost non-existent (Haller, 2002; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005). This may have led to 
sample bias in the statistical calculations of papers that examined the performance of 
IAS during this period. 
However, a considerable amount of research dealt with the impact of IAS on 
financial statements, as well as moving beyond this. These studies answered several 
crucial questions following official acceptance of IAS. For example, did they provide 
evidence of better information content compared with the directives? Why was 
harmonisation necessary for Europe? Had it succeeded? Had all countries performed 
equally? As mentioned previously, the UK had different accounting priorities from 
Germany, and such inconsistency in national environments might have had serious 
economic consequences (Tang, 1994). Indeed, studies of this period revealed the 
advantages that IAS brought to the harmonisation process and other influential factors 
that they had to overcome, such as taxation, national regulations, the socio-economic 
environment and managerial behaviour (Choi and Levich, 1991). Therefore, the 
catalyst for harmonisation anticipated by international firms appears to have been 
acceptance of IAS. Following this decision, the focus of research attention moved to 
the effects of IAS implementation on levels of harmonisation (Emenyonu and Gray, 
1996; Murphy, 2000) and their appropriateness (Cairns, 1997; Flower, 1997). Of 
course, the main body of literature for this period focused on comparisons between 
IAS, US GAAP and national GAAP. 
 
2.2.2 Harmonisation effects under IAS 
On the basis of all previous information, harmonisation of accounting practices 
appears to have been essential for three key reasons: to eliminate obstacles to 
investment within the common market; to protect shareholders and investors; and 
above all to equalise conditions under which firms could reveal their financials 
truthfully, without worrying that this would weaken their position in a competitive 
environment (Flower, 1997). On the other hand, some opinions and views in the 
literature made questionable contributions to the academic dialogue. For example, 
Tang (1994) considered accounting harmonisation as resulting from pressure by 
organisations such as the IASB and countries such as the US. His analysis seems 
limited, as he unveiled no advantages to the US. Nobes (1995) rejected such 
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explanations, focusing instead on motives for the harmonisation process. 
Nevertheless, during this period, research focused on determining the advantages and 
disadvantages of harmonisation, the difficulty of this venture, and whether any 
countries managed to gain competitive advantage. 
 
2.2.2.1 Advantages of adopting harmonised standards 
A key question that arose while searching for literature on harmonisation and 
accounting standards was why should countries and/or a companies harmonise their 
regulations? Proponents of harmonisation suggested many reasons. Even during the 
previous phase, researchers had identified potential benefits for firms, mainly 
multinationals, as it would lower the cost of consolidated accounts and facilitate their 
management processes (Mason, 1978). Cecchini (1988) was the first to quantify these 
benefits, indicating that diversity in reporting and taxation between European 
countries might raise administrative expenses for global multinational companies by 
between 10 and 30 per cent. 
Although these assumptions seem commonplace today, these two studies were 
innovative at the time, and many other studies of this period confirmed their belief 
that harmonisation is necessary for the globalisation of accounting markets, and that 
standard rules are essential for companies to increase the comparability of their 
financial statements and compete worldwide. It reduces their accounting costs 
because they use the same methods of calculation for their financials in all markets in 
which they operate, simultaneously increasing transparency. They even benefit from 
cost savings, as they no longer have to translate their accounting information (Brown 
and Tarca, 2001). Consequently, potential investors are able to make decisions based 
on more accurate and comparable data (Turner, 1983; Tan, 1996). This will increase 
investors’ interest in companies, thereby improving their stock market performance. 
Therefore, by adhering to international regimes, they will gain increased access to 
credit, an important factor especially for firms that need capital (Forschle et al., 1998). 
It is essential for companies to diversify their approach to investors by not limiting 
their options to local capital markets. Indeed, through regime harmonisation, they may 
satisfy their funding needs by approaching not only foreign investors, but also 
different categories of investors, such as pension funds (Flower, 1997) and insurance 
companies. In this way, they will reduce their premium-risk investors, and thereby 
decrease their cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Saudagaran and Meek, 
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1997; Choi and Mueller, 1992). Of course, to earn interest, they need to exhibit strict 
investment plans and procedures and long-term investment strategies, adhere to legal 
restrictions and provide accurate financial information. 
These are the most important direct benefits of and motivations for harmonisation 
distilled from the literature. However, these findings were also replicated in practice, 
as my professional experience was that during this phase many firms, even smaller 
firms in weaker economies like Greece, started to take their first steps toward 
globalisation. Indeed, the harmonisation process offered them improved transparency, 
better comparability of financial reporting, and lower preparation and capital costs 
(Choi and Meek, 2005). This is important, because the perception had been that the 
financial statements of small and medium-sized enterprises were designed mainly for 
the company’s higher management (Hussey and Hussey, 1997) or for local use by 
creditors and tax authorities (Chaveau et al., 1996). However, the results of 
harmonisation should make companies consider following the accounting rules more 
closely to take advantage of and trigger interest in their financials by external users. 
Researchers also examined less direct benefits for firms that decided to change to 
international regimes. These studies focused on the operating business objectives. For 
example, Kagermann (1999) considered that harmonisation may be a means for 
companies to accomplish strategic steps. Researchers proposed that harmonisation 
bolsters sales and improves brand names, giving better access to new markets 
(Pellens, 2001). Firms may also expand their group of stakeholders by communicating 
their economic position to stakeholders other than investors, such as clients, suppliers 
and business partners (Pellens, 2001). Finally, it was argued that harmonisation may 
be beneficial to international merger transactions (Black et al., 2004), as well as 
facilitating communications with local authorities (Siepmann, 2000). 
 
2.2.2.2 Disadvantages of adopting harmonised standards 
Many considered that preparing a set of accounting figures under a single regime 
is better than having to follow more rules, as the latter may lead to deviation from the 
estimation of core assets (Haller, 2002). This argument was consistent with the 
perspective of papers in the previous phase, that financial statements which must be 
restated for other regimes lose their originality (Mueller, 1967; Choi, 1980). On the 
other hand, Barth et al. (1999) found that harmonisation is a result of interactions 
between two forces: direct informational effects, which depend on whether 
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harmonisation increases or decreases the precision of the regime, and the benefits and 
costs for foreign investors to become familiar with the harmonised standards. Because 
of this interaction, they concluded that harmonisation is not a desirable singular goal. 
This led to my realisation that these studies failed to consider another important 
question: whom do these factors benefit? Although many studies did not specifically 
say so, they appeared to be addressed to multinational companies. Thus, they seemed 
to generalise their results, forgetting to calculate and compare the increased costs for 
smaller companies following the harmonisation process. They considered all countries 
as being on a similar economic level, contrary to reality. Thus, they proved that 
harmonisation is preferred by multinational corporations and major public auditing 
firms (Cook, 1989; Choi and Levich, 1990). 
However, many insisted that all firms should take steps toward harmonisation. For 
example, McMahon (2001) sampled companies from Australia, and showed that small 
companies with high growth rates have a greater need to divulge and disseminate 
financial information. However, he failed to estimate whether the additional 
managerial and accounting expenses would make them more economically secure or 
more vulnerable. Although many thought that the need to access capital markets 
would increase the trend toward harmonisation (Taplin et al., 2002), a large body of 
later literature suggested that it was unnecessary for firms to adopt harmonised 
regulations. Since most firms disclosed information voluntarily, analysts should focus 
on the content of such information (Baginski et al., 2004). Opponents of 
harmonisation supported this notion and noted that differentiating between countries 
was necessary, as companies’ financial information was already adequate. Therefore 
any efforts to eliminate such disparities would not be cost-effective. In this context, 
studies needed to quantify the additional expenses incurred by companies and 
countries to conclude whether the costs of harmonisation outweighed the benefits, 
considering the unique circumstances of each firm and country. Therefore, Nobes’s 
(1998) identification of characteristics of countries with similar accounting needs, as 
described previously, was particularly important. 
Indeed, opponents of harmonisation adduced evidence of differentiation between 
harmonised countries. IAS, as well as other reporting systems such as US and UK 
GAAP, were considered to be capital market-oriented systems, meaning that they 
aimed to supply information to investors and were independent of tax reporting 
considerations. In contrast, the traditional accounting systems of continental Europe, 
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as used by German, French and Greek GAAP, were characterised by creditor 
protection, offering extensive information oriented toward profit distribution and tax-
reporting requirements, which was less informative for investors (Breker et al., 1999; 
Niehus and Thyll, 2000). Thus, these two systems obviously had different 
requirements, but as the new (IAS) harmonised standards had market-oriented values, 
countries like Germany might have problems depicting their financial information to 
traditional accounting users who used independent financial criteria (Goeltz, 1996). 
Consequently, after harmonisation, information asymmetry might increase in 
countries with this accounting background (Ball et al., 2000). Similarly, implementing 
an investor-oriented regime in countries where the likely users are tax authorities, 
owners and lenders may be inappropriate. Previous studies raised such concerns. For 
example, Nobes (1998) suggested that, given that auditors and accountants are 
accustomed to analysing and interpreting accounting information based on previous 
regimes, it would be difficult for them to implement something entirely different. 
These researchers approached the subject from a different angle and seemed to 
challenge the simple assumption that adopting a harmonised system would be 
advantageous and offer sufficient motivation even to companies that were used to a 
different system (Horvath and Arnaout, 1997; Kubin, 1998). 
Finally, several studies focused on whether harmonisation might lead to more 
efficient cost reduction (Street et al., 1999). In this respect, I considered whether some 
companies might have preferred not to adjust their figures, but were obliged to do so 
because of their lack of independence. For example, companies might be required to 
reconcile their accounts with those of their parent company, and developing countries 
regarded as ‘accounting colonials’ might be forced to harmonise with standards used 
by developed countries (Chandler, 1992). Many researchers suggested that, in such 
cases, firms’ financial reporting might be suboptimal if they had to follow regulations 
that were inappropriate for them (Rahman et al., 2002). For this reason, Sunder (2002) 
argued that it was better to allow firms to choose freely between compelling sets of 
regimes, rather than forcing them to apply one predetermined system. They would 
choose according to their needs, reducing their capital costs, while competition 
between systems would enhance accounting quality. Dye (2002) moved a step further 
to model the probability of the success of accounting regimes based on different 
standard setters. 
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However, these studies are only of theoretical interest, as they failed to consider 
the long-term effects and practical extensions of such proposals. They may have been 
influenced by similar studies of stock markets, such as that of Huddart et al. (1999), 
yet accounting regulations should not be compared with stock market rules. 
Companies are allowed to list their shares on any stock market they want, but it would 
be impracticable for them to choose between accounting regimes. This might result in 
opposite effects from the harmonisation process, especially for medium-sized 
companies (Larson and Street, 2004). Even Vansteeger (2005), who supports 
harmonisation, lists significant issues that must be overcome in order to harmonise 
without cost (Roberts et al., 1996; Brown and Tarca, 2001). The best way to do this is 
to focus on the empirical evidence on accounting harmonisation through IAS, as 
described in the next sections. 
 
2.2.3 IAS adoption 
This section focuses on the practical implications of IAS, as distilled from firms’ 
voluntary adoption. From the beginning of the IAS endorsement, studies aimed to 
confirm the quality of the new standards (Zarzeski, 1996). Papers from this period 
used various sample countries, which in some cases led to mixed results with limited 
evidence. Some researchers considered that financials would be more transparent 
under IAS (Ashbaugh., 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), helping companies to 
attract investors (Weibenberger, 2002). Similarly, Swiss companies (Murphy, 1999) 
under IAS had higher foreign sales and could be listed more easily on foreign 
exchanges. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) obtained similar results for various countries, and 
concluded that EU countries with a lower debt-to-equity ratio were positively 
associated with IAS adoption. On the other hand, results for German (Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2004; Bartov et al., 2004; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005) and 
Chinese (Eccher and Healy, 2003) companies provided mixed evidence on whether 
applying IAS improved accounting quality. In addition, Comprix et al., (2003) found 
little evidence of a significant market reaction to such events. Other researchers 
approached IAS adoption through analysts’ forecast errors, which they considered 
extremely important as these errors reflected the quality of accounting figures 
(Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001). Hence, in adopting IAS, which required greater 
disclosure and allowed less accounting measurement rules, analysts should be better 
prepared to predict firms’ earnings. 
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Lang and Lundholm (1996) posited that analysts’ forecast accuracy would 
improve as firms’ disclosure levels increased, and tried to find statistically reliable 
models to examine this. Although these studies considered several endogenous factors 
that might impact on analysts’ ability to predict firms’ earnings, they failed to 
estimate the measurement flexibility that remained in light of the stringency of IAS in 
this respect (Davis-Friday and Rueschoff, 1998). Furthermore, they failed to consider 
that changing accounting policies might impair analysts’ ability to estimate firms’ 
earnings (Elliott and Philbrick, 1990), while such changes might always hide earnings 
management, as described below. These studies established initial motives for future 
research, but were questioned by other analyses (Barth et al., 2005; Ashbaugh and 
Pincus, 2001) as they focused on very limited or very heterogeneous groups of firms. 
To further support this view, most studies examined a single country or stock 
exchange. Few studies compared peer groups of companies under their new reporting 
sets (Ordelheide, 1998; Auer, 1999); thus, as Pownall and Schipper (1999) noted, the 
results might vary across empirical specifications, time periods and firm samples. 
This means that the results for a country in this period might not be replicated for 
other countries, indicating that the results were not comparable and were thus 
inconclusive on IAS performance. Furthermore, some companies followed IAS 
without fulfilling all the required obligations. Street and Gray (2002) detect a 
significant number of these firms, especially cases that failed to implement the IAS 
disclosure requirements. This is another essential consideration relating to sample 
bias, as in many studies, these firms formed part of the IAS sample, but did not fully 
follow IAS. 
More recent studies solve this problem (Ball et al., 2003), but do not include in 
their results the accounting amendments released by standards setters. This is critical, 
and for this reason, research has not been conducted on individual standards. Of 
course, it is not only the sample selection that limits the reliability of estimates of the 
impact of IAS adoption; false comparisons are also problematic. For example, studies 
of Polish firms under IAS found that Poland had a traditional accounting system 
(Krzywda et al., 1995), so they compared it with other code-law countries such as 
Germany. They failed to recognise significant differences in political functions, 
history (Obloj and Kostera, 1993; Wilczynski, 1996) and accountants’ education 
(Jaruga et al., 1996). Based on such assessments, studies of this period failed to 
explain the reasons for the findings. 
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Despite their inconsistencies and regardless of the arguments for and against 
harmonisation, previous studies proved that IAS development substantially increased 
harmonisation. Thus, a key question following IAS adoption is to what extent the new 
accounting practices achieved their scope for one regime. The level of accounting 
harmonisation and the success of IAS will depend on necessary reforms aimed not 
only at reducing differences between national accounting standards and IAS, but also 
at making changes to related factors, such as the national taxation systems of each 
country. IAS have attractive qualitative characteristics, but their relevance, reliability 
and comparability must be confirmed through empirical assessments. 
Taking all these aspects into consideration, I investigated the literature further to 
identify studies of value relevance, fair value, taxation differences and elimination of 
earnings management, because accounting standards per se have little potential to 
succeed if they do not cooperate with other regulations contained within international 
accounting. These are also the most frequently examined aspects of IAS 
implementation. 
 
2.2.4 Value relevance 
This section reviews studies that examined IAS, including additional parameters 
to those of previous studies that aimed to measure the quality of harmonised regimes. 
These papers estimated quality in terms of relevance and reliability (Schippe and 
Vincent, 2003). The primary purpose of accounting is to offer a company’s 
information to the public, from investors and tax authorities to everyone interested. 
Relevant information will enable outsiders to assess a firm’s financial prospects, but it 
must be useful and reliable, accurately reflecting the company’s economic value. In 
other words, it must be value relevant. A vast body of literature has addressed the 
value relevance of IAS, making it the most examined concept of IAS and IFRS 
implementation. More than a thousand studies had referred to it by 2001 (Kothari, 
2001). However, differences between the methods and samples used to evaluate and 
compare the new standards regarding value relevance have led to mixed results once 
again. Early studies postulated the legal environment as a crucial factor in value 
relevance (LaPorta et al., 1999). Following this approach, many researchers classified 
their samples between common-law and code-law countries, and observed that the 
former performed better than the latter in relation to value relevance, on reported 
accounting numbers such as earnings (Ball et al., 2000; Guenther and Young, 2000; 
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Ali and Hwang, 2000). They justified their conclusion by suggesting that in common-
law countries managers have less flexibility in reporting financials. 
Similarly, Hung (2001) analysed a sample of firms from 21 different countries and 
found low value relevance of financial statements in countries with little shareholder 
protection. Thus, it could be concluded that Germany, as a low shareholder protection 
country, would produce information with low value relevance. Indeed, Bartov et al. 
(2005), who examined the value relevance of German GAAP, IAS and US GAAP for 
Germany’s stock exchange-listed firms, concluded that earnings were more value 
relevant under IAS than under German GAAP. They also found no difference 
between IAS and US GAAP. On the other hand, these findings are inconsistent with 
those of Hung and Subramanyam (2007), who also examined the impact of IAS 
adoption in Germany. Among other things, they also compared value relevance 
between IAS and German GAAP. For this purpose, they used a sample of firms that 
had voluntarily adopted IAS in Germany, and concluded that there was no difference 
in the value relevance of the book value of equity and earnings under IAS and 
German GAAP. Similarly, Niskanen et al. (2000) examined the value relevance of 
Finnish GAAP compared with IAS, based on earnings. Their results also indicated no 
significant increase in value relevance to either domestic or foreign investors. 
Although these studies used conventional methods, they reached different 
conclusions. However, it seems that in all cases IAS performed at least as well as 
national GAAP. This is also consistent with Daske’s (2006) finding. After using 
several stock valuation models, he failed to support a decrease in the cost of equity for 
IAS in Germany. Theory suggests that information asymmetry is positively associated 
with the cost of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lamber at al., 2007). Thus, low 
cost and low asymmetry should lead to higher value relevance. On the contrary, more 
recent studies suggest that IAS result in higher-quality financials than local GAAP 
(Barth et al., 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) but not US GAAP. Although, as 
previously described, Bartov et al. (2005) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that 
both sets of standards provide similar information asymmetries, and are thus of equal 
value relevance, Harris and Muller (1999) and Barth et al. (2005, 2006) argue that 
accounting reports under US GAAP are more value relevant than under IAS. 
Nevertheless, consistent with a KPMG survey, Leuz (2003) claims that firms, 
especially those interested in raising their funding prospects, will prefer to follow US 
GAAP. 
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As noted previously, some studies based their results on examining the 
relationship between financial statements and capital markets. These are known as 
capital market studies, and they mainly investigated earnings response coefficients, 
including market efficiency tests and analysts’ forecasts (Kothari, 2001). Other 
studies examined the relationship between specific accounting figures and equity 
market values, aiming to predict a significant relationship between the two. 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) categorise these studies into three types,10 but their 
critical review is more important, as they were the first to critically assess the body of 
value relevant literature. In brief, they consider that such studies failed to specify the 
individuals for whom the information is value relevant, and employed stock prices for 
their models, which shaped the accuracy of the results, as stock prices are affected by 
factors other than accounting information (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Sloan, 1999). 
In relation to their first point, it is important for studies to refer to whom the 
accounting standards will be value relevant, such as investors or authorities, because 
each need different information, but the accounting framework is specific. Few 
researchers have considered this. An exception is Niskanen et al. (2000), who divided 
investors into external and internal to consider their different needs. Relating to 
Holthausen and Watts’s (2001) second critical point, as previously described, they 
considered that stock prices represent the aggregation of individual investors’ 
valuations. Thus, they did not consider each individual investor, and could not reflect 
on accounting amounts, as the prices were affected by other factors. Although in some 
cases stock prices fail to depict a company’s fair value, they do not appear to have 
considered the ease of information transactions within the stock market and earnings 
management. The first grants every single interesting part of accounting information 
access to market prices. Furthermore, the stock market has two privileged advantages 
that I have experienced. It can adjust its prices in seconds by combining large 
amounts of information, which accounting cannot do, and it can be manipulated only 
                                                 
10 Holthausen and Watts’s (2001) three types of value-relevant research are: (a) relative association 
studies researching the association between market values or changes and financial reporting numbers 
for different GAAP over long estimation windows (e.g. Beaver and Dukes, 1972; Harris and Ohlson, 
1987; Vincent, 1999; Bartov et al., 2005; these studies are also referred to in the literature as direct 
valuation studies); (b) incremental association studies that investigate individual financial statement 
numbers to explain market capitalisations or changes thereto, along with other financial values over 
long windows (e.g. Barth, 1991, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; Choi et al., 1997; Ayers, 
1998); and (c) marginal information studies that explore the association between prices and abnormal 
market capitalisation changes over short estimation windows, usually around the date when the 
financial reporting data are published (Auer, 1996). 
 61 
for a short period, as there are many adjustment mechanisms. In contrast, through 
earnings management techniques, financials may be misleading for years. Consider, 
for example, the Globo case described in Chapter 1, where it was the stock price that 
revealed the truth to authorities, managers and everyone else. In this case, financial 
statements revealed nothing, but the stock price was value relevant for all. In this 
respect, in my opinion, the stock price proxy for value-relevant evaluation is a prudent 
benchmark that captures all public value-relevant information. 
The literature review also raised methodological issues in some studies, with the 
sample being the most common. For example, Bartov et al. (2005) excluded loss-
making firm observations from their estimations, whereas Hung and Subramanyam 
(2007) included them in their study. However, the latter limited their examination to 
only a year before IAS adoption, whereas Bartov et al.’s sample (2005) was more 
extensive and included all German listed firms from 1990 to 2000. On the other hand, 
while these two studies focused on German companies to observe the effects of IAS 
adoption, Barth et al.’s (2005) analysis included a broader set of countries. 
Researchers should also pay close attention to variables and model selections. 
Most studies use the Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and 
Ohlson, 1995) to regress book values and net income with price or returns (changes in 
prices). Many insist that price specification is better than returns specification 
(Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995), but the crucial point is for researchers to stipulate 
that the share price is linear with earnings and equity book value, given a dividend 
valuation model and clean surplus accounting (Ohlson, 1991). Thus, any omission in 
the accounting or market variables may raise questions about the linearity of their 
relationship and lead to mis-specified models. This may explain the failure of book 
value in Bartov et al.’s (2005) regression model. They needed to adjust their models 
to take into account the accounting measure, and country-level specific factors that 
might affect their results (Sun, 2006), as pricing mechanisms and the information 
environment differ across firms and countries (Bushman et al., 2004). Overall, value 
relevance appears to be an essential concept for IAS, and has been extensively 
debated and examined. 
 
2.2.5 Fair value 
The fair value orientation of IAS means that companies must re-evaluate their 
assets based on their market value rather than their historical cost. Appendix I, Table 
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5 describes the individual standards that are subject to fair value. The rationale for the 
fair value concept is to increase the reliability of financial statements. It estimates that 
assessing a firm’s assets at market value gives all the company’s interested parties a 
clearer view of the company’s financials. Thus, it is another means for IAS to increase 
value relevance and eliminate earnings management. The greatest change is that, in 
most cases, any difference between the residual value (the asset value after 
depreciation, if any is applicable) and the market value must be transferred into equity 
as a loss (impairment) or gain (impairment reversal). Thus, it has a direct effect on 
firms’ equity, whereas in the past this process involved profit and loss statements. In 
other words, firms under fair value are more vulnerable to changes in the market 
value of assets, which may easily change the companies’ evaluation and value. This 
fact, along with other changes introduced by IAS/IFRS such as the introduction of a 
discrete category for investment assets that are not subject to depreciation, set the 
framework for a fair value orientation. 
It appears that IAS was not the first regime to adopt this method. US GAAP had 
already followed the fair value option. The results were not promising, as the market 
had not responded as expected (Beatty et al., 1996). Abad et al. (2000) and Niskanen 
et al. (1998) argued that fair-value consolidated financial statements are more value-
relevant than individual statements. Furthermore, Eccher et al.’s (1996) examination 
of the banking sector in the US found that only fair value disclosures for investment 
securities are value-relevant. Several studies also focused on IAS, examining the 
value-relevance of fair value disclosures. Barth (1994) was the first to provide 
evidence of this. She tested how share prices reflect historical costs and fair values of 
assets and compared the results. She provided evidence that fair values of banks’ 
investment securities was relevant and reliable for investors, offering more 
informational content than historical costs. However, she also found that a 
combination of two annual fair-value estimates used to calculate securities gains and 
losses was value-irrelevant. In a later study, Barth et al. (1996) provided more 
information and stated that the fair values of loans, securities and long-term debt were 
all of incremental value-relevance over notional estimations. Venkatachalam (1996) 
added that derivatives also have incremental explanatory power for book values, 
while Nelson (1996) stated that only fair values of investment securities are value-
relevant. It is thus obvious that fair value may enhance the accuracy of information, as 
it provides an option for timely information. However, it is too soon to draw safe 
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conclusions. Future researchers must determine whether market prices objectively 
depict assets’ value or may be materially influenced by managers. Moreover, they 
should observe the volatility that is always introduced when firms change from mark-
to-model to mark-to-market methods, and estimate the effect of fair value on equity 
gains or losses. 
 
2.2.6 Taxation 
One of the greatest concerns in the harmonisation process were differences in 
taxation between countries. In some countries, this was so important that it overrode 
even fair value in the new accounting standards (Kosmala-MacLullich, 2003). Nobes 
and Schwencke (2006) suggest that many studies examined the connection between 
tax and financial reporting (p.64), and it appears that most writers in this period 
considered the connection between taxation and accounting to be strong (Doupnik and 
Salter, 1995; Choi et al., 2002; Radebaugh and Gray, 2002). Although some argued 
that this influence had reduced over time (Kinserdal, 1995), no specific details were 
provided. However, the literature does not give common assessments of tax reporting 
linkages. Many studies considered that there was the need to contrast financial 
reporting systems, as they were responsible for the differences (Roberts, 1995), 
whereas others considered financial reporting differences to be a cause of tax 
differentiation (Nobes, 1998). Hoogendoorn (1996) was one of the first to summarise 
the results from 13 European countries, but his examination conflated additional 
issues with tax reporting connections, so it is difficult to interpret his results. On the 
other hand, Lamb et al. (1998) revealed that some countries’ financial reporting may 
be less tax-influenced than others. They argued that UK and US financial reporting is 
less tax-influenced than German reporting, whereas the French position lies in the 
middle. Their sample consisted of four countries, which was sufficient since their 
research followed the classification between common- and code-law countries. The 
UK and the US are normally presented as countries that have a low connection 
between taxation and accounting regimes, as they intend mainly to provide useful 
information to investors. Consequently, in these countries, tax rules never prevail over 
financial reporting, contrary to countries such as Germany where, as previously 
mentioned, tax information dominates (Haller, 1992; Nobes, 1998). A key question 
relates to the nature of the framework under IAS. Early indications considered that, as 
IAS follow the same route as US GAAP and the old UK regime, they would have less 
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connection with tax regulation. For example, Germany displayed weak tax correlation 
for its firms’ consolidated reports using IAS (Haller, 1992). 
On the other hand, accounting and stock market practitioners know that the 
operational connection between tax and financial reporting is overwhelming, even in 
cases where it is reduced. Indeed, following IAS adoption, countries retained their 
national tax sovereignty, leading to significant disharmony. This calls the 
harmonisation process into question, as it creates imperfect competition for firms and 
contagion effects for accounting standards. An indicative example is deferred taxes. 
In most cases, financial income is different from tax income. For example, in Greece, 
tax authorities have their own depreciation proportion that firms must follow, contrary 
to IFRS which allows greater elasticity. Consequently, depreciation affects earnings, 
and thus there is a tax-base difference. This is known as deferred taxes and results 
from the need for book-tax conformity. This is a crucial matter that still affects 
companies, especially in the banking sector. Deferred taxes exist under all regimes, 
but IAS, as well as US GAAP, eliminate tax conformity and increase deferred tax. 
This is why deferred tax is the most frequently adjusted item in transitioning from 
German GAAP to IAS (Hung and Subramanyam, 2007). 
Therefore, studies needed to investigate whether this differentiation might 
increase companies’ motivation to engage in earnings management. Few studies 
focused on this. Healy and Wahlen (1999) reviewed studies by Visvanathan (1998), 
Miller and Skinner (1998) and Ayers (1998), and concluded (pp.13-14) that there was 
little evidence of a correlation between earnings management and deferred taxes. 
They also criticised these studies for not combining their analysis with circumstances 
that might increase the need for earnings management, such as analysts’ forecasts. 
However, in my opinion, if they had addressed these issues, the results would still not 
have indicated a direct correlation between taxation and income-smoothing activities. 
Other studies for this period denoted that the higher the link between regimes and 
taxes, the lower the quality of accounting standards (Guenther and Young, 2000). 
As a practitioner, the approaches of these studies appear to have been 
oversimplified, and therefore failed to consider two significant motives. First, without 
going into technical details, differentiating between the book value of the carrying 
amount and the tax basis may create deferred tax assets or liabilities. This may help 
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companies that need to increase their assets, so may be subject to manipulation.11 
Thus, I concur with recent findings that tax compliance reduces earnings management 
(Haw et al., 2004). Furthermore, tax rates differ between countries. Companies that 
have equal accounting earnings but have to pay more tax may lose their competitive 
advantage in a common market. Consequently, a high tax rate is a motive for 
companies to hide their profits in financial reporting, even if they have to manage 
their earnings (Burgstahler et al., 2007). This may impact on companies’ resource 
allocations and may result in different preferences for dividend distributions (Hietala 
and Keloharju, 1995), with knock-on effects on investors. Therefore, I would be 
cautious about stating that taxation is not related to earnings smoothing. 
 
2.2.7 Earnings management 
Since the global accounting scandals, an increasing volume of literature has 
focused on earnings management. Earnings management is intentional interference 
with financial reports to obtain some private gain (Schipper, 1989). Of course, 
changing a company’s financials requires access and motive. According to Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), managers usually use their positions to alter financial reports and 
transactions, aiming to bring about the desired level of reported earnings and mislead 
stakeholders and/or shareholders about the company’s economic performance. 
Therefore, it is easily inferred that earnings management is a form of fraud and has 
nothing to do with reporting errors. The term is not new, and was first used 
extensively in studies of US companies, notably that of Jones (1991). By developing a 
discretionary accruals model to measure earnings management, she proved that 
companies had strong incentives to reduce their earnings during import relief 
investigations. 
She confirmed a correlation between discretionary accounting accruals and 
influenced reported earnings, and thus a correlation between discretionary accounting 
                                                 
11 An example is the banking sector during the crisis. Deferred tax assets (DTA) are instruments that 
may be used by a company to reduce the amount of future tax obligations. Although this is normally 
contingent only on future profits, many countries took advantage of this regulation to increase the 
capital of their banking institutes and comply with the capital requirement regulations (CRR) of the 
Basel Accord. Based on their national tax regulations, they transformed DTA into deferred tax credits 
(DTC), which are not contingent only on future profits, but count as capital regardless of whether the 
firm reports a profit or a loss. As a result, many participants asked for further clarification concerning 
their actions (e.g. https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/ernstyoung.pdf). At the same time, this appears to 




accruals and earnings management. Her models and methods were referenced in many 
subsequent studies, and are still used by many researchers as an indication of earnings 
quality (Dechow et al., 2010). Many later papers confirmed this managerial drift 
toward using earnings manipulation in cases where they sought to disorient 
stakeholders. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997b) confirmed the use of earnings 
management by firms that aimed to avoid publishing earnings decreases or small 
losses. Another interesting observation was documented by Teoh et al. (1998a, 
1998b), who reported that before events for which companies need funding, such as 
IPOs or SEOs,12 earnings management increases. The most remarkable point in these 
studies is not the earnings management results, but Jones’s (1991) changes to the 
statistical modelling of earnings management. 
In this vein, research on accruals grew significantly, and almost all studies focused 
on earnings management following Jones’s (1991) model or a variation of it. At the 
same time, many researchers started to determine whether IAS were associated with 
higher or lower earnings management by examining managers’ behaviour in 
Australia, Europe and other countries. This is an important concept for IAS/IFRS that 
has practical considerations and extensions (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). The first 
indications from the literature were again mixed. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005) argued that German companies exhibited the same earnings management 
behaviour after IAS adoption. In contrast, Barth et al. (2006) found that firms under 
IAS exhibited more discretionary accruals and a lower correlation between accruals 
and cash flows. However, Van Tendello and Vanstraelen’s (2005) empirical tests 
should be interpreted with caution, because they considered only 636 firm-year 
observations from 1999 to 2001, and re-evaluated fixed assets under IAS to employ 
an accruals model based on Jones (1991). This may have introduced measurement 
errors (Aboody et al., 1999). Thus, once again, it may have been too early for IAS to 
provide high-quality accounting information, and the absence of other determinants, 
such as legal enforcement, investor protection regulations and countries’ different 
cultural environments (Leuz et al., 2003; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007), may 
have been crucial factors. 
As an accountant, I had had to deal with many management cases, and in this 
study, I aimed to examine other methods of earnings management on which the global 
                                                 
12 An IPO is an initial public offering of shares before the company enters a stock market, and an SEO 
is a seasoned or secondary equity offering that increases the company’s capital. 
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literature has not yet shed light, as described in the next phase. First, the literature 
needs to provide answers to how managers succeed in their intentions and what are 
the motives behind their decisions. Concerning the first question, the literature 
provides little detail. However, in practice, earnings management involves an increase 
or decrease in revenues and earnings. In their review of the earnings management 
literature, Healy and Wahlen (1999) summarised the most important techniques that 
managers can use to exercise judgment and influence reported earnings, whether or 
not based on specific accounting methods. Such cases depicted in companies’ 
financials may involve future estimations of pension and employment benefits, as 
well as other economic events, the salvage values of long-term assets, their expected 
life, depreciation methods and impairments, inventory cost methods, and factors other 
than accounting processes, such as suspicious partnerships or subsidiary creations. 
Therefore, managers have many tools to manipulate their earnings according to their 
needs. However, the literature focused mainly on motivations for earnings 
management. 
A growing body of literature focused on such motives, including the need to meet 
company forecasts (Kasznik, 1999) or analyst forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 
1998) to avoid debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), to maximise 
their bonuses (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), to increase their companies’ market 
performance (Graham et al., 2005), or to protect the company’s ownership (Perry and 
Williams, 1994). Finally, some researchers focused on earnings management 
procedures arising from political costs (Maydew, 1997; Han and Wang, 1998) and 
takeover and merger settings. Most studies prior to IAS adoption focused on this last 
category, and very few on the post-implementation period. Combining information 
from the reviews by Koumanakos et al. (2005) and Healy and Wahlen (1999), most 
such studies appear to have concluded that, prior to the announcement of a takeover 
attempt, managers are more likely to engage in income-increasing accounting 
methods (North and O’Connel, 2002; Louis, 2004). However, other researchers failed 
to support this evidence, including Eddey and Taylor’s (1999) examination of a 
sample of 43 takeovers of Australian companies, and Erickson and Wang’s (1999) 
focus on specific industries in other countries. Aspects meriting further discussion are 
considered in the next sub-sections. 
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2.2.7.1 Capital market motivations and analysts’ forecasts 
The literature suggests that managers may engage in earnings management to 
influence short-term stock price performance, and consider what would create 
earnings for the company and how it might do this. As discussed previously, an 
increase in market value has many advantages, especially in cases around capital 
market events, such as buyouts, equity offers and IPOs. In such cases, managers 
overstate or underestimate earnings to meet their purposes, using various methods 
(Dye, 1988). However, studies of this period failed to provide compelling evidence of 
financial accounts being managed. Only a few researchers, such as Teoh et al. (1998), 
found that companies followed depreciation and debt allowance policies that would 
affect the firm’s income during the IPO year and for several subsequent years. 
Nevertheless, many questions have been raised about these authors’ sample selection, 
as it seemed to maximise the likelihood of detecting earnings management. Other 
studies focused on banking and insurance companies, examining cases that might 
relate to critical assets and liabilities. A number of them detected that loan loss 
reserves for banks depended on management judgment, and thus could be used for 
earnings management purposes. However, other studies found no strong evidence to 
support this view (Collins et al., 1995; Liu et al., 1997). On the other hand, studies 
that examined casualty insurance loss reserves found evidence of earnings 
management, but were unclear whether this was intended to affect stock market 
performance (Petroni and Wahlen, 1995). Closely related to market performance are 
analysts’ predictions, which many studies used to evaluate the quality of IAS. 
However, this seems also to be a motivation for earnings management. Early studies 
failed to find a significant correlation between future returns and analysts’ forecasts 
(Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992), but in my working experience, whenever a company 
announces earnings that meet or surpass analysts’ consensus estimates, its market 
performance increases. 
Indeed, Bartov et al. (2002) found that such firms produce higher stock returns, 
around three per cent higher over the quarter than similar firms that fail to meet 
analysts’ estimations. Therefore, companies are under huge pressure to meet these 
expectations, even if they have to proceed to earnings management (Schonfeld, 1998). 
Several studies confirmed this opinion and produced evidence that many firms would 
use accruals to increase their earnings if they were in danger of failing to meet 
analysts’ financial forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Bushee, 1998; Kasznik, 
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1999). On the other hand, many considered earnings management to be of no use 
under any case, as they questioned the characteristics and accuracy of analysts’ 
estimates. Abarbanell and Bushee (1998), aiming to expand Penman’s (1991) study, 
concluded that analysts are unable to depict all financial statement information in their 
reports. Of course, this is natural, as analysts cannot access companies’ financials; but 
it remains a disadvantage because investors may thus not fully utilise the reflections 
in their reports (Elgers at al., 2003). However, there are indications that earnings 
manipulation may lead to contrary results. For example, in studies surrounding equity 
issues, as described previously, firms with income-smoothing activities, 
underperformed (Teoh et al., 1998b). It seems, therefore, that earnings management 
relates to stock market performance, since by increasing their earnings, companies 
may attract investors and improve their market performance. However, no evidence 
has been found for the opposite effect, where managers might speculate on market 
prices and thus improve a company’s financials. 
 
2.2.7.2 Contractual motivations 
Theory distinguishes two contractual cases that may attract earnings management 
procedures: managers’ compensation and debt covenants. Both provide a fertile 
ground for research. Indeed, several studies have examined executives’ compensation 
contracts to identify potential earnings management incentives. In most cases, 
managers tend to be awarded extra bonuses based on reported earnings. The literature 
suggests that managers are likely to manipulate companies’ income when earnings 
targets have not been met, in order to achieve the maximum permitted bonuses (Hand 
and Skantz, 1998). 
Although Gaver et al. (1995) considered that these results might be 
methodological effects of the studies, Holthausen et al. (1995) moved a step further to 
discover that it is crucial for managers to remain between the lower and upper bounds 
designed by the bonus plan. Thus, they showed that firms with an upper limit on 
bonus awards are more likely to use earnings management so as not to exceed the 
bonus cap than firms with no bonus limit. Nevertheless, these studies provided no 
evidence on which accruals are most likely to be managed. More recent studies of this 
period confirmed this correlation between earnings management and bonuses, as they 
argued that executives behave in this way in order to improve their reputation, career 
prospects and job security (Shuto, 2007). With regard to debt contracts, theory 
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suggests that, in order to avoid this violation, firms manipulate their financials. I avoid 
referring to dividend contracts because older studies argued that companies prefer 
simply to meet the dividend constraint by cutting dividends rather than using accruals 
(DeAngelo et al., 1992). However, debt is a crucial factor in a firm’s performance, 
while violation may result in several negative issues. It will increase volatility in 
accounting measures and ratios, such as liquidity, worsening the firm’s economic 
position and possibly even leading to bankruptcy (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994). In addition, it will result in the firm finding it more difficult to obtain 
financing, which will be subject to more burdensome terms (Doukas et al., 2005), and 
it will also send a negative signal of corporate performance, affecting both the 
company’s stock behaviour and managers’ reputation (Holthausen et al., 1995). 
The literature implies that firms have huge incentives for avoiding violation of a 
lending contract, including through earnings management. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) and Sweeney (1994) examined a sample of firms that had violated their debt 
covenants. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) stated that firms smoothed their earnings 
one year prior to the violation, whereas Sweeney (1994) found that firms increased 
their income only after the violation. Many consider this evidence to be mixed, but in 
my professional experience, managers tend to engage in earnings management long 
before the violation if the firm has experienced a recent financial difficulty or is close 
to doing so. In this case, Sweeney (1994) examined the companies’ intentions to 
reduce the likelihood of future covenant violations (Fields et al., 2001) and not to 
avoid defaulting on the previous violation. She also found that the frequency of using 
earnings management for loan reasons was low in a random sample, but this was a 
generalisation, as she focused only on firms that had violated loan covenants. 
It seems, therefore, that lending contracts are a crucial factor, as an increasing 
number of studies consider that the leading economic function of financial reporting 
should be to facilitate creditors (Ball, 2006). Creditors not only pay great attention to 
accounting numbers, but have also started to implement additional control methods to 
counteract managerial incentives to manipulate their reports. More specifically, they 
are moving beyond traditional ways of measuring a firm’s health and viability. 
Bankers tend to require more guarantees for loans, excluding intangibles and 
including goodwill from the net asset base of corporate borrowers (Day and Taylor, 
1997). Citron (1992) and Moir (2001) provided evidence from the UK, arguing that in 
order to reduce any earnings management effects, creditors require information in 
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addition to balance sheet numbers, such as profit and loss accounts and cash flow 
statements. 
 
2.2.7.3 Regulatory motivations and auditors 
The final category of motives for earnings management distilled from this 
literature review relates to regulatory motivations and auditors. One of the most 
important industry regulations that all countries maintain is a minimum capital 
requirement for a firm to operate in a market. Many companies that are close to this 
limit and aiming to avoid authorities’ inspections may smooth their accounting 
numbers. Therefore, there is considerable evidence that, in such cases, firms engage in 
earnings management to keep their equity above the nominal limit (Beatty et al., 
1995; Adiel, 1996). In this way, they avoid legal procedures such as capital increases, 
but also shun auditors. On the other hand, studies of this period failed to answer 
whether regulatory motives for earnings management might be widespread in other 
companies as well, because the number of firms sampled in their research was 
relatively small, limiting the applicability of their results. 
Furthermore, apart from public authorities, companies are obliged to have their 
financials examined by auditors, who reduce the probability of firms mis-stating their 
financials. Any deviation from the rules to avoid lower capital limits will be detected 
by the firms’ auditors. Failure to do so indicates that the auditors are too lenient, or 
lack knowledge and training. Studies of this phase categorised auditors based on their 
reputation and size (Big 4 and non-Big 4) to examine the extent to which constraints 
on earnings management are a measure of audit quality. In this respect, most studies 
claimed that Big 4 companies constrain earnings management (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001). 
However, these studies did not consider whether existing regulations on forensic 
accounting were sufficiently strong to control firms under IAS, and whether auditors 
were sufficiently well trained to deal with the new regimes. 
 
2.2.8 Gaps in the second period of literature 
In this body of literature, a plethora of studies evaluated IAS following their 
official acceptance. This review has sought to address the main issues in each area of 
focus. Previous literature has found mixed results on the effectiveness of IAS, but in 
general, there is a reduction in information asymmetry, lower earnings management, 
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lower costs of capital and lower forecast errors compared with national GAAP. 
However, most studies examined only a sample of firms or countries, so their results 
must be combined with additional information in order to draw useful conclusions. 
Therefore, if a study provides evidence that IAS are more value-relevant for a country 
than old GAAP, and at the same time another study indicates that for the same period 
this country increased its earnings management, it can be inferred that the 
effectiveness of the new standard is questionable, as earnings management goes 
against the value relevance concept. 
However, what appears to be lacking is any explanation of how IAS may 
overcome any harmonisation deficits attributable to this correlation in real time. Some 
business parties have privileged information over others, and this information 
asymmetry may be used for earnings management purposes. However, from my 
experience as a practitioner in this field, when companies are obliged to publish their 
financials, this information favours insiders. Thus, even if authorities subsequently 
detect such cases, time will already have passed. This is a considerable issue that has 
many implications, but no studies have been identified that examine these issues. 
They need to retrospectively examine financials two or more years before, and of 
course focus on an event window around the announcement. On the other hand, this 
requires a large amount of information that in some cases cannot be accessed. 
Detecting earnings management is never easy. 
The review of this phase of the literature suggests that there were several 
important considerations following IAS introduction that needed to be examined, 
which unfortunately have yet to be observed in the third phase. Overall, the next 
phase offers opportunities to identify whether concerns about IAS have been 
transferred to IFRS. 
 
2.3 Phase III: Official IFRS Implementation (2004 onwards) 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, from 2005 under EC Regulation No 1606/2002, all 
listed firms in the EU were required to formulate their financials under IFRS. Europe 
thus aimed to establish a single set of financial reports for all public companies, 
hoping to improve the quality, comparability and transparency of financial statements 
(Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). The IFRS values resulted from the previous IAS 
standards, with several amendments and new inputs (Appendix I, Table 6). Along 
with the EU, other countries such as Australia also required their listed firms to report 
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under IFRS from 2005. In addition, many countries, including Japan, were positive 
about adopting IFRS in the future, while the US established a convergence plan with 
IFRS, as described in the next sub-sections. This justifies the fact that most studies 
have focused on the EU, Australia and the US. 
This appears to have been a complicated process, although it might have been 
expected that countries would have been well-prepared as a result of the previous IAS 
implementation. However, they still had to overcome considerable problems, 
including technical difficulties (Sucher and Alexander, 2002), statement effects and 
compliance under the new enforcement and regulations. This review focuses not on 
technical details but on the statement and market effects of IFRS under several 
conditions. Following Soderstrom and Sun’s (2007) conclusions and based on the 
previous literature of Phase II, it was expected that IFRS introduction would be a 
positive step for global accounting. However, these earlier studies showed increasing 
debate between academics over the efficiency of IAS, while they lacked significant 
samples, as only 15 per cent of EU companies had adopted IAS by 2002 (PwC, 2002). 
Official adoption opened up the potential for more interesting and accurate research 
results, as the samples would consist of all listed firms. Therefore, the literature 
review in this phase seeks to establish whether IFRS managed to overcome these 
complications. 
 
2.3.1 General findings after official adoption 
Following official IFRS adoption, most studies have focused on the effects of 
IFRS, aiming to compare them with the old national GAAP. Using the same accepted 
tests as in the previous period, enhanced with more countries and more recent years of 
reference, these studies offer interesting information about the effects of IFRS 
implementation. Most focus on Europe, examining differences in performance 
between European countries following IFRS introduction, but taking different 
approaches. Many examine a single country. Aisbitt (2006) indicates that there has 
been no difference in equity between UK GAAP and IFRS for bigger UK companies. 
Similarly, Christensen et al. (2007) state that IFRS adoption has not benefited all UK 
companies, while Horton and Serafeim (2006) confirm Aisbitt’s (2006) finding in 
concluding that IFRS adoption is value-relevant for earnings but not for equity. These 
studies seem to separate their samples in the same way, leading to common 
conclusions. For example, Horton and Serafeim (2006) only examine 85 companies 
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listed in the UK with high capitalisation. One difference is that most studies consider 
the average impact of their examined measures, while Aisbitt (2006) also considers 
the individual performance of her measures, such as retirement benefit obligations and 
PPE. This reveals differences between IFRS and UK GAAP. 
Similarly, Spanish listed companies seem not to have experienced considerable 
improvements in their reporting after IFRS (Callao et al., 2007), while in some 
countries there seem to be considerable transaction costs that may affect companies’ 
performance (De Jong et al., 2006). On the other hand, Cordazzo (2008) states that 
IFRS adoption has been positive for earnings and capital for Italian listed firms, and 
Cordeiro et al. (2007) argue that, in general, under IFRS Portuguese firms have 
improved their financials, mainly due to the effects of fair value. However, the latter 
only examined 39 industrial companies, making generalisation risky. In all cases, 
researchers focus mainly on equity and earnings, two of the most indicative and 
important accounting financials on which all market professionals focus. They 
provide indications of the performance of IFRS during the mandatory adoption, but 
only reveal average stock market effects, whereas the results reveal many variations 
between countries. 
For this reason, other studies focus on sets of countries, enabling them to better 
describe any homogeneity or heterogeneity resulting from the introduction of IFRS. 
For this reason, some researchers enhance their classification criteria to examine 
countries that have adopted IFRS (e.g. Leuz, 2010; Nobes, 2008, 2011; Sellhorn and 
Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). O’Connell and Sullivan (2008) analyse a group of firms 
listed in the FTS EuroFirst 80 index. They focus on this index as it includes the 
biggest companies in Europe, while they exclude UK and Irish companies as they 
aimed to analyse the remaining countries as members of Continental Europe with 
common previous accounting values. Their study demonstrates an increase in net 
income, but no significant impact of IFRS. Furthermore, their sample also includes 
banking companies which, as revealed in the previous phases, may affect the results. 
Similarly, Ferrer et al. (2008) analyse the impact of IFRS adoption for a set of 11 
European countries. They include both code-law and common-law countries, and 
conclude that IFRS had a material impact in the UK, Ireland, Sweden, France and 
Spain, relating mainly to fixed and current assets, short-term liabilities and earnings. 
Daske et al.’s (2008) study of IFRS adoption focuses on a sample of 26 countries 
globally. This study reports interesting results and makes significant contributions. 
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They find that IFRS adopters increase their market liquidity, but the results for a 
decrease in their cost of capital are unclear. However, they believe that both outcomes 
cannot have resulted only from IFRS adoption per se, but that additional enforcement 
may have had an effect. They show that both liquidity and cost of capital improved in 
countries with strong legal systems. Thus, they conclude that firms’ reporting quality 
is a result of many factors, and that one of the biggest factors is the institutional 
system of the country adopting IFRS. This conclusion was also reached by studies in 
the previous phase, as well as by Jackson and Roe (2009) who refer to a positive 
correlation between strong enforcement and market performance. In addition, Byard 
et al. (2011) state that the legal system influences analysts’ forecast errors, and claim 
that earnings disclosures provide better information under IFRS for countries that 
have strong legal systems. Similarly, Horton et al. (2013) state that analysts’ forecasts 
have improved under IFRS, but their results may have been affected by the industry 
and country on which they focus in their analysis. It seems, therefore, that although 
IFRS values are common, their implementation differs according to the legal 
framework of each country. This may partially explain the heterogeneity of results 
exhibited following IFRS adoption (Christensen et al., 2013). 
Most studies of this period show continuity with the previous phase. In fact, in 
examining IFRS performance, most papers in this phase follow the statistical and 
empirical methods of analysis previously described, and the data samples are similar 
to the IAS phase. Most researchers have sought to determine the effects and 
performance of firms under IFRS compared with old GAAP, and to correlate specific 
accounting values to examine fair value, cost of capital, value relevance and earnings 
management, in order to determine the level of categorisation and harmonisation 
following official adoption. These core issues were also analysed under IAS, and the 
same mixed results are observed under IFRS. Of course, this does not mean that the 
literature following IFRS adoption concentrates exclusively on these issues. Indeed, 
researchers have broadened their sample target to consider, for example, developing 
countries and IFRS adoption (Lasmin, 2011; Ismail et al., 2013; Suadiye, 2017) and 
countries adopting IFRS for the first time, such as Canada (Khan et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, there is a growing consensus on the need to determine the effects of 
a common accounting framework on unlisted firms, as distilled from the work of 
Mantzari et al. (2017) for Greek unlisted firms and Devi and Samujh (2015) for small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Their conclusions are highly significant, depicting an 
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evolution of global accounting theory, as they use methodologies other than statistical 
models, and provide additional samples. However, such cases provide only early 
indications, so satisfactory data are not yet available. In this case, unlisted firms in 
Greece have been required to follow IFRS since 2015. Therefore, their performance 
cannot be compared with that of listed or unlisted firms from other countries that have 
yet to embody IFRS values in their national regimes. For this reason, such samples 
were excluded from my project. Furthermore, reviewing the literature on developing 
countries or countries that have not officially followed IFRS would result in 
estimations rather than accurate conclusions about the effectiveness of IFRS adoption. 
For this reason, and since my project relies on this phase of the literature review, I 
concentrated on studies closely related to my research. In this respect, I reviewed 
papers that examine the association between IFRS and accounting quality and 
investigate specific incentives and tools between financials and accounting quality. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous sections, accounting quality and accuracy 
may be evaluated using several interchangeable methods, such as earnings 
management, so I chose to concentrate on the incentives for this measure, and how it 
might affect quality following IFRS adoption. As already mentioned, the higher the 
level of earnings management, the lower the quality. Furthermore, potential earnings 
management cases were the first that I examined in my professional work. 
Consequently, through this review, I was able to address all streams of the literature, 
while considering one of the most interesting issues most closely related to my project 
and my professional career. This enabled me to better detect how IFRS studies have 
evolved compared with IAS, to determine whether they have used the same methods, 
to combine their results, and finally, as they relate closely to my research, to better 
detect any gaps in the literature. As a result, this review concentrates on the impact of 
IFRS transition on listed companies, as depicted by earnings management, its 
implementation effects in the US, and its correspondence with the crisis. 
 
2.3.2 Earnings management under IFRS: Early indications 
In several countries, firms had already been applying IFRS voluntarily before 
2005, always in compliance with their national regulations. For example, the Greek 
government allowed IFRS for listed firms from 2003 onwards. Therefore, this section 
reviews cases of early adoption to detect any economic consequences for firms that 
adopted IFRS earlier, as they may provide some first insights into the effect of the 
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obligatory transition. In this period, early or voluntary adopters refer to IFRS 
adopters. These firms differ from the voluntary adopters examined in the previous 
phase in relation to IAS adoption. Nevertheless, studies of IFRS early adopters are 
limited for two reasons. First, most researchers exclude them to avoid sample bias. 
Second, few studies focus purely on early adoption of IFRS, as most refer to early 
IFRS, but simply expand IAS adoption as part of their general analysis. Of course, the 
general values and philosophy of IFRS and IAS are the same, yet these studies do not 
provide clear evidence of the impact of IFRS introduction. For instance, Barth et al. 
(2008) and Jermakowicz et al. (2007) cover a period including both IAS and IFRS 
data, which makes it difficult to interpret their results on the impact of IFRS 
specifically. For this reason, such studies have been criticised for heterogeneity, as 
they combine IAS and IFRS without refining this information (Daske et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, several studies do examine early IFRS adopters. The most important 
are those of Daske et al. (2008) and Capkun et al. (2011), whose frameworks 
categorise early adopters and examine them in parallel with their main analysis. 
Daske et al. (2008) were the first to consider a separate category for early adopters. 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, they produce interesting results for 
mandatory adopters, but also suggest that voluntary adopters may display lower 
information asymmetry resulting from the increased transparency of IFRS. Following 
a similar categorisation, Capkun et al. (2011) did not consider such cases in their 2008 
study, but state that early adopters exhibit an increase in earnings management. This 
finding is contrary to that of Daske et al. (2008), and seems extremely important, as 
most studies conclude that early adopters did not need to engage in earnings 
management as they voluntarily adopted IFRS. Furthermore, the statistical accuracy 
of these studies is questionable. Indeed, both use the same models for their sample, 
separated into early and normal adopters. However, their sample seems narrow, as 
early adopters tended to be bigger firms and were considerably fewer in number than 
normal adopters, raising additional heterogeneity issues. 
Overall, these early indications pose many ambiguities, as they are affected by 
statistical bias. In addition, similarly to the voluntary early adoption of firms, the 
official period included voluntary adoption of standards. Indeed, in 2005 firms were 
allowed to partially adopt some individual IFRS standards. IFRS 1 describes the 
general framework of procedures that firms must follow as first-time adopters. This 
may affect their first adoption process, because some firms may take advantage of this 
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procedure and deviate from some rules, resulting in a significant impact on their 
performance. Many studies focus on these cases (e.g. Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 
2009), and Barth et al. (2011) summarise these exemptions and recognise that most 
firms prefer to be exempted from IAS 21 (Cumulative Translation Differences) and 
IFRS 3 (Business Combinations). They suggest that this may result in distortion of 
their reported profits. All these findings prove the appropriateness of my choice to 
review IFRS and IAS adoption separately, providing greater confidence in the 
methods, samples and time periods used by researchers. This allows better 
formulation of opinions on IFRS implementation with the least possible confusion. 
Early indications are important, but more accurate results are provided by mandatory 
implementations of IFRS, as revealed in more recent studies. The next sub-sections 
move on to review the results of official adoption. 
 
2.3.3 Earnings management under IFRS 
My expertise as a market analyst indicates that managers are under considerable 
pressure to prove that they can increase stakeholders’ profits, and may resort to 
creative accounting practices. Previous literature on IAS suggests debate about the 
effectiveness of IAS in controlling the motives and tools for earnings management. 
Given the motives for earnings management discussed in the previous section, 
recent studies focus on whether managers have changed their policies under 
IFRS, and whether IFRS are so effective that they reduce the need for earnings 
management. Thus, studies of this period aim to further distil the tools and motives 
for earnings management. Better information, greater expertise and more data should 
enable them to focus on why firms engage in earnings management, yet they seem to 
follow the same route as in the previous phase, and some factors are not considered at 
all. Audit quality has been extensively analysed in relation to IAS, but under IFRS, 
few studies correlate auditors with earnings management. For instance, Francis and 
Wang (2007) find that firms audited by Big 5 auditors presented better earnings 
quality than firms with smaller auditors, and Ball et al. (2015) suggest that Australian 
listed firms may benefit from auditors’ rotation. 
Further studies reveal a difference in earnings quality across countries that have 
applied IFRS (Houqe et al., 2012), confirming that legal enforcement in each country 
may be a reason for this (Doupnik and Perera, 2009). Indeed, similarly to Barth et al. 
(2012), Chua et al. (2012) state that adoption of IFRS has decreased earnings 
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management for Australian companies. On the other hand, Ahmed at al. (2013) 
examine a sample of 20 countries to determine whether IFRS have decreased income-
smoothing activities compared with a matched sample of non-IFRS users. They 
indicate that IFRS adopters have increased earnings management. Also, as their 
sample includes countries with strong regulations, and as they prove that accounting 
quality has decreased under IFRS, they conclude that countries with strong laws 
perform better under their national GAAP. This is the first study to present such 
indications. However, their analysis is not statistically significant compared with non-
IFRS adopters, raising questions about their findings. In addition, Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) find that earnings-smoothing activities have not declined under IFRS, 
while in France there is strong evidence of increasing numbers of suspicious cases. 
Closely related is Djankov et al.’s (2008) research on stock market regulations along 
with earnings management. They find that large equity markets have better and more 
restrictive regulations, which may result in less earnings management and more 
accurate financial reporting. 
In addition, Ding et al. (2007) examine how a country’s legal system may affect 
earnings management, even if the country has adopted IFRS. They also conclude that 
the lower the quality of the legal framework, the greater the opportunities for earnings 
management. Therefore, adopting IFRS seems likely to increase earnings quality but 
is not the only determinant, as earnings smoothing appears to relate to additional 
institutional and market regulations (Isidro et al., 2015; Cascino and Gassen, 2015; 
Shan, 2015). For example, Ernstberger et al. (2012) show a lower level of earnings 
management for German firms following improvements to the German enforcement 
system. Therefore, they state that earnings management may even increase under 
IFRS if countries do not adopt strict legal and market enforcement (Goldman and 
Slezak, 2006). On the other hand, Platikanova and Nobes (2006) indicate higher 
quality for UK and German firms under IFRS and, most impressively and similarly to 
Armstrong et al. (2007), they state that firms in a lower-quality information 
environment benefit more. Moreover, many studies focus on motives for earnings 
management relating to bonuses. Orszag and Choudhary (2005) suggest that most UK 
listed companies still use earnings to determine managers’ bonuses, although many 
studies find that it has declined since IFRS adoption (Voulgaris et al., 2014). 
There is also a threshold in earnings below which there are no bonus distributions, 
making it even more essential for managers to smooth earnings if a company is close 
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to this limit. Therefore, reporting a profit is still essential under IFRS (Graham et al., 
2005). Furthermore, in recent years, stock markets have tended to play a crucial role 
in firms meeting analysts’ forecasts, and investors’ expectations are essential for their 
operational performance. Failure to reach their estimates may thus have devastating 
impacts on access to capital, growth prospects and future potential (Graham et al., 
2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). For this reason, firms may be inclined to use 
earnings management to meet estimates by achieving significant market premiums 
(Lin et al., 2006; Rees and Sivaramakrishnan, 2007). 
This is important for an additional reason. Florou and Kosi (2015) contribute to 
examining whether IFRS meets creditors’ needs. They conclude that under IFRS, 
firms seem to produce higher-quality and more comparable financials. For this reason, 
many listed firms issue bonds to take advantage of lower bond yield spreads that 
investors will pay compared with increased loan spreads. However, their argument is 
questionable, as similar studies find that firms’ debt contacts may be costly, and that 
their use has decreased since IFRS adoption (Ball et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015; 
Brown, 2016). This may suggest that private investors question the effectiveness of 
IFRS. However, this difference in findings may be attributable to the fact that Florou 
and Kosi’s (2015) sample is limited to before 2008, so they do not consider the crisis 
period, while other studies include this period. In all cases, more data are required to 
estimate the long-term effects of IFRS on debt contracting, and it seems that once 
again countries’ regulation may affect this process (Gow et al., 2015; Wu and Zhang, 
2017). Overall, in line with the previous phase, there is debate about whether IFRS 
has succeeded in reducing earnings management. 
 
2.3.4 IFRS reconciliation with US GAAP 
From 2007, the SEC allowed foreign firms to report under IFRS in the US. For 
market participants, this was the first step toward total globalisation of stock markets, 
and perhaps toward joint improvement of both regimes, but there were many 
obstacles owing to their differentiation. Although US GAAP are rules-based and IFRS 
is a principles-based regime, both are considered to be the highest quality accounting 
standards globally (Van der Meulen et al., 2007). However, apart from their 
theoretical differentiation, there are also practical considerations. Recent studies focus 
on these and produce differing results in many respects, for example concerning 
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accounting quality. Many believe that US GAAP is of higher quality than IFRS (Barth 
et al., 2006), and that this superiority is reflected in US firms (Barth et al., 2012). 
In this regard, the high disclosure level of US GAAP seems to be important. 
However, this quality of US GAAP is lower in non-SEC environments (Glaum and 
Street, 2003). Thus, researchers consider that the most effective solution for countries 
with weak financial disclosure requirements is to adopt IFRS (Ding et al., 2007). The 
latter seem appropriate in such cases in order to deter auditing irregularities and 
increase shareholders’ confidence (Daske et al. 2008). A country’s enforcement 
system and institutional structure are closely related, as well as its underlying 
economic and political forces, which may lead to differences in accounting quality 
(Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). Therefore, the country’s profile plays an important 
role in accounting performance. The same standards in different countries result in 
different levels of accounting quality (Ball et al., 2003), while in other cases, different 
standards may result in the same quality. In Germany, for example, there is no 
evidence of any difference in terms of timeliness, accruals quality or value relevance 
between US GAAP and IFRS (Van der Meulen et al., 2007). 
However, in the US, researchers are likely to be more sceptical toward IFRS, 
owing to differences such as revenue recognition and write-offs of long-lived asset 
impairment losses (Trottier, 2013; Gordon and Hsu, 2014; Hong et al., 2018). Some 
claim that, for this reason, there have been significant increases in foreign firms’ cost 
of equity (Han and He, 2013), while many studies suggest that this may lead to 
significant capital market effects. Such cases may be sufficient to raise questions 
about the benefits of introducing IFRS in the US. Indeed, considering the convergence 
process, there seem to be many practical apprehensions and limitations (Jermakowicz, 
2004) that may affect it. Debate began even before the introduction of IFRS in the 
US. Reconciliation of the two regimes has both benefits and costs, and the potential 
results are unclear. However, early studies indicate that it may produce significant 
benefits for investors, and may remove unnecessary costs and barriers for foreign 
firms listed in the US. Moreover, for foreign registrants required to reconcile with US 
GAAP, there was a time difference in presenting their annual reports, decreasing 
information symmetry. Reconciling IFRS and US GAAP has thus increased the 
comparability of investment opportunities. All these factors are likely to result in 
increased investor protection (Street and Linthicum, 2007). Similar studies indicate 
additional potential benefits. In practice, there has been a return to market balance, 
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and the reconciliation process has not been associated with abnormal trading volumes, 
abnormal volatility in returns or changes in the bid-ask spread after the release date 
(Jiang et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that IFRS has changed market liquidity or 
insider trading after the first implementation year, compared with firms that have not 
adopted IFRS. The same research indicates that there is no significant impact on the 
cost of equity, analysts’ forecast errors or stock price changes (Kim et al., 2012). 
Several other studies single out the importance of the convergence process, suggesting 
that it increases comparability, reduces costs and enhances global competition 
between financial markets (Ball, 2006). Of course, discussion should concentrate on 
the value relevance of reconciling IFRS and US GAAP. Many believe that value 
relevance will decrease following the reconciliation process, resulting in a loss of 
information. However, the fact that US GAAP are more closely related to IFRS than 
to the old national GAAP (Ashbaugh, 2001) instils optimism about the venture. Early 
studies suggest that reconciliation from IFRS to US GAAP is value relevant (Henry et 
al., 2007), and motivates IFRS in the US to provide informative disclosures, 
enhancing the integrity of accounting measures (Hansen et al., 2012). 
The stricter the enforcement of IFRS, the more willingly companies comply 
(Street and Gray, 2002), so the strong protection laws and rights in the US (Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen, 2005) may be an advantage for their adoption. Indeed, there is a 
positive correlation between abnormal trading volumes and earnings reconciliation 
adjustments within a two-day window surrounding the release of the reconciliation, 
suggesting that investors rely on reconciliation information to make valuation 
decisions (Chen and Sami, 2013). Similarly, Chen and Khurana (2015) document a 
positive market reaction for firms adopting IFRS. On the other hand, Lin et al. (2013) 
argue that under IFRS, earnings management has increased. However, their results are 
based on a sample of German high-tech firms that transitioned to IFRS from US 
GAAP in 2005, so their results are of questionable applicability to all IFRS firms in 
the US. Overall, firms must overcome technical differences, the cost of change and 
volatility resulting from IFRS adoption. 
 
2.3.5 IFRS and US GAAP during the last financial crisis 
The 2008 financial crisis proved to be a critical point for market participants, as it 
increased suspicion of companies’ financials and raised criticisms of accounting 
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regimes. Indeed, many studies blame accounting standards for not foreseeing the 
crisis, raising concerns about the global sustainability of the financial reporting 
system. Once again, they focus on and accuse fair value orientation for the crisis, but 
not for the market reaction nor the straight comparison between US GAAP and IFRS. 
It seems, therefore, that a new debate has arisen about the causes and effects of fair 
value, which increase under turbulent conditions (Mallet, 2008). Although fair value 
rules are not ideal, many insist nonetheless that they are by far the most appropriate 
method compared with any alternatives, providing much greater transparency and 
comparability (Brown, 2008). They claim that there is still more timely loss 
provisioning under IFRS (O’Hanlon, 2013), as disclosures indeed contribute to rapid 
identification of financial problems (Hinks, 2008) and may provide early warning 
signals of an impending crisis (Allen and Carletti, 2010). 
However, markets operating in an unstable investing environment lack reliable 
measures (Brown, 2008), which may lead to alterations of income (Ball, 2006). Some 
studies even suggest that firms would have performed better under old national 
GAAP. For this reason, the IASB eased fair value accounting standards relating to 
financial instruments (IAS39 and IFRS7), offering companies a choice of 
retroactively reclassifying financial assets previously measured at fair value into 
amortised cost, expanding this reclassification concession to assets that were 
voluntarily classified. Studies reflect positively on IFRS authorities (Neal et al., 
2015), as earnings management decreased for many European firms during the crisis 
(Kousenidis et al., 2013; Filip and Raffournier, 2014). However, most studies 
consider the periods 2006–2007 and 2008–2009 to examine the effects of the crisis. It 
would be interesting also to examine the years 2007-2008, because in many cases 
firms were engaging in earnings management prior to the crisis. 
In contrast, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) decided not to 
deviate from its policy. The results vindicate the FASB, as companies that used the 
reclassification option produced only short-term benefits, leading to greater 
information asymmetry and reduced transparency, and potentially allowing 
companies to manipulate some of their figures through creative accounting practices 
(Ramanna and Watts, 2007). It seems, therefore, that standard setters did not initially 
succeed in managing these difficult circumstances effectively. Responding to these 
accusations, in January 2013, the IASB issued IFRS 13, which provides a framework 
for measuring and disclosing fair value. This is less complex and improves 
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transparency and objectivity. Apart from these obvious advantages that might help to 
overcome the effects of the crisis, IFRS 13 was the result of joint efforts with the 
FASB, the US GAAP standard setter. It successfully created a common set of high-
quality global accounting standards and, unlike the first attempt, these further 
improvements may result in greater convergence with US GAAP. Overall, this fair 
value debate seems to have been a starting point for fundamental and necessary 
improvements to establish a stable mechanism that will prevail in similar, future 
cases. 
Amid these concerns, questions were also raised about whether authorities were 
prepared for such large and broad changes (Heilpern et al., 2009). The results prove 
that none of the parties involved was adequately prepared. Even credit-rating 
companies were unable to estimate the risk of default precisely, leading to many false 
ratings (Coval et al., 2008). As these complex operations seemed to threaten 
regulators and authorities, it was essential to update the accounting frameworks, 
focusing on these symptoms (Hatherly and Kretzschmar, 2011). Under both IFRS and 
US GAAP, the banking industry took advantage of securitisation transactions and 
derecognition of financial asset regulations. Securitisation transactions count as sales, 
offering banks an opportunity to increase their capital ratios and reduce their needs 
under the Basel Regulation.13 
During the financial crisis, this accounting window increased (Laux and Leuz, 
2010), while the lack of information available to investors and authorities led to 
irreversible outcomes (Barth and Landsman, 2010). Similarly, derecognition of 
financial assets enabled assets to be eliminated from balance sheets, allowing banks to 
increase their earnings and capital ratios (Ryan, 2008). This enhanced the belief that 
the banking sector’s financials were imprecise (Bushman, 2014), so increased 
regulations were needed (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2017). Following this, the IASB 
focused on these two issues and in 2011 initiated several new standards (IFRS 10, 
IFRS 11 and IFRS 12) improving on IFRS 7, aiming to enhance the banking sector’s 
                                                 
13 The Basel Regulation or Basel Accord (Basel I) introduced in 1988 was developed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as a set of minimum prudential regulations for banks 
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm). Since then, it has been amended and updated to strengthen 
regulation of the banking sector. This resulted in the last Basel III Accord, which was adopted by the 
European Union in 2013 as a legislative package. This package applied as of 1 January 2014 to EU 
member countries. It includes a regulatory framework for the banking industry, such as capital 
requirements and supervisory tools, including stress tests and asset quality reviews 
(http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe). 
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financial statement disclosures and improve accounting mechanisms. This 
enforcement also affected the shadow banking sub-sector. 
In Europe, in contrast, most financing is still undertaken by traditional credit 
institutions. For this reason, and since shadow banking poses greater systemic risk 
than traditional banking, official concerns have increased, focusing on several issues, 
including the scale of shadow banking, regulatory gaps, regulatory arbitrage and the 
complexity of the shadow banking system. This may also have resulted from reducing 
the size of shadow banking, increasing its concentration (Beck et al., 2006), or 
lessening interconnections between commercial and shadow banking entities (De 
Jonghe, 2010). On the other hand, some consider that regulating shadow banking may 
make matters worse if it prevents banks from taking any risks at all (Ordonez, 2013). 
Restrictions on capital requirements will result in limited interest from investors, 
leading to decreased funding opportunities (Harris et al., 2014) and greater risk 
(Plantin, 2015). Overall, capital structure costs, financial regulation and audit 
innovation must be considered together in order to prevent similar future risks (Adrian 
and Shin, 2009; Schoenmaker, 2016). 
For these reasons, authorities in both Europe and America have sought to enforce 
a legal framework on the shadow banking sector. IFRS must be sufficiently strict; 
otherwise, it is pointless discussing any shadow banking regulation. Therefore, apart 
from the improvements to IFRS mentioned in the previous sub-section, and owing to 
continued criticism of IAS 39, the IASB introduced IFRS 9. IFRS 9 introduced 
changes to the classification, measurement and impairment assessment requirements 
for the financial industry, including new requirements on hedge accounting. This 
implemented simpler and more accurate recognition and measurement rules, aimed at 
reducing volatility and controlling inadvertent risk. Since it was published only 
recently, few studies have focused on its effectiveness. Onali and Ginesti (2014) 
indicate a positive market reaction to its announcement. However, it is too early to 
conclude whether it has succeeded in regulating both traditional and shadow banking 
systems. 
 
2.4 Critical summary of literature review and discussion 
Through this project, I aimed to examine how the implementation and evolution 
of IFRS have contributed to eliminating earnings management. From my engagement 
with the literature, I determined that most studies have examined the idea of earnings 
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management in connection with IFRS, and have concentrated mainly on Australia, 
Germany, the UK and the US. For this reason, I focused on research that identified 
earnings management under IFRS, and closely related notions such as value relevance 
and fair value. Although these were the significant outcomes of my literature review, 
during the early stages I was unable to evaluate many of the studies because a critical 
issue emerged: I realised that many researchers had tended to confuse IAS with IFRS 
in their analysis, leading to misinterpreted results and confusion because IFRS and 
IAS differ considerably. If a country has managed to decrease accounting smoothing 
activities under IAS, this does not indicate that it will perform similarly under IFRS. 
Therefore, the key problem is that such studies cannot clearly determine whether the 
introduction of IFRS or IAS helped companies to eliminate earnings management. 
I needed a clear view on the IFRS regime and its performance. To deal with this 
challenge, I decided to compile my review in chronological order, separated into 
discrete periods to meet the needs of my research. This approach had many 
advantages. First, it helped me to condense the large number of studies that did not 
separate IAS from IFRS, and assess their findings based on their years of analysis. I 
was thus able to establish which cases were more important in the literature within 
specific time frames. I was also able to determine the main issues that emerged 
following the introduction of IFRS, and whether earnings management was clearly 
presented and explained in these cases. Consequently, I was able to focus on the 
omissions and limitations of each period in order to detect the evolution of the models 
and methods used to examine earnings management, helping me to formulate my 
research questions and examine my hypotheses. 
Much of the literature in the first period confirms a need to improve accounting 
standards. This is attributable to the fact that more companies are trying to compete 
globally, so they need regimes that will be accepted by the global accounting 
community. Throughout lengthy efforts to harmonise accounting, studies have 
answered many research questions, but theories and concerns seemed to increase 
when the EU began to attempt to achieve harmonisation through directives. 
Subsequent research has highlighted the importance and limitations of common 
standards, and many researchers have modified or extended the literature and 
improved their theories, leading to consideration of additional methods and raising 
more points of concern. The most important concern has been the introduction of 
IFRS, which has had a significant impact on companies’ financials. Since it is a set of 
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unique, high-quality standards that aim to increase the transparency and comparability 
of information between adopting countries, most studies have understandably found a 
decrease in earnings smoothing activities and more truthful accounting figures. 
Indeed, many researchers argue that IFRS introduction has reduced the need for 
earnings management (Chua et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2012), yet these findings have 
been challenged by other studies. For example, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) find that 
earnings smoothing activities have not declined under IFRS, and Ahmed at al. (2013) 
indicate that IFRS adopters engage more in earnings management.  
However, many of these studies are ineffective because they compare different 
sample countries and periods, leading to heterogeneity in their results. More careful 
sample selection might have enabled this issue to be anticipated, since different 
countries usually react differently, as I had already experienced as a professional in 
the stock market. Consequently, studies focusing on Europe do not necessarily apply 
to other IFRS countries. Similarly, research focusing on one transaction period will 
not necessarily be relevant to other periods. The literature on this key concept reveals 
mixed results, with no clear agreement on whether IFRS has managed to decrease or 
increase earnings management. For this reason, many researchers have focused on 
additional factors that influence the level of earnings management, such as fair value 
(Abad et al., 2000), taxation (Nobes and Schwencke, 2006), capital market 
motivations (Bartov et al., 2002) and managers’ compensation (Ball, 2006). It may 
also be possible for several companies to engage together in earnings management 
owing to accounting and legal regulations (Gore et al., 2001; LaPorta et al., 2006; 
Ahmed at al., 2013). In these studies, many researchers have tended to consider the 
performance of US GAAP as a reference point to examine reactions to IFRS, 
adjusting statistical models and methods for US GAAP to IFRS needs. Therefore, I 
expected that similar studies would have observed more cases of income smoothing 
since the official introduction of IFRS in the US in 2007.  
However, most research has focused on other interests. Most studies seem to be 
sceptical of reconciling IFRS and US GAAP owing to their differences, such as 
revenue recognition and write-offs of longstanding asset impairment losses (Trottier, 
2013; Gordon and Hsu, 2014; Hong et al., 2018). They suggest that IFRS neither 
increase firms’ liquidity and stock market performance, nor reduce the cost of capital. 
These results are clearer than the previously mentioned findings; nevertheless, studies 
of this period do not produce effective arguments concerning the introduction of IFRS 
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in the US. Most research examines US GAAP and IFRS separately, so does not 
determine whether US enforcement may increase the effectiveness of IFRS, and 
provides no evidence on whether IFRS successfully compete with US GAAP in terms 
of accounting misinterpretation, since the analysis does not take account of earnings 
management. Thus, the compelling finding for this period is that there are many 
differences between US GAAP and IFRS that may affect their performance, but their 
performance cannot be adequately compared in the absence of indications of whether 
companies that have adopted IFRS and are listed in the US have used earnings 
management to increase their financials or market value. This may cause ambiguities, 
because in many cases in my professional experience, companies have appeared to be 
performing well, but have later been proved to have deliberately used accounting 
misstatements. 
Finally, I have critically evaluated studies focusing on the last financial crisis. 
Until recently, most studies have tended to focus on listed firms other than banks, 
owing to differing reporting regulations, and only a few recent papers have sought to 
explore this issue further. These studies mainly indicate that the financial sector, i.e. 
banking and insurance companies, may use earnings management techniques to hide 
their economic problems (Bushman, 2014), so increased regulation is needed 
(Chiaramonte and Casu, 2017). After the crisis, both IFRS and US GAAP authorities 
introduced several improvements to their enforcement relating to financial 
institutions, so it might be expected that these amendments would have helped with 
market regulation. However, it is unclear how financial companies have responded to 
these measures, since studies have not focused on specific improvements, such as 
IFRS9, but have examined authorities’ strategies as a whole. Thus, the results for 
these institutions seem to be less pronounced, because although these measures sound 
beneficial in theory, little is known about their potential effects in practice. It seems, 
therefore, that recent literature has failed to consider whether specific amendments to 
accounting regimes have been effective in responding to the effects of the crisis, or 
whether accountants and investors should pay greater attention to the new regulations. 
The literature does not fully explain whether the reclassification option has been 
appropriate, how weaker economies have responded to the crisis, and whether stock 
markets have recovered from their losses. Similarly, there has been little in-depth 
empirical exploration of shadow banking in recent years.  
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Overall, a large body of literature suggests that firms that follow IFRS may derive 
significant benefits. However, it does not provide convincing arguments on whether 
IFRS has succeeded in improving accounting quality, because there is no clear 
evidence of whether all companies under IFRS have decreased their earnings 
management, including companies listed in the US and during the crisis period. 
Although the above-mentioned body of literature clearly points to the applicability 
and effectiveness of IFRS, it has only looked at specific cases and analysed particular 
samples. On the other hand, more recent studies focusing on qualitative analysis of 
IFRS use different research methods for analysis, such as interviews and 
questionnaires. However, this may create more deficiency in IFRS analysis, since 
modern researchers seem to forget how important and unethical earnings management 
phenomena may be. Some researchers seem convinced that IFRS have specific 
potential and it is necessary to wait for the market to regulate itself, ignoring any 
accounting smoothing activities. In this case, it is debatable what criteria accountants 
and investors should use to assess the performance of IFRS – managers’ opinions, 
companies’ financials, or the perceptions of authorities or companies’ auditors? 
Thus, there is a need to better understand how and why companies engage in 
earnings management, and how they benefit from it. There is also a need to return to 
quantitative analysis so as to develop new tools and elucidate the motives for earnings 
management, in order to help market participants to identify such cases before it is too 
late. A quantitative study analysing the characteristics and motives of firms that 
engage in such activities might make an important contribution to improving IFRS. 
Earnings management remains a contemporary issue of concern to investors and IFRS 
authorities, as it continues to represent a significant challenge for every accounting 
regime. My review of the literature reveals that many studies address earnings 
management problems and produce theories and findings on their performance; 
however, they fail to identify modern tools and techniques for earnings management, 
such as insider trading and abnormal market returns. These are important aspects that 
appear not to have been fully researched. As an investor, I am aware that many firms 
manage their earnings despite being listed on strongly regulated stock markets. 
Importantly, such firms have increased their stock market trading volumes, but it is 
difficult for market authorities to evaluate the motives for any insider trading. 
Nevertheless, no studies have been found that correlate insider trading with earnings 
management activities. The closest is that of Hail et al. (2014), who suggest that IFRS 
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enforcement against insider trading may increase financial transparency. Insider 
trading is an important gap in both the academic and professional literature because, 
as most studies use market values for their models, if market prices are affected by 
insider speculation, the precision of these models may be questionable. 
Closely related is the cost of capital. The literature argues that the cost of capital 
has decreased since IFRS adoption; yet if this cost reduction results from earnings 
management, it may significantly change assessments of the effectiveness of IFRS. In 
their recent study, Eliwa et al. (2016) find no correlation between earnings 
management and the cost of capital, but their sample was drawn only from the UK. 
More research is needed to understand which individual standards most affect and are 
affected by earnings management, and how. The literature provides many examples of 
accounting misinterpretations, such as the Enron and Globo cases and the banking 
sector during the crisis. However, the challenge is to distinguish and define the 
individual standards responsible for this performance. The existing literature does not 
consider all aspects of how this phenomenon may arise in order to propose possible 
methods for its elimination. Therefore, reflecting on the literature and on my 
experience as a market participant, my aim is to address these gaps in accounting 
research following IFRS adoption, and to answer my research questions in light of 
this review (Appendix I, Table 7). 
 91 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL PROCESS 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodological process employed to achieve the aim 
and objectives of this project (Johnson and Clark, 2006). It considers ontology, 
epistemology, methodology and methods (Crotty, 1998), which are interrelated and, 
along with additional assumptions, enable consistency in the research process, with 
many possible combinations (Appendix I, Table 8/Panel A). This section explains the 
underlying epistemological and ontological assumptions, describes and reviews the 
background of paradigms in accounting, and locates myself as a practitioner-
researcher within this framework. Justifications are provided for my decisions to 
adopt a pragmatic approach, and to combine survey with action research in my 
methodology (Appendix I, Table 8/Panel B). At the end of this chapter, I analyse the 
limitations of my choice, and describe my role as a researcher. 
 
3.1 Ontological Assumptions and Epistemological Considerations 
Ontology and epistemology connect research and the researcher (TerreBlanche 
and Durrheim, 1999). They describe authors’ world views and help them formulate 
their strategic approach (Wainright, 1997). Identifying these key considerations 
provides a more holistic view of the project. In this respect, this study follows Cohen 
et al.’s (2000) definition of ontology as claims about and perspectives on the nature of 
reality. This is the study of being, aiming to answer the question of what reality is, to 
understand how it is constructed and to discern what constitutes it (Blaikie, 2000). I 
also consider the principal dimension of ontology to lie within the opposing extremes 
of the objectivist–subjectivist continuum (Saunders et al., 2016). Thus, ontology 
distinguishes between the single truth of pure realism, as embraced by objectivism, 
and the individual reality of relativists/idealists/nominalists/conventionalists at the 
subjectivist extreme (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Preserving the same objectivist and subjectivist perspectives, epistemology 
concerns assumptions about the theory of knowledge, its nature and limits 
(Blackburn, 1996). It focuses on the origins of what constitutes acceptable, legitimate 
and warranted knowledge in a field of study (Johnson and Duberley, 2003) and 
frames the relationship between the inquirer and the object of inquiry (Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994). Its perceptions establish the researcher’s contribution to social 
knowledge and claim to show how this information is communicated to others 
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(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Consequently, epistemology ranges from objective facts 
to subjective interpretations (Saunders et al., 2016), according to the context of the 
project. 
It seems, therefore, that ontological and epistemological considerations are 
inseparably connected with the researcher’s convictions and perceptions of what 
constitutes reality. From my perspective, before setting out on this doctoral 
programme, I had never considered these assumptions, believing that my personal 
perceptions were irrelevant to my working and educational life. As I had to deal with 
numerical reports, my fundamental belief was that truth is only revealed by numerical 
data. Therefore, individual perceptions might be a limiting parameter in confirming or 
explaining the reality observed by numerical data. Similarly, during my studies, I had 
to deal with quantitative approaches. 
Despite my experience, I had never considered involving my personal world view 
and developing a critical conjecture on my practice. However, during this programme, 
I have come to understand that my world view had been rather unexplored in terms of 
interrelationships. Reflecting on this consideration, I started to realise that my 
personal philosophy is closely related to my practical thinking. Consequently, I have 
recognised that what I accept as true affects what I do, and this cannot be 
predetermined. On the contrary, I have come to believe that questioning my theory 
and practice enables me to gain a better understanding of my position, and I am able 
to develop my standpoint based on my experiences, beliefs and values. To further 
position myself and define my assumptions, in the next section, I review the general 
framework of paradigms and consider their parameters. 
 
3.2 Philosophical Paradigms of Accounting 
Research philosophy refers to the nature and background of knowledge underlying 
the research (Saunders et al., 2007), and is defined by research paradigms. Paradigms 
refer to the broad framework of beliefs, perceptions and assumptions about the 
development of knowledge (Cohen et al., 2000) and, as already mentioned, can be 
characterised with reference to their ontology, epistemology and methodology (Guba, 
1990).14 Therefore, they include research procedures and agreements that are accepted 
                                                 
14 Axiology is usually added to these assumptions (Saunders et al., 2016). This refers to a researcher’s 
values and their nature within the process. It is an implicit part of the research, revealing personal 
perspectives and ethics, and can easily be detected by the reader as part of the whole project. Therefore, 
it is important to focus on other components that fuel the debate about philosophies. 
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by scientists in their efforts to establish patterns in their processes and address their 
research problems (Gliner and Morgan, 2000). This has resulted in the divergence and 
coexistence of multiple research philosophies, paradigms, approaches and 
methodologies engaged with ontological and epistemological issues. However, each 
academic discipline has specific research perceptions, and its status may be affected 
by specific scientific subjects. 
Accounting and finance follow the broader context of the social sciences 
(Starbuck, 2003), formulating interesting sub-sets of related philosophies. Lincoln and 
Guba (2003) suggest four major paradigms (positivism, post-positivism, critical 
theory and constructivism), while in their latest work, Saunders et al. (2016) consider 
five research philosophies: positivism, critical realism, interpretivism, post-
modernism and pragmatism. Several researchers also consider an additional set of 
assumptions, formulating a set of participatory paradigms which assume that practical 
experiences create reality. The most well-known studies are by Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) and Arbnor and Bjerke (2009; see Appendix I, Table 9). Thus, there is a wide 
range of possible combinations of different assumptions, between positivism at the 
objective extreme and interpretivism at the subjective extreme. 
Positivism is highly influenced by empiricism (Pearson, 1892), stating that reality 
exists independently of human thoughts and perceptions and that our senses are 
sufficient to reveal reality (Sarantakos, 2005). Thus, positivism may be referred to as 
naïve realism (Guba and Lincoln, 1998) which focuses on pure, plausible, observable 
and measurable facts and data that result in credible and meaningful information 
(Crotty, 1998). Based on these regularities, a positivist researcher aims to define any 
causal relationships in the data in order to describe and explain phenomena and to 
create law-like generalisations (Gill and Johnson, 2010). During all these processes, it 
is essential for the researcher to remain neutral and detached in order to avoid 
influencing the project’s findings (Crotty, 1998). All these cases seem to fit closely 
with the world of finance in discovering, explaining and predicting phenomena. 
Indeed, most studies reviewed in the literature perform hypothesis-testing procedures 
to create predictive knowledge, verify causal relationships between measured 
variables and produce generalised findings (Gordon and Porter, 2009), supporting 
their process with statistically reliable tests (Bonner et al., 2006). For these reasons, 
positivist paradigms initally prevailed in accounting. 
 94 
However, this quantitative statistical approach was insufficient for researchers. 
They needed to apply different assumptions and techniques to observe the social 
reality behind the numbers (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). Therefore, interpretivism 
was introduced, a more naturalistic approach supported by subjectivist perspectives, 
including purely qualitative methods. Interpretivism is directly in opposition to the 
objectivity of positivism, and focuses on understanding interpretative descriptions of 
events (Holmes et al., 1991) rather than developing generalisations (Fay and Moon, 
1977). Interpretivists emphasise the subjective world of human experience (Cohen et 
al., 2000) and accept that individuals construct reality based on interactions with their 
social environment. Therefore, reality is multiple, relative and may embrace many 
interpretations (Newman and Benz, 1998) and, since it is created through human 
perceptions, it may span multiple dimensions that are equally correct (Merthens, 
2010). 
For this reason, interpretivism advocates that it is necessary for the researcher to 
understand differences between humans in their roles as social actors. Participants are 
considered to be active knowers who understand and reflect on social phenomena, 
while researchers are incapable of being entirely detached (Dunne et al., 2005). This 
approach focuses on reflecting how social activities of accountants and different 
groups of people, such as directors, managers, and even customers, through their 
behaviour may develop and affect accounting norms and techniques in practice 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). Consequently, interpretivism has gained momentum in 
the social sciences, establishing itself as a considerable rival to positivism. 
Accounting theory has followed this general drift, and researchers are increasingly 
using these underpinnings (Quattrone, 2000), as they seem to be a successful tool for 
this science, producing challenging outcomes that other philosophies are incapable of 
addressing (Parker and Roffey, 1997). Interpretivism includes further approaches, 
such as social constructivism, phenomenology and hermeneutics (Collins, 2010). 
Additional assumptions also relate to the logical reasoning of the theory 
development process. For example, typical positivist research first formulates 
hypotheses based on existing theory, and then tests them. However, this process is not 
applicable to all research. The difference lies in the priority of the approach to 
knowledge. In other words, the research must define what to process first, theory or 
data. There are two main approaches: deductive or theory-testing, and inductive or 
theory-building (Saunders et al., 2016). More specifically, the deductive approach 
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signifies that the research moves from the general to the specific. It develops a theory 
and examines hypotheses to derive outcomes logically (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010). 
In contrast, inductive reasoning follows the opposite path. There is no need for 
premises, but data/observations are processed first, potentially resulting in theory 
developments (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010). It seems, therefore, that these 
approaches establish another set of extremes within the research process, similar to 
the objective–subjective and quantitative–qualitative binaries. Hence, this reasoning 
can be attached to the previous paradigms. Without resorting to reductive labelling or 
pair matches, deduction seems to correspond better with positivism, and induction 
with interpretivism (Delamont, 1992). 
 
3.3 My Position as a Practitioner-Researcher 
Considering all these different approaches, I needed to locate myself within this 
theoretical framework of inquiries. In order to develop my paradigm, I had to distil 
my research motivation to determine how this might frame my ontological and 
epistemological considerations. In my profession, I am familiar with fundamental 
analysis, so in this research I set out to answer questions such as how the introduction 
of IFRS would affect information for fundamental analysis, how I could reflect this in 
my practice, what I could learn from my results and how I could apply these to 
improve my working perspectives. How could I transform my empirical findings into 
acceptable theories, creating new knowledge for theorists and practitioners, and how 
could I interest my peers in engaging in fundamental analysis? What should I propose 
as a mechanism to prevent misstatements in the future? 
I recognised that it was crucial to create measurable and accurate outcomes, 
accepted by external experts in the accounting field. Therefore, I decided to apply 
hypothesis-testing procedures with quantitative statistics. I considered that this type of 
data would be sufficient to examine my cases, leaving aside any interactions with 
individual market participants that might colour my conclusions. Thus, I estimated 
that the approach that would best suit my scope must take an objectivist stance with 
deductive reasoning. By default, I excluded philosophies from the subjective extreme, 
such as interpretivism and postmodernism. Postmodernism represents a range of 
sceptical and distrustful viewpoints on accepted ideologies and tenets. Its adopters 
presume that knowledge is not absolute but is a product of social, historical and 
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political interpretations, and they aim to deconstruct established realities (Kilduff and 
Mehra, 1997) and legitimise alternative marginalised views (Chia, 2003). 
Initially, I moved toward the philosophy of positivism, focusing on a naturalistic 
position concerning accounting regimes, entailing a realistic ontology that would 
prove that the reality of aspects of IFRS is singular and unique, external and 
independent of social actors. Indeed, prior to my engagement with the literature and 
the processes of the programme, I accepted that there could be only one truth: the 
reality of numbers. In both my professional career and education, I had always taken 
into consideration numerical outcomes that could be easily measured and analysed. I 
have never thought that personal feelings, values and attitudes might also constitute 
acceptable sources of knowledge. 
However, in reviewing the literature and focusing on the scope of this study, I 
realised that even the truth of numbers may hide personal evaluations. They cannot 
reveal a single truth, and thus cannot accurately be generalised. I started to reflect on 
my intentions for this research, and realised that examining the performance of IFRS 
in five countries would not necessarily mean that their performance would be similar 
to that of other countries. Similarly, examining specific years would not mean that the 
results would be consistent with the following periods. I also identified additional 
cases that raised questions about the objectivity of the data. For example, earnings 
management has many motives, and firms’ manipulated financials reveal the multiple 
subjective realities of managers rather than an accurate position of the firm. So how 
can one be sure that companies’ assets have not been affected by managers’ 
perceptions and beliefs? Inspired by this realisation, I recalled many cases during my 
professional career as a market analyst that had caused me to question the proof of 
data and prioritise my personal beliefs in investing in listed companies. Many 
companies’ reports reveal manipulated data, so how could I be sure that stock market 
prices reveal the truth? Thus, it seems that a firm’s market value is often a result of 
emotions, estimations, prospects and investor information. At this point, I disagreed 
with Hines (1988) and Morgan (1988), who state that accountants should not consider 
themselves as representatives of reality but rather as ‘subjective constructors of 
reality’ (Morgan, 1988, p.477). 
All these thoughts led me to conclude that there might be other layers of reality 
behind the numbers. Without ignoring that in many cases there might be one truth, it 
seems that in accounting science, ontology and epistemology interact very closely, 
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leading to a cyclone of combinations that makes it easy to transform objective data 
into subjective information. Therefore, throughout this process, I considered different 
positions on reality to challenge my ontological position and clarify my 
epistemological assumptions. In some cases, I accepted the single reality of 
positivism, but was also careful to recognise that personal estimations and values 
develop acceptable knowledge. Indeed, most IFRS amendments and developments 
have been based on personal beliefs and considerations. Thus, I deteremined that 
reality is a relative concept that may interact and evolve in different situations. Each 
branch of accounting, as part of social sciences, may have its own reality, depending 
on the communities in which it operates, from the single truth considered by 
accountants to the subjective motives of analysts and the political reasoning of 
responsible authorities. 
Considering all these, I established that positivism would be an inappropriate 
philosophical approach for this study. Reflecting more on the paradigm, I decided that 
it would not provide me with an opportunity to consider my role as a practitioner-
researcher, from which I aimed to generate knowledge that could be immediately 
applied to the accounting community or be an agent of change to existing practices. 
Thus, I could not be independent and external. I therefore decided to follow the 
paradigm of pragmatism rather than critical realism. Critical realists claim that reality 
is layered above any empirical results, as it is extremely complex. Consequently, they 
imply that there is always a hidden truth or reality, and accept that all observations are 
fallible. For this reason, they emphasise the importance of applying multiple measures 
and methods to minimise such biases and remain as objective as possible (Reed, 
2005). I chose to follow the tenet of pragmatism, not because I wanted to avoid 
choosing a philosophy, as Saunders et al. (2016, p.143) suggest, but because I saw 
myself through this doctoral process as a practitioner-researcher seeking scientific 
assertions, considering the complexity of the situation examined. Pragmatists are not 
concerned with theoretical questions of reality, but accept a claim as true if its 
practical application proves it to be so (Scruton, 2001). In this context, I focused on 
the approach that best matched my intentions, so following this route gave me more 
options to concentrate on the problem and apply action research with a survey, as 
described in the following sections. 
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3.4 Formulating the Research Methodology 
The methodology is another determinant of a paradigm, and refers to the plan of 
action for discovering knowledge (Wainright, 1997). It is the main way to connect all 
major parts of a research project (Myers, 2009), and consists of the methodological 
design and strategy. To eliminate any confusion, this section describes the main 
components of my methodology, and justifies my strategy selection. It starts with the 
approach adopted for this work-based research project, enhanced by theory, and then 
provides detailed explanations of the research context and the actions taken in the 
research cycle. Finally, it describes the limitations of the adopted strategy and my role 
as an action researcher. 
 
3.4.1 Methodological approach 
Methodological design 
According to the objective–subjective extremes reviewed in the previous sections, 
the research methodology may be classified as qualitative or quantitative. A 
qualitative approach is more naturalistic, lying at the subjectivist pole, as it focuses on 
the socially constructed nature of reality (Saunders et al., 2016). Thus, it attempts to 
study different groups of observations to describe, compare and explore the attitudes, 
behaviour and experiences of individuals (Stainback and Stainback, 1988). In 
contrast, quantitative research is typified by an objective stance. It focuses on the 
measurement and analysis of variables, aiming to determine their causal relationships 
(Creswell, 1994). It thus seeks to establish general principles derived from 
interpretations of variables, excluding any interference by individuals. 
There are further differences between these approaches concerning the forms of 
data they present (Creswell, 2003). Qualitative research generates data that are not in 
numerical form and cannot be quantified, such as narrations and words (Punch, 1998). 
They follow no formalised structure, but are more open and responsive to their 
participants, attempting to interpret the results in their natural setting (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000). On the other hand, a quantitative design tends to generate data that 
can be collected and expressed in numerical form, ready to be analysed and presented 
statistically (Backman, 1998). Although there is no right or wrong choice, the 
methodology should be based on the context, purpose and nature of the study. I chose 
to follow a quantitative research design, together with its associated assumptions. 
Based on a high level of reliable numerical data and statistical processing, I intended 
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to focus on verifiable facts, leading to conclusions that would be generally replicable 
in a data-driven process (Hambrick, 2007). Therefore, a quantitative design presented 
my process with many advantages (Matveev, 2002). Indeed, it allowed me to focus on 
and isolate important elements that might affect my observations, enabling me to 
eliminate any confusion and ambiguity from my models. Furthermore, it would be 
possible to reconsider some research aspects and reassess some parameters in future 
time frames. A quantitative design is an instrument to enable valid measures (Patten, 
2004), assuring the researcher of accurate outcomes (Wallen and Fraenkel, 2001), 
while at the same time its structure permits the reader to follow and understand the 
procedures. 
Methodological strategy 
The research design can be further divided into strategies. These strategies use a 
common set of procedures to describe and depict the research methodology and better 
define the link between the philosophy and the subsequent choice of methods (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2011). There are many categories, but the best known are experiment, 
survey, archival research, case study, ethnography, action research, grounded theory 
and narrative inquiry (Saunders et al., 2016). These strategies may involve a 
quantitative or qualitative design, or may implement both types. For the scope of my 
research, I decided to combine empirical survey with action research. Empirical 
research uses direct or indirect evidence to answer a specific question and to reject or 
support a hypothesis (Goodwin, 2005). In data analysis, such research uses 
standardised statistical methods which are critical in determining their validity. 
According to Heitink (1999), the empirical research approach consists of the 
following steps. The first is observation, where the researcher observes, collects and 
organises inquiries concerning a phenomenon. This is followed by induction, where 
the researcher must formulate hypotheses and general expectations of the examined 
phenomenon. In the next step, deduction, the researcher estimates the consequences of 
the hypotheses as testable predictions and formulates methods that will test them. The 
researcher then proceeds with hypothesis testing and data collection. This is followed 
by evaluation, meaning interpretation of the results and formulation of a theory. This 
cycle ends with an argument that presents the results as a reasonable explanation for 
the phenomenon. Surveys define the status of an identified variable and rely on 
systematic collection of information that can be systematised in useful models, 
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establishing associations between variables (Patel and Davidson, 1994). Empirical 
surveys determine associations between variables, using statistical techniques to 
describe and measure their relationships (Creswell, 2012). Surveys are often confused 
with questionnaires and interviews, but the latter are simply data collection techniques 
for this strategy. Surveys may include alternative techniques, such as secondary data, 
and may be addressed not only to groups of people, but also to objects. 
In addition, action research is a methodological choice in which the researcher 
participates actively in systematically collecting research data to deeply examine an 
objective and evaluate the results (Remenyi et al., 1998). It was initiated by Lewin in 
the 1940s (Cousin, 2009; McNiff and Whitehead, 2002; McKernan, 1996) in order to 
add new research ideas and challenge traditional practices. Lewin (1948) believed that 
one understands something better if one tries to change it. Therefore, the initial plan 
of action research was to study phenomena by changing them and evaluating the 
effects of this change. In adhering to these values, action researchers try to solve real 
problems with real solutions. Thus, they use their professional experience, aiming not 
only to change but also to improve an environment (Elliott, 1991). Their aim is not 
only to improve their learning and professional development, but also to improve the 
social context in which they operate (Gill and Johnson, 2003). Therefore, action 
research is twofold: it emphasises the researcher, offering the possibility to improve 
and reflect on his understanding practically (Carr and Kemmis, 1986), but also 
advocates the researcher as a contributor, offering the opportunity to validate and 
reflect on his practice and knowledge (McNiff et al., 1996). As this approach has 
practical implications, it is important for the researcher to anticipate the possible 
impacts of his intervention in the examined situation. Therefore, it is a very popular 
approach for educational studies, but is also widely used in practical cases in the 
social world, such as managing organisational change (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
 
3.4.2 Rationale and justification for my approach 
Rationale 
As described in the previous sections, empirical studies formulate specific 
hypotheses, with pre-planned and structured designs, and result in perfect descriptions 
of a market (Lehman, 1989). As I needed to produce systematic sets of data based on 
reliable statistics from firms’ balance sheets, this was an appropriate strategy to 
recognise potential trends in IFRS adoption. However, this approach would not 
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provide me with an opportunity to use my professional experience to consider my 
problem, as hypotheses must reflect the literature. Instead, action research focuses on 
practitioners’ problems and involves the researcher’s intervention in a change or 
improvement to specific practices (Blaxter et al., 2001), and its purpose is to make 
decisions oriented to specific problems. Therefore, its research questions derive from 
practical concerns and have limited generalisability, and statistical significance is of 
low importance (McMillan and Wergin, 1998). Most studies in my field apply 
empirical surveys, while most doctoral studies in this area use action research. 
I decided to conduct an empirical survey project within the context of action 
research, as this gave me more possibilities to assess the effectiveness of IFRS and 
evaluate market reactions in a number of cases. Indeed, the survey helped me to 
define the problem and gather data from a wide range of sources. This enabled me to 
maintain the statistical significance and generalisability of the survey to examine 
IFRS. Based on a high level of reliable numerical data, I was able to include both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal tests and to elaborate these data with the necessary 
statistical tools, such as linear modelling and logistic regression. This approach 
provides valid and accurate outcomes (Patten, 2004; Wallen and Fraenkel, 2001), 
fulfilling all the criteria of accurate research, including causality, internal validity and 
reliability (Johnson and Duberley, 2003). This helped me to formulate my hypotheses 
and test them empirically (Burns, 2000). 
However, these advantages were insufficient for a DProf programme, as I needed 
to add more practical concerns to the previously specified benefits. I aimed to reflect 
my working expertise in this project. Since a strength of action research is that the 
researcher is also a participant (Blaxter et al., 2001), I decided to use this 
methodology to enable me to add practical suggestions to my findings. My intention 
was to move a step further from theoretical research and continue to critically review, 
evaluate and suggest possible improvements relating to IFRS implementation. 
Furthermore, action research is not only applied in cases focusing on specific 
organisations, but can be used to examine any events relating to the researcher (Gill 
and Johnson, 1997). Indeed, my rationale for this approach was to give prominence to 
my advantage as a practitioner-researcher. Since I work as an accountant, I was able 
to approach the complexity of IFRS implementation as a researcher involved in 
applying accounting regimes to Greek firms, which might be impossible for an 
external researcher (Saunders et al., 2007). 
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Therefore, this concept was particularly helpful in all the areas in which this 
research was interested. On the one hand, it allowed me to confront concerns arising 
from IFRS implementation and derived from theory and practice which I intended to 
examine. On the other hand, action research improved my personal development and 
understanding of IFRS, and enabled me to emphasise my self-evaluation (Gill and 
Johnson, 1997; Mills, 2003). This process thus provided a perfect opportunity to 
question my beliefs, clarify my values and evolve in this context (Zajc and Bednarz, 
2007). This combination enabled me to combine theoretical concerns with practical 
reflections. I was able to transform the theoretical questions into practical concerns. 
For example, I was able to answer the question of whether IFRS performed better 
than old GAAP and whether IFRS had been trusted during the crisis, while providing 
insights for practitioners into whether they should invest in IFRS companies listed on 
the US market and what companies they should focus their attention on during crises. 
Justification 
From the literature review, I concluded that earnings management has continued 
to be a critical issue even after IFRS implementation. I aimed to address this problem 
because, as a market professional, I have detected that the tools used for creative 
accounting have been updated but the literature does not refer to such cases. Indeed, I 
have noticed many cases of suspicious performance by firms with high insider trading 
activity and firms that have made late announcements in order to retain privileged 
information. Therefore, as previously mentioned, I chose to combine empirical survey 
with action research because this helped me to thoroughly understand the questions 
that I needed to answer, both for my own benefit and that of the accounting research 
community. Through this process, I was able to determine the nature of the research 
problem and the current state of knowledge, and evaluate the opinions of market 
participants on earnings management. In addition, I considered that an action research 
approach would align better with my role as a practitioner-researcher, and would 
integrate with my intention to develop meaningful and understandable results that 
could be used by other market participants. I am thus confident that my choice of this 
combination of strategies was appropriate, as it helped me to contribute to improving 
accounting through my personal development as a market professional (McNiff et al, 
2003), as well as facilitating use of the statistical variables involved in my analysis. 
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Detecting real problems through action research allowed me to maximise the 
experiences gained from accounting, auditing and investing during my career as an 
accountant and stock market participant, so as to determine why earnings 
management still exists under IFRS, and how harmful and unethical it may be for 
investors. I have already explained the importance of earnings smoothing, but this is 
the first time that accounting research has given priority to a real-world dilemma and 
issues arising from IFRS implementation. I aim to bring the problem of earnings 
management to the fore in terms of its effects on the accounting community, as most 
previous studies have focused only on its financial effects. Indeed, my review of 
related literature revealed that only general conclusions have been drawn on earnings 
management. Many researchers do not appear to consider earnings management to be 
harmful, as they believe in market balance. Moreover, most studies have carried out 
empirical surveys and built statistical models, or have sought to determine 
accountants’ beliefs and opinions using interviews or questionnaires. Some have used 
action research, but only to address a problem relating to a specific company. Thus, I 
contribute to research design in my field by reinforcing the methodologies offered for 
accounting research with a set of strategies that combine companies’ financials with 
real-world market issues. Of course, the methodology alone cannot solve the earnings 
management problem; however, I believe that my choice was ideal for this specific 
case and for the scientific accounting community. This methodological combination 
enabled me to develop knowledge that will be useful to responsible authorities and 
market participants. Therefore, I consider this to be a starting point for further 
research that combines statistical data with researchers’ experiences and reflections 
within an action research framework. 
 
3.5 Action Plan 
3.5.1 Action research type 
Having identified my general methodological framework, I was able to decide on 
the exact structure of my approach. Different kinds of action research models may 
produce different types of knowledge. Most researchers identify three common types: 
technical, practical and emancipatory (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). Technical action 
research is applied to solving practical problems. It tests an intervention using a pre-
specified theoretical framework (Lewin, 1951) and results in the refinement of 
existing theories. Practical action research is interpretive research by practitioners for 
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practitioners, aiming to enable participants to understand current situations to 
contribute ideas (Graham, 2006). Finally, emancipatory action research is a 
participatory process that involves individuals or groups intending to develop 
practical knowledge in pursuit of critical examinations of the current practice of an 
organisation or issue to change and improve it (Wadsworth, 1998). This is the most 
common type of action research, and requires the researcher’s intervention and 
collaboration with organisational members (Gill and Johnson, 2003), leading to 
proposed changes. All participants play a vital role in the research. 
All these cases have some elements in common, and follow the general aims of 
action research of improvement and involvement (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). However, 
in reading about these different approaches to action research, I discovered that this 
methodology is confused, including multiple traditions that are constantly evolving 
(Herr and Anderson, 2005). Therefore, neither the above categories nor other studies 
such as those by McKernan (1996) and McNiff and Whitehead (2002) would allow 
me to express my research effectively.15 I was therefore inclined to follow Coghlan 
and Brannick (2005 and 2010), who identify 12 types of action research strategies, 
including classic, participatory and reflective practice. 
Within this framework, my initial thought was to follow the traditional action 
research approach; but at the same time, I felt that my research had to add more 
information. Indeed, I identified the potential for it to be empowering (Carr and 
Kemmis, 1986) and emancipatory (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). However, contrary to 
Cohen et al. (2011), who argue that action research cannot be empowering or 
emancipatory, I believe that action research always enables individuals and 
communities to flourish (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010). In order to influence social 
change, it is always better to work with others, and there are more opportunities to 
increase personal, professional and social benefits (Cohen et al., 2000). Indeed, for 
me, this is the primary difference between action research and participatory action 
research (PAR), as in the latter the investigator is always acting ‘in relation with other 
people’ (McNiff and Whitehead, 2002, p.36). 
Therefore, I understood that I needed to follow a PAR approach, as this seemed to 
be particularly relevant to my intentions. It would enable me to focus beyond the 
                                                 
15 McKernan (1996) introduced his new model of ‘rational-interactive dynamic’ action research, based 
on three general types: scientific, practical-deliberative and critical emancipatory. McNiff and 
Whitehead (2002) also specify three dominant models of action research: conceptual, abstract and 
reified. 
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organisational frame, involving a community and empowering researchers to use their 
working knowledge (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010). My research agenda was not 
typical, but it attempted to understand the performance of accounting regimes under 
certain circumstances and to engage in situations that might be responsible for any 
abnormal actions. I did not have access to internal information, but only open-access 
public information and tacit knowledge acquired through my working experience. 
Indeed, I went back over the literature review to detect whether these cases had 
already been analysed for my dataset, and I also used theoretical models derived from 
the literature. Furthermore, in this path I was alone, as I did not cooperate with 
colleagues and other insiders because I do not work for an organisation but am self-
employed in the financial field. Therefore, I did not aim to focus on the change 
process of a specific organisation, but on improving the general field of accounting, as 
an insider in this community. 
To provide a detailed depiction of the nature of collaboration and participation and 
to further enhance my argument and choice, I needed to place myself in the context of 
this PAR. Positionality in terms of insider or outsider is central to all action research 
approaches. Thus, I followed Herr and Anderson’s (2005) insider–outsider continuum 
(Appendix I, Table 10). Within this spectrum, I was easily able to position myself as 
an insider researcher. Insider researchers engage in research within a community or 
organisation. As previously stated, I consider myself to be part of the accounting field 
and an insider in this community. My major goal was thus to address problems 
relating to this field and generate knowledge that could be fed back into the setting, 
resulting in improved practices. 
However, I recognised that I was probably not the only one interested in this 
research and its outcomes. Accounting has important implications and extensions, not 
only for accountants but for society in general. Also, nowadays it is very easy for 
individuals to invest in listed companies, so they need to be familiar with the issues I 
aimed to examine, and with my views and beliefs about IFRS. In this respect, I again 
followed Coghlan and Brannick (2005), who suggest that it is important to distinguish 
between the researcher and the system in and on which the research is taking place. I 
needed to clarify my role. Through their deep analysis and examples, Coghlan and 
Brannick (2005) further define these concepts. The system refers to a large 
organisation, community, department or unit, while the role is determined by whether 
the researcher is committed to organisational or self-study. In this respect, they 
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indicate that there may be a range of such combinations, distinguishing a commitment 
to intended self-study in action by the researcher and/or the system. They formulate 
four possible cases, as described in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Interaction between researcher and system 
Source: Coghlan and Brannick (2005) 
In examining this table, I could situate myself in all quadrants. For example, I was 
using a survey methodology, and I aimed to examine pre-identified issues (Coghlan 
and Brannick, 2005), making me part of the first and second choices respectively. 
Therefore, I considered it appropriate to focus first on the edges, to better define my 
intention and eliminate my choices. For this case, however, I needed to identify 
myself as an insider researcher and at the same time a participant in a doctoral 
programme. Concerning the researcher continuum, as already described, my initial 
intention was to position myself at the intended self-study edge. In participating in 
this programme, I aimed to critically reflect on myself in action (Schon, 1983), to 
improve my professional practice and engage myself in examining assumptions that 
have unfolded during my career. 
In addition, the system continuum was more complicated, and it was therefore 
hard for me to decide. I did not want to limit my view and the outcomes of the 
research to a restricted audience, but aimed to communicate my findings to a broader 
context. These opportunities for extension would help me to provide suggestions for 




Intended self-study in action 
No intended self-study in action 
1. Traditional 
research approaches: 
collection of survey 
data, ethnography, 
case study 





engaged in reflective 












approaches (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005) toward the implementation of IFRS, 
resulting in the selection of the fourth quadrant. However, this assumes that the 
system is deliberately engaged in study in action to undertake transformational 
changes, which in my case does not happen. On the basis of all this information, I 
located my project in the third quadrant, which denotes a self-study in action for the 
researcher but not for the system (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). This combination 
seemed to cover my intentions for this study, and promised to help me better employ 
the cycles of action research described in the next sub-sections. 
 
3.5.2 Action research cycles and phases 
As already described, action research seeks to detect, describe, explain, act on and 
improve the examined field. There are variations between action research models, as 
some researchers describe their process as cycles of reflective action, some as flow 
diagrams and some as spirals of action (McNiff et al., 1996), depending on which 
aspects they aim to emphasise. However, most are cyclical in nature (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002), involving a reflective approach, while each cycle centres around 
reviewing the desired change. The key stages remain planning, acting, observing and 
reflecting (Zuber-Skerritt, 1992), but over the years many researchers have introduced 
differentiations. For example, Cousin (2009) identifies a formal reconnaissance stage 
to describe the condition prior to the context and purpose of the research (Coghlan 
and Brannick, 2010). In this respect, I was likely to engage in the traditional action 
research spiral of iterative cycles of planning, acting, observing and reflecting (Lewin, 
1948). 
This spiral process was crucial for my work, but as I had to deal with real-world 
accounting issues, I needed to add more actions into the classical cycle steps to enable 
me to explain my empirical survey and hypotheses. I therefore combined Mills’s 
(2003) model, Susman’s (1983) Lewin-enhanced model, and McNiff et al.’s (1996) 
and McNiff’s (1998) models, formulating an action research process that involved 
identifying the problem, an proposing action plan, selecting action steps, planning 
data collection and data gathering, while at the end of the cycle I could draw 
conclusions and communicate my findings. Therefore, I applied the steps of an 
empirical survey, as described in Section 3.4.1, within each cycle of my action 
research process, and linked these actions in a spiral of cycles. Thus, I produced 
immediate results as I worked toward completing the project. I enhanced the fluidity 
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between stages and increased the feedback within the model cycles (Elliott, 1991). 
Overall, my action plan consisted of three main cycles, as illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Cycles of my action plan 
Cycle I:  






cases under IFRS in 
Australia, Germany, 
Greece and the UK. 
Plan: 
Examine listed firms from these countries under IFRS and 
compare the results with old GAAP. 
Find models that would add new knowledge to earnings 
management techniques and would have practical interest. 
 Formulate hypotheses 
Collect data and calculate ratios 
Run the models 
Evaluate the results and state whether the hypotheses hold 
Reflect 
Cycle II: 





Effect and impact of the 
introduction of IFRS in 
the US. 
Plan: 
Examine companies that follow IFRS and are listed in the 
US. 




Collect data and calculate ratios 
Run the models 
Evaluate the results and state whether the hypotheses hold 
Reflect 
Cycle III: 






Impact of the last crisis 
on IFRS and US GAAP 
 
Plan: 
Examine the financial sector for earnings management under 
IFRS. 




Final reflection along with previous results 




This cycle could be divided into two sub-cycles. Initially, I was motivated by the 
literature and my working experience as an accountant in Greece, so I was concerned 
to examine IFRS implementation in Greece. As I had examined the post-adoption 
effects of IFRS in Greece for my master’s dissertation, I had already detected several 
interesting gaps in the literature, which I aimed to fill. Therefore, I intended to 
examine any falsified statements (FFS) under IFRS, to compare them with the 
previous national GAAP, and to examine individual IFRS standards to determine 
which might be engaged in earnings management. I also formulated an additional 
hypothesis for insider-trading activities, because as a market professional I have seen 
many suspicious cases of stock performance linked with insider trading. I collected 
the data and analysed them through statistical models. However, I realised that my 
sample did not provide a comparative analysis of other countries. Regarding this 
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objective, I recognised a need to examine additional countries to better estimate IFRS 
performance. My choice was closely related to my work; thus, as explained in 
Chapter 1, I also included Australia, Germany and the UK in my sample. 
Taking advantage of this opportunity, I added supplementary examination models. 
For this reason, I decided to conduct an extended literature review in order to find 
better proxies for FFS calculation that were adjusted to my parameters, and to 
consider longitudinal analysis of accruals, auditors’ opinions and the cost of capital. 
Therefore, I was able to formulate my three final hypotheses for this cycle and run my 
models. Analysis and evaluation of my results revealed that the problem of this cycle 
had been fully answered. However, I did not find supporting evidence for IFRS 
implementation in the US. As many insist that IFRS effectiveness relates to external 
enforcement, such as national laws and regulations, I realised that it would be 
particularly interesting to determine whether IFRS performed better in the US than in 
other countries. For this reason, I proceeded with the next cycle of action research, 
and formulated additional hypotheses to examine IFRS performance in the US and 
document another crucial issue during IFRS implementation. 
Cycle II 
Through this cycle, I aimed to evaluate the effects of IFRS implementation in the 
US. This is undeniably important for IFRS, as they have been accepted into one of the 
biggest stock markets globally. The actions of this cycle were the same as before. I 
searched the literature for hypotheses and gained feedback from data on firms listed 
on the US stock market but following IFRS. The results of this cycle provided 
examples of how IFRS performs outside Europe. This added another parameter to my 
study, a comparison between IFRS and US GAAP, simultaneously contributing 
important information to the next phase. Indeed, in 2008, as the crisis broke out, I was 
already working as a stock trader, so my first thought was that, apart from the system 
that seemed to have collapsed, IFRS was responsible for many issues. This led me to 
consider what would have been the case if countries had still had their old GAAP or if 
they had followed US GAAP instead. This cycle therefore added information to 
enable consideration and comparison of IFRS and US GAAP under crisis, as 
described in the next cycle. 
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Cycle III 
The objective of this final cycle was to compare and examine the performance of 
IFRS and US GAAP under crisis situations. Having distilled all the necessary 
information from the previous phases, I was prepared for this final step. The only 
challenge of this stage was to locate interesting and relevant literature, as it was a 
contemporary issue and few researchers had yet focused on it. However, I combined 
my expertise as a stock analyst and prepared my models, enabling me to examine the 
last three hypotheses, again based on secondary data from accounting figures. Overall, 
throughout these cycles, I managed to establish a total of nine hypotheses that 
addressed interesting and contemporary issues, as distilled from the adoption of IFRS 
over time. My findings would help me to answer many inquiries arising during my 
working life, and would therefore improve my professional perspective. 
 
3.5.3 Limitations 
In seeking to minimise any possible negative implications resulting from my 
process design, it seemed that by combining empirical survey with action research, I 
would be able to eliminate any disadvantages of both approaches. I established a 
distinct set of data, and in formulating hypotheses, I overcame the limited potential 
for generalisation associated with action research (Adelman, 1993). However, it was 
impossible to avoid the natural limitations of this research approach. Hence, although 
studies that follow this paradigm and methodology offer many advantages for 
financial disciplines, they tend to produce less detailed information (De Vaus, 1986). 
Therefore, my research was too focused on hypothesis testing and structured data 
processes that might ignore creative thinking. Relationships between variables were 
simply observed and identified, not manipulated. Moreover, I did not establish the 
causation of variables, but simply managed to reveal the truth of numbers. Finally, 
individual realities and motives concerning accounting regulations and firms’ 
performance are not depicted in this research. 
 
3.5.4 My role in the research 
I had previously had little experience of action research. My previous research had 
been based on classical methodologies. In quantitative studies that analyse secondary 
data, researchers are objective observers who have little agency in the study. They 
aim to retain the objectivity of quantitative research, meaning that they seek not to 
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influence any aspects of it. Such researchers attempt to remain detached from the 
study, the sample and the data. They try not to manipulate it with their own personal 
values, perspectives and experiences, as such involvement might cause bias effects 
and lead to poor scientific results and deviation from the quantitative standpoint. In 
this respect, my role in previous research had been typical, namely gathering all the 
data necessary to perform statistical procedures and set out the results. However, as 
part of this programme, I had an opportunity to conduct more pragmatic research. 
Indeed, in adopting the survey approach, I tried to maintain highly objective 
standards, as previously described, but also to follow an action research approach. I 
was involved in the research strategy, as it enabled me to use my professional 
experience and tacit knowledge as a sound basis for methods and hypotheses. 
I formulated my hypotheses based not only on the literature but also on my 
professional needs and considerations, so that the outcomes might improve my 
professional practice and evolution. I was able to apply my sense of real practical 
IFRS problems, and thus, as Costley and Armsby (2007, p.132) suggest, to provide 
tangible meaning to the accounting community, evidenced through observable and 
measurable data. Furthermore, I detected emergent approaches that might strengthen 
the analytical models, and improved the data collection methods by formulating 
screening criteria. In this respect, I used my working connections to contact and 
access companies’ annual reports where needed, and was also able, through my work, 
to access numerous global financial databases that an outsider researcher might have 
difficulty accessing. With regard to the above arguments, I contributed to this project 
through my professional knowledge, my implicit understanding of the concepts 




This chapter has outlined the philosophy, methodological design and strategy of 
the research. Having clarified my ontological and epistemological considerations, I 
was able to identify myself as a pragmatist researcher and have given detailed reasons 
for my choice of approach. It was crucial for me to characterise myself as a pragmatist 
researcher, as this helped me to consider more practical inquiries that would depict 
my professional problems. This enabled me to better define my research strategy, 
which I have justified, combining action research with empirical survey. The cycle 
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process helped me to transform my considerations into practical problems, and 
facilitated my statistical analysis. Indeed, whenever I identified inappropriate statistics 
or models that might lead to statistical inaccuracy, I provided the necessary feedback 
on the procedure and re-started my analysis. In this way, I managed to solve a 
problem with my FFS models in my first hypothesis. Consequently, I was ready to 
proceed to the main analysis, which is described in the next chapter, including data 
collection tools and analysis techniques. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROJECT ACTIVITY 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the principal activities of my project. My first step was to 
determine the collection methods for my raw data. I then proceeded to identify my 
models’ variables. More specifically, I applied financial ratios formulated from the 
companies’ financials. Thus, I emphasised quantitative variables that could easily be 
transformed and subjected to statistical analysis. I was then able to implement my 
three action research cycles, in which I formulated a total of nine hypotheses, based 
on my final research questions that emerged from the background to the project, my 
engagement with the literature and my professional knowledge. I selected models for 
each hypothesis, so each hypothesis expressed a specific problem connected with 
IFRS implementation, and resulted in specific outcomes concerning IFRS 
performance. In this way, I was able to enhance my theoretical and practical 
knowledge of accounting. Figure 2 summarises the process and methods I used to 
transform my aims into outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 2: Linking aims, methods and outcomes 
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4.1 Research Methods 
This section introduces the process of analysing my initial raw data to prepare to 
formulate variables for my main analysis. Methods refer to techniques used to acquire 
and analyse data (Hay, 2002). In this section, I refer to both data collection tools and 
data analysis procedures, and both qualitative and quantitative notions also apply to 
the methods. I have already described their meaning in research design, but in this 
section, these terms refer to collection and analysis (McMillan and Schumacher, 
2006). Quantitative collection methods include written or narrative details other than 
numbers (Blaxter et al., 1996). They typically involve observations, interviews and 
questionnaires, opinions or public documents (Sprinthall et al., 1991), and in some 
cases researchers’ impressions and reactions (Myers, 2009). Quantitative gathering 
methods, on the other hand, focus on numerical data. They emphasise large-scale and 
representative sets of information with pre-validated measures to enable the numbers 
to be readily analysed and interpreted (Aliaga and Gunderson, 2000). Various means 
of collection are used, such as questionnaires and sampling. Thus, many tools, 
including questionnaires, are common to both methods, but the nature of the data 
differentiates them. 
Furthermore, data can also be categorised as primary or secondary, which has 
additional effects on the selection of collection strategies. Primary data are those 
observed or collected by the researcher for the first time, while secondary data are 
those that have already been published or collected (Saunders et al., 2007). Thus, this 
distinction inevitably further defines the methods, as it is impossible to gather 
secondary data from questionnaires or primary data from published sources. Finally, 
analysis methods are also separated into quantitative methods, where the data are 
objectively measured and statistically processed, and qualitative methods, which refer 
to non-statistical analysis techniques. There are many different methods of data 
collection and analysis, and researchers can apply various combinations, for example 
combining multi-methods or mixed methods of collection with multi- or mixed 
methods of analysis (Saunders et al., 2007). However, I applied quantitative methods 
at both levels, since I used only numerical data, meaning values measured as 
quantities. Finally, another critical issue that researchers must consider has to do with 
the time horizon of the research. Cross-sectional studies focus on one point in time, 
whereas time series use data over a given period (Greene, 1993). I used both methods 
according to the needs of each hypothesis. 
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4.1.1 Data sample 
In Chapter 1, I justified my decision to examine Australia, Germany, Greece, the UK 
and the US. In this section, I provide additional details. My data sample can be 
divided into three sub-categories. 
a) In comparing IFRS and old national GAAP, I focused on Australia, Germany, 
Greece and the UK. I included all companies that had shares listed on the stock 
markets of these countries. Following previous research (Leuz et al., 2003; Kwan, 
2003; Lin and Paananen, 2006), I excluded the financial sector, i.e. banks, and 
insurance and investment companies. In this way, I increased the homogeneity of 
my data, as financial firms must follow additional enforcement protocols that 
might affect IFRS implementation. I also excluded firms that had been delisted 
during the examined period, and firms that were early adopters, meaning they had 
adopted IFRS before the official year of 2005, as they had an advantage compared 
with normal adopters and this might affect the results. Furthermore, I detected 
many cases of firms listed simultaneously on various stock markets, such as on 
both the London and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges. Hence, to avoid double-listed 
firms, I examined such firms only in the stock market of the country in which they 
had their official head office. In contrast to many previous studies that have used 
small samples, my research sought to investigate most listed companies of the 
aforementioned countries, in order to avoid any sampling bias. Overall, a total of 
1,366 listed companies was examined for the period 2004–2009. This analysis 
period was chosen to integrate the impact of IFRS implementation and their 
improvements, as well as the first consequences of the global financial crisis of 
2008. 
b) Regarding the comparison between IFRS and US GAAP, this dataset was simpler. 
I examined companies that were not American but had shares listed on the US 
stock markets (NYSE, NASDAQ). I focused only on these foreign-listed firms 
which used to follow US GAAP but had transitioned to IFRS after the SEC 
granted permission to do so. Thus, an additional 216 firms were detected and 
examined from 2006 to 2008. Financial firms were also excluded in this case. 
c) Finally, regarding the effects of the crisis on accounting regimes, the analysis 
focused only on companies from the financial sector composed of the banking 
industry, insurance companies and shadow banking. I included firms from 
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Australia, Germany, Greece, the UK and the US, and collected information on 679 
financial institutions for the period 2009–2013. 
I settled on these time frames because I aimed to capture IFRS performance 
surrounding specific events. These events, as already described, were official IFRS 
adoption in 2005, IFRS in the US in 2007, and the crisis effects in 2008. Following 
the literature, I decided to expand my examination to a year before and after this 
timeframe. This would reduce bias by examining long-term IFRS performance. An 
appropriate timeframe was therefore essential. For example, Stenheim and Madsen 
(2017) exhibit different results for the same country, in contrast to Gjerde et al. (2008) 
who examine a shorter period of firm-year observations. Finally, I assumed that the 
fiscal year of each company was a full year. This is important because most firms in 
Australia prefer to release mid-term financial statements. Analytical details of all 
three sample categories are provided in Appendix II, Table 1, while data issues that 
emerged during the analysis are described in the next sub-section. 
 
4.1.2 Collection and analysis tools 
In view of the nature of the sample and the purpose of the study, I implemented 
quantitative gathering methods for secondary data. I needed raw and compiled data 
that would provide or could be transformed into numerical information for statistical 
analysis (Kervin, 1999). For this reason, I first focused on databases such as Amadeus 
and Screener, but since they did not provide all the data needed, I searched separately 
for each firm’s financials. In these cases, I also had recourse to economic websites 
such as Bloomberg, MarketWatch, Morningstar and The Financial Times, and 
databases such as Factiva and LexisNexis to access companies’ announcements, find 
their official websites, and download firms’ annual reports and statements. I also 
focused on detailed information from the footnotes of annual reports and firms’ 
disclosures and announcements. I manually collected the information, and in certain 
circumstances referred by hand to quarterly financial statements, especially in my 
examination of the effects of the crisis. Analytical details of both the specific data I 
needed and their sources are provided in Appendix II, Table 2. 
Through all these standardised procedures, I not only increased the already high 
reliability and validity of the data, but managed to collect all data, with no missing 
cases in the ensuing statistical process. Finally, to store and analyse the data, I used 
Excel software, organised into Excel tables and categorised according to country, year 
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and fundamental category. I needed the data to be grouped and easily accessed. I 
checked for double recording issues, and ensured that there were no missing cases. 
However, there were cases where firms had zero data, such as companies that did not 
distribute any dividend. I recorded zero in these circumstances, but highlighted these 
cells to draw my attention to them during the variable calculation process. 
 
4.2 Identification of Variables 
All projects in similar research areas support their analysis with variables. 
Variables depict characteristics of the examined subject, and should therefore be 
measured and monitored to extract valid results and conclusions. The selection and 
classification of variables was an essential step in my statistical process, since it 
defined to a great extent the statistical tests that had to be implemented. Therefore, I 
needed to understand the differences between types of variable to generate 
appropriate statistics and enhance my analysis models. Although many different 
methods could have been used to describe and categorise them, I identified my 
variables according to their level of measurement and their type within the statistical 
process (Saunders et al., 2007), always focusing on the needs of each hypothesis and 
previous similar research. 
1. Levels of variable measurement 
Although variables have specific levels of measurement, in some cases their 
categorisation may be confusing. In general, most research divides variables into two 
broad categories according to the level at which they can be measured. Categorical 
variables describe a characteristic of a data unit, the values of which cannot be 
measured numerically, whereas numerical variables have values that can be measured 
numerically as quantities (Saunders et al., 2007). Categorical variables can be further 
subdivided into ordinal (ranked) and nominal (descriptive). In the former, the values 
can be logically ordered or ranked (Blumberg et al., 2008), while in the latter, 
observations cannot be organised in a logical sequence. 
Furthermore, many statisticians consider nominal variables as a third separate sub-
category, which have only two values of data, referred to as dichotomous variables 
(Morris, 2003). Numerical variables can also be further subdivided as either 
continuous or discrete. A continuous variable is a numerical variable with 
observations that can have any value, whereas discrete variables can only take distinct 
and precise values, which must be integers (Dancey and Reidy, 2008). Alternatively, 
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numerical variables can be either interval or ratio. Interval variables cannot state the 
relative difference between two values, whereas ratio variables enable this difference 
to be stated. This is attributable to the fact that in the first case, the zero value does not 
represent a true zero (Krebs, 1972). 
However, in applying the statistical process, this categorisation may provoke 
problematic issues. Most statistical programs accept only numerical values, meaning 
that categorical data must be coded, which may lead to confusion between ordinal 
categorical and numerical discrete variables (Polgar and Thomas, 1995). However, 
the SPSS statistical program that I used has only three levels of measurement, namely 
scale, ordinal and nominal, and two categories, numerical and string data. In light of 
this, for my main analysis, I used numerical scale variables (Appendix II, Table 3), 
while any categorical variables were recorded numerically, as described in Section 
4.3. I thus excluded any unnecessary categorisation and focused the statistical process 
on identifying appropriate types of variable. 
2. Types of variable 
Identifying and selecting appropriate types of variable involves judgment in order 
to avoid flawed conclusions. It is critical to understand and appropriately manipulate 
types of variable in order to make correct inferences. Classifying variables according 
to type is relatively straightforward. Thus, when applied to research, variables are 
generally classified as independent or dependent (Dominowski, 1980). An 
independent variable is one that affects or causes an outcome. This outcome is the 
dependent variable that is influenced by the independent one. Furthermore, as 
contemporary research uses more complicated statistical procedures, there is a need to 
define additional types of variable to enable proper analysis and meaningful results. 
There are thus further variable types, such as confounding, moderating and mediating 
variables and variables of interest (Neuman and Robson, 2004).16 In my statistical 
analysis process, inputs into the research models consisted of continuous numerical 
independent variables used to compare the performance of dependent variables in 
parametric tests. In most cases, the dependent variables were categorical variables 
classified as dichotomous. Finally, I also used discrete independent variables, which 
                                                 
16 Confounding variables are those that influence the dependent variable. Moderator variables influence 
the relationship between two other variables, while a mediator explains the relationship between the 
two other variables (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Finally, variables that do not cause any correlation are 
labelled as variables of interest (Neuman and Robson, 2004). 
 119 
were used in some cases as moderator variables (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Details of 
the variables selected are given in descriptions of the tests for each hypothesis in 
Section 4.6, as well as in Appendix II, Table 3. 
 
4.3 Preliminary Analysis of Variables 
Having formulated the hypotheses and identified the variables, I needed to devise, 
analyse, organise, prepare and store these variables to proceed with the research. 
These actions had be detailed and carefully implemented, as they supported the main 
analysis and might permit greater confidence in the main findings. For this, I applied 
the following three steps (Saunders et al., 2016). The first step included the data 
layout. All variables were organised into tables and matrices based on country, year 
and hypothesis criteria. The data had to be correctly formulated and grouped 
according to the needs of each hypothesis, enhancing chronological and regional 
assessments. Files were split into separate sub-groups using the above patterns in such 
a way as to facilitate each case and to remove the need to re-enter the same data. 
These tables were saved in Excel files, with appropriate labels, while attention 
was given to a storage format that would be compatible with SPSS analysis software. 
The next step consisted of coding and transformation of the data to enable appropriate 
formulation and statistical preparation. Most variables were numerical. However, in 
some cases, it was necessary to recode the data using numerical codes, in order for 
them to be correctly recognised by the statistical program. I calculated a year dummy 
for logistic regressions, numerically coded the FFS firms and insiders’ trading 
positions, and coded auditors’ size. Furthermore, where needed, as in the first 
hypothesis, I transformed the data to prepare for longitudinal analysis. 
The final step included the maintenance of minimum data input quality according 
to the specific standards of each test, and a check of the sample to ensure that it was 
compatible for all years examined with the same measurement units. An appropriate 
data layout at the first stage and the fact that there were no missing raw data 
facilitated this step. The variables were filtered for any recording errors, focusing on 
illegitimate or misinterpreted cases. At the same time, I detected any cases of number 
omissions and/or inaccuracies, and deleted any repeated measurements. Data with 
numerical problems were not interpreted. In addition, owing to the large amount of 
data and because tests for linearity and normality were implemented in the principal 
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analysis of the final models, I checked for possible outliers, focusing only on any 
extreme values in my sample. 
At this preliminary stage, the skewed population had not been transformed 
through any statistical tools (Anderson, 2003). For all these error and outlier cases, I 
cross-checked the raw numbers again from additional resources to detect any 
misinterpretation. Thus, in my final variables sample, in which all these errors and 
irrelevant ratio data were coded as ‘999.8’, these were easily excluded from the tests. 
Finally, I also carried out statistical procedures at this stage (Polgar and Thomas, 
1995), as I calculated descriptive statistics for these variables to summarise, describe 
and present inferential characteristics of countries and firms (Sim and Wright, 2000). 
Overall, during this preliminary analysis, all the data were observed to be 
complete, legible, comprehensible and consistent. For this reason, the volume of data 
gathered and processed makes them difficult to present in tables; however, Appendix 
II, Table 4 displays a sample of ratios for the first 50 companies of each country 
examined, while files containing all my data and ratios are available on request. 
 
4.4 Accounting Data Estimation Models: Scientific and Practical Viewpoints 
Data analysis and estimation models in the accounting sector usually use 
quantitative analysis based on statistical models. Most researchers perform analysis 
on panel data, such as time series and pooled cross-sectional observations, and these 
models predominate because they provide better opportunities to answer financial 
research questions. For this reason, researchers use econometric models for 
hypothesis testing, mainly including linear regressions, univariate and multivariate 
time series models, logistic regressions, volatility models, standard fixed effects (FE) 
estimation and least-squares correlation (Kiviet, 1995; Bruno, 2005). These 
mathematical models are extremely valuable and necessary to transform theories into 
practical concerns, contributing to scientific examination, explanation and causation. 
Of course, choosing between them depends on the objectives of the analysis and the 
problems examined, in conjunction with the variables used. Thus, aiming to 
strengthen their statistical performance, researchers have established general 
scientifically approved models, such as discretionary accrual models, event study 
methods, cumulative abnormal returns estimation, and cost of equity capital 
estimation models. I explain these models in Section 4.6, as most were used in this 
study. 
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These models preserve the primary characteristics of methods generally applied in 
financial studies, namely statistical analysis and hypothesis testing, with slight 
variations from model to model and study to study. For example, Jones’s (1991) 
model is unable to detect significant variations in accruals. Thus, researchers have 
modified her accruals model (Dechow et al., 1995) to be regressed with cash flow 
from operations (Larcker and Richardson, 2004) or with prior-year returns on assets 
(Kothari et al., 2004). Nevertheless, these models are subject to similar limitations. 
Consequently, many researchers use DeFond and Park’s (2001) model, which is based 
on the firm’s separate accruals, avoiding any country bias. 
However, Houqe et al. (2016) estimate both methods and conclude that both 
DeFond and Park’s (2001) and Jones’s (1991) models, with respect to their metrics on 
the impact of IFRS, lead to similar findings. It seems, therefore, that many models, 
despite contributing to the evolution and accuracy of financial research, may give rise 
to scientific and practical concerns. Indeed, although they impose restrictive 
requirements on their implementation, various complexities and debates arise in 
empirical accounting research. Sample heterogeneity is a common problem in such 
projects (Wintoki et al., 2012), while correlation residuals and the potentially 
fractional nature of the dependent variable may lead to statistical bias and 
inconsistency (Nickell, 1981). This problem may be exacerbated by the performance 
of the independent variables, adding to the statistical insignificance of the model 
owing to the presence of residual autocorrelation, and leading to invalid results 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). All these problems may have significant implications for 
the outcomes of research. To overcome these scientific issues, and because 
accounting research is extremely sensitive to their estimation techniques, a growing 
number of recent studies combine the calculation of more proxies. Using 
simultaneous estimation methods for these models eliminates statistical risk, 
strengthens the presentation and responds to criticisms. 
Furthermore, in addition to the above scientific advantages and concerns, there are 
also considerable practical issues and empirical challenges. The methods may be 
impacted on by measurements and values or functional forms, leading to anticipation 
effects with practical concerns (Aubert and Dumontier, 2007). Indeed, in many cases, 
models have led to opposite results in practice. In this respect, research must consider 
the nature of the dataset along with any industry- and country-specific differences in 
business processes (Burgstahler et al., 2004). 
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Some studies perform accurate statistical analysis, but since they do not consider 
differences between characteristics of the examined country of the initial model and 
those of the corresponding country of their model, they generate inaccurate results in 
practice. This is highly important in accounting estimation models. The same 
considerations affect studies that fail to carefully select and distinguish models 
originating from continuous categorical variables for unbounded dependent variables, 
affecting the performance of the model (Loudermilk, 2007). Consequently, in many 
cases, multivariate analysis has been used with only one dependent variable. The time 
frame being examined may also have considerable practical effects. For example, 
some models insist on a short, specific event window (Daske et al., 2007), resulting in 
opposite outcomes on abnormal returns, while on many occasions, models have been 
used with a reference year that leads to ambiguous returns. For all these reasons, I 
aimed to carefully formulate and implement the following models. 
 
4.5 Data Analysis Models Selected for the Research 
For the main data analysis, I aimed to test data associations, to assess the strength 
of their relationships and differences, and to examine any trends, based on classical 
statistical methods (Tukey, 1977). As described previously, these methods focus on a 
number of parametric statistics and, more specifically, on univariate and multivariate 
statistical tests, such as Pearson’s correlation coefficient, binary and multinomial 
logistic regression analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis and 
multilevel models. In addition, independent sample F-tests and t-tests were performed 
to test the accuracy of the standard deviation and significance of the mean 
respectively, to contribute to the comparability of the index across values (Pallant, 
2005). Each test is useful for analysing specific value categories according to the 
needs of each hypothesis,17 and despite their differences, as parametric analysis 
methods they follow a number of shared assumptions, including levels of 
measurement and sample size requirements. 
In particular, the project considered the assumptions of linearity, normality, 
homogeneity and independence. Linearity refers to the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables, which should be linear and is easily examined 
                                                 
17 Logistic regression, for example, is useful in analysing categorical data, as the dependent variable is 
dichotomous and takes only two values, i.e. 0 and 1 (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). Multinomial 
regressions are appropriate for more than one explained variable, while linear regression cannot be 
used with categorical dependent variables. 
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through residual plots. Furthermore, the numerical data were examined to establish 
whether they followed a normal distribution. For this reason, the study employed 
Wilcoxon, skewness and kurtosis tests (Adams et al., 1999; Pallant, 2005). Although 
the sample was relatively large, applying the central limit theorem (Argyrous, 2006), 
the data were treated carefully because of possibly skewed distributions (Adams et al., 
1999). Outliers that might significantly affect the empirical results were excluded 
from the standardised residuals. Concerning the homogeneity of variance, I tested 
whether controlled and measured data had equal variances (homoscedasticity) or not 
(heteroscedasticity). The analysis software contains statistical tests for this purpose, 
and I used Levene’s (1960) test. Finally, particular attention was paid to the 
independence of measures, meaning the absence of correlation between two or more 
independent variables, to avoid collinearity or multicollinearity, respectively. 
Multicollinearity might potentially cause misinterpretation of the contribution of 
independent variables, as this makes it difficult to determine their separate effects, 
leading to numerical problems. Possible cases of multicollinearity were detected 
through examination of standard errors. A standard error larger than 2.0, excluding 
the constant, might indicate this problem (Wichers, 1975). 
All these methods were assessed according to the relative significance of the 
estimated coefficients (p-value < 0.01, two-tailed), and additional parameters were 
also measured. The parameters for logistic regressions were determined based on the 
maximum likelihood method, and diagnostic tests of significance were based on the 
Wald statistic. The Wald test evaluates whether the independent variable is 
statistically significant in differentiating between two groups. In addition, utility 
estimations were based on proportional by chance accuracy criteria, which were 
preferred over proportional reduction in error. These were computed by squaring and 
summing the proportion of cases for each group (Bayaga, 2010; El-Haib, 2012). For 
the OLS regression, a White test was performed, focusing on the correlation 
coefficients among the test variables and the R-squared measure. The predictive 
accuracy of the models and the consistency of the estimates were assessed in this way. 
Overall, this section has described the general framework of methods used to 
analyse the data and the assumptions that were satisfied in each case. Nevertheless, as 
the models relate to additional factors for each hypothesis, I separately examined 
these methods based on their individual needs. In the next sections, I provide further 
details of the structure of the variables and their preliminary analysis, along with 
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descriptions of the project’s specific models. In this respect, considering my sample 
and variables, and given the concerns described previously, I adopted several different 
models. Based on the needs of each hypothesis, I selected the best alternative methods 
for analysis, considering their practical applicability and scientific acceptance. 
Finally, I analysed these models through the SPSS statistical program, apart from Test 
2/H1, where I used STATA and the student’s version of HLM as they offered greater 
possibilities for longitudinal analysis. Brief points concerning the selected statistical 
tests are shown in Appendix II, Table 5, and specific details of the models are 
presented in the following sections, separately under the theme of each hypothesis. 
 
4.6 Hypothesis Development and Models 
4.6.1 Cycle I: IFRS versus old GAAP versus IFRS improvements 
The general framework of the three following hypotheses sought to compare IFRS 
with the old national GAAP of Australia, Germany, Greece and the UK. Considering 
also the amendments to IFRS (Appendix II, Table 6), I formulated the following 
hypotheses to detect which country performed better, as they previously exhibited 
significant differences (Appendix II, Table 7). This set of hypotheses aimed to answer 
the first set of initial research questions (Q1). 
H1: The introduction of IFRS has decreased falsified financial statements and 
improved auditing quality. 
This first hypothesis aimed to shed light on several issues originating from the 
official introduction of IFRS and relating to the manipulation of earnings. Although 
earnings management has been the most investigated theme since the introduction of 
IFRS, I aimed to initiate more critical values for its detection. Creative accounting and 
fictional finance have caused many scandals, even though in most cases it has been 
illegitimate and costly for investors. Thus, through this hypothesis, the research 
sought not only to discover any decrease in the number of firms with falsified 
financial statements (FFS), but also to detect specific increases or decreases in each 
firm’s accruals over a period of years. This is the first study to examine accruals in 
time series, and is also the first attempt to identify the individual standards that have 
an impact on earnings management. Of equal importance was my intention to 
contribute information to whether auditors displayed appropriate reflection in IFRS 
implementation, concerning their quality, technical capability, size and independence. 
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All listed firms are required to have their financial statements audited. Yearly 
forensic accounting procedures aim to provide stakeholders with an assurance of 
proper financial statements and discover any material misstatements or cases of fraud 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Thus, it is essential to detect whether big auditing companies have 
benefited from IFRS implementation or whether smaller auditors have managed to 
eliminate their distance, performing equally well in crucial matters such as accruals 
detection. In addition, as legislation concerning auditors’ reports differs among 
countries that follow IFRS, this was a good opportunity to test each country’s 
performance. This hypothesis is critical to IFRS implementation, with additional 
extensions that apply even in their convergence with US GAAP. Many consider that 
postponement of this venture was attributable to differences in auditors’ regulation, as 
US authorities provide more restricted and responsible roles for auditors than IFRS. 
Thus, I ran the next tests. 
TEST 1: Falsified financial statements (FFS) and IFRS 
The project aimed to detect any decrease in FFS following the adoption of IFRS 
and to specify financial ratios that might affect this phenomenon. Focusing on 
auditors’ opinions for each year, authorities’ reports and Altman’s Z-score, I 
classified each company for every year as FFS or not.18 For FFS, I noted companies 
with reports giving a qualified auditors’ opinion, companies that had been involved in 
fraud cases and companies with negative or extremely low Altman’s Z scores. 
Altman’s Z-score is used to determine the likelihood of a company going bankrupt. 
For public companies, the Z-score is calculated as follows (Altman, 1968, 1983): 
Z = 1.2*(Working Capital / Total Assets) + 1.4*(Retained Earnings / Total Assets) + 
3.3*(Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets) + 0.6*(Value of Equity / Book 
Value of Total Liabilities) + 1.0*(Sales/ Total Assets)    (1) 
Having calculated this possibility for each firm and each year, I performed the next 
two sub-tests. 
                                                 
18 For this test, I initially considered following Spathis’s (2002) FFS equation. However, I noticed that 
my results based on this model, or on similar methods as referred to by Dalnial et al. (2014), such as 
multilayer perceptron neural network (MLP), probabilistic neural network (PNN) and radial basic 
functions network (RBF), did not produce accurate results for the purposes of this project, as I had to 
formulate new equations for every examined year. This would have been time-consuming, with 
unpredictable accuracy. Thus, I preferred to manually select the possibility of a firm having FFS. 
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a) In the first sub-test, I tested the next multinomial logistic regression to detect any 
FFS decrease over the years of IFRS implementation: 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 Sizei,t + a2 Investmenti,t + a3 Growthi,t + a4 Profitabilityi,t + a5 
Liquidityi,t + a6 Leveragei,t + a7 FFSi,t + ei,t     (2) 
where, RRi,t is equal to 0 for 2004, 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006, etc., and FFSi,t is a 
dummy for FFS that takes a value of 1 if falsified and 0 otherwise; for other 
variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; ei,t is the error term. 
The project implemented this regression type, as it aimed to follow firms’ 
performance for several years (2004–2009) so as to include the effects of adoption 
in 2005 and any crisis effect in 2008. For this, I chose 2004 as the reference year. 
A negative FFS value would indicate a decrease in FFS. 
b) Moving a step further, I examined the association of firms’ ratios with FFS. The 
following binary logistic regression was performed: 
FFSi,t = a0 + a1 Sizei,t + a2 Investmenti,t + a3 Growthi,t + a4 Profitabilityi,t + a5 
Liquidityi,t + a6 Leveragei,t +  ei,t       (3) 
where FFSi,t is a dummy for FFS that takes a value of 1 if falsified and 0 
otherwise; for other variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; ei,t is the error term. 
This model contributed to the profiling of differences in a number of critical 
ratios between FFS and non-FFS firms over a period of six years (2004–2009). 
TEST 2: Longitudinal analysis of accruals 
One significant conclusion from my engagement with the literature was the fact 
that earnings management continues to be a contemporary issue and that most 
researchers accept the correlation between accruals and earnings management. Thus, 
many papers suggest that under IFRS, discretionary accruals are lower as a result of 
more transparent transactions (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2007; Jermakowicz and 
Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). However, as they all focus on cross-sectional 
procedures, they usually detect the average effects of the variables examined. 
Therefore, the results are often mixed, and it is impossible to determine firms’ 
individual accruals performance over a period. Through this test, I aimed to fill this 
gap, as I attempted to observe firm-by-firm accruals over a period of six years (2004–
2009). 
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This test enabled me to detect whether firms that managed to lower their accruals 
under IFRS adoption preserved this capacity during the crisis, and vice versa. The 
first step in this test was to determine an appropriate method for accruals calculation. 
Most models separate accruals into non-discretionary (normal) and discretionary 
(abnormal). The absolute value of the abnormal component determines the quality of 
earnings, meaning that the larger the absolute value of discretionary accruals, the 
lower the quality of earnings. This study used the residuals of the following regression 
as discretionary accruals (DAC), based on the Jones’s (1991) model (see also Bartov 
et al., 2001; Kothari et al., 2004): 
ACi,t = a0 (1/Ai,t-1) + a1 REVi,t + a2 PPEi,t + e i,t     (4) 
where ACi,t is accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets (total assets in year t-1); 
accruals equal the annual change in current assets (excluding cash) minus current 
liabilities (excluding short-term debt and income tax payable) minus depreciation; 
Ai,t-1 is the total assets in year t-1; REVi,t is the annual change in revenues in year t 
scaled by lagged total assets; PPEi,t is property, plant and equipment in year t scaled 
by lagged total assets; and ei,t is the error term. As previously noted, all variables in 
the model are scaled by lagged assets, meaning assets from the previous year, to 
reduce heteroscedasticity (Jones, 1991). In general, a high level of discretionary 
accruals would indicate relatively low earnings quality. 
For the main examination of this hypothesis, multilevel analysis was used.19 The 
model was decomposed into two parts (Level 1 and Level 2), following studies by 
Liang and Bentler (2004), Longford and Muthen (1992) and Yuan and Bentler (2007). 
The Level 1 model represents the amount of change for a specific individual (firm) 
over the time period of the study, while the Level 2 model represents the relationship 
between Level 1 growth parameters and time-invariant characteristics of the 
individuals. More specifically, I implemented the following model: 
Level-1: yi,t = π0,i + π1,i (Timei,t) + π2,i (TimeGroupi,t) + ei,t    (5) 
                                                 
19 I came to this decision for two reasons. First, multilevel methods present a number of advantages 
concerning assumptions, such as linearity, normality and independence of observations, compared with 
similar traditional models such as repeated measures ANOVA (Garson, 2013). This elasticity was 
essential for my sample. Second, traditional statistical procedures assess changes in only one type of 
variable (intra-individual or inter-individual) in a time frame, while multilevel modelling offers the 
ability to simultaneously assess both types (Laird and Ware, 1982). In this way, I enforced the FFS 
results of the previous Test 1 by adding this parameter to the Level 2 test. 
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where yi,t is the criterion variable for individual i at time t; π0,i is the intercept for 
individual i; π1,i is the slope for individual i; Timei,t is an explanatory variable (as time 
is used as an explanatory variable at Level 1, this model is conceptualised as 
longitudinal; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002); π2,i is the regression weighting for 
explanatory variable TimeGroupit; TimeGroupi,t is an additional dummy explanatory 
variable (0 for the period 2004–2006 and 1 for the period 2007–2009); and ei,t is the 
error term. 
Level-2: π0,i = β0,0 + β0,1 (FFSi,t ) + r0,i       (6) 
     π1,i = β1,0 + r1,i 
where π0,i is the intercept for individual i; π1,i is the slope for individual i; β0,0 is the 
population intercept for individual i; β0,1 is the difference in population intercept for a 
change in FFS; FFSi,t is the dummy variable for FFS from Test 1; β1,0 is the 
population slope; r0,i is the unique effect for individual i on the intercept; and r1,i is the 
unique effect for individual i on the slope. 
Τhe Level 2 model consists of two equations: π1,i depicts the Level 1 change 
coefficients and π0,i the Level 2 change. In this equation, I added the FFS variable as a 
time-invariant predictor because I aimed to examine the interaction of FFS with the 
individual change intercept rather than the slope. I also intended to detect the 
relationship between accruals and FFS firms throughout the examined period, rather 
than for separate time groups. Thus, I considered that there would be no implications 
if I did not include the TimeGroupi,t explanatory variable in the Level 2 model. The 
full model is as follows: 
Full model: yi,t = [β0,0 + β0,1 (FFSi,t) + r0,i ] + [β1,0 + r1,i(Timei,t)]+ ei,t  (7) 
All variables have already been defined, and I estimated the nine parameters of the 
full model using restricted maximum likelihood (REML).20 
                                                 
20 In general, likelihood models seek to estimate the probability of a parameter for a given outcome. 
The REML approach differs from maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in considering that some 
parameters have little importance for the model. It uses transformed data to eliminate the effects of 
these parameters and then calculates the likelihood function, whereas ML does this for all parameters 
(Upton and Cook, 2014). Overall, REML seems to produce more accurate estimates of random 
variances, while ML is appropriate for fixed regression parameters (Twisk, 2006). 
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TEST 3: To what extent do individual standards impact on earnings management? 
Having examined firm-by-firm accruals performance in the previous test, it 
seemed interesting to examine the individual standards that had the most effect. As 
referred to before and applied in this case, most studies examine specific variables to 
detect earnings management, without considering separate standards that might affect 
these values. I aimed to contribute to the literature in this way, as this is the first study 
to correlate accruals with the materiality of the impact caused by each standard and 
the frequency with which these individual standards appear to affect earnings 
management. Based on Tsalavoutas and Evans (2007) and similar studies, I assessed 
the partial index to compare two consecutive years of IFRS implementation.21 I was 
thus able to consider which particular standards correlated most with creative 
accounting practices, and whether any of their amendments had been effective. The 
research focused on firms that provided information in their statements in relation to 
the financial measures that I aimed to examine. More specifically, my analysis was 
based on a partial index of materiality, as introduced by Gray (1980) and proposed by 








        (8) 
where PI (DAC)i,j,t is the partial index of materiality for item j to accruals of company 
i at time t; PAi,t is the partial adjustment, meaning the difference between the amount 
of individual standards in years t and t-1; and DACi,t-1 is the discretionary accruals of 
company i at time t-1. If the partial index equals 0, the individual standard has no 
impact on accruals; if the index assumes a value greater than 0, this indicates that 
accruals have increased, so there has been a negative impact of this standard for my 
analysis; and if the result is lower than 0, this indicates a positive impact. 
The index was calculated for each country for the years 2005–2009. I excluded 
2004, as I aimed to focus only on the IFRS period. Materiality was divided into five 
categories according to the mean and standard deviation of the examined parameters. 
Finally, to develop my dataset of the individual standards examined, I focused on 
                                                 
21 Most research that applies partial index methods focuses on reconciliation statements to detect 
individual standards’ effects on shareholders’ equity and net income for a specific year. In my research, 
rather than reconciliation statements, I focused on two different years; and rather than shareholders’ 
equity or net income, I examined accruals. 
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direct and indirect measures that affect discretionary accruals calculation according to 
the literature. Thus, I detected any separate standards that influenced these measures 
to complete my dataset (Appendix III, Table 6). 
TEST 4: Auditors’ size and quality of financial statements 
Many studies in the second phase of the literature review expressed concern about 
the qualifications of accountants and auditors to enable them to respond to the 
requirements of the new standards. However, after the official IFRS adoption, these 
concerns reduced. Therefore, through this test I aimed to re-surface this issue by 
determining the relationship between auditors and earnings management, taking into 
account cases where auditors changed. 
a) Previous studies focusing on auditing firms separate their samples according to 
size. This is a common practice that has led to the adoption of two categories: the 
Big 4 audit firms comprising the four largest firms, and the non-Big 4 auditors 
that include the remaining companies.22 The research followed this categorisation 
to answer the question of whether, following IFRS implementation and the 
outbreak of the crisis, an auditor’s size was still a factor that might eliminate 
earnings management. Early studies conclude that larger audit firms place greater 
constraints on earnings management (Burgstahler et al., 2004). However, given 
that my dataset contained a different profile of auditors, it seemed interesting to 
compare countries where listed firms tend to put their trust in companies other 
than the Big 4, such as Greece, with countries where Big 4 auditors are in the 
majority, as in the UK. For this, the following linear regression model was used: 
DACi,t = a0 + a1 DVi,t + a2 DVi,t Sizeii,t + a3 DVi,t Profitabilityi,t + a4 DVi,t 
Leveragei,t + ei,t         (9) 
where DACi,t is discretionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional Jones 
(1991) model; DVi,t is a dummy variable representing whether a company has a 
big auditor; DVi,t equals 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 company and 0 
otherwise; DVi,tSizei,t is the size ratio as described in Appendix III, Table 1, 
multiplied by DVi,t (used to examine the impact of auditors’ size on the 
association between discretionary accruals and firm size); DVi,tProfitabilityi,t is the 
                                                 
22 The Big 4 refers to the four largest accounting firms in the world: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd 
(DTTL), Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), Ernst and Young (E&Y) and Klynveld Peat Marwick 
Goerdeler (KPMG). All other companies are characterised as non-Big 4 auditors. 
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profitability ratio as described in Appendix III, Table 1, multiplied by DVi,t (used 
to examine the impact of auditors’ size on the association between discretionary 
accruals and profitability); DVi,tLeveragei,t is the leverage ratio as described in 
Appendix III, Table 1, multiplied by DVi,t (used to examine the impact of 
auditors’ size on the association between discretionary accruals and leverage); and 
ei,t is the error term. 
b) An equally important consideration relating to earnings management is auditors’ 
rotation. From my working experience, I have noticed that a longstanding 
business relationship with auditors may lower auditors’ reflectiveness. Therefore, 
a change in auditor may decrease fraud motives, suggesting that a more rapid 
mandatory change would result in cost reductions and a decrease in Big-4 
dominance, but most importantly in increased quality. I followed the previous 
regression model (9) to detect whether firms that had rotated their auditors had 
lower accruals. The DVi,t value equals 1 for firms that had changed their auditors 
and 0 for firms that had not. The remaining variables remain the same as in 
Equation 9. 
H2: Under IFRS firms demonstrate a decrease in speculative insider-trading 
cases 
Phase III of the literature review revealed that earnings management may increase 
a firm’s stock value (Jiraporn et al., 2008). This is attributable to the fact that stock 
markets reflect companies’ financials, meaning that the higher the reposting results, 
the better the firm’s market performance (Junttila et al., 2005). Most research 
considers this correlation to be one-way, as described, but as a market participant, I 
believed it might also work in the opposite direction. Thus, an increase in a 
company’s stock value may increase its financials. An additional parameter was 
required to examine this claim: insider trading activity. Insider trading is the 
involvement in a transaction of a person with a close interest in the firm, such as a 
director, officer, senior manager, employee or associate, as well as other relevant 
persons connected to them, such as family members. In general, these dealings are 
legal and, in many cases, necessary, as long as there is no misuse of privileged 
information. However, insider trading started to have negative connotations after its 
correlation with financial misstatements, accounting manipulation and scandals. There 
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seemed to be a gap in the regulations on information that firms reveal publicly, and in 
some cases firms used reinstatement processes to hide their managers’ insider trading. 
For this reason, IFRS increased obligatory disclosures of stakeholders’ and 
stockholders’ market activity, no longer allowing them to take advantage of any 
internal information. Many consider that this enforcement of insider trading may 
increase the transparency of financial information (Hail et al., 2014; Christensen et al., 
2016). Nevertheless, in recent years there has been an increase in indications of 
insider information and privileged access to important data. Indeed, there are even 
cases where insiders have engaged in suspicious transactions, for instance buying 
stocks before an important announcement. An unexpected increase in directors’ 
buying activity may suggest fraudulent dealing, especially if it is accompanied by a 
share price increase. The restrictive laws on investor protection that followed IFRS, 
forcing top managers to make their holdings public, among other things, seem to have 
resulted in little improvement.23 Advance knowledge may prove crucial because stock 
market participants need to know about cases of insider trading to make their trading 
decisions, although it is hard to detect in time. 
Thus, the following tests examined the effectiveness of this measure, determining 
firms’ performance under IFRS compared with old GAAP, as well as identifying 
insiders’ activity in stock markets and evaluating whether insiders used this as a tool 
to increase the company’s value or financials, or both. The first two sets of tests 
concentrated on the comparison between IFRS and old GAAP, so I focused on the 
period 2004–2006, while the third set focused from 2007 to 2009 to include any crisis 
effects. I considered directors, officers, senior managers, employees and associates, as 
well as others closely related to them, as insiders. Finally, for all relevant tests, I 
estimated both purchases and disposals by insiders.24 
TEST 1a: Decrease in insiders’ purchases under IFRS 
In order to examine the performance of insiders’ purchases, I estimated the 
following logistic regression: 
                                                 
23 There is huge variance in legal sanctions between countries concerning insider trading, from 10-year 
sentences in the US to two years in France. The US has the longest and strictest history of insider 
trading regulations and is considered to have influenced other countries (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 
2002). 
24 In order to adequately outline the performance of insider trading, the research focused on both 
purchases and disposals by insiders, although many studies insist that stock purchases rather than sales 
are more likely to be led by new information concerning firms’ future prospects, sending a stronger 
signal of possible fraud (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). 
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RRi,t = a0 + a1 HBVALUEi,t + a2 LBVALUEi,t + a3 Sizei,t + a4 Profitabilityi,t + a5 
Leveragei,t +  ei,t                   (10) 
where RRi,t is a dummy variable indicating the examination year, equalling 0 for the 
first year and 1 for the next. I had two sets: 2004 (0) versus 2005 (1), and 2005 (0) 
versus 2006 (1). HBVALUEi,t is a dummy variable indicating cases of high-value 
trades, meaning directors’ deals higher than £1 million. This dummy equals 1 if the 
total value of shares purchased by directors of firm i during year t exceeded £1 
million and 0 otherwise. LBVALUEi,t is the opposite of the previous dummy. It equals 
1 if the trade value of insiders’ purchases was lower than £1 million and 0 otherwise. 
For other variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; ei,t is the error term. 
TEST 1b: Decrease in insider disposals under IFRS 
The next logistic regression was similar to the previous one (10), focusing on 
insiders’ disposals. 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 HSVALUEi,t + a2 LSVALUEi,t + a3 Sizei,t + a4 Profitabilityi,t + a5 
Leveragei,t +  ei,t                     (11) 
where RRi,t is a dummy year variable, as previously defined (Equation 10). Similarly, 
HSVALUE is a dummy variable indicating the value of shares disposed of. It equals 1 
if the total value of shares sold by directors of firm i during year t exceeded £1 million 
and 0 otherwise. LSVALUEi,t is the opposite of the previous dummy. It equals 1 if the 
trade value of insiders’ disposals was lower than £1 million and 0 otherwise. For other 
variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; ei,t is the error term. 
TEST 1c: Decrease in the number of insiders 
Similarly, the next logistic regression focused on the number of insiders: 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 BIDi,t + a2 SIDi,t + a3 Sizei,t + a4 Profitabilityi,t + a5 Leveragei,t +  ei,t
                     (12) 
where RRi,t is a dummy year variable as defined in Equation 10; BIDi,t is the total 
number of insiders that bought firm i’s shares for a specific year t; and SIDi,t is the 
total number of insiders that sold firm i’s shares for a specific year t. For other 
variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; ei,t is the error term. 
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TEST 2: Accruals and insider activity 
To achieve a more detailed analysis of insider trading, I aimed to examine the 
relationship between accruals and directors’ activity. For this, I performed the 
following linear regression model, similar to H1/Test 4 (Equation 9): 
DACi,t = a0 + a1 DVi,t + a2 DVi,t Sizei,t + a3 DVi,t Profitabilityi,t + a4 DVi,t Leveragei,t + 
ei,t                     (13) 
where DACi,t is the discretionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional Jones 
(1991) model; DVi,t is a binary dummy variable, equalling 0 or 1 according to a 
number of variations described in the following paragraph; DVi,tSizei,t is the size ratio 
described in Appendix III, Table 1, multiplied by DVi,t, used to examine the impact of 
auditors’ size on the association between discretionary accruals and firms’ size; 
DVi,tProfitabilityi,t is the profitability ratio described in Appendix III, Table 1, 
multiplied by DVi,t, used to examine the impact of auditors’ size on the association 
between discretionary accruals and profitability; DVi,tLeveragei,t is the leverage ratio 
described in Appendix III, Table 1, multiplied by DVi,t, used to examine the impact of 
auditors’ size on the association between discretionary accruals and leverage; and ei,t 
is the error term. 
Aiming to include all critical variations in insider trading, as in the previous first 
set of tests, I formulated the value of DVi,t in this equation as follows: 
a) I compared firms with no trade activity with firms that had at least one insider 
trading case. DVi,t equalled 1 if a firm had insider activity and 0 otherwise. 
b) I also focused on large purchase values as opposed to small purchases. DVi,t 
equalled 1 for firms with high purchases (more than £1 million) and 0 otherwise. 
c) Similarly, I examined large stock disposals compared with small sells. DVi,t 
equalled 1 for firms with high disposals (more than £1 million) and 0 otherwise. 
d) Finally, I focused on the number of insiders who realised at least one stock market 
transaction (sell and/or buy). DVi,t equalled 0 for firms that had insider activity by 
1 to 4 insiders and 1 for firms whose stocks had been traded by 5 or more insiders. 
TEST 3: Insider dealing and abnormal returns 
This last test aimed to explore any relationship between insider trading and the 
firm’s stock price. In most cases, companies present such effects close to events such 
as mergers, dividends and earnings announcements. However, my purpose was to 
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address the issue of the total effects of a year. In this respect, the project aimed to 
examine any correlation of insiders with abnormal market returns (AR). AR is the 
difference between the actual performance of a firm and its expected returns. For this 
reason and to calculate these measurements, I chose to apply the event study 
methodology based on the market model method (Strong, 1992), as represented by the 
following equation: 
ARi,t = Ri,t – (ai + bi Rm,t) + ei,t                 (14) 
where ARi,t is the abnormal returns of security i in period t; Ri,t is the return on 









, where Pi,t is the price of 
the security at the end of period t; Di,t is the dividend paid during period t; Pi,t-1 is the 
price of the security at the end of period t-1, adjusted for any capitalisations to make it 
comparable with Pi,t; ai is the intercept for security i; bi is the beta coefficient, which 
measures the sensitivity of security i to the market and is a measure of risk; Rm,t is the 
return of the stock market m in period t; and ei,t is the statistical error term. 
To estimate the return of the stock market (Rm,t), I used ASX for Australia, DAX 
for Germany, ASE for Greece and FTSE for the UK. A positive AR means that a 
stock performed better than the market, while a negative one indicates that the stock 
underperformed the market. Therefore, if a firm exhibits positive or negative AR at 
the same time as high insider buying or selling respectively, then there is a suspicious 
correlation between them. Considering all the above, I calculated the annual 
cumulative AR of a firm along with its ratios and annual insider trading activity, and 
performed the following regression model, similar to Test 2 (Equation 13). As 
previously mentioned, in focusing on 2008, I aimed to detect any crisis effects on this 
phenomenon. 
CARi,t = a0 + a1 DVi,t + a2 DVi,t  Sizei,t + a3 DVi,t  Profitability i,t + a4 DVi,t  Leveragei,t 
+ ei,t                     (15) 
where CARi,t is the cumulative abnormal market return for firm i in year t, aggregated 
over an annual window; DVi,t  is a binary dummy variable, equalling 0 or 1. I 
followed the same four categorisations of DVi,t values as in the previous Test 2 
(Equation 13), and the remaining independent variables are also as defined in that test 
(13). 
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H3: Under IFRS firms exhibit lower cost of equity, without resorting to earnings 
management procedures 
Cost of capital has always been one of the most crucial factors in a company being 
viable, especially nowadays when liquidity is limited. It is highly important in 
enabling a firm to remain competitive. Therefore, managers may resort to earnings 
management to achieve a lower cost of equity. On the other hand, this may lead to the 
opposite results, as now that liquidity is limited, investors and banks engage in strict 
due-diligence control and detailed auditing of the company’s financials in seeking to 
confirm the firm’s real performance on a multilevel basis. This gives the impression 
to the market that a company with low capital cost will therefore have been 
extensively audited and evaluated by the banking sector; thus, it is a sign of trust for 
investors. I aimed to examine this fact, so I needed to measure firms’ cost of equity 
capital (COCi,t) for my models. As there are many methods available to calculate it, I 
considered previous research (Hail and Leuz, 2006, 2009; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 






                 (16) 
where COCi,t is the Easton (2004) PEG proxy for estimating the cost of equity capital 
of a firm i in period t; E0(EPS1) is the consensus forecast of earnings per share at t+1; 
E0(EPS2) is the consensus forecast of earnings per share at t+2; and P0 is the stock’s 
price at the end of fiscal year t. 
Having calculated the cost of equity, and based on the same methods as the 
previous hypothesis (H2), I examined the following three tests, aiming to detect 
whether IFRS had decreased firms’ cost of equity, whether this performance was 
without suspicious procedures, and whether it related to firms’ stock market reactions. 
TEST 1: Under IFRS firms exhibit lower cost of equity 
In this first test, COCi,t was regressed with indicator variables from 2004 to 2006 
in order to detect its performance after IFRS adoption. Therefore, I followed the 
following logistic regression: 
                                                 
25 I also considered using the Fama and French method (Gebhardt et al., 2001) to calculate cost of 
equity, but I chose the PEG model as it provides the greatest degree of construct validity (Botosan et 
al., 2011) for its calculation compared with embedded and external variables based on firms’ 
accounting information. 
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RRi,t = a0 + a1 COCi,t + a2 Sizei,t + a3 Profitabilityi,t + a4 Leveragei,t +  ei,t            (17) 
where RRi,t is a dummy variable indicating the examination year, equalling 0 for the 
first year and 1 for the next. I have two sets: 2004 (0) versus 2005 (1), and 2005 (0) 
versus 2006 (1). COCi,t is the Easton (2004) PEG proxy for estimating the cost of 
equity capital of firm i in period t. For other variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; ei,t is 
the error term. 
TEST 2: Accruals and cost of equity capital 
In this test, I aimed to estimate whether any possible decrease in firms’ cost of 
capital was attributable only to the accuracy of IFRS, or whether an increase in firms’ 
accruals had followed it. For this reason, I again used the same methods as in the 
previous H2/Test 2 (Equation 13): 
DACi,t = a0 + a1 DVi,t + a2 DVi,t Sizei,t + a3 DVi,t Profitability i,t + a4 DVi,t Leveragei,t 
+ ei,t                     (18) 
All variables were defined as in H2/ Test 2, except for DVi,t values. In this case, 
firms were categorised using the median of the cost of capital, as calculated by the 
PEG proxy. Thus, firms were separated into those with high cost and those with low 
cost of capital. The dummy variable, DVi,t is equal to 1 for firms with low cost and 0 
for firms with a high cost of capital. The remaining independent variables are defined 
as in Equation 13. This empirical analysis also focused on the period 2004–2006. 
TEST 3: Cost of capital and abnormal returns 
In the last test, I sought to detect any correlation between the cost of equity and 
firms’ stock performance, using the following linear regression: 
CARi,t = a0 + a1 DVi,t + a2  DVi,t Sizei i,t + a3 DVi,t Profitability i,t + a4 DVi,t Leveragei,t 
+ ei,t                     (19) 
where CAR i,t is the cumulative abnormal annual returns as defined in H2/Test 3; DVi,t 
is the dummy variable as defined in the previous Test 2; and the remaining 
independent variables are as defined in Equation 13. This analysis focused on the 
years 2007–2009 in order to detect any effect of the crisis. 
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4.6.2 Cycle II: IFRS versus US GAAP 
The next three hypotheses correspond with the second initial set of research 
questions (Q2), to determine IFRS performance in the US compared with US GAAP. 
With considerable differences in many aspects of accounting, such as goodwill, taxes 
and asset revaluations (Appendix II, Table 8), it is crucial for IFRS to succeed in this 
endeavour so that the SEC’s strategic plan for IFRS and US GAAP convergence is 
not postponed yet again. Thus, I focused on the following hypotheses. 
H4: The SEC’s decision to allow IFRS for foreign firms has increased the level of 
convergence 
The introduction of IFRS aimed to bring European accounting standards closer to 
US GAAP. Although many insist that IFRS resembles US GAAP, mainly for 
businesses’ convenience, they appear to have major differences. Therefore, every 
public company had to reconcile its accounting figures with US GAAP. However, in 
2007, the US SEC allowed foreign firms listed on the US market to publish their 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS, without reconciliation with US GAAP. 
This might be considered as the first step toward a future total convergence of the two 
standards, and is only one of the measures taken to enhance comparability between 
the two standards. Apart from any practical concerns, this decision had direct cost-
saving advantages for companies. 
Even firms that followed Canadian GAAP expedited their IFRS transition as early 
adopters, in order to take advantage of this decision and avoid reconciliation 
processes.26 Contrary to this move, from 2008, European companies also listed on US 
markets that chose to report under US GAAP were no longer allowed to claim for 
exemption but had to prepare their consolidated financial statements also in 
accordance with IFRS. I examined this hypothesis, aiming to investigate early 
indications of comparability and convergence between the two accounting standards 
before and after the SEC’s decision. Thus, I formulated the following test. 
TEST: Convergence after IFRS allowance in the US 
After the allowance of IFRS in the US in 2007, many considered that this would 
eliminate their differences. In order to capture these differences and examine the level 
of convergence, I adopted the following comparability index measures (Whittington, 
2000): 
                                                 
26 Canada voluntarily adopted IFRS from January 2011 and officially in 2015. 
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1. The net income absolute difference measure (DIFFNI): 
DIFFNI =
(IFRS) Assets Net
(IFRS) Income Net(US) Income Net 
               (20) 
2. The net assets absolute difference measure (DIFFNA): 
DIFFNA =
(IFRS) Assets Net
(IFRS) Assets Net(US) Assets Net 
               (21) 
3. The return on net assets absolute difference measure (DIFFRONA): 
DIFFRONA = (IFRS) Assets Net on Return-(US) Assets Net on Return             (22) 
4. The earnings per share absolute difference measure (DIFFEPS): 
DIFFEPS =
(IFRS)  Shareper Earnings
(IFRS)  Shareper Earnings(US)  Shareper Earnings 
                    (23) 
I specified earnings and assets, as I had determined that these figures seemed to 
prevail in differences between the two regimes (Appendix II, Table 8), as also 
suggested by the literature. My sample consisted of firms that published their 
accounting statements under IFRS but also reconciled them under US GAAP. I 
calculated the above measurements for each company for the years 2006–2008, and 
estimated the mean for each measure for each year. The closer to 0 their mean value, 
the better the convergence process, while a mean of 0 would indicate total 
convergence of the two standards. I also carried out a t-test for equality of means to 
examine the above measurements across years and gain a better picture of this aspect. 
H5: Financial statement effects under IFRS for firms that used to follow US 
GAAP 
Acceptance of IFRS has saved companies costs and time in preparing their 
financial statements, and has simplified investors’ decisions as they have more timely 
access to reliable and clear information, providing easier cross-country and cross-firm 
comparability. On the other hand, many insist that IFRS may introduce volatility into 
the US market. Although this may be an advantage for financial reporting, as it 
reflects timely information, volatility may be disadvantageous to investors and other 
users if it reflects managerial manipulation. For this reason, this hypothesis aimed to 
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detect, among the effects of their differences, the level of volatility introduced into 
firms using IFRS in the US market. Consequently, I examined the following tests. 
TEST 1: Financial statement effects 
This test aimed to detect any financial effects following acceptance of IFRS for 
use in the US. The following logistic regression model was used: 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 Sizei,t + a2 Investmenti,t + a3 Growthi,t + a4 Profitabilityi,t  + a5 
Liquidityi,t + a6 Leveragei,t + ei,t                 (24) 
where RRi,t is a dummy variable indicating the year of the reported numbers, equalling 
0 for the year before the acceptance and 1 after; for other variables, see Appendix III, 
Table 1; ei,t is the error term. 
TEST 2: Income volatility in accounting measures 
This second statement-effects test focused on ratios (Appendix III, Table 1), 
seeking to detect any volatility following the introduction of IFRS in the US. Possible 
income volatilities were detected through analysis of variance, using an F-test for 
standard deviation (Snedecor and Cochran, 1983), and more specifically Levene’s 
(1960) test. 
H6: Under IFRS, firms listed on US markets tend to exhibit less earnings 
management 
This sixth hypothesis focused on whether adoption of the new standards has 
eliminated the need for earnings management in the US, as it has in Europe. Objective 
and reliable information contributes not only to the efficient and cost-effective 
functioning of the capital market, but also to information symmetry, which in turn 
helps companies achieve improved performance. Earnings management should be 
unknown for firms adopting IFRS in the US, as the US legislative environment seems 
ideal for the new standards. These last two hypotheses might produce interesting 
results, as most foreign companies preferred to follow IFRS after the SEC’s decision, 
while many more firms wanted to switch to IFRS. I focused on the following tests. 
TEST 1: Volatility 
The first test of this hypothesis used an analysis of variance (F-test) to detect 
volatility of change in net profits to total assets (ΔNP/TA) and the volatility of change 
in net profits to the volatility of change in cash flows from operating activities 
(ΔNP/ΔOCF). As the literature links the volatility of a measure with its accuracy, it 
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was expected that under IFRS firms would exhibit greater volatility in the above 
measures. 
TEST 2: Accruals performance 
This second earnings-management test focused on accruals performance and 
consisted of the following sub-tests. 
a) Following a Pearson correlation between discretionary accruals (DAC) and 
operating cash flows (OCF) for the year before and after acceptance of IFRS in 
the US (2007), the research sought to detect any indications of decreased use of 
accruals. A negative correlation would imply that companies might be increasing 
their accruals in case of low cash flows, leading to earnings management. 
b) In addition to the quantity of accruals highlighted by most studies, the quality of 
accruals is often used to test combined models (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999). The 
next sub-test focused on this quality measure, testing operating cash flows (OCF) 
separately so as to increase the position of estimates. To this end, the following 
model was estimated, as suggested by Wysocki (2004): 
ΔWCi,t = α0 
+ α1OCFi,t + ei,t                 (25) 
where ΔWCi,t is the change in working capital scaled by total sales; and OCFi,t is 
the operating cash flow for firm i in fiscal year t, scaled by total sales. 
A higher R-squared for the model under IFRS compared with that under US 
GAAP would reflect high earnings quality and lower potential for income 
smoothing under IFRS. A low R-squared value for all results is attributable to the 
absence of more independent variables from the model. However, I preferred not 
to add additional independents, which would have increased the power of R-
squared but may have decreased the estimation of the accruals’ quality. 
c) Finally, in this third accruals sub-test, the next ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression was run to examine the relationship between discretionary accruals, 
profitability, leverage and size ratios. 
DACi,t = a0 + a1 Profitabilityi,t + a2 Leveragei,t+ a3 Sizei,t+ ei,t                   (26) 
where DACi,t is discretionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional Jones 
(1991) model; other variables are as described in Appendix III, Table 1; and ei,t is 
the error term. 
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TEST 3: Small positive profits and large-scale native losses 
The third test concentrated on small positive profits (SPP) and large-scale native 
losses (LNL), as these measures indicate a possible earnings management case. 
a) It is a common target for firms with small losses to manage their numbers in order 
to convert these small accounting losses into small positive profits (SPP) 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997b; Leuz et al., 2003). For this reason, the following 
logistic regression model was used: 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 Sizei,t + a2 Investmenti,t + a3 Growthi,t + a4 Profitabilityi,t + a5 
Liquidityi,t + a6 Leveragei,t+ a7 SPPi,t + ei,t                (27) 
where RRi,t equals 0 for the first examination year and 1 for the second; SPPi,t is a 
dummy for SPP, equalling 1 if the net profit scaled by total assets is between 0 
and 0.01, and 0 in all other cases; for other variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; 
ei,t is the error term. A negative coefficient of SPPi,t would indicate less earnings 
management, as it would denote that under IFRS, SPP firms have decreased. 
b) The LNL test deals with the time at which large-scale losses are recognised. 
Although higher-quality standards may provide investors with more timely and 
accurate information, most firms tend to postpone large accounting losses to 
future years (Ball et al., 2000). Thus, earlier loss recognition is a top priority for 
both IFRS and US GAAP. The following logistic regression was run (Lang et al., 
2003, 2005), similar to the previous one. 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 Sizei,t + a2 Investmenti,t + a3 Growthi,t    + a4 Profitabilityi,t + a5 
Liquidityi,t + a6 Leveragei,t+ + a7 LNLi,t  + ei,t               (28) 
where RRi,t equals 0 for the first examination year and 1 for the second; LNLi,t is a 
dummy variable indicating loss recognition, taking a value of 1 if net profit scaled 
by total assets is less than -0.20 and 0 in all the other cases; the remaining 
independent variables are as defined in the previous equation (27). A positive 
coefficient of LNLi,t would indicate less earnings management, as it would denote 
that under IFRS, firms have given more timely notice of large-scale losses. 
 
4.6.3 Cycle III: IFRS and US GAAP under crisis 
The last three hypotheses examine the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. 
They provide answers to the third initial set of research questions (Q3). The study 
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sought to detect whether IFRS and US GAAP protected firms from abnormal sales 
arising from the outbreak of the crisis, whether the reclassification option under IFRS 
was an answer to the crisis, and whether IFRS and US GAAP succeeded in regulating 
shadow banking through their amendments. 
H7: The outbreak of the crisis negatively affected stock performance in the 
banking and insurance sectors in Europe, Australia and the US 
In 2008, an international economic crisis started to appear, affecting mainly the 
financial sector. In every crisis, many events may affect the performance of securities 
and may be unexpected, as in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (PwC, 2009), which 
proved a pivotal incident in the crisis that nobody had predicted. Indeed, most 
banking and insurance companies seemed to have serious balance sheet problems that 
triggered investors’ interest. On the other hand, many insist that, even in these cases, 
investors had access to internal information and may have engaged in speculation on 
the stock markets. Therefore, I aimed to examine the market reactions of bank stocks 
from Europe and the US to this major international event. In other words, I sought to 
determine whether the crisis resulted in significant abnormal returns in stock markets, 
and whether this might be attributable to a normal overreaction, or was due to well-
planned speculative intentions. 
Examining firms’ performance under such conditions might also help me to 
determine the necessary timeframe for companies to recover their stock prices, and 
any common assumptions that might help me as a market professional to react better 
to similar future cases, as the effects of the crisis seem to be ongoing. I considered, 
therefore, that it would be particularly interesting to estimate any abnormal returns of 
financial companies from Australia, Germany, Greece, the UK and the US during the 
Lehman Brothers incident, in order to detect the short-term reactions of these markets. 
Thus, I again used the market model method, as in H2/Test 3. The model proceeded 
exactly as in Equation 14, but in this case I focused on an estimation window five 
days before and after the effective date of the event, 15 September 2008 (the date on 
which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy).27 Finally, I again used ASX for 
Australia, DAX for Germany, ASE for Greece, FTSE for the UK, and DJIA and 
NASDAQ for the US. 
                                                 
27 http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/sep/16lehman.pdf. 
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H8: Use of the reclassification option has resulted in financial statement effects, 
increasing accruals in many cases, but adding market value 
To alleviate the effects of the crisis, authorities in Europe allowed deviations in 
IFRS values. More specifically, the IASB amended individual standards IFRS 7 and 
IAS 39, permitting banking firms to reclassify some of their assets that had previously 
been measured at fair value, under restrictive rules and disclosures. These 
amendments were effective from July 2008. However, as revealed in the literature 
review, there were cases of prudential ratio violations, and references to complaints of 
accounting misconduct increased significantly following the outbreak of the credit 
crisis (Johnson, 2008). In addition, some have even criticised the extremely short 
notice procedure which was followed, rather than the regular standard-setting process. 
In contrast, the FASB decided not to suspend fair value accounting for US firms, also 
affecting the accounting measures of US banks. Exploring this hypothesis provided a 
good opportunity to compare the different reactions of IFRS and US GAAP to the 
outbreak of the crisis, and to investigate firms’ performance as a result of these 
modifications. 
The next three tests aimed to analyse the extent to which these two boards’ 
different decisions affected the banking sector. The analysis focused on the years 
2007–2009, in order to detect the long-term effects of the reclassification option. 
Furthermore, I focused on companies operating in the financial sector from Australia, 
Germany, Greece, the UK and the US. However, since the US had many more 
financial listed firms than the other countries examined, I decided to merge the sample 
of these countries and compare this new dataset with the US. In this way, I was able 
to achieve better statistical significance. Finally, to estimate whether a firm used the 
reclassification option, I focused only on the choice of a company to adopt this 
amendment, rather than on details of the disclosure.28 
TEST 1: Financial statement effects of reclassification option 
In this first test, I proposed to detect any financial effects following the 
introduction of the reclassification option. For this, I used the following multinomial 
logistic regression model: 
                                                 
28 The reclassification option involved, apart from a firm’s option to use it, a decision on how to 
disclose it, as well as the items it chose to reclassify. As a result, many studies introduce subcategories 
into this reclassification option. 
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RRi,t = a0 + a1 Size i,t + a2 Profitabilityi,t + a3 Leveragei,t + ei,t              (29) 
where RRi,t is a dummy variable indicating the country and the reclassification option, 
equalling 0 for firms that did not reclassify, 1 for reclassified and 2 for US companies; 
for other variables, see Appendix III, Table 1; ei,t is the error term. 
TEST 2: Accruals and reclassification option 
The reclassification option will have been more useful if it succeeded in 
preserving lower discretionary accruals for firms that chose to follow this option. 
Thus, correlation between accruals and this option is highly important. For this 
purpose, the second test of this hypothesis was divided into two further sub-tests: 
a) Starting from the need to detect any decrease in accruals for reclassified 
companies, the following logistic regression was performed for year sets 2007–
2008 and 2007-2009. A negative DACi,t value could be a reference. 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 DACi,t + a2 Sizei,t + a3 Profitabilityi,t + a4 Leveragei,t+ + ei,t      (30) 
where RRi,t equals 0 for the first examination year and 1 for the second; DACi,t is 
discretionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model; 
other variables are as described in Appendix III, Table 1; and ei,t is the error term. 
b) Moving a step further, I also sought to observe the performance of firms that did 
not adopt the reclassification option, as well as US firms. For this reason, I 
focused on the years 2008 and 2009, and again followed the linear regression 
below, similar to H1/Test 4 (Equation 9): 
DACi,t = a0 + a1 DVi,t + a2 DVi,t Sizei i,t + a3 DVi,t Profitability i,t + a4 DVi,t 
Leveragei,t + ei,t                   (31) 
where DACi,t is discretionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional Jones 
(1991) model. DVi,t is a binary dummy variable, equalling 0 or 1 according to a 
number of cases: in the first case, DVi,t equals 1 for reclassified companies and 0 
for non-reclassified companies; in the second case, DVi,t equals 1 for US 
companies and 0 for reclassified; and in the last case, DVi,t equals 1 for US firms 
and 0 for non-reclassified companies. Other variables are described in Appendix 
III, Table 1; and ei,t  is the error term. 
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TEST 3: Reclassification and abnormal returns 
In this last test, the project proposed to detect the market reaction to the 
announcement of the reclassification option. For this reason, I performed exactly the 
same methods as adopted in the previous Test 2b (Equation 31), for the same 
examination years, with identical DVi,t value categorisation. The only difference was 
that, instead of accruals (DACi,t), I considered firms’ annual cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARi,t) as the dependent value. 
H9: Amendments to both IFRS and US GAAP have improved the accuracy of 
the shadow banking sector 
Following the outbreak of the crisis, all responsible authorities tried to enforce a 
legal framework on the shadow banking sector, and researchers sought to determine 
key elements in its development. Many blamed shadow banking for its inadequate 
control mechanisms.29 For this reason, and to protect the financial system from future 
anomalies, authorities aimed to tighten accounting regulations relating to shadow 
banks and instituted regulations to control them. This was their first attempt to 
regulate this system, and thus they focused on three crucial issues: revenue 
recognition, leasing and financial instruments. 
As a result, the IASB introduced additional improvements to IFRS 7 and IFRS 9, 
taking effect from 2011 and 2013 respectively.30 It has already planned the 
introduction of IFRS 13, dealing with fair value measurement, and may further 
regulate this sector (Appendix II, Table 6). Similarly, although it has not yet issued 
final standards in this area, the FASB introduced US GAAP amendments effective 
from 2011 that aimed to regulate the banking sector (Appendix II, Table 9). Testing 
this final hypothesis contributes to overall comparison of the two regimes, as it 
scrutinises whether these improvements have helped regulate this sector. Although it 
appears that, for the first time, IFRS had a more timely effect than US GAAP, 
multiple parameters must be taken into consideration. The banking system has 
                                                 
29 Shadow banking consists of institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds which are not 
subject to the same regulations as depository institutions such as commercial banks. 
30 In November 2009, the IASB issued IFRS 9 ‘Financial Instruments’, replacing IAS 39 and taking 
effect from 2013. However, the Board released further amendments to IFRS 9 in 2010 and 2013, and 
its final form was established in 2014 and will take effect from 2018. Thus, I aimed to examine the 
effects of IFRS 9 in its pre-2014 format, as it remained available for application to the period on which 




additional rules that may affect financial statements, such as the Basel Accord which 
sets many policies closely related to IFRS, such as deferred tax credits. 
Through this hypothesis, I aimed to analyse the performance of the amendments 
to IFRS 7 and IFRS 9 that took effect from 2011 and 2013 respectively, and to 
compare these improvements with corresponding US GAAP improvements. For this 
purpose, I estimated the following tests, concentrating on information asymmetry, 
value performance and earnings management. The tested years were 2010 versus 
2011, and 2012 versus 2013. If accounting regimes performed better in the years 2011 
and 2013, then the amendments could be considered successful. Finally, the dataset 
consisted of firms listed in Australia, Germany, the UK and the US, excluding Greece 
since its stock market has no shadow banking companies. 
TEST 1: Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry models assume that at least one party to a transaction has 
relevant information whereas the other does not. For this reason, the introduction of 
amendments to both regimes aimed to provide better quality financial reporting in 
order to decrease information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) for all 
interested parties in the investment environment. However, as this notion reflects 
many measures, income volatility and value relevance were used as proxies for 
information asymmetry. 
a) Income volatility 
In this test, I aimed to detect any volatility in accounting figures. For this reason, I 
performed an F-test for the standard deviation of ratios, similar to the model of 
H5/Test 2. A high standard deviation would indicate high volatility, and high 
volatility would indicate low information asymmetry. Thus, the higher the 
standard deviation, the better the information for investors. 
b) Value relevance 
Value relevance is the ability of the information disclosed in financial statements 
to capture and summarise the firm’s value. Increased value relevance leads to 
higher accuracy, higher-quality accounting amounts, and consequently lower 
information asymmetry. For this reason, the following OLS regression was 
performed (Burgstahler and Divchev, 1997a; Ohlson, 1995). 
Pi,t = a0 + a1BVPSi,t + a2NPPSi,t + ei,t                (32) 
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where Pi,t is the firm’s price at the end of the year; BVPSi,t is the firm’s book value 
scaled by the total number of shares; NPPSi,t is the firm’s net profit deflated also 
by the number of shares; and ei,t is the error term. 
For this regression, I examined the explanatory power of the regression (R²), 
which was expected to be higher after the improvements. Furthermore, as book 
value and net profit are the main measures of value relevance, meaning that higher 
book value indicates better accounting quality, it was also expected that after the 
amendments, these measures would exhibit higher significant positive coefficients 
(Burgstahler and Divchev, 1997a; Ohlson, 1995). 
TEST 2: Impact of firm value 
It is believed that markets impact on accounting events (Barth and McNichols, 
1994), and that investors react positively to amendments to accounting regimes. This 
study evaluated investors’ reactions to the above improvements in the shadow 
banking industry, taking into account changes in the actual value of the firm. This 
value perception was based on Tobin’s q assessment, as measured by Daske et al. 
(2007). The higher the Tobin’s q score for a firm, the higher the value of the firm, as 
it reflects greater investor confidence in the firm’s growth potential (Daske et al., 
2007). For this reason, based on Elbannan’s (2010) model but with slight 
differences,31 the following logistic regression model was used: 
RRi,t = a0 + a1 ΔΤqi,t + a2 ΔTAi,t + a3 LEVi,t + a4 MVi,t + ei,t              (33) 
where RRi,t is a dummy variable of the year, with 0 representing the most recent year 
prior to the amendments (2010 and 2012) and 1 representing the year after (2011 and 
2013); ΔΤqi,t represents the change in Tobin’s q scaled by total assets; Tobin’s q is 
calculated as total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity (Daske et al., 
2007); ΔTAi,t is measured as the change in total assets; LEVi,t is measured as total 
liabilities divided by total stockholders’ equity; MVi,t is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity; and ei,t is the error term. 
                                                 
31 First, I excluded the ‘median Tobin’s q for an industry’ independent variable of Elbannan’s model, as 
in this model I focused only on the shadow banking sector. Secondly, I chose to follow a logistic 
regression approach rather than a linear regression with a year categorical independent value. For 
analysis of binary data, logistic regression seems to predominate over all other methods in the social 
sciences (Allison, 2012). In addition, as I wished to preserve a consistent statistic processing 
methodology, I chose to follow logistic regression, as in similar previous hypotheses, with two years of 
comparisons. 
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A positive ΔΤqi,t figure would suggest an increase in the market value of the 
sample firms after the improvements, and a negative change in q would suggest a 
decrease in firm valuation, meaning that any amendments had been insufficient to 
earn investors’ trust and increase firms’ value. 
TEST 3: Earnings management 
To test earnings management, I focused again on discretionary accruals based on 
Jones’s (1991) model, as performed in H1/Test 2, proceeding to the following three 
sub-tests. 
a) As in H6/Test 2a, a Pearson correlation was performed between DAC and OCF 
for the years before and after the improvements to detect any indications of 
decreasing usage of accruals. A positive correlation might be a reference, as this 
would mean that managers no longer responded to low cash flows by increasing 
firms’ accruals (Myers and Skinner, 2002; Land and Lang, 2002). 
b) Moreover, based on Tendeloo and Vanstraelen’s (2005) model, the study aimed to 
examine accruals performance before and after the amendments, linked with size, 
profitability and leverage ratio. For this, the following logistic regression was 
performed: 
RRi,t = a0 + α1 DACi,t + α2 Sizei,t + a3 Profitabilityi,t + a4  Levaregei,t + ei,t       (34) 
where RRi,t equals 0 for the first examination year (2010, 2012) and 1 for the 
second (2011, 2013); DACi,t is the discretionary Jones (1991) model accruals; 
other variables are as described in Appendix III, Table 1; and ei,t is the error term. 
c) Finally, concerning the quality of accruals after the accounting improvements, the 
following model was used, as in the case of H6/Test 2b: 
ΔWCi,t = α0 
+ α1OCFi,t + ei,t                 (35) 
where ΔWCi,t is the change in working capital scaled by total sales; OCFi,t is the 
operating cash flow for firm i in fiscal year t, scaled by total sales; and ei,t is the 
error term. A higher R-squared would reflect high earnings quality and lower 
potential for income smoothing. 
 
4.7 Challenges Concerning the Application of Panel Modelling 
The project used already known and successfully applied methods for hypothesis 
testing and variable assembly. Thus, I faced few challenges during the modelling 
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activity. However, in many cases, there was a need to transform the models to achieve 
better results and to suit the dataset. These emerging transformations and adjustments, 
although considered crucial for the significance of the results, nevertheless proved 
challenging, difficult and time-consuming. An indicative example was the case of the 
first test of the first hypothesis, postulating that the method of calculation of FFS 
companies needed to change. A similar case was the Jones accruals calculation model 
(H1/Test 2), where I decided to follow a longitudinal approach rather than the cross-
sectional study that I had initially planned. This required additional time to obtain 
appropriate data and find the most suitable format. Above all, to familiarise myself 
with the new procedures, I had to obtain a new statistical program, along with the 
necessary training. Updated knowledge and highly intensive preparation were 
necessary to obtain meaningful and accurate results in this case. In contrast, in H4 I 
had planned a longitudinal analysis, but instead, owing to sample restrictions, I 
adopted a cross-sectional analysis. Overall, time constraints and the difficulty of 
obtaining data were the most challenging issues for the modelling activity. However, 
in all cases, I managed to determine the strengths and weaknesses of possible 
alternative methods, and thus formulated appropriate models, always taking statistical 
accuracy into account. 
 
4.8 Ethical Considerations 
Research ethics has always been critical in studies like this. Thus, all responsible 
parties, including organisations and universities, set distinct rules and boundaries on 
ethical considerations. In this context, I required careful and predetermined ethical 
steps to maximise the quality of information and minimise ethical risks. The first step 
was approval of my research proposal by Middlesex University and close cooperation 
with my advisors so as to meet the university’s ethical guidelines. The next steps 
involved the planning and strategy stages of research, including data access, 
collection and analysis, as they might affect participants, society and professional 
relationships (Gillespie, 1994). 
There were no individual participants in my study. Thus, I focused only on the fair 
treatment of companies’ data, while societal risks were involved in the impact of the 
knowledge produced from the project’s results. All hypotheses and methods were 
based on my own knowledge as distilled from the literature and ideas emerging from 
my working experience. Furthermore, the research was self-funded, with no sponsors, 
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and I work neither as an accountant nor an employee of any of the companies 
examined, nor have I ever audited or officially analysed them or any of their rivals. 
Thus, I had no possibility of using any internal/privileged information, so I also had 
no need to fear any conflict of interest or confidentiality violation. Therefore, I 
approached this study with professionalism, accuracy, objectivity and no ethical bias. 
Overall, as there was no personal interference in any ethical issues, and since the 
literature search and theoretical review presented no obstacle because all the articles 
had been published, I inevitably focused on data collection and analysis techniques. I 
focused on three issues. 
1. Ethical issues during data collection 
The data collection stage is associated with several ethical issues that must be 
taken into account in any study. This is very important, because without objectively 
collected data, the final analysis and report will be questioned. In my case, gaining 
and maintaining access to the information required was easy. I did not explore or 
gather any data from interviews, questionnaires or internet forums, but focused on 
secondary numerical data that needed no special permission for access. Every listed 
firm is obliged to publish its accounting figures, and these can be accessed and 
analysed by anyone, eliminating any confidentiality issues. Furthermore, as many 
official databases and resources offer access to statistical and accounting figures, I 
encountered no difficulties concerning the reliability of any data. As explained in 
Section 4.1.2, I used databases and official financial sources for data collection. 
Maintaining objectivity and unimpaired accuracy during the data collection stage was 
also important, so I did not partially exclude any company, exercising subjective 
selectivity in my sample. Overall, all data were collected accurately and fully, while 
in cases that needed permission for access and publication, I obtained official 
authorisation (Appendix II, Table 9). 
2. Ethical issues associated with data processing and storage 
Data processing may also raise ethical issues. For this reason, and in order to 
avoid partial processing in favour of one country’s firms, the research proceeded with 
careful clarification of the data. I examined corresponding variables from each 
country, and performed the same statistical procedures for the same years for each 
country. The large amount of data and differences in the size of the economies and 
firms compared might also have involved ethical considerations, regarding both the 
process and the results, but I managed to apply variables that would balance these 
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differences out. Furthermore, the research estimated all ratios in each firm’s official 
currency, enhancing the objectivity of the data process. As data procedures may also 
be affected by information that is difficult to elicit, such as managerial motives, in this 
research no data were processed that might be controversial or for which the real 
managerial intentions behind their decisions had not been made clear. Finally, 
concerning data storage,32 consistent with my undertaking not to use any ethically 
questionable procedures, and although the study contains no individuals’ personal 
data, firms’ data and other information obtained by permission were stored and 
moved securely. 
3. Ethical issues relating to analysis and reporting 
Maintaining objectivity is also very important at this stage, as any lack of 
objectivity will distort conclusions and recommendations. Although many suggest 
that it is difficult to sustain objectivity (Wells, 1994), I managed to preserve the 
accuracy of the results and methods used, not only through the statistical precision of 
analysis, as already explained, but also during the hypothesis tests. For this reason, I 
identified several practical issues. First, there were no cases of misrepresentation or 
misinterpretation of results. I did not engage in any selection of data input or output, 
nor have I misrepresented the models’ statistical accuracy (Zikmund, 2000). 
Statistical and interpretational integrity also include the presentation of unexpected 
results. The findings were not adjusted to fit expectations, nor to suit the needs of 
specific firms or favour any of the accounting regimes examined. 
In addition, to enhance the impartiality of results and understand, compare and 
analyse the final outcomes, I have provided descriptive statistics of all values and 
measures used. Therefore, I have eliminated any hidden information, and there is no 
dissemination of intentionally false statistics. For example, in the first test of the first 
hypothesis (Section 4.6.1), the result for Greece was impressive, being the only 
country that has managed to decrease its FFS firms every year. In focusing on this 
impressive and accurate fact, it might have been preferable to display only this 
outcome. Instead, consistent with the most unbiased interpretation of the results, this 
thesis compared the descriptive characteristics of all countries, revealing that Greece 
had the most cases of FFS firms before IFRS implementation, meaning that even after 
their elimination it still had the most FFS firms. In a similar vein, there was no 
                                                 
32 The European Union (Directive 95/46/EC) imposes strict regulations on the protection of individuals 
in processing, storing and moving personal data. 
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intention to skew any results against or in favour of any country. This confirms the 
broad and multidimensional interpretation and presentation of the results. 
Furthermore, most of my models were based on cross-sectional analysis, 
enhancing firms’ confidentiality. Even in cases where I performed a firm-by-firm 
examination (H1/Test 2), I maintained the same ethical standards. The results are 
analysed and reported with anonymity (McNamara, 1994). The study did not aim to 
cause any harm to firms’ reputation as a result of their potential weakness in particular 
tests. Thus, aiming not to risk targeting any firm for any reason, I exercised great care 
to avoid such situations. Companies cannot be recognised or identified as I have not 
revealed any of their characteristics. In addition, I intend to create a database of 
accounting behaviour that will lead to recommendations and eliminate misleading 
behaviour in the future, and addressing individual companies and singling out their 
performance is far from my role. The research design preserves the accounting 
community from being victimised by my study and specific countries and firms from 
being targeted. Overall, my key concern has always been to maintain a high level of 
ethical behaviour and to ensure that I cause no harm to any company, authority or 
individual (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). For this reason, on completion of this 
research, a full copy of the findings was shown to my advisors. Ultimately, it is 
impossible to manage the results of research focusing on firms’ earnings management, 
but it is possible to guarantee that high standards of ethical and transparent procedures 
have been followed. 
 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter has described in detail the methods used to gather and process data, 
as well as the selection and preparation of variables. This was the last step before 
examining the results. Therefore, I tried to maintain high standards of data to make 
my models significant and scientifically accepted. I have also explained the rationale 
for the hypotheses and the models, as distilled from the action research cycles, as well 
as how these responded to my final research questions, as developed through my 
literature review and working experience. I was already familiar with most of the tests 
used, enhancing the precision of the analysis, since statistical models may be affected 
by small discrepancies in the process or data sample. Therefore, I focused on 
appropriate implementation of the procedures, leading to interesting and precise 
results and outcomes, as described in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: PROJECT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I interpret, discuss and analyse in detail the empirical results 
obtained. In the first section, I explain the descriptive statistics of the analysis. The 
main characteristics of the firms and countries examined are outlined, and the means 
of the values used in the main statistical analysis are compared. Descriptive statistics 
are presented not only by year, but also by country, contributing to better readability. 
The second section moves on to the actual results, which are summarised according to 
the thematic task of each hypothesis. Thus, the results are presented in three broad 
sections closely related to the framework of hypotheses from the previous chapter, 
namely IFRS versus Old GAAP, IFRS in the US, and IFRS versus US GAAP against 
the backdrop of the crisis. Since the volume of statistical results for each hypothesis is 
huge, I have chosen to present all the detailed findings in Tables in Appendix III. All 
critical measures, as described in Chapter 4, are highlighted and explained in detail 
during the presentation of the results. Table 3 provides concise information on the 
outcomes. 
Table 3: Overall outcomes in brief 
Null Hypothesis Result Outcomes 
Descriptive statistics  
Interesting 
‘demographic’ 
details of the 
dataset 
No need for further action. I compare and describe 
ratios and measures by country and/or by year. 
H1: The introduction of IFRS has 
decreased falsified financial statements 
and improved auditing quality. 
Accepted with 
notes 
Additional attention needed for IFRS: 
*Insist more on FFS cases under crisis, 
*Reprofile accruals performance, 
*Focus more on specific individual standards, 
*Reconsider auditors' functional frame. 
H2: Under IFRS firms demonstrate a 
decrease in speculative insider trading 
cases. 
Rejected 
*Increased trading value and number of insiders 
for all countries, 
*Need to proceed to additional regulations and 
mechanisms apart from restrict disclosure 
requirements, 
*Close observation of insider cases, 
*Improvement of related individual standards, 
*Link between insider trading accruals and 
abnormal returns. 
H3: Under IFRS firms exhibit lower 
cost of equity, without resorting to 
earnings management procedures. 
Accepted 
Under IFRS, there is a decrease in firms’ cost of 
capital, without any speculative procedures. 
However, there are always cases that need special 
attention.  
H4: The SEC’s decision to allow IFRS 
for foreign firms has increased the 
proportion of the converging process. 
Accepted 
FASB and IASB may cooperate more closely in 
order not to postpone again their convergence 
plan.  
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H5: Financial statement effects under 
IFRS for firms that used to follow US 
GAAP. 
Accepted 
Typical procedure effects with increased volatility 
but with better performance for IFRS compared to 
other countries where they have been introduced. 
It seems that the US environment is appropriate 
for IFRS. No further action is required 
H6: Under IFRS, firms listed in US 
markets tend to exhibit less earnings 
management. 
Accepted 
*Less earnings management in the first IFRS 
adoption year, 
*They kept a high level of accurate accounting 
interpretation, 
*Decrease of SPP and increase of LNL firms, 
*Special attention needed for the next crisis year.  
H7: The outbreak of the crisis has 
negatively affected stock performance 
in the banking and insurance sector in 
Europe, Australia and the US. 
Accepted 
*High abnormal returns for all countries, 
*More volatility for US markets, 
*Possible considerations for speculative 
procedures before the event, 
*Quick recovery for all countries. 
H8: The use of the reclassification 
option has resulted in financial 
statement effects, increasing accruals in 
many cases, but adding market value 
Accepted 
*Successful decision of IFRS Board, 
*FASB should have followed this decision for US 
firms, 
*Special attention to leveraged firms, 
*Need to consider similar tests on a long-term 
basis. 
H9: The amendments of both IFRS and 
US GAAP, have improved the 
accuracy of the shadow banking sector. 
Rejected 
*No indications that all amendments of both 
regimes increased accuracy of shadow banking 
sector, 
*Results of high importance for surmounting the 
crisis, 
*More measures needed from IFRS, 
*US GAAP may rush for their final improvements 
in this field, 
*Close cooperation of all authorities. 
 
5.1 Overview of the sample descriptive statistics 
Appendix III, Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. These 
provide a better understanding of the particularity of the dataset, and will assist in 
explaining the main analysis and results. 
5.1.1 IFRS versus old GAAP 
2004–2006 (Panel A) 
Panel A presents statistics for the IFRS adoption period. The most impressive 
finding is that under IFRS, all countries increased their insider trading value, and in 
every case, this increase was consecutive also for 2006 (ITV). This can be attributed 
to the restrictive insider trading rules under IFRS, or even to insiders’ trust as a result 
of IFRS. Concerning the remaining variables, in Australia (Panel A1), the results 
indicate that during the first year of adoption, firms had lower size measures 
(SALETAS, RESSFU) and leverage ratios (DEBT), but higher liquidity measures, 
except for the CASH ratio which was lower. Profitability measures do not give a clear 
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picture. In every case they remained negative and operating profits were lower under 
IFRS in the first year (OPM), while investments increased (DIVYI, HOLTA). 
Panel A2 presents descriptive statistics for German firms before and after the 
adoption of IFRS. The results for falsified firms (FFS) are encouraging as they show 
signs of decreases in both 2005 and 2006. German companies, like Australian ones, 
exhibit lower size measures (SALESHA, SALETAS). However, a potential cause for 
concern, as it is potentially unfavourable to all other countries, is that Germany had 
lower liquidity measures (CASH, QUI). Otherwise, German firms exhibit greater 
investment prospects (PE), profitability (EPS) and leverage (DEBT, INTCOV). It 
seems, therefore, that negative results did not deprive German companies of 
borrowing opportunities, promoting their increased profitability and accounting 
accuracy as collateral benefits. 
The same motive applies to Greece, where the number of FFS cases reduced under 
IFRS and which is the first country with higher size ratios (RESTAS, RESSFU). The 
results also improved for growth (MVBV) and liquidity (CUR, QUI) measures. The 
fair value orientation seems not to have had any adverse effects on the market value 
of Greek firms, suggesting that IFRS helped smaller economies to become more 
competitive. On the other hand, more steps need to be taken by Greek companies, as 
investment (DIVCOV, HOLTA), profitability (ROSC, ROCE) and leverage 
(INTCOV, DEBTE) ratios decreased. New accounting methods may always influence 
net profit results (Perramon and Amat, 2006), while lack of familiarity with new 
procedures and higher transaction costs may make smaller economies more 
vulnerable to these measures. 
Finally, the UK presents a clearer picture concerning IFRS performance. Indeed, 
UK companies increased their sales (SALESHA) and managed to perform better on 
almost all the examined measures. Taking advantage of this more objective global 
accounting system and its external orientation, UK firms increased their profitability 
(OPM, EPS), leverage (ETL, INTCOV) and liquidity (CUR, WCR). Similarities 
between the UK’s old GAAP and IFRS seem to have given UK firms an advantage in 
the transition process. Overall, the new accounting methods influenced many 
measures in their first implementation year, probably owing to their fair value 
orientation (Perramon and Amat, 2006). 
Concerning the post-adoption period (2006), in most cases the results are 
insignificant, with no major differences in most values. In other words, during 2006, 
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firms from all countries maintained their performance. This may indicate that IFRS 
provided a more stable business environment, absorbing any disturbances in the initial 
adoption period. However, this does not seem to have been preserved under the crisis, 
as analysed in the next paragraph, while differences in changes to the variables 
between countries are notable, as described below. 
2007–2009 (Panel B) 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the period 2007–2009. This period was 
characterised by turmoil and unprecedented conditions for IFRS. The results reflect 
these difficult circumstances, as the values for all countries were lower for 2008 than 
for 2007. Noteworthy exceptions were Australia’s accruals performance (Panel B1) in 
2008, which decreased, although the following year they unexpectedly increased, and 
there are some indications that Australian companies managed to increase their 
leverage ratios (DEBT, TLSFU) despite the crisis. These negative outcomes were not 
sustained for long, as already in the next year, there are indications that the 
environment improved significantly. In this respect, Australia managed to balance its 
size ratios (SALESHA), improve its growth ratios (MVBV) even more than in the 
year before the crisis, and increase its liquidity (CFSH, WCR) and leverage (ETL, 
IGEAR). 
On the other hand, Germany (Panel B2) succeeded in recovering only with regard 
to its cost of capital (COC). It appears, therefore, that although investors trusted 
German firms, all other measures decreased further a year after the outbreak of the 
crisis. Similarly, measurements for Greece (Panel B3) did not improve. Indeed, the 
results indicate that size (RESSFU), investment (PE) and leverage (TLSFU, DEBTE) 
ratios decreased further, while the most worrying factor is the increase in FFS firms. 
However, the cost of equity seems to have decreased (COC), and there are signs that 
profitability (OPM) was higher, but the most promising outcome was the increase in 
growth ratio (MVBV). On the other hand, the UK (Panel B4) again performed best 
after the crisis, and indeed was close to fully recovering from the effects of the crisis. 
The results indicate that all of its ratios increased, while its cost of equity (COC) 
decreased. However, the huge increase in the number of FFS firms raises questions 
about this positive performance. Overall, all countries seemed to handle the crisis 
effectively, but there are obvious signs that more actions were necessary. 
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Country-level comparison (Panel C) 
Comparisons between the countries’ descriptive statistics (Panel C) are equally 
important. In this respect, the results reveal interesting information about the 
performance of these countries over the entire period. Once again, there are signs that 
smaller economies performed better under IFRS (Armstrong et al., 2007). For 
example, Greece exhibited better cost of equity (COC) and growth (MVBV) 
measures. Taking advantage of the accuracy of IFRS and the safety of participating in 
the EU, Greece over-performed. Although its firms had the smallest mean of Big 4 
auditors and it exhibited the highest mean of FFS during this period, these factors did 
not prevent it from exhibiting better results than the worst-performing country on each 
measure. With regard to the other countries examined, there was a clear ascendancy 
of Germany in terms of size measures, followed by the UK and Australia. Germany 
and the UK also had higher profitability (EPS), while Australian companies preferred 
to keep high retained earnings (PLOWB) and, in conjunction with higher leverage 
(DEBT, ETL), also maintained high liquidity (CUR, QUI). Overall, all countries 
maintained their characteristics during the difficult conditions of this period. 
 
5.1.2 IFRS versus US GAAP 
The SEC’s decision to allow non-US firms to publish their accounting figures 
using IFRS was highly important. The descriptive statistics (Panel D) reflect that 
under IFRS, although companies’ size ratios (SALESHA) decreased, they exhibited 
better investment (DIVSH), growth (MVBV), profitability (EPS), liquidity (CUR, 
QUI) and leverage (DEBT) ratios. However, 2008 was a crucial year for global stock 
markets because the crisis effects started to be reflected in firms’ balance sheets. 
Thus, the results give some first indications that companies did not succeed in 
maintaining their previous performance. Indeed, under the second year of IFRS 
adoption, they show a decrease in all the above measures. Since this outcome is a 
result of the difficult global environment, the statistics in Panel E are particularly 
interesting. 
Descriptive statistics for the financial sector under IFRS (Panel E1) and under US 
GAAP (Panel E2) reflect early signs that, during the crisis, neither of the accounting 
regimes managed to prevent a decrease in the ratios. It appears, therefore, that under 
crisis conditions, size, profitability and leverage ratios reduced in Australia, Germany, 
Greece, the UK and the US. The results in the next year for both regimes were 
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similar, but with indications of slight improvements. After the first shock, companies’ 
size measures (SALESHA for IFRS, RESTAS for US GAAP) increased, with cases of 
better leverage (DEBT for both), but their profitability did not increase. Based on 
these first indications, IFRS and US GAAP showed common reactions on key 
measures during the crisis. 
Finally, as most commentators considered that in order to prevent such situations 
in the future, it was essential to regulate the shadow banking sector, both regimes 
implemented drastic amendments for this purpose. The results (Panel F) indicate that 
the first set of improvements (2010–2011) caused contradictory outcomes for IFRS 
firms, as there is no clear picture on ratio effects, apart from profitability and leverage 
which were lower. On the other hand, under US GAAP for the same period, all firms’ 
accounting measurements decreased, while firms’ value (Tobin’s variable) decreased 
under both standards. Nevertheless, statistics concerning the second set of 
improvements (2012–2013) are more encouraging, as companies displayed improved 
ratios. Once again, the two standards seemed to perform similarly, as both IFRS and 
US GAAP firms increased their size, investment, growth and leverage ratios. 
However, US GAAP adopters overperformed on profitability and liquidity measures, 
compared with IFRS firms which did not manage to follow suit. Overall, the results 
indicate that the two regimes performed similarly. 
 
5.2 Results of Cycle 1: IFRS versus Old GAAP versus IFRS Amendments 
5.2.1 Results for Hypothesis 1 
TEST 1: Falsified financial statements (FFS) and IFRS 
Recent debates continue to focus on whether IFRS has managed to eliminate cases 
of falsified statements. The results of the first test reveal that under the first two years 
of IFRS adoption, both Australia and Germany eliminated such phenomena 
(Appendix III, Table 3/Panel A), indicating that IFRS did indeed succeed in reducing 
FFS cases for Australian and German firms compared with previous GAAP. 
Nevertheless, during the latter stages of the crisis, FFS performance deteriorated for 
these countries, as the number of cases increased. It seems, therefore, that 
amendments to IFRS did not cause appropriate reactions during the crisis. This 
supports the critical opinion of those who consider that under old GAAP, firms would 
have performed better. This may also be reinforced by the results for the UK, where 
the results show an increase in the FFS measure for every examined year (Panel A4). 
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In contrast, Greece (Panel A3) performed best among all the countries examined, 
reducing its FFS cases every year, even during the crisis, compared with old GAAP. 
This unexpected performance is important; however, until 2009, Greece had the 
highest mean of FFS incidents detected (Table 2, Panel C). 
Additional tests were run in order to identify characteristics of firms with falsified 
statements. Detailed information is provided in Appendix III, Table 3/Panel B, while 
Table 4 below shows overall relationships between FFS and the ratios. 
 
Table 4: Relationships between FFS and ratios 
 Australia Germany 
Year Size Inves. Growth Prof. Liq. Lev. Size Inves. Growth Prof. Liq. Lev. 
2004 - + 0 - - + - 0 0 - - - 
2005 - - 0 - - + 0 0 0 + + + 
2006 - 0 0 - - + - 0 0 + - - 
2007 - 0 0 - - - - 0 0 - + + 
2008 - 0 0 - - - + 0 0 - - - 
2009 - - 0 - - + + - 0 - - - 
 Greece UK 
Year Size Inves. Growth Prof. Liq. Lev. Size Inves. Growth Prof. Liq. Lev. 
2004 - 0 0 - - - - 0 0 - 0 - 
2005 - - - 0 - - + 0 0 - + - 
2006 - + - 0 - + - 0 + - 0 - 
2007 0 0 0 0 - + - 0 0 - - - 
2008 - + - - - - - 0 0 - - - 
2009 - 0 0 - - - - - 0 - - - 
(-) stands for a negative relationship, (+) for apositive relationship and (0) for no relationship 
 
The results reveal that from 2004 to 2009, Australian FFS firms displayed 
negative coefficients with regard to size (SALESHA), profitability (EPS) and 
liquidity (CUR, CFM) ratios. This indicates that under both old national GAAP and 
IFRS, even during the crisis, large Australian companies with high profitability and 
liquidity did not engage in FFS. However, the leverage ratios are higher for all years 
except for the period 2007–2008, indicating that firms with high leverage tended to 
falsify their statements, and that IFRS did not succeed in alleviating this phenomenon. 
Germany, on the other hand, seems to exhibit the most turbulent results. In 2004, 
under national GAAP, there were decreases in all ratios for FFS firms, namely size 
(SALESHA), profitability (EPS), liquidity (CASH) and leverage (CLSFU), whereas 
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during IFRS implementation there were examples of positive correlations between 
these ratios and FFS firms. The most indicative case is increases in the size measure 
(RESTAS) in 2008 and 2009, meaning that during the crisis, even big companies 
engaged in falsified statements in Germany. 
With regard to Greece and the UK, the results show that under both old GAAP 
and IFRS, FFS firms had lower size, profitability, liquidity and leverage ratios. The 
only exception for Greece was in 2006 and 2007, when firms with high leverage 
ratios (TLSFU, CGEAR) produced inaccurate statements; and for the UK, in 2005 
even big companies (SALESHA) resorted to fraudulent reports, perhaps seeking to 
overcome the effects of the IFRS transition process. Overall, the results indicate that 
although IFRS adoption resulted in a decrease in FFS in some cases, it did not 
succeed in improving the qualitative characteristics of firms that took such action. 
Thus, under both old GAAP and IFRS, smaller firms with low profitability and 
liquidity continued to be more vulnerable to fraudulent statements. 
TEST 2: Longitudinal accruals analysis 
Firms that engage in FFS aim to alter their financial reports in order to mislead 
with regard to their financial appearance and performance. Apart from artificial 
increases or decreases in revenues and earnings, this may involve using discretionary 
accruals. My Level 1 model reveals interesting results concerning the accruals 
performance of individual firms over time (Figure 3). Figure 3 depicts firm-by-firm 
growth measures for accruals. Only significant results (not tabled) are displayed in 
order to enable their interpretation. The most interesting picture is of Australia, which 
displayed the most volatile measures and seems to have used accruals during crucial 
periods. Similarly, UK firms also seem to have engaged in accruals techniques in 
difficult situations, such as IFRS introduction and during the crisis. In addition, 
Germany shows signs of accruals application mainly during the crisis, while for 
Greece there is a smooth curve with extreme cases of deviation. However, the main 
aim of this test was to determine whether a firm that applied accruals assistance in one 
year would find it easier to use such procedures subsequently. 
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Figure 3: Accruals performance over the examined years 
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Table 5: Accruals performance 
Characteristics Australia Germany Greece UK 
Initial sample 456 404 205 297 
Sig. results 285 324 133 246 
% 62,50% 80,20% 64,88% 82,83% 
2004–2006 Cases 
Companies with increased accruals 196 197 71 180 
% 68,77% 60,80% 53,38% 73,17% 
Companies with decreased accruals 89 127 62 66 
% 31,23% 39,20% 46,62% 26,83% 
2007-2009 Cases 
Companies with increased accruals 79 114 47 132 
% 27,72% 35,19% 35,34% 53,66% 
Companies with decreased accruals 206 210 86 114 
% 72,28% 64,81% 64,66% 46,34% 
Longitudinal Analysis Cases 
Companies that preserved increased accruals 42 65 28 94 
% 14,74% 20,06% 21,05% 38,21% 
Companies that preserved decreased accruals 52 78 52 28 
% 18,25% 24,07% 39,10% 11,38% 
From increased to decreased accruals 154 132 19 86 
% 54,04% 40,74% 14,29% 34,96% 
From decreased to increased accruals 37 49 34 38 
% 12,98% 15,12% 25,56% 15,45% 
 
The general outcomes indicate that firms in some countries used more accruals to 
overcome the transaction effects than to deal with crisis phenomena, those in other 
countries increased their accruals during the crisis, and many did so in both situations. 
Accruals increased for the period 2004–2006 and decreased from 2007 to 2009 (Table 
5), but this does not indicate that firms exhibited less accruals in 2008 than, for 
example, in 2005. This performance can be determined only from the descriptive 
statistics (Appendix III, Table 2) but is beyond the purpose of this test, the sole aim of 
which was to detect the trend in accruals for each firm for these two periods. Indeed, 
in the cases examined, longitudinal analysis reveals that more than half of companies 
in Australia that applied earnings management during the adoption period did not use 
accruals during the crisis. Germany and the UK exhibited similar performance, 
indicating that firms that attempt earnings managements once will not necessarily use 
these methods forever, but that every such case is particular and requires further 
analysis. Equally interesting is the indication that fewer than 16 per cent of firms in 
countries that had decreased accruals during the adoption period increased their use 
during the crisis. Thus, the results are encouraging, as most firms that previously used 
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misstatement techniques tended to stop doing so, and companies that had kept their 
accruals low tended not to increase them. 
The results of the Level 2 multilevel analysis (Appendix III, Table 4) confirm this 
reflection. Unfortunately, the estimates of fixed effects (Panel A) exhibit a positive 
relationship between time and accruals for Australian FFS firms, indicating that they 
tended to increase their accruals every year. This result may explain their volatility in 
the Level 1 test. On the other hand, there is a significant negative relationship between 
time and accruals for FFS firms in all European countries. This suggests that, year on 
year, FFS firms tended to decrease their accruals in Europe. This would be a 
beneficial outcome for Europe were it not for the following issues. First, the increase 
in FFS firms for Germany and the UK, determined in the previous Test 1, means that 
firms may have focused on methods of earnings management other than accruals. 
Second, there is evidence of a significant positive interaction between time and non-
FFS firms, indicating that in every year, non-FFS firms in Germany and the UK 
tended to increase their accruals. Thus, there was an increased likelihood that these 
firms would become FFS firms, and in Germany this started to appear, as Panel B 
indicates that, for the first time, non-FFS German firms had a higher mean of accruals 
than FFS firms (there is a negative difference between them). 
Overall, this test overturns the general estimations for accruals, leading to the 
conclusion that, when a firm has high accruals, there is high potential for it to produce 
falsified statements; but this does not mean that if a firm has falsified statements, it 
necessarily uses accruals. At the same time, if a firm uses earnings management once, 
there is high possibility that it will not do so again in similar situations. 
TEST 3: Individual standards 
The third test (Table 5) aimed to shed more light on discretionary accruals, 
focusing on individual standards of IFRS that might affect them. For Australia, the 
results indicate that, during the first year of IFRS implementation, IAS 12, 16 and 36 
had a negative effect on accruals, meaning that they led to the elimination of accruals 
by Australian firms (Panel A), and in the case of IAS 12 the outcome was impressive. 
Indeed, this individual standard positively affected more than 66 per cent of the 
companies examined. However, this performance did not last long. During the 
ensuing years, the effects of IAS 16 and 36 became negative, while IAS 12 also 
contributed to an increase in accruals during the crisis. On the other hand, apart from 
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the initial and crisis years, cash flow statements (IAS 7) seemed not to be a preferred 
tool for companies to increase earnings management. Only IAS 32–39 resulted in 
decreased accruals during the crisis, indicating that the amendments to these standards 
that took effect in 2008–2009 were fully effective for Australian firms. 
Similarly, for the first two years of IFRS implementation, there was an impressive 
positive effect of individual standards for Germany (Panel B), as most of them (IAS 7, 
12, 16, 23, 33 and 38) contributed to the elimination of accruals. This corresponds 
entirely with the result of Test 1, which showed a decrease in FFS firms during this 
period. Nevertheless, in 2007, a year characterised by early manifestations of crisis 
effects, there are indications that some of the previous standards did not succeed so 
well. Indeed, the average material impact of IAS 7, 23 and 38 was positive in relation 
to accruals, while improvements to IAS 32–39, which were effective in Australia, did 
not seem to have the same effect for Germany during the crisis. However, the most 
encouraging fact is that, under crisis conditions, German firms did not use IAS 33 
(EPS) to improve their financials. Since many have expressed concern that IAS 18 
and IAS 33 were the first individual standards used to increase accruals, it is highly 
important that Germany was the only country examined that did not apply this option. 
Proceeding to the results for Greece (Panel C), during the first implementation 
year and during the crisis, the average impact on accruals of most individual standards 
was positive, while in all other years most (IAS 12, 16 and 18) had negative effects. 
As in Australia, IFRS improvements to IAS32–39 were successful. Finally, the UK 
(Panel D) exhibited an impressive first year of IFRS implementation, using the least 
possible individual standards to increase accruals, but its performance over the 
following years declined. The year 2008 was the peak of this achievement, where 
only two individual standards (IAS 16 and 36) contributed to the decrease in accruals. 
Similarly to Germany, in the UK the improvements to IAS 32–39 had no positive 
effects. 
Overall, the results indicate that once again each country performed differently, 
although the effects on European countries were similar to Australia. For example, 
IAS 16 and 33, which for most years had a positive impact on accruals in Australia, 
had the opposite effect for all other countries. The only individual standards showing 
a common reaction are IAS 12 and IAS 32–39, which made negative and positive 
contributions respectively. Under such circumstances, IAS 12 indicates that low 
taxation reduces earnings management, while the fact that, in all countries, IAS 32–39 
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were positively related to accruals may indicate that the IFRS board should introduce 
further amendments. Thus, as proved by these results, and considering the indications 
of the previous Test 2, it is crucial for investors and authorities to have a clear picture 
of each separate firm’s and standard’s performance. 
TEST 4: Auditors’ size and quality of financial statements 
Since its introduction in 1992, statutory auditing has expanded (Leventis et al., 
2005), making forensic accounting necessary for listed companies. However, the 
effectiveness of auditing has been constantly questioned (Leventis and Caramanis, 
2005), especially under IFRS where expectations seem to be higher. Previous studies 
find that companies that select Big 4 auditors have less scope for earnings 
management procedures, although the quality difference due to auditors’ size 
attenuates in countries with stronger investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003; 
Burgstahler et al., 2004). Following this rule, Australia, Germany and the UK should 
have overperformed compared with Greece. However, in my analysis, the findings 
(Appendix III, Table 6/Panel A) reveal a more complicated situation. Indeed, 
Australian firms audited by Big 4 companies displayed a positive relationship with 
accruals for all years of IFRS adoption except 2006 (DV value). 
The outcome of this test is also revealing about the characteristics of firms that 
employed such practices. More specifically, there is a positive relationship between 
accruals and size ratios (SALETAS) from 2005 to 2007, suggesting that larger firms 
may be inclined to use earnings management in order to retain the security of a Big 4 
auditor. However, this trend ceased during the crisis (LNMV). Australian firms also 
displayed a positive association between accruals and profitability ratios (OPM, EPS), 
proving that highly profitable firms may have employed high accruals. The first 
encouraging results are indicated by the correspondence between accruals and 
leverage, which was significantly negative (DEBTE) for most years. Thus, highly 
leveraged firms audited by Big 4 companies did not use high accruals in order to 
overcome debt issues. 
Furthermore, the results reveal that German firms with Big 4 auditors had a 
negative accruals correlation under IFRS, except for 2006 and 2008. Although this 
performance may be justifiable under crisis conditions, during 2006 companies seem 
to have taken advantage of the elastic regulations of the first implementation year in 
order to gain competitive advantage. Similarly to Australia, German firms exhibited a 
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positive relationship between accruals, size (SALETAS, LNMV) and leverage 
(DSFU, DEBT, IGEAR) measurements for all years. This indicates that Big 4 
auditors did not prevent large German companies with high leverage ratios from using 
high accruals. 
With regard to profitability, during the crisis there was a negative relationship, 
meaning that companies with low profitability seemed to engage in earnings 
management in order to improve their financial figures. Moreover, there appears to 
have been a negative correlation between Greek and UK firms with Big 4 auditors and 
accruals, except during the crisis period. They exhibited similar results in relation to 
size ratios as the aforementioned countries. Concerning the other ratios, UK firms 
exhibited a negative correlation between accruals and profitability (NPM), while 
Greece showed no clear trend in performance for these ratios throughout the 
examined years. Finally, another striking result is that under old GAAP, all countries 
except Germany had a negative correlation with accruals, meaning that firms with Big 
4 auditors appeared to engage in fewer earnings management cases. 
In addition, as already mentioned, apart from auditors’ size, recent debates focus 
on their rotation. Most people consider that a more rapid change procedure should be 
introduced for auditors, as in the UK, but many oppose this on the grounds of 
increased cost and potentially disruptive effects. The results (Appendix III, Table 
6/Panel B) in this case are revealing. Indeed, the UK authorities might feel justified, 
as UK firms that changed their auditors decreased their accruals under IFRS. In 
Germany as well, most firms that rotated auditors exhibited negative accruals. Greece 
did not display significant results as few firms made such changes, while Australia 
displayed a negative correlation only for the years 2006 and 2009. Concerning 
additional characteristics, in Australia there was a negative correspondence between 
accruals and profitability (NPM) and a positive correspondence with leverage 
(DEBT), indicating that firms with low profitability and/or high leverage took 
advantage of this change in order to increase their accruals. The results for the 
remaining ratios were similar, with the exception of the UK, which exhibited a 
negative relationship between leverage and accruals for most years (DEBT). This 
indicates that in every case of change, there was a high possibility that the new 
auditors would not use earnings management techniques. 
Overall, this hypothesis sought to examine a crucial concept relating to IFRS 
implementation during these years. FFS is a complicated notion that relates to many 
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aspects of IFRS performance. In order to determine whether these aspects had 
improved, the study combined a number of parameters, as expressed in the tests 
performed. The results indicate that IFRS did indeed improve the qualitative 
characteristics of FFS cases and the quality of smaller auditors. As IFRS seems to 
have improved financial statements, H1 can be accepted, with a few exceptions. 
 
5.2.2 Results for Hypothesis 2 
Insider trading was another crucial factor in IFRS implementation. Many 
countries introduced additional regulations and mechanisms, including strict 
disclosure requirements, in order to discourage cases of privileged information. The 
results of the first test (Appendix III, Table 7) indicate that under IFRS, both the value 
of trading and the number of traders increased dramatically. More specifically, 
Greece’s  insider trading values (Panel C) increased on all measures, including the 
number of insiders that engaged in a transaction. Australian companies (Panel A) 
decreased only low disposal trades (LSVALUE) for the first year and low purchase 
value (LBVALUE) for the next year. In Germany (Panel B), high buying value 
(HBVALUE) and total selling amount (HSVALUE, LSVALUE) decreased for 2006. 
UK firms decreased their purchasing activity for 2005 for values less than £1 million 
(LBVALUE) and selling trades in the same category (LSVALUE) for the next year, 
and also decreased the total number of buying insiders for 2005 (BID). Such activities 
do not always indicate fraud; they may be attributable to the fact that under IFRS, all 
insider transactions must be disclosed, or may be a sign of trust in the company on the 
part of insiders. Nevertheless, this stock market behaviour needs to be closely 
observed and recorded in detail. 
For this reason, the next step in the main analysis was to examine the potential 
correlation between accruals and insider case categories. Most people associate 
insider trading only with stock markets. However, as insiders usually have access to 
company’s operations, they may obscure disclosures in order to manipulate stock 
returns. Thus, this relates to fundamental analysis and accruals. The results (Table 8) 
for Australia (Panel A) indicate that each case of insider trading activity under IFRS 
was positively correlated with accruals (DV), while under old GAAP it had a negative 
correlation. In addition, firms that engaged in insider trading and had higher size and 
profitability ratios (LNMV, RESTAS, OPM) were more likely to have higher accruals 
(Test 2a). Furthermore, large purchases seemed to influence highly leveraged firms 
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(CGEAR, TLSFU), while large selling affected highly profitable firms (OPM). 
Finally, big companies with many insiders displayed a negative association with 
accruals (SALESHA) and a positive association with profitability (OPM). 
On the other hand, German and UK firms (Panels B and D) did not seem to be 
affected by insider trading, as they displayed negative DV values in most cases. 
However, for both countries there was a positive association between discretionary 
accruals and size for all years examined (SALETAS, SALESHA, RESTAS, LNMV), 
suggesting that large firms may have used smoothing procedures to trigger insider 
trading activities. Finally, in Greece (Panel C), large firms with significant insider 
activity were positive related to accruals (LNMV), while there was a negative 
correspondence between accruals and profitability (ROCE). This indicates that 
insiders in low-profit companies may have displayed high accruals in order to 
manipulate earnings and increase investors’ interest, and seem to have achieved this 
purpose. Indeed, the results of Tests 2b and 2c confirm this phenomenon: insiders 
purchased large values in these companies and sold large amounts of companies with 
positive earnings correlation (EPS), as these firms displayed low profitability and low 
accruals. 
Finally, my last tests for this hypothesis focused on insider trading and stock 
market performance. Higher abnormal returns connected with insider trading may be 
an indication that insiders took advantage of privileged information, and thus 
manipulated firms’ stock performance in order to increase their earnings potential. 
Many suggest that during the crisis these cases may have increased, even in countries 
with strong protection laws. On the other hand, IFRS was intended to eliminate these 
speculative procedures, but the results (Appendix III, Table 9) indicate that they only 
partially succeeded in this. Australia displayed a negative correlation between insider 
trading and abnormal returns for the years 2007 and 2009, but a positive correlation in 
2008 (DV). It seems, therefore, that during the crisis, insiders helped increase 
abnormal returns, maybe considering the potential domino effects on the market. 
Furthermore, the results display a positive association between abnormal returns and 
size for all years examined (SALETAS, LNMV) and for companies that bought 
and/or sold large share values. This may imply that the stock performance of large 
firms tends to be more easily manipulated by insiders with high trading amounts. 
Compared with the results of the previous test, it seems that big Australian companies 
are more vulnerable to insiders, as they exhibited increased accruals and abnormal 
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returns. Given that they have high trading volumes, insiders may prefer them as they 
can better cover their tracks. 
Similar results were displayed by the other countries examined (Panels B, C and 
D). In at least two of the categories examined, they all had positive DV values under 
crisis conditions and negative values for the other years. IFRS did not control the 
outbreak of stock transactions arising from the effects of the crisis, nor fully disclose 
their correlation with insider trading. Concerning the remaining characteristics, 
similarly to Australia, Greece displayed a positive correlation between abnormal 
returns and size (RESSFU, SALETAS) for companies that bought and/or sold large 
share values. In addition, in Germany, a large number of buying and selling insiders 
preferred highly leveraged companies (TLSFU, DEBT, DEBTE), which is not 
unexpected considering that most highly leveraged firms exhibited a positive 
relationship with accruals in the previous tests for the same categories. Finally, the 
characteristics of UK firms appear to have changed every year, so no universal 
outcomes could be detected. Overall, the results indicate that the null hypothesis 
cannot be accepted, as there are no indications that suspicious insider trading cases 
were eliminated following the introduction of IFRS; rather, in all countries, worrying 
cases were detected. 
 
5.2.3 Results for Hypothesis 3 
The cost of equity has always been one the most critical elements in evaluating 
companies. Appendix III, Table 10/Panel A presents the results of the first test. 
Germany had the best performance, as its firms decreased their cost of capital for both 
years, while during the second year of IFRS implementation, costs increased for firms 
in all other countries. These second outcomes are no cause for concern, as it was 
entirely normal for markets to seek to rebalance following the introduction of IFRS 
which successfully managed to decrease capital costs. Previous research indicates that 
such costs are positively related to leverage (Damodaran, 2010) and the inflation rate 
(Gosnell and Nejadmalayeri, 2010), and negatively related to size (Li, 2010), growth 
in GDP (Vassalou, 2003) and average stock returns (Kofman and Martens, 1997). 
Therefore, many factors may affect the cost of equity, although the results indicate 
that a set of accurate standards may have a greater impact on a firm’s cost of equity 
than any other factor. For example, based on the negative correlation between cost 
and GDP growth mentioned previously, and considering that most European countries 
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in my sample exhibited a decrease in GDP growth in 2005 (Appendix II, Table 10), I 
expected an increase in capital costs. However, the results for 2005 were contrary to 
expectations. In addition, I sought to determine the impact of IFRS in relation to any 
correlation between cost of capital, accruals and abnormal returns. Theory suggests 
that in order to lower the cost of equity, firms tend to attract investors’ interest 
through strong fundamentals and appealing stock performance. For this reason, 
managers have incentives to implement earnings management to achieve the former, 
and abnormal returns to attain the latter. 
Nevertheless, the results of the second test (Panel B) do not seem to support this 
theory. Indeed, Greece and the UK exhibited negative correlations between accruals 
and the cost of capital for firms with low costs for both years under IFRS, while 
Australia and Germany seem to have made use of accruals in order to lower their 
costs only during the transaction year (DV). Furthermore, Australian firms displayed 
negative coefficients between accruals and leverage ratios (CLSFU), meaning that 
firms with high debt that needed to lower their cost of capital did not choose to use 
accruals to improve their borrowing prospects. In contrast, in Germany this was a 
preferred option not only for leveraged firms (IGEAR, CGEAR), but also for highly 
profitable companies (OPM, ROCE). Similarly, UK listed firms seemed to adopt this 
process, aiming to obtain better cost of equity (OPM, EPS), while in Greece it was 
large companies that chose to use earnings management to decrease their costs, as the 
results show a positive relationship between size and accruals (RESTAS). 
In a similar vein, the results of the third test (Panel C) indicate that firms did not 
use abnormal returns in order to decrease their cost of equity, an outcome that 
corresponds entirely with previous research (Kofman and Martens, 1997). Germany 
and Greece produced negative relationships for both years, while Australia and the 
UK used abnormal techniques only for the crisis period (DV). Nevertheless, there 
were always cases that tended to confirm or deny the hopeful outcomes of the general 
test. Australian leveraged companies that did not use accruals in my previous 
examination seemed to prefer abnormal returns, as they exhibited a positive 
relationship with these measures (CLSFU, DEBTE). On the other hand, large Greek 
companies, which seemed to use accruals previously, displayed a negative correlation 
with abnormal returns (LNMV, SALETAS). These results increase the value of 
considering both fundamentals and market analysis, as firms that used accruals did 
not employ abnormal returns, and vice versa. 
 172 
On the whole, the findings indicate that this hypothesis is accepted. Under IFRS, 
the cost of capital was lower with more accurate reporting, as in most cases this 
decrease was not accompanied by earnings management or market speculation. 
 
5.2.4 Discussion of the results of Cycle I 
IFRS implementation has been the most significant reform in accounting. The 
above results raise interesting issues over the ten years of IFRS implementation. 
Following the literature, I conclude that IFRS have performed better in most crucial 
cases compared with old national GAAP, and even in cases where they did not 
succeed, they recovered quickly. It seems, therefore, that European and Australian 
listed firms in my sample successfully transferred from one system to another with the 
least possible effects, revealing that adopting IFRS was a helpful tool for improving 
financial figures. Furthermore, the amendments to IFRS also seem to have been 
successful in most cases; hence I deduce that, in general, the objectives of IFRS have 
been realised. 
However, the results of this first cycle lead to a conviction that IFRS must proceed 
with further improvements in a number of areas, as they reveal that firms may still use 
number smoothing in order to meet their targets. Indeed, Australia, Germany and the 
UK did not succeed in decreasing FFS cases for all years, while the outcomes also 
reveal that in every year German and UK non-FFS firms increased their accruals, 
indicating that under IFRS, FFS cases will increase in future. Only Greece managed 
to perform better and reduce FFS incidences even during the crisis. Greece also 
performed equally well in a number of other cases, indicating that small and weak 
economies may be positively affected by accurate regimes. 
This is in line with the previous literature, which states that weaker economies 
gain the most advantages from a set of accurate accounting measures. Similarly 
impressive is the fact that, in many cases, large companies were more vulnerable to 
earnings management even if they were audited by Big 4 firms. In fact, Big 4 
companies in my analysis often did not seem to respond as expected, since they 
restricted mainly highly leveraged firms from increasing their accruals. It seems, 
therefore, that under IFRS they lost their competitive advantage, and smaller auditing 
companies appear to have gained on them professionally. For this reason, responsible 
authorities have considered shortening the obligatory rotation time for auditors. The 
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results indicate that this has been a positive step, as there is a high possibility that new 
auditors will prevent firms from using earnings management techniques. 
However, we need to be continuously on the alert, because new methods of 
accounting misinterpretations may be used, and regulating such cases in a challenging 
economic environment may be difficult. Indeed, I detected cases where falsified firms 
tended to decrease their accruals and focus on other methods. All these considerations 
apply, without having to illustrate the year-on-year accruals performance of each 
company. Therefore, bearing in mind that each case and economy reacts differently, 
and every company has specific characteristics and motives, my analysis suggests that 
most companies that applied earnings management in the first adoption period did not 
use accruals during the crisis. I have also determined the individual standards that 
may have affected accruals performance for all countries. In fact, even for European 
countries, each individual standard had significantly different effects. For example, 
improvements to ISAS 32–39 turned out to be extremely effective in Australia, but 
did not seem to exhibit the same performance in Germany and the UK, leading to 
negative performance for their shadow banking sector as well. Moreover, insider 
trading may be another appealing case for IFRS, as it seems to determine both the 
fundamentals and the market performance of companies. The results indicate that 
IFRS failed to entirely control speculative procedures that aimed to increase abnormal 
returns, but managed to decrease firms’ cost of capital, without speculative 
procedures. 
 
5.3 Results of Cycle II: IFRS versus US GAAP 
5.3.1 Results for Hypothesis 4 
The introduction of IFRS in the US posed a greater challenge than their launch in 
Europe. In this case, they did not replace previous accounting regimes, but had to 
compete with US GAAP in the same market. Thus, I aimed to consider whether IFRS 
and US GAAP are as different as many consider them to be in practice. Despite the 
small sample, since few companies chose to reconcile their accounting values under 
both regimes, the outcomes indicate that following IFRS adoption in the US, the 
variation between them decreased. Indeed, the mean differences in net income (NI) 
and EPS were significantly lower than their mean for 2006 (Appendix III, Table 11). 
As previously stated, the lower the mean of a measurement, the greater the 
convergence. 
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On the other hand, differences in assets (NA, RONA) increased for the first year. 
It seems that, as asset calculations are based on long-term procedures, and in many 
cases are affected by national laws, more time is needed to eliminate any 
dissimilarities. This is why relevant studies identify tangible assets as a significant 
factor in the incomparability between IFRS and US GAAP. However, apart from 
continued good earnings performance (EPS), there was an impressive decrease in the 
mean of both NA and RONA variables in 2008 compared with 2007. This signals that 
assets might further converge over time, and that the SEC’s decision was an 
appropriate starting point for greater collaboration between these two regimes. It 
seems, therefore, that in these two years, firms usually had higher points of 
convergence compared with 2006, supporting H4. 
 
5.3.2 Results for Hypothesis 5 
In the previous section, I focused only on the level of convergence. Although I 
found signs that these two standards cooperated better, this does not mean that the 
introduction of IFRS in the US had no effect. In addition, as few previous studies 
have straightforwardly compared IFRS with US GAAP, this study aimed, through 
these tests, to contribute to the current concerns of investors and analysts that IFRS 
will not succeed in the US. The results (Appendix III, Table 12/Panel A) suggest that 
firms under IFRS displayed higher liquidity (CUR, QUI, CFSH) and also sustained 
lower leverage ratios (ETL, TLSFU) for their first year, indicating that both the 
market and companies were deterred from increasing their borrowing. In addition, 
under IFRS, firms were lower in size as they displayed negative measures 
(SALETAS, LNMV). This result was unexpected, as previous research has found that 
IFRS tends to privilege larger companies (Tarca, 2004). 
On the other hand, profitability (PLOWB, ROSC) was higher for firms under 
IFRS than had been the case under US GAAP, even though convergence of earnings 
figures was detected in the previous hypothesis. It seems that the difference between 
the two standards in this field is too large to alleviate in just a year. Besides, most 
research detects a significant increase in earnings in the first year of adoption of IFRS 
(Moya et al., 2005). The outcomes of the second implementation year seem to support 
the initial findings and expectations (Panel B). Leverage ratios (DEBT) were still 
negative, but size measures had become positive, meaning that larger firms performed 
better in the second year of IFRS (LNMV). However, investment (DIVCOV), growth 
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(MVBV, PEG), profitability (PLOWB, OPM, NPM), liquidity (CUR, QUI) and 
leverage (DEBT) were negative compared with the previous year. This may have 
been a result of the turbulent conditions that prevailed in the market as a result of the 
economic crisis, which arose in that year. 
Overall, the first indications from IFRS implementation are more encouraging 
than suggested by the literature, while the underperformance of some investment and 
profitability measures might have been anticipated due to transition effects and the 
volatile conditions. For this reason, the results of the next test are important. All 
studies that have examined the volatility of measures under IFRS attribute this 
performance to their fair value direction, but in this case the reactions are even more 
interesting, as US GAAP also has a fair value orientation. However, the results 
(Appendix III, Table 13) indicate that firms under IFRS tended to exhibit more 
volatile investment measures (DIVCOV, PE, HOLTA), as well as higher volatility in 
profitability (PLOWB, NPM, EPS), liquidity (CUR, CASH, QUI, CFSH) and 
leverage (TLSFU, IGEAR) ratios. 
Although such volatility may affect market performance, as it may deter 
traditional investors, the literature suggests that more variable measures may denote 
less earnings smoothing (Leuz et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2003). Thus, the results 
indicate that it is easier for companies and safer for investors if foreign firms do not 
reconcile with US GAAP but keep their original standards. Similarly, the outcomes 
for 2008 indicate that, after two years of adoption, IFRS was still more volatile in 
relation to size (NAVSH), growth (PEG, DIVSHG) and leverage (CLSFU, IGEAR) 
ratios. In general, this hypothesis delivers a first indication that IFRS performed better 
than expected in the US. However, this does not mean that they did not have 
significant effects on accounting statements. Indeed, the outcomes tend to prove that 
H5 holds, which may curb scepticism regarding the introduction of IFRS in the US. 
 
5.3.3 Results for Hypothesis 6 
The research aimed to examine additional issues following the introduction of 
IFRS in the US by focusing on earnings management, the basic concern of all 
accounting standards. The results of the first test indicate early signs of less earnings 
management following the adoption of IFRS. More specifically, firms under IFRS 
exhibited higher volatility in net profit change (ΔNP/TA) and higher volatility in the 
change in net profit to the change in operating cash flows (ΔNP/ΔNCF) compared 
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with US GAAP (Appendix III, Table 14/Panel A). This increase in the standard 
deviation of the above variables signals a decreased need for earnings management. 
The second test aimed to determine the correlation between accruals and cash flows 
from operating activities. Since the analysis in H1/Test 4 revealed that IAS 7 (cash 
flows) was used by all countries under difficult circumstances, including in their first 
year of IFRS adoption and under crisis conditions, it was essential to detect how my 
sample performed in this case. 
The results (Appendix III, Table 14/Panel B, Test 2a) reveal a positive correlation 
between accruals and cash flows in the first year of implementation, indicating that 
firms with low cash flows exhibited low accruals. It seems, therefore, that IFRS 
performed better than in similar cases in other countries, and better than US GAAP 
(which displayed a negative correlation in 2006). Nevertheless, the results for the 
following year (2008) were less encouraging. The correlation between accruals and 
cash flows was again negative, meaning that IFRS adopters in US may have managed 
their earnings using accruals. This was definitely a negative downturn, but it may 
have been justified, as in 2008 the effects of the crisis started to appear. However, 
whether attributable to the crisis or other factors, the results were even worse, given 
not only that the next test (2b) displayed a decline in accruals quality for 2008, but 
also that US GAAP outperformed IFRS. 
For this reason, the research was taken a step further to compare accruals with 
leverage, size and profitability ratios. Panel C (Test 2c) presents the results. During 
2006, firms using US GAAP had a negative relationship with size ratios (SALETAS) 
and a positive correlation with profitability (OPM, NPM) and leverage (ROCE, 
CGEAR). It is thus obvious that under US GAAP, large firms and companies with 
low profitability exhibited low accruals. However, the significant positive relationship 
between accruals and leverage indicates that firms with debt issues may have 
increased their accruals to present a different image and avoid the effects of a possible 
debt violation. Firms under IFRS presented the same picture as under US GAAP, for 
both years of implementation. Indeed, there was a negative relationship between 
accruals and size (NAVSH, RESSFU, SALESHA) and a positive relationship with 
profitability measures (OPM, NPM). The only exception was in leverage ratios where, 
contrarily to US GAAP, firms presented a negative correspondence (DEBT) under 
IFRS. It seems, therefore, that IFRS managed to prevent firms with high borrowing 
from implementing earnings management procedures, although this may simply have 
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been an effect of the reduced leverage measures during the IFRS implementation 
identified in tests for H5. In both cases, IFRS seem to have had an advantage over US 
GAAP in accurately interpreting accounting measures. 
Finally, Panel D presents the results of two equally important and significant 
problems. As previously explained, SPP and LNL are indicative of earnings 
management, and IFRS managed to deal with these successfully. Indeed, the results 
indicate a decrease in SPP firms during the first two years of official adoption, while 
at the same time, for both years again, the outcomes reveal an increase in firms with 
LNL compared with US GAAP. This is a strong indicator that under IFRS, these 
firms tended not to manage their accounting measures, but presented their small or 
large losses in a timely manner. All these outcomes confirm that H6 is valid. Even in 
cases where IFRS seemed not to exhibit the expected results, their adoption proved to 
have the potential to prevent cases of earnings management. 
This confirms that, when an accurate accounting system meets strong investor 
protection laws (Koumanakos et al., 2005), earnings management techniques are 
eliminated. Overall, concerning this set of hypotheses (H4–H6), it seems that, 
although IFRS did not always perform better than US GAAP, they managed to earn 
investors’ trust, balance performance during the two years examined, and interest 
many companies from Asia, Canada, Brazil, and even the US, to consider adopting 
them. Given that the decision to allow their use also enables the convergence process, 
and that the results reveal that in some cases IFRS perform better than US GAAP and 
vice versa, perhaps a combination of the two is the solution to eliminating their 
drawbacks for accounting. 
 
5.3.4 Discussion of the results for Cycle II 
Convergence between IFRS and US GAAP is the final step on a path fraught with 
difficulties. Especially nowadays, many consider it to be useless, as with globalisation 
of financial markets, investors are familiar with both IFRS and US GAAP, so it is 
easier for them to analyse and accept both of these dominant regimes, especially after 
aligning many of their financials, as revealed in tests for H4. Nevertheless, as already 
mentioned, the literature suggests that local US firms listed on the US stock market 
display higher earnings quality than foreign firms that are also listed on US markets 
(Lang et al., 2006; Leuz, 2006). This is attributed to weaker protection laws and 
regulations for these cross-listed companies. Of course, these studies were conducted 
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before use of IFRS was allowed in the US, so they focused on financials that firms 
needed to reconcile with US GAAP. It seems, therefore, that during the reconciliation 
process, many firms engaged in earnings management, as a change in an accounting 
measure is always an easy method for smoothing a company’s financials. 
However, in this study, although I did not compare US firms with foreign 
companies, my results give sufficient indications that the findings of previous 
research no longer hold. Indeed, IFRS seemed to perform without serious implications 
in the US market as, apart from typical adoption effects such as volatile measures, it 
helped companies to perform better than they had under US GAAP. Contrary to 
previous studies, my results show that under IFRS, foreign firms seemed to take 
advantage of the better US market enforcement and regulation. Thus, they performed 
better and with fewer effects than in other countries during their first transition in 
Europe. Combined with the results of the previous cycle and the literature, responsible 
IFRS authorities should consider the US market as an appropriate environment for 
IFRS, and should proceed with necessary improvements, even before any 
convergence process. This may be a solution to the harmonisation problems detected 
in examining many of my hypotheses. 
 
5.4 Results for Cycle III: IFRS and US GAAP versus Financial Crisis 
5.4.1 Results for Hypothesis 7 
As many people blame IFRS and US GAAP for the development and transmission 
of the crisis, it is vitally important to determine financial sector performance at the 
peak of the crisis. For this reason, I focused on abnormal returns in order to examine 
any extreme stock reactions in this sector. The analytical results (Appendix III, Table 
15; aggregated below in Table 6) indicate that the outbreak of the crisis had negative 
effects on the Australian and European banking sector. On the other hand, the US did 
not seem to report great losses on the day that Lehman’s became bankrupt. 
Table 6: Aggregated results for AR and CAR 
Event Day Australia Germany Greece UK NYSE NASDAQ 
Positive AR 33.33% 14.29% 0.00% 50.00% 72.41% 58.97% 
Negative AR 66.67% 85.71% 100.00% 50.00% 27.59% 41.03% 
5-Days CAR 
Positive 50.00% 25.00% 0.00% 84.62% 97.30% 94.55% 
Negative 50.00% 75.00% 100.00% 15.38% 2.70% 5.45% 
10-Days CAR 
Positive 71.43% 20.00% 25.00% 69.23% 94.12% 91.94% 
Negative 28.57% 80.00% 75.00% 30.77% 5.88% 8.06% 
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* These statistics were calculated based only on significant results 
 
Furthermore, the results show that cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for most 
companies in all the countries examined returned to positive values as early as 10 
days after the incident, indicating that investors trusted both regimes and authorities, 
since they seem to have taken all the necessary measures. The only exceptions were 
Germany and Greece, but even in these countries the results improved. It seems, 
therefore, that there was a normal recovery process, comparable to markets’ 
performance after sudden events such as terrorist attacks (Raby, 2003). However, 
such occasions are extremely unexpected, and as a market analyst, I was aware of 
turbulent conditions long before the Lehman Brothers’ issues, providing investors 
with time to plan possible speculation procedures. 
An additional factor must be taken into consideration. As mentioned earlier, 
abnormal returns express the difference between a company’s expected and realised 
performance. The calculation of expected performance is based on the general stock 
market index; hence, when there are positive abnormal returns, as in case of the US, 
this does not mean that stocks did not go down, but that they may not have decreased 
as much as expected. Furthermore, AR and CAR calculations depict the reaction at a 
specific time point, rather than the trend in the measure examined. 
For this reason, Figure 4 seeks to illustrate the continuum of AR 10 days before 
and after the event and detect any suspicious cases. 
 
Figure 4: Abnormal returns before and after Lehman’s Brothers’ bankruptcy 
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The results shown in Figure 4 reveal some interesting points. Australia and 
Europe seem to have a smooth curve. Europe has the most stable line, as it appears 
that any losses in Germany and Greece were counterbalanced by better performance 
by the UK. Furthermore, all examined countries one or two days before the event 
exhibited an increase in abnormal sales, which may be evidence of information 
leakage, because without inside information, abnormal returns should not have been 
significantly different from zero until the event day. However, the most impressive 
factor is the extreme volatility displayed by the US markets, both NYSE and 
NASDAQ, after Lehman’s collapse. 
In previous indications (Table 6), US markets seemed to act normally, and nothing 
predicted this irregular US behaviour, not even the slight decrease in their positive 10-
day CAR. Nevertheless, this raises concerns about the reasons for this performance. Is 
it attributable to the crisis or to speculation? In fact, investors may have considered 
various listed companies to be more vulnerable than others; thus, it seems that some 
companies extremely underperformed, while others extremely overperformed during 
the crisis. On the other hand, this move has the typical characteristics of speculation, 
as firms increased their prices at first, and two days later suddenly decreased their 
values. These cases are highly important and require further examination. Overall, the 
results in Figure 4 provide clear evidence that H7 holds, as the crisis influenced firms’ 
performance in all countries examined. Combining these facts with the outcomes of 
H2/Test 3, which revealed a positive correlation between insider trading and abnormal 
returns during the crisis, I conclude once again that additional attention is required in 
this respect. 
 
5.4.2 Results for Hypothesis 8 
The reclassification option was the most determinant action of IFRS for 
alleviating the crisis. The results of the first tests (Appendix III, Table 16) indicate 
that this action was successful. Test 1 aimed to outline the differences between three 
categories of companies: those that chose to reclassify, those that did not adopt this 
option, and US firms that did not have this possibility. Although the first category of 
firms exhibited lower size ratios prior to implementing this option (RESTAS), it 
appears that after adoption they increased their size measures, kept their higher 
profitability (ROSC, NPM) and managed to lower their leverage (CGEAR). In a 
period of crisis, this performance is highly important. 
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Moreover, US firms, without any help, also managed to lower their debt measures 
(ETL). Thus, firms seem to have preferred not to reclassify their assets, and displayed 
lower size and earnings ratios, with increased leverage during the two years 
examined. Since reclassified firms managed to lower their accruals for this period 
(Table 17/Panel A), it appears that the IFRS Board’s action was appropriate, contrary 
to many researchers’ predictions that this option would be a window to earnings 
management procedures. However, these results must be refined, focusing on the 
characteristics of these firms in conjunction with their accruals performance and 
abnormal returns. Furthermore, the outcome of this test addresses only reclassified 
firms, without comparing them with other categories, as in the following results. 
Appendix III, Table 17/Panel B presents the OLS regression results for accruals. 
Although reclassified firms lowered their accruals, in their first reclassifying year they 
displayed a positive correlation with accruals (DV) compared with non-reclassified 
firms. The tumultuous conditions and the implementation of a new unknown 
procedure seems to have resulted in this temporary outcome, as in 2009 the DV value 
returned to negative. Furthermore, compared with the others, US firms, whether 
reclassified or not, exhibited a positive correlation with accruals for all years. This 
performance may indicate either that the effects of the crisis were more severe for US 
companies, or that US GAAP should have adopted the reclassification option. The 
results also demonstrate that the profitability ratios (OPM) of reclassified firms were 
significantly negative in relation to discretionary accruals. This is critical, as firms in 
this category exhibited higher earnings than firms that did not choose to reclassify 
(Test 1) and, as proved by this outcome, this higher earnings performance was 
accompanied by lower accruals during the crisis. 
An unexpected outcome was the negative association between accruals and 
leverage (ETL) for reclassified firms, as this may indicate that disclosers with low 
leverage ratios tended to increase their accruals and, as previously analysed (Test 1), 
reclassified firms decreased their leverage. Furthermore, the results indicate that US 
firms underperformed compared with both reclassified and non-reclassified 
companies, as they showed signs of a positive relation between accruals, profitability 
(OPM, ROCE) and leverage (INTCOV). Similarly, the results of the third test (Panel 
C) depict that reclassified firms performed well. They demonstrated lower abnormal 
returns during the crisis compared with non-reclassified firms (DV value), and 
exhibited a positive association between abnormal returns and leverage ratios 
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(CGEAR, DEBTE), proving that low leveraged firms provide low abnormal returns. 
Finally, US firms appear to have achieved less successful results, given the positive 
correlation with abnormal returns (DV). Overall, the outcomes indicate that H8 is 
accepted: IFRS reacted successfully to the crisis with its reclassification option, 
absorbing any possible statement effects and accruals increases. 
 
5.4.3 Results for Hypothesis 9 
The first test of this section aimed to detect any improvements in ratios following 
the disclosure amendments for the shadow banking sector under both regimes. The 
results are based on the fact that the higher the volatility, the better the improvement. 
In Australia (Appendix III, Table 18/Panel A), for the first year of improvements, 
firms exhibited more volatile size (SALESHA) and profitability measures (PLOWB), 
while no safe conclusion can be drawn on the other measures. The outcomes for the 
compared years 2012–2013 are more obvious, as companies tended to exhibit more 
volatility in all ratios. Investment (DIVCOV, PE) and profitability (PLOWB, OPM, 
NPM) ratios were considerably more volatile in 2013, and the same picture is 
presented for liquidity (CUR, QUI) and leverage (ETL, INTCOV). These facts may 
be early indications that the second set of IFRS improvements positively affected the 
shadow banking sector in Australia. 
Similarly, Germany performed equally well under both sets of years examined, 
with more volatile investment (DIVYI, PE), profitability (PLOWB, OPM), liquidity 
(CUR, QUI) and leverage (ETL, INTCOV) measures. The outcomes for the UK were 
similar, as it also displayed more volatile variables. On the other hand, the results for 
US companies were less promising. US GAAP implemented only slight 
improvements to the banking sector, as their final developments would be presented a 
few years later; nonetheless, firms exhibited lower volatility in investment (DIVCOV, 
PE), profitability (PLOWB, OPM), liquidity (CUR, QUI) and leverage (DEBT, 
INTCOV) ratios for the years 2010–2011. They reacted better in the second year of 
comparison, as apart from leverage (DEBT, INTCOV), which still reported lower 
volatility, the other measures performed better. 
Furthermore, the next test (Appendix III, Table 18/Panel B) is in most cases 
consistent with the previous results. Thus, although Australia exhibited the highest R-
squared in 2011, it also presented the lowest BVPS, indicating that the first set of 
amendments was confusing for the Australian shadow banking sector. On the other 
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hand, BVPS and NPPS had their highest values in 2013, and given that their R-
squared was similar, the results confirm that the second set of improvements was 
effective. Germany and the UK also showed signs of ongoing improvements in 
performance, as they exhibited significantly positive coefficients of BVPS and NPPS, 
and both displayed their highest R-squared in 2013. The results in the US were similar 
to Australia. Although neither performed well in the first years of the first test, they 
exhibited their highest R-squared in 2011. Furthermore, also like Australia, the US 
exhibited its highest BVPS value in 2013, indicating that the second set of US GAAP 
improvements was more effective. 
This performance seems also to have affected firms’ value, at least for Australian 
and US companies (Appendix III, Table 18/Panel C). Indeed, as these two countries 
reacted better to the accounting improvements that took effect in 2013, this behaviour 
was reflected in firms’ higher value (ΔTq) for both countries for 2013 compared with 
2012, while it was lower for 2011 compared with 2010 (first set of improvements). 
Germany’s performance was also similar. Although the first tests revealed that 
Germany achieved better results for all examined years, its firms’ values increased 
only in 2013. Finally, UK shadow firms did not succeed in increasing their value, 
even though the previous results indicated that UK companies were positively 
affected by the IFRS improvements. Investors may have been too critical in this case, 
or IFRS may not have disseminated appropriate information. 
Finally, the last set of tests for this hypothesis concentrated on earnings 
management after the IFRS and US GAAP improvements. In the first sub-test, the 
results reveal that accruals and operating cash flows exhibited a positive correlation 
for all countries from 2011 to 2013 (Panel D, Test 3a). Although they exhibited a 
negative correlation in 2010, the regulations introduced seem to have eliminated cases 
where shadow banking firms used accruals in order to increase their low cash flows 
(Land and Lang, 2002). This is an impressive outcome, as in H6 it was determined 
that it was difficult for regimes to regulate the negative relationship between accruals 
and cash flows. The only exception to this performance were the results for Germany 
in 2011, where the correlation was still negative. This may be one reason why firms’ 
value did not increase in Germany in 2011, or why accruals did not decrease. Indeed, 
the results of the next sub-test (Panel D, Test 3b) depict an increase in accruals for 
German companies, despite the improvements. In Australia, on the other hand, 
accruals decreased for both year sets, while in the US and the UK only for 2013. 
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The results of the third sub-test (Panel D, Test 3c) also reveal interesting details 
concerning accruals quality. Australia and the US not only managed to decrease their 
accruals, but also succeeded in improving their quality. Australia had by far the best 
reaction in accruals quality in 2013, exhibiting the highest R-squared, while Germany 
and the UK saw little improvement in quality. After each set of improvements, their 
accruals quality was lower. Therefore, H9 is rejected, as there are no strong 
indications that all amendments of both regimes impacted positively on accuracy in 
the shadow banking sector. In particular, IFRS authorities should pay more attention 
to this point, as the combination of all these results indicates that IFRS improvements 
were unsuccessful for Germany and the UK. 
 
5.4.4 Discussion of the results of Cycle III 
In the literature review in Chapter 2, I referred to the fact that I had never 
understood why so many studies have been concerned with the fair value orientation 
introduced by IFRS. It turned that I had not considered emerging effects such as the 
economic crisis in 2008, and I had also underestimated the IFRS tools effectiveness in 
dealing with such financial phenomena. Prior to undertaking this project, I thought 
that the US authorities should have reacted better. However, the results suggest that 
the reclassification option was successful, helping firms to perform better amid the 
crisis. US GAAP should have activated this option for US firms. 
On the other hand, the US may not have hurried to act because its banking sector 
seemed to recover more quickly than in Australia and Europe. Either way, both 
regimes need to consider speculative market cases that might have appeared during 
the crisis, as I have detected cases of abnormal returns. Finally, concerning regulation 
of the shadow banking sector, the results seem to be encouraging only with regard to 
the latest improvements and only for all countries examined. In all cases, we need to 
await the official changes to US GAAP, while further actions should be considered 
for IFRS, as Germany and the UK have failed to regulate their shadow banking sector. 
Overall, IFRS seem to have accomplished their vision of greater transparency and 
integrity, but further steps must be taken in order to entirely realise their objectives. 
More information on each individual firm and country, as well as high configuration 




This chapter has outlined the results of the main analysis of the research relating 
to each hypothesis. Prior to embarking on this project, as a professional I defended 
IFRS adoption, expecting that in the long run they would increase the accuracy of 
financial information and eliminate any need for earnings management. My results 
confirm this expectation, but not without concern. The analysis has revealed that some 
countries performed better in some cases, but none succeeded in overcoming all 
difficulties, while both IFRS and US GAAP need to try harder to defeat the effects of 
crises. However, the most pessimistic outcome is that my results suggest an 
overwhelming lack of harmonisation in a number of areas. This uneven performance 
between the countries examined is in line with previous literature, which states that 
accounting harmonisation requires not just the implementation of standards, but is 
affected by many additional factors (Christensen et al., 2008; Gow et al., 2015). My 
results confirm this concern, and increase academic awareness of this issue. Overall, 
my findings help prepare the ground for recommendations and suggestions for 
improvement. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main conclusions of the analysis derived from my work-
based project. I evaluate my results in terms of achieving my aims for this project. As 
a practitioner and theoretical researcher, I have been able to produce interesting and 
accurate results. This is the first study to analyse and explore the correlation between 
earnings management, insider trading and the cost of capital. Hence, I contribute to 
existing knowledge and theory development by making new assumptions relating to 
earnings management. It is also necessary to communicate these new findings to 
market participants, so I contribute to practice by analysing possible methods of 
evaluation for investors to detect earnings management cases in a timely manner. 
Finally, I suggest promising generalisations that might provide an appropriate path for 
practical IFRS amendments that would eliminate accounting misinterpretations in 
future. I conclude this section with recommendations for further research. 
 
6.1 Evaluation of Empirical Findings 
The results discussed in Chapter 5 reveal interesting and contemporary insights 
into the performance of IFRS following their official adoption. They derive from a 
work-based research project that aimed to investigate whether IFRS decreased firms’ 
earnings management, to estimate IFRS performance compared with US GAAP, and 
to discover how these regimes responded to the last economic crisis. The analysis 
presented in the previous chapter revealed interesting findings relating to IFRS 
performance. Figure 5 displays my key findings, analysed under my three 














Figure 5: Key findings 
 
Having completed this process, several questions still remain. Did I successfully 
apply my research plan as described in Chapter 1? Did I answer my research 
questions? Did all these results add new knowledge? 
These questions can all be answered positively. I reviewed the literature and 
separated it into three chronological phases. In this way, I was able to better determine 
whether information related to IAS or IFRS. I also clarified my ontological and 
epistemological position. Therefore, I was in a position to decide on my 
methodological process. In combining these with my expertise in the accounting 
professional field, I employed an action research process. Implementing three 
research cycles enhanced my initial research questions and helped me to develop my 
final theoretical and practical research questions (Appendix I, Table 7). This guided 
my development of appropriate hypotheses and models. Thus, I not only succeeded in 
implementing my plan, but the outcomes of the project prove that my procedures were 
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appropriate. Despite the difficulties in obtaining and processing amounts of data, I 
successfully ran statistically accurate models of analysis that led to findings with 
theoretical, practical and ethical implications. 
Theoretical concerns 
My results reveal issues of high academic interest. Indeed, they prove that every 
case, firm and year had unique characteristics, which had different effects on their 
performance. For example, Australia exhibited major differences from European 
countries, and more interestingly, Australian shadow companies acted more similarly 
to US than European firms. Therefore, IFRS seem not to be appropriate for Australia 
or may differ from A-IFRS. However, in the other European countries examined, I 
detected diverse reactions in a number of cases. Indeed, my empirical findings, as 
described in Chapter 5, indicate considerable diversity in the reactions of different 
countries for the same tests. For example, with regard to the individual standards 
responsible for encouraging speculation, I noticed subsequent differentiation in my 
sample. Therefore, the harmonisation process seems questionable. Through the 
literature review, I realised the importance of harmonisation between countries that 
follow IFRS. Ball (2006) concludes that, despite the implementation of international 
standards, local practices have great effects on them, increasing her scepticism about 
IFRS adoption. Thus, she asks: ‘Does anyone seriously believe that implementation 
will be of equal standard in all countries that have announced the adoption of IFRS in 
one way or another?’ (Ball, 2006; p.31). Nobes (2005) is similarly concerned about 
whether variations between different regimes are observable following IFRS 
adoption. Although I had not considered this question when I planned this research, 
and contrary to Ramanna and Sletten (2014), my empirical results question the 
harmonisation of accounting standards under IFRS. 
Furthermore, I contribute new insights into the earnings management debate, as 
this is the first such study to apply longitudinal analysis, enabling me to determine 
accruals performance through a year-by-year examination of each firm separately. It 
is easy to claim that accruals increased during the crisis, but it is more difficult to 
detect whether firms that increased their accruals during the crisis also increased their 
accruals following IFRS introduction. Similarly, I contribute new knowledge relevant 
to academics and professionals, as I have proved that IFRS was ineffective in 
controlling falsified statements. I have revealed that larger companies were often 
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more vulnerable to earnings management, and have found that big auditing companies 
do not always prevent falsified statements, while when firms change their auditors 
there is a reduced incidence of earnings management. Furthermore, my results 
provide insights into another major issue relating to IFRS: the initial advantages of 
adoption do not seem to be maintained, as I detected differences in year-on-year 
performance, even in the same country. Insider trading, crisis effects and banking 
regulations are examples of where IFRS have not stabilised performance in all years 
and countries examined. Thus, I have illustrated that the characteristics of and motives 
for falsified statements are changing. I have also proved that foreign companies 
operating in the US market performed better under IFRS, and that IFRS manipulation 
of the crisis was appropriate. 
Practical implications 
In this project, I aimed to combine firms’ financials with market models to bring 
together accountants and investors to exchange valuable information. Based on this, 
market participants may be able to create a framework of categorisation for firms and 
countries, so as to make investment decisions more easily and quickly. Thus, 
accountants might consider a firm’s performance as expressed by market value, and 
market analysts might codify important accounting information on which they should 
focus. In addition, investors who consider my results might combine and examine my 
ratios in more detail so as to reach supplementary conclusions. Therefore, my project 
has considerable potential for applicability and dissemination by finance 
professionals. 
As a practitioner in accounting and the stock market, I have updated my 
professional databases according to my results, and can confirm their value in 
practice. For example, I estimated the risk of investing in a Greek listed company and, 
based on my analysis, concluded that for Greek firms, revenues have a positive 
relation with accruals for all years examined, except 2006 (Appendix III, Table 6; 
results of H1/Test 3). This indicates that high revenues are likely to result in earnings 
management. Furthermore, from the same analysis, I have also determined that IAS 
32–39 are a favourable means of eliminating earnings management for Greek firms. 
These standards make several clarifications, including the presentation of financial 
instruments in the classification, recognition and measurement of financial assets. 
Thus, investors should focus on these standards, especially if a company has 
 191 
subsidiaries in countries that have not officially adopted IFRS. Concerning my results 
for insider trading, my analysis reveals that in Greece, large firms with significant 
insider activity are positively related to accruals. I have also determined that Greek 
firms display a positive correlation between abnormal returns and size for companies 
that buy and/or sell large share values. In my opinion, these two factors, namely 
insider trading and abnormal returns, are the most important in evaluating stock 
performance. For example, a large Greek listed company with increased insider 
trading activity may be subject to speculation. 
Finally, concerning the cost of capital, I have found that large Greek companies 
choose to use earnings management rather than decreasing their costs, as the results 
reveal a positive relationship between size and accruals. Thus, a company with high 
debt may have considerable incentives to engage in earnings management. Based on 
these results, I would refrain from investing in companies such as Folli-Follie.33 I do 
not suggest that all listed companies with increased revenues in Greece have managed 
their earnings, but if a company has increased revenues, high insider trading activities 
and large debts, then I suggest that investors should consider their options. Of course, 
such combinations may also be displayed in other countries in my sample. Overall, 
market participants might apply and combine the key concepts revealed in this project 
to identify any misinterpretations before investing. My intention is not to suggest 
specific investment alternatives, but to lead market participants to make decisions 
after reviewing and correlating similar cases that need increased awareness, as a path 
to more rapid evaluations based on specific characteristics of countries and firms. 
Ethical issues 
One significant challenge is creative accounting practices, which continue even 
under IFRS. As a bookkeeper and accountant, I have had many opportunities to apply 
creative accounting techniques, but I have always believed that any outcome of this 
activity would have only short-term benefits. In addition, firms’ stakeholders and 
stockholders should always know about the practices in which their accountants 
engage so that all interested parties have the same information. Through my 
engagement with the literature and from my working experience as a market analyst, I 
conclude that most researchers and investors consider earnings management to be a 
                                                 
33 The Greek stock market was recently stunned by the release of a report on the Folli-Follie company 
(http://www.qcmfunds.com/folli-follie/) by QCM. This is the same fund that detected the Globlo case. 
Folli-Follie has been temporarily delisted from the Greek stock market. 
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fairly routine procedure, whereas I believe it to be highly unethical, as such cases 
provide privileged or early information to specific market participants. Hence, some 
market players gain personal benefits over other investors who do not have access to 
such information, which might differently determine their strategies. 
Companies that deliberately falsify their financials cannot disorientate investors 
forever, and managers will eventually realise the short-term benefits of their actions; 
however, I believe that we cannot leave the market to self-regulate, but must protect 
all market participants. In cases like Enron, Globo and Folli-Follie, as previously 
mentioned, some investors lost money, and my working experience shows that it is 
average investors with no privileged information who tend to suffer the greatest 
losses. Therefore, earnings management is a highly important and challenging issue. It 
leads to privileged information, and hence to unbalanced markets and significant 
losses for investors, raising important ethical concerns. It is undoubtedly a form of 
fraud, and should thus never be normalised; all possible steps should be taken to 
reduce it. Having detected many such cases during my professional career, and 
believing that all market participants should be able to invest under equal 
circumstances, I was motivated to pursue this project. Moreover, I believe that 
through my results and outcomes, I may effectively contribute to reducing earnings 
management, revealing that it is highly detrimental to investors who do not have 
access to privileged information. Thus, I may help investors and accountants to detect 
earnings management cases in a more timely manner, and assist authorities in starting 
to consider the right tools to eliminate this phenomenon. 
 
6.2 Policy Suggestions 
The previous conclusions reveal the importance of accurate information. Although 
the literature suggests that firms generally tend to report sufficient information 
(Mediratta and Jain, 2007), my results reveal that nowadays, possibly fraudulent cases 
have different qualitative characteristics than in the past. Therefore, financial 
reporting quality needs to be reinforced, with information continuously updated in a 
timely fashion. All announcements, including annual reports, press releases and 
websites, should provide precise details on firms’ operations, investments and 
financing (Chang et al., 2006). For this reason, many companies are inclined to 
disclose additional data voluntarily to reduce uncertainty and information asymmetry 
(Iatridis, 2008). However, further action is needed to achieve total accounting quality 
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and efficiency. I propose a two-step framework to enable IFRS to deal with future 
challenges in practice and to overcome any disadvantages revealed by my empirical 
findings. 
 
6.2.1 Redesign the annual report 
Based on the outcomes of this research, IFRS should focus more on separate 
standards relating to earnings management and falsified statements, which continue to 
cause concern. Despite their amendments, the results confirm that the drawbacks of 
IFRS include late reaction and absence of prediction. Furthermore, I have detected 
severe cases of insider trading and concerns over auditors’ inspections. The basis of 
audit opinions rests on assessments and judgments by the company’s directors. 
Therefore, as auditors have no responsibility for material misstatements, they may 
undertake inadequate forensic accounting checks. A useful step to dispel this 
impression would be to introduce mandatory half-yearly auditors’ reports. However, 
greater statutory changes should be made to IFRS to enrich the information provided 
to auditors and investors. Following Mankin et al. (2017) who suggest additional 
disclosures, and contributing to a discussion that few previous studies have considered 
(Gow et al., 2016), I suggest the total redevelopment of firms’ annual reports. This 
would be a first step that might lead to a tidal wave of change in the information 
provided, and might address many of the effects revealed by Hypotheses H1 to H3. 
It is undeniable that annual reports often contain unnecessary information that 
may mislead investors. Hence, they might be divided into two parts, consisting of 
basic and additional information respectively. Each part should be further categorised 
and organised into clusters of information according to thematic tasks and time 
events. As the needs of owners, investors, authorities and academic researchers differ 
significantly, each interested party would have more targeted and precise access to 
necessary notices, making IFRS less complex and promoting the usefulness of 
financial statements (Hoogerdoorn, 2006). 
Moving a step further, I propose that all these data should be placed in the same 
predefined pages for every company. For example, the balance sheet should be placed 
on the first page of every annual report, making it more easily detectable, more 
precise and less complicated. This would create a specific point of interest for due 
diligence, providing opportunities for early detection of any signs of audit fraud. 
These should obviously be enhanced with additional notifications, including on 
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insider trading, discretionary accruals and cost of capital calculations, covering a 
historical period of 10 years. All these modifications would help investors and 
accounting professionals deal with changes, such as the new electronic balance sheet 
to be introduced by the IFRS Board. 
 
6.2.2 Development of an electronic database for real-time validation of financials 
The outcomes of this research reveal considerable concerns about lack of 
information, failure to combine necessary data and differences between IFRS 
economies. For example, Australia has the most restrictive law on insider trading, but 
the absence of databases for gathering directors’ transactions reduces its advantages. 
Furthermore, in most cases, auditing rules are recorded according to each country’s 
national regulations, but many national tax laws and regulations go against IFRS 
norms. Dealing with these unbalanced situations is essential for IFRS, to alleviate any 
differences between countries and to provide a stable environment with equal 
possibilities for all firms. Thus, in addition to reforming annual reports, there is a need 
for appropriate tools to gather and transmit data to investors and authorities according 
to their specific needs. Thus, I suggest the development of an electronic database 
platform for all IFRS countries, for the same reasons for which SEC introduced 
Edgar,34 but with enhanced potential. IFRS would hence supply the targeted, accurate 
and timely information necessary to promote the progress of accounting science. This 
would resolve any adverse effects of H1–H3, enhance the potential for IFRS to 
compete with US GAAP (H4-H6), and offer appropriate tools to proceed to targeted 
amendments (H7–H9). Overall, apart from obvious returns for companies and 
investors, this platform would offer three key advantages. 
1. Combined and supplementary information 
As previously stated, firms must adhere to many accounting rules and procedures 
originating from different authorities. For example, a listed firm must respect national 
taxation and accounting policies, IFRS standards and MiFID regulations.35 Thus, it is 
                                                 
34 EDGAR is the acronym for the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system. This is an 
electronic database where companies submit official forms and documents required by law by the SEC. 
The SEC is in a position to collect, validate, control, distil and forward this information to every 
interested party, free of charge. 
35 MiFID is the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC). The European Union 
adopted this directive in 2007, seeking to improve the competitiveness of EU financial markets and 
create a common set of rules for all of them. In 2014, MiFID II was introduced, an improved version of 
MiFID. For more details, see https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir. 
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responsible to the tax and IFRS authorities, the Capital Market Commission and the 
Market Exchange Committee, while each of these authorities require information and 
operate their own controlling mechanisms. This phenomenon is more marked for the 
banking industry, which is also accountable to the sensitive rules of the Basel Accord. 
This creates an extremely bureaucratic environment that offers nothing but reduced 
transparency for managers, owners, investors and accountants, and limited auditing 
effectiveness for authorities, leading to possible statutory deviations. 
At the same time, some companies take advantage of this confusion to speculate 
on earnings and eliminate auditing controls. Therefore, the platform would offer the 
possibility for controlling mechanisms to cooperate harmoniously, and collect, 
embody and combine all their separate data into a single source. In addition, 
supplementary information could be displayed on the platform, such as merger 
intentions, holdings for sale and lease contracts, thereby clarifying necessary details 
for all separate standards that until now have been difficult to obtain under current 
publishing criteria and reporting formats. In addition to being of interest to listed 
companies, this database might be expanded to emerging markets, increasing 
transparency and funding opportunities, and even to unlisted companies, making it 
easier for them to adopt IFRS. 
2. Easy and accurate cross-tabulation of data 
The platform proposal would also offer cross-tabulations of financial statements 
between companies. This would enhance the role of auditors and investors, 
eliminating cases of companies reporting potential transactions and earnings as 
accrued. For example, Globo was accused, among others, of preparing falsified 
invoices for sales to other companies that the authorities had neither the opportunity 
nor the means to confirm. However, through my proposed platform, such cases would 
be detected, as all transactions would be electronically recorded, giving access to 
targeted information and allowing authorities to cross-tabulate the data. In addition to 
financial statements, it might be possible to juxtapose auditors’ statements and 
opinions, directors’ reports and credit assessments or similar data, split into sections 
such as corporate governance, risk profile, debt covenants, changes in accounting 
policies and insider trading transactions. 
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3. Enhance IFRS improvement tools 
Finally, my proposal would enhance procedures for improving IFRS. IFRS seem 
to exhibit a specific evolutionary cycle. Usually, the market detects a problem, the 
IFRS Board invites responsible parties to a public debate, researchers focus on it, and 
then the Board designs a long-term plan. In the previous two sections, I described how 
the platform would help IFRS during the debate phase, enhancing available data and 
producing a more effective and accurate environment for all interested parties. 
However, in addition, my proposal would offer appropriate tools for the design phase. 
Thus, I would aim to supply the groundwork to virtually back-test any new standards 
or amendments, for a sample of companies or countries, simulating IFRS amendments 
and initiations.36 This is the first time such a concept has been introduced into 
accounting, and might revolutionise and mitigate the effects of any IFRS decisions. 
This technique responds not only to the question of whether IFRS amendments 
have been successful, but also to the most critical question: what would the results 
have been if other alternatives had been adopted? This would equip standard setters 
with new procedures and data that should decrease inconvenience and practical 
concerns during improvements, while eliminating delays in decision making. Indeed, 
many observe that it takes a long time for new standards to be incorporated within the 
main IFRS principles, and by that time, in some cases, circumstances have already 
changed. My suggestion bridges the gap between theoretical and practical 
implementation, and grants the security necessary for new standards to be released 
successfully. This would increase the confidence of the IFRS Board, eliminate 
ambiguities and provide the groundwork for close monitoring of the evolution of 
proposed regimes. 
 
6.3 Areas for Future Research 
This study identifies several issues arising from IFRS adoption and reveals 
interesting results that may prompt further study. Although IFRS seems to have been 
analysed to saturation point, recent history has proved not only that many issues have 
not been solved, but also that new problems have emerged. Therefore, future research 
should focus on a number of issues. First, it needs to further address the causes of 
                                                 
36 Back-testing is a very effective method in technical market analysis. The analyst uses real historical 
data in order to simulate his trading strategy over a period of time. Thus, he tests the behaviour of his 
model under real circumstances, analyses the results and estimates the predictive accuracy of his 
approach. Analysts use this method to examine their strategies efficiently and safely. 
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falsified statements. My results indicate that IFRS did not succeed in eliminating FFS 
cases during the period studied, while at the same time firms seemed to find 
additional methods for earnings management. Accordingly, future studies should 
detect these methods and their correlation with FFS firms, not only under IFRS but 
also under other national regimes, and even under US GAAP. A closely related issue 
is firms’ consolidated figures. Many insist that consolidated figures are more 
vulnerable to earnings management and transfer pricing, as it is easier for firms to 
hide their problems in consolidated statements than in separate balance sheets. 
Similarly, researchers must consider whether the proposal to repeal compulsory 
publishing of quarterly accounting results may have negative effects. Quarterly filings 
have always been unaudited and have been accused of facilitating falsifying 
techniques, but as these figures are now published voluntarily, it may provide 
managers with an additional motive for implementing misleading window-dressing 
procedures.37 Consequently, earnings management seems to be a continued threat to 
IFRS, not only in terms of firms’ fundamentals, but also in their market performance. 
For this reason, my research has focused on insider trading, but I have only analysed 
dealing by directors. Thus, it is important for future studies to obtain information on 
shareholders’ dealing and stock option transactions, while comparing the date of such 
transactions with potentially significant events for the company. 
In addition to the previous issues, future research should determine whether IFRS 
have eliminated bureaucratic procedures and managed to perfectly coordinate all 
related mechanisms and authorities, since they are in a cycle of endless improvements 
and assessments. Therefore, studies should determine whether they have improved 
typical characteristics and efficiency in a number of actionable events in recent audit 
cases, such as the Globo company, as well as the banking system which is still is 
affected by the 2008 crisis. Thus, standard setters should order the development of a 
system that will provide more accurate depictions of companies. For this reason, there 
is a need to identify interactions between accounting and banking regulations, which 
usually lead to off-balance-sheet financing effects, prettifying banks’ performance. 
Thus, optional tools for IFRS should be enhanced. 
                                                 
37 Mutual funds, portfolio managers, investment firms and similar companies must present their 
performance reports to their clients and shareholders annually. Near to the date of such announcements, 
they try to improve the appearance of their performance. For this reason, they engage in buying and/or 
selling activities in order to establish an attractive portfolio. I refer to this as window dressing, which 
usually consists of selling holdings with large losses while purchasing high-flying stocks. 
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For example, voluntary disclosures are viewed as a positive development, 
providing reliable information; but do firms use this option to reflect their true 
economic background, or simply to mitigate the concerns of a negative economic year 
and mislead investors? Furthermore, as the catalogue of countries aiming to adopt 
IFRS increases, the challenges have also increased. Thus, studies should focus on the 
implementation of IFRS in Japan, as it has permitted voluntary application of IFRS 
since March 2010, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) recently announced that 141 
listed companies had adopted or planned to adopt IFRS. Of course, there are other 
cases requiring further research. European authorities have expedited the 
implementation of IFRS in the public sector by formulating International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). Future research should focus on this evolution 
and how it may interact with IFRS. Finally, as most accounting studies share the same 
objective motives, it would be interesting for future research to analyse the profile of 
market participants, taking into consideration their feelings and attitudes, to discover 
the real motives for their behaviour, for example in relation to earnings management. 
Overall, IFRS seems likely to remain in the limelight for a long time, introducing an 
imperative need for further practical studies. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have reviewed my research approach to determine whether I have 
successfully applied all steps. This has been a significant accomplishment, as I have 
implemented my statistical analysis and achieved my aims and targets. As a result, I 
have raised enlightening theoretical and practical concerns, and have highlighted 
potential considerations in IFRS adoption. Finally, I have combined the project’s 
outcomes to propose a set of conclusions and actions that might contribute to and 
practically facilitate future prospects for IFRS. Therefore, it is crucial for financial 
professionals to consider these recommendations and for researchers to examine the 
future challenges outlined. 
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CHAPTER 7: REFLECTIONS ON IMPACT AND 
PROFESSIONAL LEARNING 
7.0 Introduction 
In this final chapter, I focus on the personal and general impacts of my results and 
process. The dynamic accounting environment has many participants, including 
financial authorities, academics, accountants and investors, who demand more 
objective and reliable information to enable the capital market to function more 
efficiently and cost-effectively. In Chapter 1, I outlined the significance of this study 
to specific professionals. In this chapter, I aim to show how the research has impacted 
on my professional development, to evaluate my engagement with learning, and to 
explain how the results may impact on business and academia. 
 
7.1 Reflections on Personal Learning and Professional Development 
Academic research inspired by professional needs articulates both theoretical 
knowledge (Brannick and Coghlan, 2007) and practical considerations. It combines 
theoretical and practical knowledge, impacting on both personal learning and 
professional awareness. Thus, I understood that although results are important, 
knowledge is intrinsically gained throughout the process. During all stages of the 
project, I have expanded my abilities and gained new cognitive skills, and uncovered 
and further developed my assumptions, interpretations and expectations. The 
literature review enabled me to understand and expand my knowledge of other studies 
and to develop an integrated picture of IFRS and US GAAP. I am now able to 
critically review and evaluate the theoretical background of this subject area, focusing 
on the crucial points of published research. 
Similarly, by setting out a specific philosophical level, and evaluating and 
deciding between different epistemologies, I perceived and questioned my 
epistemological and ontological assumptions, which I had never done prior to 
embarking on this project. I gained a coherent knowledge of methodology, and 
successfully designed and implemented appropriate tools and methods to develop a 
reliable methodological framework. Even my engagement with data analysis 
programs was surprising constructive, as I was able to train in statistical analysis and 
become familiar with useful details. Therefore, I obtained the necessary background 
and confidence to reflect on this knowledge in order to open my mind to different 
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ways of thinking. Apart from typical competencies, such as patience in the data 
process, work systematisation and checking resources, I was introduced to new 
methods for performing accurate and innovative procedures such as longitudinal 
analysis. The project also taught me to detect issues, focus on them and provide 
solutions. 
In addition, apart from these theoretical benefits, the processing experience helped 
me to implement all the results of the project directly in my professional environment. 
My results gave me greater trust in IFRS in the US and under crisis, prepared me for 
the new IFRS 9, the first version of which did not seem to have the expected market 
outcomes, and encouraged me to be suspicious of insider trading, as the regulatory 
framework is incomplete and deficient. Indeed, as a market analyst, I now pay greater 
attention to stocks whose directors have engaged in insider transactions, and I am in a 
position easily to combine this information with a number of other factors, such as the 
size of the firm, its costs and market performance. 
Thus, I have had an opportunity to implement and enhance new working 
perspectives, as I have gained greater familiarity with IFRS and US GAAP and have 
developed an integrated picture of these standards. Along with the other research 
outcomes, this has helped me to focus only on required information, in a more timely 
manner and with more accurate results for market analysis, increasing my 
professional competence and strengthening my career prospects. I am now able to 
distil from annual reports only the information I need, which is essential for an 
accountant. I have therefore acquired the necessary scientific background to shape my 
perspectives on events and identify not only useful patterns and advantages, but also 
focal points concerning the analysis and auditing of listed firms. 
In view of all these factors, I have changed my investment strategy in my work as 
a market investor. Indeed, I have adjusted the determinants for selecting stock 
companies to include in my investment portfolio based on the outcomes of my 
project. I was therefore protected from the recent downturn in the Greek stock market 
because I was able to identify that several listed companies might have speculative 
financials (for instance Folli-Follie, mentioned in Chapter 6). This has undoubtedly 
made me more confident in statistical analysis, proving that fundamental analysis is 
effective as long as there are accurate inputs. 
However, during the research, I had to deal with many concerns that I had never 
considered prior to participating in this programme. I had thought that my educational 
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and professional background would provide a strong foundation for such research, but 
I faced a number of challenges and ethical considerations that changed my thinking. 
My first concern was that I had to collect and analyse a vast amount of data. Although 
I have always been occupied with numbers, it was challenging for me to engage with 
them on such a significant project under such restricted conditions. I recognised their 
importance for the first time. I also had to deal with limited time, a lack of resources 
for some financials, and conflicting ideas and frameworks. These were critical issues 
that might have led to failure and loss of self-esteem. 
Systematic work, prudent time allocation and focusing on real needs were the only 
solutions to overcoming these obstacles. I was also surprised by how enlightening and 
necessary were my supervisors’ and advisors’ notes and guidance. The research 
enabled me to transform all these issues into strengths, reinforcing my research, 
analytical and planning abilities. Having achieved these competencies, the feeling of 
success is greater. I was finally able to organise my thoughts and deliver a specific 
action plan to complete this research. Overall, it was an enlightening experience that 
contributed substantially to my learning. It forced me to identify and develop 
capabilities that might prove useful for further investigations of similar topics. 
All these important reflections, along with practical decisions and innovative 
ideas, have equipped me for future personal and professional development, enabling 
me to proceed with my future business steps. The integration of this programme 
enabled me to contribute effectively to major changes in the world of accounting and 
analysis. 
 
7.2 Impact of the Research 
In this section, I focus on some thoughts originating from my results and 
proposals in order to specify my overall impact on theory and practice. As the 
research examined several issues relating to IFRS implementation, it revealed 
interesting results sometimes contrary to my general expectations. These outcomes 
exposed four issues. The first is that there seems to be a problematic relationship 
between professionals, authorities and researchers. Professionals develop market 
trends, authorities try to regulate them, and researchers investigate whether these 
regulations have been successful. 
My contribution to this issue is the platform proposal described in Section 6.2.2. 
In this way, I aim to reduce these differences between market participants, helping 
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authorities to manage such issues more effectively. This will help make business 
reports clearer by bringing together all the aforementioned categories, but it also has 
academic implications, as it will improve the assurance and statistical accuracy of 
academic research, eliminating the time gap between theory and practice. My second 
issue is closely related: the deficiency in targeted information in firms’ annual reports. 
Through my proposal to redevelop annual reports, I aim to alleviate this phenomenon, 
laying strong foundations for a major change to the accounting system. This change 
would affect the core of the financial reporting system, with repercussions for all 
interested parties, including accountants, stock analysts, credit rating companies and, 
of course, theoretical researchers, who would have easier access to data. 
In addition, the project reveals a gap in the ability of IFRS to react effectively and 
in a timely way to critical cases; therefore, considerable modifications are required, 
focusing more on auditors’ and firms’ reporting procedures. In this vein, the research 
is influential, as through its hypotheses, it contributes to this theoretical debate and 
highlights issues on which the IFRS needs to focus. However, as these improvements 
would have a direct impact on accountants, auditors, investors and analysts, I have 
provided warnings and solutions that should be taken into consideration by 
professionals and firms to equip them for future patterns in the accounting profession. 
Finally, I have detected substantial dissimilarities, not only between countries’ 
performance, but in year-on-year comparisons in the same country. These results will 
have a considerable impact on professionals, as it is obviously very important for 
them to realise that countries that have adopted IFRS do not react similarly in all 
cases, for example Australia and European countries in my tests, and that European 
firms are not reducing falsified statements year on year. 
All these results are valuable for two further reasons. First, since most listed 
companies operate internationally and have branches in many countries, but 
consolidate all of their accounting figures under IFRS, investors should be familiar 
with the differences that I have detected. Second, accountants and analysts also act 
globally, as they obtain international accreditations and professional certificates, so 
they follow many foreign companies in order to be competitive and effective for their 
clients. Overall, apart from these considerations, professionals need to fully 
understand the applied behaviour of IFRS in my tests to gain accurate perspectives on 
their performance. For example, in H2 I examined insider trading and detected that 
suspicious cases of directors’ deals increased under IFRS and during the crisis. 
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Combined with the fact that accruals are lower and abnormal returns higher under 
IFRS, it is futile for professionals to try to detect such cases of fraud from accounting 
figures. They should focus elsewhere to detect and justify deviations in the stock’s 
performance, as such information is not divulged until much later in annual reports. 
This fact should also trigger authorities’ interest in taking drastic measures to 
eliminate this phenomenon, and the results indicate an appropriate framework for 
such action. 
For all these reasons, the findings of this research may impact on European, 
Australian and American firms and contribute to the academic and business research 
communities. They may be used by financial authorities, academics, accountants, 
investors, firms’ insiders and people from every part of the financial environment, as 
analysed in the following sub-section. 
 
7.3 Audiences and Dissemination Strategy 
As previously stated, this research has both practical and theoretical implications, 
since I intend to familiarise my audience with the concept of earnings management 
under IFRS, to suggest how this phenomenon might be eliminated and to establish a 
database that might help investors make appropriate decisions. Therefore, the key 
audiences for my research are: 
 Academics 
In revewing the literature, I established that few recent studies focus on earnings 
management. However, my results suggest that firms are still engaging in earnings 
smoothing activities. Therefore, based on my findings, financial and accounting 
researchers should further discuss earnings management issues in light of current 
tools and motives for accounting misstatements. 
 Market analysts and investors 
As revealed in this research, there are considerable differences in the IFRS 
performance of the countries examined. Thus, it is important for analysts and 
investors to realise that, although many countries follow IFRS, in practice there 
may be considerable divergence in their effectiveness. Hence, it is highly 
important for them to better estimate country risk and determine whether IFRS 
perform better in weaker economies like Greece, in countries like the UK that 
used to follow regimes similar to IFRS, in economies like Germany with different 
accounting philosophies, in countries like Australia that follow IFRS values but 
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have their own accounting boards, or in environments like the US with high 
competition and restrictive regulations. By enhancing their tools of analysis with 
my results, they might detect more effectively not only how each country 
responds to IFRS improvements, but also cases of earning management, thus 
improving their investment strategies.  
 Accountants and auditors 
Similarly, it is essential for auditors and accounting professionals working with 
IFRS companies to detect and consider the characteristics of firms that engage in 
earnings management. My analysis will give them a deeper understanding of how 
accounting regimes perform under certain circumstances, and which individual 
standards have been most used by companies to manipulate their accounting 
figures. However, it is also important for them to realise that managers may use 
methods other than creative accounting to produce financial misstatements, such 
as abnormal returns and insider trading. Thus, they may be able to help reduce 
fraud cases under IFRS, protecting investors who have no access to privileged 
information. 
 Accounting and market authorities 
It is critical for authorities in countries that follow IFRS to reduce fraud. My 
analysis is important in giving them an understanding that, despite improvements 
to their regulations, companies still engage in earnings management, while 
managers seem to have changed their methods for accounting misstatements. The 
authorities therefore need to cooperate closely and focus on the reasons behind 
such procedures, so as to enhance improvements to their regulations.  
The findings of this project must be communicated effectively to these audiences 
through their representative committees, structures and networks. My dissemination 
strategy is as follows. 
Concerning the academic audience, I aim to publish my results in accounting 
journals and newsletters, and to present my key findings to accounting conferences, 
workshops and seminars. Addressing market professionals may be more difficult, as 
most investors and analysts seem to trust their own tools for analysis and are sceptical 
of changes. However, as my outcomes result from statistical models, I am confident 
that my project will be highly appealing to accounting and market professionals, 
raising their awareness of key issues. Therefore, I plan to identify and engage with the 
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most important market participants who may capitalise on my findings. I plan to use 
my professional communication channels and, more specifically: 
 Present my results and suggestions to the annual meeting of the Greek 
stockbrokers’ association. 
 Communicate my key findings and outcomes at seminars organised by the Greek 
trading club of which I am a member and which cooperates with similar global 
trading communities, so as to gain peer review and feedback. 
 Introduce a newsletter, based on real market examples of firms that might engage 
in earnings management techniques. This could be disseminated through a 
monthly webinar organised by the stockbroking company with which I cooperate, 
and in which many organisations, global investors and market analysts 
participate. I would support my results and suggestions with real cases, and 
present my strategy. 
 Exhibit a version of this project with the key findings and outcomes in order to 
disseminate all relevant knowledge gained from my research to the Greek 
Accountancy and Bookkeeping Association, of which I am a member. In this 
way, I could address the accounting community and my professional associates in 
order to enhance debate on earnings management practices. 
Finally, it is equally important to disseminate a sub-set of the knowledge gained from 
my project to the relevant authorities. Thus, I plan to contact the Federation of 
European Accountants (FEE) and the European Accounting Board to show them the 
benefits of reforming annual reports, and I intend to submit a comment letter to the 
IFRS Board to present my results on the performance of individual standards against 
earnings management (H1/Test 3). 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
In this final chapter, I have reflected on the success of the research and on my 
learning and professional evolution. It has been a great experience, and may also 
contribute to accounting science, as I identify several theoretical and practical 
implications. For example, I have considered contemporary issues such as IFRS 9, on 
which few studies have previously focused (Onali and Ginesti, 2014), to enhance my 
analysis of IFRS and US GAAP, contrary to Lin et al. (2013), and have correlated 
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Appendix I: < Descritpive Tables> 
 
Table 1-Key Factors of the Project’s background 
Key Factors before 
and after IFRS 
Brief details 
Accounting groups in 
Europe before IAS/IFRS 
1. Continental/code-law system. It was dominated by the principle of 
prudence, with stakeholder orientation 
2. Anglo-Saxon/Common-law system. It does not take the specific 
European environment into consideration (Hoarau, 1995), but prefers 
low levels of regulation and taxes, and low barriers of information to 
investors in the capital markets (Epps and Oh, 1997). 
International Accounting 
Standards Committee 
(IASC) Establishment  
In 1973, the professional accountancy bodies of Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and the United States cooperated and established IASC 
Introduction of Fourth 
(78/660/EC) and Seventh 
(83/349/EC) EU Directives 
These EU Accounting Directives are the cornerstones of EU accounting 
harmonization.  They don’t aim to set accounting rules in the EC under 
uniformity, (Stolowy and Jeny-Cazavan, 2001), but they prescribe a 
common set of accounting rules and require EU firms to prepare audited 
financial accounts and to provide publicly accessible financial 
statements. 
International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) 
establishment, replacing 
the IASC, in order to 
implement the final IFRS 
regimes 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) replaced the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 2001, under 
an organisational restructuring program. IASC released the first common 
rules, called International Accounting Standards (IAS), from 1973 until 
2000. It managed to release a series of standards based numerical 
sequence from IAS 1 to IAS 41. The IASB has adopted these body of 
standards, but any new standard released after 2001 would be published 
under the series name IFRS. For convenience, under IFRS we mean both 
IAS and IFRS. Details: http://www.ifrs.org/about-us/who-we-
are/#history and http://www.iasb.org/about/history.asp 
Under this transformation the SIC (Standing Interpretation Committee) 
was renamed also to IFRIC (International Financial Reporting 
Interpretations Committee) (IAS 1.11). 
Accounting scandals in 
2001 
Dot-com collapse or the dot-com bubble is the term that describes the 
period from 1997 to 2001, when many internet-based companies were 
established, taking advantage of the rapid technological improvement 
and triggering investors’ interest. As a consequence, they had hugely 
increased their market capitalization but most of them did not confirm 
the earnings the investors’ estimated. As a consequence, they went 
bankrupt. Most analysts consider that this bubble grew out of a 
combination of speculations and the absence of regulations.  
Details: http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/11/09/technology/overview/ 
Enron case on the other hand did not directly perform stock market 
speculation, but it had to deal with accounting misinterpretations. It was 
in 2001 when one of the America's largest corporations collapsed after 
fraud detection. It was a besmearing moment for all US market 
participants, from authorities to accountants and investors. 
Details: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1780075.stm 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in the US 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was the reaction of US authorities to 
several accounting scandals, like Enron, to protect investors that had lost 
their faith in the US accounting system. It was introduced in 2002 and it 
was named after its sponsors, US Senator Paul Sarbanes and US 
Representative Michael Oxley. It includes several regulations that 
enforce protection mechanisms and increase accuracy. Its main 
reformation mandates strict financial disclosures for corporations, 
requires top management to certify the accuracy of financial 
information, defines which company records need to be stored and 
increases the penalties for severe fraudulent activity.  
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Details: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf 
IFRS official introduction 
in 2005 
From January 1st 2005, companies traded on a regulated market of any 
European Member State or other countries that also adopted IFRS, need 
to prepare their financials under IFRS. The regulation was about 
consolidated accounts of listed firms. However, Member States have the 
option to require or permit this option to unlisted companies and to 
individual financial statements (EC, 2005). Results denote that most 
Member States allowed this option (Larson and Street, 2004). 
Furthermore, a temporary exception was approved for companies that 
traded also in other regulated countries like for example in the U.S. For 
these firms, IFRS compliance has been postponed until January 1, 2007 
(EC, 2002). To facilitate companies with the IFRS implementation and 
transition to this new framework, in June 2003, the IASB issued IFRS 1, 
called “First-Time Adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards” (IASB, 2003), where it is described all information. 
Although IASB is the responsible standard setting body, however, these 
standards need to be endorsed by the EC to control if they assemble to 
EU. For this reason, it has been established the Accounting Regulatory 
Committee (ARC) that is responsible to provide early opinions on the 
Commission’s proposals to endorse IFRS. Similarly, additional entities 
and organisations surround the performance of the IASB on an effort to 
face IFRS challenges and proceed to appropriate enforcements. 
Indicative examples are the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), the Federation of European Accountants (FEE) The 
International Audit and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) etc. All these 
panels aim to prepare recommendations to facilitate, encourage and 
intensify the adoption of IFRS. Of course, every Member State could 
have its own review panel, as for example the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel (FRRP) in the UK. 
IFRS European countries in 
2007 
On January 1st, 2007, in the EU participated 27-member countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Additionally, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway as part of 
European Economic Area (EEA) have also adopted IFRS.  
IFRS in the US in 2007 From 2007 IFRS have been accepted in the US without being necessary 
their reconciliation to US GAAP.  
IFRS and the crisis of 2008 Under the crisis, the IASB eased fair value accounting standards related 
to financial instruments (IAS 39 and IFRS 7), offering the choice to 
companies to retroactively reclassify financial assets that were 
previously measured at fair value into amortized cost, expanding this 
reclassification concession to assets that were voluntarily classified. 
Recent Warning signs The US Justice Department is aiming to regulate the new banking 
environment and eliminate any skewed cases from the past crisis, 
imposing a fine on a number of banking institutions. I refer to the 
following indicative cases that could lead to a possible new downturn of 
the global economies. The companies of Royal Bank of Scotland and 




The Globo company is the latest case that shocked European stock 
markets, as the company was delisted from AIM Market in UK, after 





Table 2 - Timeline of the Literature review 
Phases Review 
Phase I: up to 1994 
Accounting Harmonisation 
and Globalisation Initial 
steps 
 
 What do we mean by Harmonization, Harmony, and 
Globalization? 
 Accounting Directives 
 IAS formulation 
 IAS vs Directives 
 Harmonisation Level 
 Advantages and disadvantages 
Phase II: 1995-2003 
IAS implementation and 
international accounting 
 
 IAS voluntarily application 
 Harmonisation Level 
 IAS vs national GAAP vs US GAAP 
 Fair value 
 Market effects 
 Earnings management 
 Audit quality 
 Taxation 
Phase III 2004-onwards 
IFRS introduction 
1. Official IFRS adoption (2005) 
 IFRS harmonisation 
 IFRS vs Old GAAP vs IAS 
 
2. IFRS vs US GAAP (2007) 
 Reconciliation after the SEC 
 
3.IFRS and US GAAP under crisis (2008) 
 Effect of the crisis 
 Abnormal returns 
 Reclassification option, Fair value 
 Banking crisis, 
 Shadow banking 























Table 3 - Stages of Literature synthesis 
1. Parameters 
definition 
 Language of publication,  
 Subject area,  
 Business sector,   
 Geographical area,  
 Publication period,  
 Literature type. 
2. Keywords 
Development 
Developing keywords or search terms is the lynchpin of the review. It is the 
most common and the most important method of identifying and searching 
literature (Ely and Scott, 2007). However, they need to be carefully 
formulated, considering effectiveness, accuracy and time allocation, avoiding 
extremely narrowly or broadly defined parts of the subject. The research 
identified its terms through discussion, brainstorming, initial reading and 
relevance trees (Bell, 2005). Furthermore, I considered similar, related and/or 
alternative keywords that might elicit different set of results or further 
information, while in most cases I operated a strategy of combining 
keywords using boolean operators, meaning words that link terms together, 
such as ‘AND’, ‘OR’, ‘NOT’ (Ely and Scott, 2007). Finally, special attention 
was paid to spellings and terminology, as well as to singular and plural 
versions of words (Younger, 2004).  
3. Sources of 
information  
A review, in order to be well written and objective, should gather 
information from different sources. Although the distinctions between them 
could be ambiguous and often overlap, I consider three main categories of 
sourcing: primary (published and unpublished), secondary and tertiary. 
Primary sources refer to original studies that contain original research data. 
They include published sources such as reports, government publications, 
results in journals, dissertations, conference proceedings or even unpublished 
manuscripts. Secondary sources rely on the subsequent interpretation of 
primary literature. They use primary sources to synthesize and integrate new 
research. They are addressed to a wider audience, they are more easily 
located and consist of books, journals, review articles etc. Tertiary sources 
provide key research information gathered from other resources. They are 
search tools designed to locate research from the previous categories. For 
this, they include indexes and abstracts and consist of textbooks, 
encyclopedias, handbooks, newspapers etc. I mainly focused on journals, 
reports, theses and books. Professional journals and reports have been 
excluded from the literature review, although they have been used in the 
body of the research, including hypothesis formulation and analysis. I aimed 
in this way at a high degree of academic integrity in this part, eliminating any 
question-marks as to accuracy. The only exception was in the crisis and 
shadow banking section of the review. As these were recent concepts for the 
literature, in order to gather more information, I also included working 
papers and professional reports, always considering the restricted valuation 
and quality criteria. 
4. Databases 
Location 
After defining the necessary sources, I needed to locate the appropriate 
databases and search engines in order to obtain the literature. Therefore, the 
study searched for printed sources on library catalogues but it mainly 
explored relevant electronic databases. Computer databases offer access to an 
enormous quantity and quality of information, in an easier and quicker 
manner (Younger, 2004).  
5. Evaluation of the 
results 
Once the initial search has been completed it is necessary to perform a 
critical review of the content. I need to analyse, select and synthesize the 
findings, assessing the quality of the literature gathered, as well as its 
relevance, value, sufficiency and correspondence. However, critical appraisal 
of a collection of articles could be complex. Therefore, the study has 
established a set of criteria. It included items that were up-to-date, it focused 
only on their current version and it included cases whose main objectives 
were sufficiently close to our research. On the contrary, superseded papers, 
items that were irrelevant, insufficient and low value or researches that 
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seemed to be biased, had methodological omissions, were imprecise and 
overall lacked academic integrity (McNeill and Chapman, 2005), have been 
excluded. Special attention has been given to clear and well-defined 
methods, to the interpretation of results and to the coherence of format. 
Finally, my inclusion criteria consider whether a paper’s questions have been 
answered, whether its aim has been achieved and whether it has strong 
references and citation index. Some of these guidelines were easy to scan, 
while other involved more steps. Consequently, the research initiated a 
preview filtering stage, where I had the opportunity to focus on peer-reviews 
and other critiques. After this initial impression, the remaining items have 
been fully read in order to assess the rest of the criteria. 
6. Recording the 
Results 
The recording stage may seem trivial, but it is extremely time effective. The 
study recorded all results retrieved from the previous step, even papers that 
had been discarded, in case they were needed at a later stage. Most of the 
items were in electronic format and in a few cases in printed copies that I 
scanned. Thus, I managed to safely store all files to external hard drives. 
Then I generated reference lists and I processed to make notes of the results. 
I used Microsoft’s Access to mark bibliographical details, a brief summary of 
the content of each article and supplementary information, such as the 
source, the keywords and methods I used to obtain each paper (Sharp et al., 
2002). At this stage, I removed any duplicate records, while both storage and 
information record for each article have been grouped according to literature 
sections.  
7. Drafting and 
Redefining if needed 
Having accomplished all the previous steps, the study managed to synthesize 
all information gathered on the road to completing the first draft of our 
literature review, focused on pertinent outcomes (Cooper, 1988) that 
appeared to be solid in theory and useful in practice. As it is a dynamic 
process that expands throughout the project’s life, this was the appropriate 
occasion to detect whether the whole strategy worked as designed or whether 
it needed improvements; improvements that applied not only to redefining 
parameters, but to keywords, databases and valuation criteria as well. 
Hopefully, since I carried out an appropriate and targeted preparation I only 
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Cost of equity, 
Analysts’ forecast, 
Balance sheet effects, 
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US investors, 
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Table 5 - Fair value and IFRS standards 
Standards Purpose 
IAS 16 It address to fair value option for property, plant and equipment. It requires 
asset impairments (and impairment reversals) to fair value. 
IAS 38 It refers to intangible asset that need to be re-valued to market price.  
IAS 39 It refers to financial instruments other than loans and receivables that are not 
held for trading, like securities held to maturity. Securities that are for sale are 
being recorder in the Balance Sheet only. 
IAS 40 It is the fair value option for investment property. 
IFRS 2 It address to share-based payments (stock, options, etc.) 









































Table 6 - IFRS standards after the official adoption in 2005 
IAS 
IAS 1  Presentation of Financial Statements 
IAS 2 Inventories 
IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors 
IAS 10 Events after the Balance Sheet Date 
IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment 
IAS 17 Leases 
IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 
IAS 28 Investments in Associates 
IAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures 
IAS 33 Earnings per Share 
IAS 40 Investment Property 
IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation 
IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
IFRS 
IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment  
IFRS 3 Business Combinations 
IFRS 4  Insurance Contracts 
IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations 
IFRS 6  Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Assets 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 



























































How do key ratios 
affect and how are 
they affected by 
the transition? To 
what extent do the 
individual IFRS 










Have IFRS been 
more transparent 
than old GAAP 
in Europe and 
Australia?  
To what extent 
do the individual 
IFRS standards 
























































Test 4: Auditors’ 
size and the 













trading be regard 


























Test 1c: Decrease 
of the number of 
insiders 
Test 2: Accruals 
and insider 
activity 











cost of capital 
under IFRS? 
Did they succeed 







extra attention to 
companies that 
have low or high 
cost of capital? 
H3: Under IFRS 
firms exhibit 






Test 1: IFRS and 
cost o f equity 
decrease. 
Test 2: Accruals 
and cost of equity 
capital. 






IFRS in the US 





Is there a 
decrease on the 
difference 
between the two 
regimes? 
Was it the right 
time for the 
introduction of 
IFRS in the US? 
Should investors 
trust IFRS in the 
US? 
Should they keep 
investing to 
IFRS companies 
in the US? 
And if so, what 





H4: The SEC’s 
acceptance 
decision to allow 
IFRS for foreign 
firms has 
increased the 




any elimination on 
the differences 
between four IFRS 





their values and 
overcome any 




responded to the 
introduction of 
IFRS in the US?  
What are the 
effects on the 
companies’ 
financials due to 
IFRS in the US? 
H5: Financial 
statement effects 
under IFRS for 
firms that used to 
follow US 
GAAP. 
Test 1: Financial 
statement effects. 








IFRS in the US? 
H6: Under IFRS, 
firms listed in US 




Test 1: Volatility 
on financials. 
Test 2: Accruals 
Performance. 
Test 3: SPP and 
LNL. 
III. IFRS and 
the US GAAP 
under crisis 
Has fair value 
orientation in fact 







responded to the 






before and after 
the crisis? 
Has the stock 
market regain its 
balance after the 
crisis? 
 
H7: The outbreak 




the banking and 
insurance sector 
in Europe, 















the crisis?  
 





What denote the 
results for its 
choice? 





feel safe form 
the reaction of 





attention to the 
new regulations 












accruals in many 
cases, but adding 
market value. 

















new standards, the 
regulation of 
shadow banking?  




to the US GAAP? 
Has the new 
IFRS 9 managed 




both IFRS and 
US GAAP, have 
improved the 
accuracy of the 
shadow banking 
sector. 
Test 1: Income 
Volatility and 
Value Relevance 
as estimators for 
information 
asymmetry. 
Test 2: Impact on 
firms’ value.  





Table 8 - Foundations of Research Process 
Panel A - General Layers and Major Examples 
1. Philosophy 






Positivism Naitive realism 
  












Theory Development Abstract Description  
Deduction From theory to data 
Induction From data to theory 
Abduction Both 
2.Methodology 
Design Strategy Abstract Description 
Quantitative 
Survey Brief analysis on a research area 
Experiment Identifies the cause-effects between variabels 
Quantitative and/or Qualitative 
Archival Research Seeking evidence in original documents 
Case Study One phenomenon in depth 
Qualitative 
Ethnography Describing and interpreting cultural behaviour 
Action Research Collaboration with a group of people  
Grounded Theory Theory generation grounded on data  
3.Research Methods 
Data collection Examples Data analysis Examples  
Sampling Measurement and scaling 
Questionnaires Statistical analysis 
Measurement and scaling Typology 
Observation Logical Analysis 
Interview  
Focus group  
Case study  
Source:  Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill (2015) 
                            and Crotty (1998) 
Panel B - Project's specific Elements 
Key underpinnings Project's Decision Abstract reasoning 
Objective vs Subjective Both  Truth is what works at the time 
Philosophy Pragmatism Observe IFRS – start examine my case 
Theory Approach  Deductive 
Literature review then hypotheses then data 
process then theory development 
Methodoloy 
Quantitative Correlational 
Survey and Action 
research 
Large numerical data, high freedom, evaluation 
of results, secondary inputs, practical 
application 
Data Collection Tools Databases Easy accessed and accurate fundamentals 












Table 9 - Participatory paradigms 
A. Categories of paradigms adapted from (Arbnor and Bjerke, 2008) 
                                                                                               Objectivism-
Rationalistic 
Explaining 
Reality                                                                                                                                                                                                                     





























Reality as a 
social 
construction 























































Variations of free 
imagination; to 
bracket (epochѐ ) 
appearances 
 
                                                         The analytical approach 
                                                                                               
                                                                                  The  system approach 
                                                                                                                                 The actors approach 
                           
                                 Explanatory knowlwdge                                                      Understanding approach       
                                       ( Explanatics )                                                                                ( Hermeneutics )                                                                           
 
B. Four paradigms for the analysis of social Theory by Burrell and Morgan  
(1979) 
The Sociology of Radical Change 
 
                                  Radical                                         Radical 













Sociology of Regulation 
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Validity Criteria Contributes to Traditions 





Anderson & Herr 
(1999), Bullough & 
Pinnegar (2001), 
































Anderson & Herr 













Anderson & Herr 








Collaborative forms of 
participatory action 







Anderson & Herr 
(1999), Bradbury & 
















(6) Outsider Outsider(s) 
studies 
insider(s) 
Campbell & Stanley 
(1963), Lincoln & 
Guba (1985) 
Knowledge base University-based, 
academic research on 
action research 























Appendix II: < Datataset and Statistical Process > 
 
Table 1 - Data Sample per case 
(a) IFRS vs Old GAAP, Focusing years: 2004-2009 
Australia: Total sample of 459 Companies 
Sector No Sector No Sector No Sector No Sector No 


























Health    Care 
Equipment  & Services 




10 Real Estate 9 Retailing 10 
Software & 
Services 
7 Technology 26 
Telecommunication 
Services 
9 Transportation 7 Utilities 9 
UK: Total sample of 297 Companies 








2 Beverages 3 Chemicals 7 
Construction & 
Materials 









Food & Drug 
Retailers 
6 
Food Producers 11 



































13 Software & 
Computer 
Services 









Greece: Total sample of  206 Companies 











22 Media 12 Oil & Gas 3 
Personal Goods 47 
Public Services 3 Technology 16 
Telecommunicati
ons 
1 Travel & Leisure 14 
Germany: Total sample of 404 Companies 









14 Energy 8 
Healthcare 35 Holdings 7 Industrials 85 Media 5 







2 Utilities 10 
(b) IFRS vs US GAAP - Total sample of 216 Companies, Focusing years: 2006-2007 






19 Energy 29 
Healthcare 19 
Industrials 28 Technology 26 
Telecommunicati
on Services 
25 Utilities 8 
(c) IFRS and US GAAP vs Crisis, Focusing years: 2009-2013 
Banking Sector – Total sample of 358 Companies 
Australia 20 Germany 19 Greece 12 UK 30 US 277 
Shadow Banking Sector - Total sample of 321 Companies 
Australia 57 Germany 49 Greece 0 UK 43 US 172 
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Table 2 – Data Sources 
               Country 
Data 
Australia Germany Greece UK US 
Intangibles Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co 
Holdings Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report 
Inventories Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Receivables Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Cash Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Current Assets Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Total Assets Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Short-t liabilities Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Total Current 
Liabil. 
Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Long-t liabilities Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Other Long term 
Liab. 
Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Total liabilities Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Retained Profit Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Gurufocus 
Equity Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Gurufocus 
Total Reserves Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Gurufocus 
Sales Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Cost of Sales Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Interest 
Expenses 
Annual Report Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Depreciation Annual Report Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Dividend Annual Report Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
PBIT Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Profit before Tax  Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Net Profit Screener.co Amadeus Amadeus Amadeus Screener.co/Morningstar 
Share price Yahoo Yahoo Yahoo Yahoo Yahoo 











Estimated EPS Thomson One** Thomson One** Thomson One** Thomson One** - 
Reclassification Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report Annual Report - 
*Annual reports were gathered from the firm's official site or from Mergent online 














Table 3 - Identification of Variables 
Variable Operational Definition Group Category Hypothesis 
ACi,t Dependent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 2) 
Ai,t-1 Independent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 2) 
BVPSi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 1b) 
COCi,t Dependent Numerical Continuous H3(Test 1) 
DACi,t 
Dependent Numerical Continuous H6(Test 2c) 
Independent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 3b) 
Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H6(Test 2a), H9(Test 3a) 
DACi,t Dependent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 4a) 
DIFF(NI) Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H4 
DIFF(NA) Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H4 
DIFF(RONA) Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H4 
DIFF(EPS) Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H4 
DVi,t Confounding Categorical Dichotomous H1(Test 4a) 
DV OCFi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 4a) 
DV Sizei,t Independent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 4a) 
DV Profitabilityi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 4a) 
DV Leveragei,t Independent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 4a) 
ΔWCi,t Dependent Numerical Continuous H6(Test 2b), H9(Test 3c) 
ΔNP/TA Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H6(Test 1) 
ΔNP/ΔOCF Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H6(Test 1) 
ΔΤqi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 2) 
ΔTAi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 2) 
FFSi,t 
Dependent Categorical Dichotomous H1(Test 2a) 
Independent Categorical Nominal H1(Test 1a) 
LEVi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 2) 
LNLi,t Independent Categorical Dichotomous H6(Test 3a) 
MVi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 2) 
NPPSi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 1b) 
OCFi,t 
Independent Numerical Continuous H6(Test 2b), H9(Test 3c) 
Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H6(Test 2a), H9(Test 3a) 
Pi,t Dependent Numerical Continuous H9(Test 1b) 
PPEi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 2) 
REVi,t Independent Numerical Continuous H1(Test 2) 
RRi,t Dependent Categorical Dichotomous 
H1(Test 1a), H5(Test 1), 
H6(Tests 3a,3b),H9(Test 2), 
H9(Test 3b) 
SPPi,t Independent Categorical Dichotomous H6(Test 3a) 
Ratios 




Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H5(Test 2),H9(Test 1a) 
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Investment 
Independent Numerical Continuous 
H1(Tests 1a, 1b),H5(Test 1), 
H6(Tests 3a,3b) 
Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H5(Test 2),H9(Test 1a) 
Growth 
Independent Numerical Continuous 
H1(Tests 1a, 1b),H5(Test 1), 
H6(Tests 3a,3b) 
Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H5(Test 2),H9(Test 1a) 
Profitability 




Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H5(Test 2),H9(Test 1a) 
Liquidity 




Variables of interest Numerical Continuous H5(Test 2),H9(Test 1a) 
Leverage 


































Table 4 – Indicative cases of my ratios as calculated for the main analysis  
Australia 2009 
Code SALESHA NAVSH SALETAS RESTAS RESSFU LNMV CGEAR 
AAC 0,94059 2,41724 0,24639 0,37378 0,40361 5,98220 0,35304 
AAD 1,21294 1,40299 0,49183 0,06768 0,10972 6,24146 0,62737 
AAT 2,11776 999,80000 0,79092 0,04961 0,12820 -6,21461 0,66616 
AAU 0,51285 0,13705 0,67911 -0,29722 2,35623 2,67844 1,20119 
AAX 3,62379 2,20399 0,98789 -0,04170 -0,07561 5,98200 0,54668 
ABC 1,63511 1,63876 0,72856 0,00214 0,00323 7,41476 0,34533 
ABV 0,00564 0,00481 0,87970 0,11579 0,12979 3,21491 0,37613 
ACE 0,01816 -0,02013 0,17603 0,13961 -1,95952 1,49206 3,93286 
ACG 0,09588 0,03604 1,70000 0,16322 0,20476 2,93540 0,31777 
ACL 0,00356 0,20485 0,01689 0,09600 0,10181 4,84521 0,06066 
ACR 0,35041 0,50981 0,67105 0,02465 0,02497 5,85512 0,03241 
ADA 0,58896 0,19513 1,67554 -0,04706 -0,09348 3,79384 0,46911 
ADD 0,01662 0,61103 0,02601 0,00501 0,00521 -0,94827 0,04388 
ADJ 0,01871 0,03975 0,39003 0,27831 0,25160 2,18997 0,19822 
ADO 0,00022 0,00384 0,04651 0,00000 0,00000 1,28722 0,19186 
ADQ 0,36521 0,09910 1,65625 0,00000 0,00000 1,77513 0,55920 
AEI 0,00954 -0,01126 0,46697 0,48186 1,42050 2,46257 2,42724 
AEK 0,00004 0,01596 0,00098 0,00000 0,00000 -1,40402 0,72286 
AES 0,00002 0,00864 0,00047 0,00000 0,00000 3,10386 999,80000 
AGI 0,24836 0,05578 0,81251 0,13635 0,43447 3,91621 2,19941 
AGK 1,47047 13,85933 0,76138 0,00150 0,00224 8,72005 0,35869 
AGO 0,19928 0,86043 0,21812 0,04088 0,04238 6,68956 0,05739 
AGX 0,00277 0,16175 0,00913 0,78490 0,61541 -0,96050 0,26783 
AHD 5,46399 5,28770 0,82225 0,00010 0,00014 6,72333 0,22485 
AHJ 0,21146 0,55537 0,28434 0,00000 0,00000 -0,05438 0,40925 
AHZ 0,03031 0,00896 1,34628 0,05987 0,12982 1,70291 0,56621 
AIO 2,76406 3,16636 0,43989 -0,77133 2,07335 7,53718 -1,44787 
AJC 0,00337 0,00907 0,22059 0,03143 0,03911 1,67468 0,39541 
AJL 4,89633 1,98358 0,79294 0,00107 0,00250 5,59904 0,77332 
AJM 0,04761 0,18664 0,22570 0,00025 0,00034 2,46611 0,14509 
AJR 0,01558 0,01053 1,21717 1,03990 0,54541 0,19872 0,08486 
ALK 0,01874 0,17447 0,10572 0,13288 0,11960 4,47672 0,01414 
ALL 1,70887 0,35345 1,12441 -0,11386 -1,46548 7,66741 1,19159 
ALT 0,00073 0,00186 0,34940 3,16988 0,78048 2,76921 0,02600 
ALU 0,50479 0,09629 1,64011 0,24033 0,45952 3,10416 0,68024 
AMC 8,48071 3,07164 0,88596 -0,02802 -0,08293 8,77836 0,98435 
AMM 0,34061 0,72944 0,36503 0,01599 0,02073 4,07823 0,24704 
AMO 0,01858 0,01722 0,68664 -0,16197 -1,41310 1,97922 0,76033 
ANG 2,10351 1,27680 1,02663 0,00223 0,00358 5,38539 0,45255 
ANP 0,00639 0,01552 0,30769 0,70110 0,48777 1,25420 0,14954 
AOH 0,06356 0,11795 0,27202 0,33630 0,32019 1,55047 0,37744 
APA 1,89020 3,34800 0,19585 0,00008 0,00037 7,49934 2,77258 
AQC 0,00163 0,02583 0,05056 2,57468 0,57173 0,88154 0,04238 
ARI 4,07135 2,97382 0,87788 -0,00304 -0,00487 8,39722 0,43693 
ARP 3,26659 1,58812 1,54322 0,03068 0,03948 5,89078 0,24712 
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ASB 2,15753 1,39988 0,80450 0,02957 0,06642 6,32914 0,64133 
ASL 3,10946 2,08100 0,71471 0,01394 0,02404 6,04335 0,63947 
ATI 0,00944 0,22202 0,03744 0,02819 0,03101 -0,61527 0,11568 
AUK 0,00038 0,02060 0,00556 0,01005 0,01606 2,54139 0,68986 
 
Germany 2008 
Code SALESHA SALETAS RESTAS RESSFU LNMV CUR DEBT 
2HR 3,53984 2,45315 0,04922 0,11438 5,80273 2,06174 1,25529 
7DM1 1,98326 0,30608 0,00000 0,00000 -0,43706 0,00000 5,40669 
A1OS 10,75381 0,87864 0,19824 0,29197 2,31136 1,84376 4,55531 
AAD 2,20385 2,38254 0,23285 0,27792 3,79459 2,29769 9,79487 
AAGN 1,45603 1,44606 0,09332 0,28836 3,61103 1,02162 3,76169 
AAH 1,86181 1,10739 0,06196 0,10691 4,69538 1,96407 6,33806 
AAQ 1,47727 0,57744 0,60437 0,60352 3,60227 1,37976 5,69625 
ABA 1,81199 2,41986 0,20376 0,48742 5,86440 1,10646 8,97360 
ABE1 1,62034 0,84714 0,56898 0,46204 4,28895 1,98074 8,31043 
ACV 1,34074 1,14196 0,19401 0,30296 2,38950 0,00000 3,81053 
ACW 6,28571 1,02326 0,08023 0,13828 3,84802 2,63938 4,19048 
ADN1 1,69500 1,21071 -4,16071 999,80000 3,31782 1,47221 4,52000 
ADS 5,58042 1,13280 0,00000 0,00000 8,56637 1,35364 6,64963 
ADV 4,72234 1,11185 1,52196 0,75253 3,93517 2,09342 4,95900 
AEI 1,96374 0,92399 0,05843 0,12418 4,00170 1,68648 3,60282 
AFX 7,38253 0,83850 0,43853 0,39145 6,55801 3,49130 5,41697 
AGS 1,98333 0,68489 0,18489 0,22844 5,28705 0,00000 7,21212 
AIG 1,48333 1,50211 0,00000 0,00000 3,79863 0,00000 7,12000 
AIXA 3,01870 0,87166 0,33799 0,33323 6,07420 1,97732 7,07216 
AJ91 2,89915 0,75507 0,67241 0,43879 2,75056 6,18279 5,86734 
AJA 1,10625 0,92509 0,33972 0,37356 3,38993 2,81024 6,80769 
ALG 3,12092 0,02347 -0,00566 2,62395 1,81336 0,82077 0,17200 
ALX 1,82435 1,75575 0,16494 0,77892 0,15642 5,33039 5,10980 
ANO 3,03613 2,64967 0,18434 999,80000 3,97893 0,46607 1,10140 
ANZ 3,56234 0,41790 0,02949 0,07546 5,37345 1,82322 8,75247 
AOF 6,72500 1,38660 -0,01031 -0,01626 3,35341 2,94389 7,68571 
APM 2,38996 0,78459 0,99489 0,54576 3,59294 2,81238 3,90809 
ART 2,19643 1,61842 6,63158 0,92139 3,36370 1,27899 1,30712 
ARX 4,02522 0,79281 0,00000 0,00000 2,22083 2,36225 4,86597 
ATW 3,69818 0,25532 0,18201 0,21358 2,69800 1,89629 0,00000 
BAF 4,96863 0,89647 0,49301 0,59550 3,31934 1,63103 9,09797 
BAG 1,37750 1,29343 0,31455 0,56303 1,50408 1,22289 2,78283 
BAS 6,78323 1,22501 0,06372 0,14757 10,14526 1,30555 8,03715 
BAYN 4,30695 0,62688 0,07671 0,19679 10,36586 1,24033 5,52872 
BC8 6,75236 2,88551 0,28926 0,31545 5,67867 2,20698 7,59820 
BDE2 1,00000 0,41071 0,03625 0,05879 3,95967 0,00000 7,66667 
BDT 3,92144 1,99539 0,52963 0,92766 5,15389 1,78605 5,94823 
BEI 2,36944 1,33639 0,01052 0,01875 9,27019 2,35143 6,67897 
BEP 1,71053 0,73696 0,12472 0,23913 2,47603 3,35948 4,92424 
BEZ3 2,07396 1,16161 0,03967 0,12477 2,73177 0,97161 3,62659 
BHS 7,86239 1,08162 0,13589 0,33506 4,81974 0,78157 4,08095 
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BIB 3,37143 0,53153 0,51201 0,39376 3,53617 6,15194 3,27778 
BIE 4,48800 1,58475 0,25989 0,40798 3,07846 1,26923 2,49333 
BIJ 4,64938 1,33593 0,01242 0,01482 6,51731 4,88772 6,27667 
BIO 3,29744 0,65169 0,06727 0,13794 6,45779 2,36166 3,63277 
BLH 2,53447 0,98045 0,00000 0,00000 3,63759 0,70929 7,10251 
BMM 2,84627 1,27652 0,01151 0,07881 1,39872 3,31012 6,80654 
BMO 9,62500 1,17557 0,09924 0,27660 1,38629 4,08545 9,62500 
BMW 8,35844 0,54038 0,04439 0,87279 9,57207 0,98432 2,36985 
 
Greece 2006 
Symbol SATETAS RESTAS RESSFU LNMV NPM QUI CFSH 
ΑΑΑΚ 0,63430 0,22448 0,28040 1,25391 -0,03468 1,32362 -0,00622 
ΑΒΑΞ 0,41932 0,30461 0,41659 6,08495 0,04130 1,03214 0,58335 
ΑΒΚ 2,41182 0,10766 0,35541 5,28496 0,01838 0,10630 0,00000 
ΑΕΓΕΚ 0,50687 0,13734 0,41936 5,07291 -0,17079 0,72736 -0,15048 
ΑΘΗΝΑ 0,50931 0,26580 0,35805 4,10370 -0,01085 1,35400 0,19163 
ΑΚΡΙΤ 0,00044 0,44496 0,43860 3,03495 999,80000 0,83459 0,44848 
ΑΛΚΑΤ 1,74694 0,18965 0,32140 3,31760 0,02436 0,82631 0,81488 
ΑΛΚΟ 0,29785 0,13249 0,33684 3,98437 0,04239 0,82491 0,59334 
ΑΛΜΥ 0,65487 0,28226 0,40660 4,54104 0,02770 0,85350 1,49279 
ΑΛΣΙΝ 0,88244 0,19230 0,42306 2,15675 -0,02734 1,18792 0,06429 
ΑΛΤΕΚ 0,39024 0,39377 0,60556 5,19648 0,03084 1,00625 0,45032 
ΑΛΤΕΡ 0,26357 0,17256 0,49816 3,33220 0,01837 1,63028 0,14258 
ΑΝΕΚ 0,51274 0,09635 0,28647 5,13550 0,09045 1,04943 0,02913 
ΑΡΒΑ 0,90082 0,22520 0,37810 5,71510 0,05166 1,78958 0,00000 
ΑΣΚΟ 0,79612 0,05540 0,08845 3,22515 0,08398 2,13652 0,17019 
ΑΣΤΑΚ 0,12976 0,20557 0,17417 4,59915 0,40835 1,38345 0,71305 
ΑΣΤΗΡ 0,13903 0,13969 0,17024 5,58603 -0,50684 0,28159 -0,33851 
ΑΤΕΚ 0,47979 0,13132 0,58533 3,70241 0,01607 1,17242 0,04595 
ΑΤΕΡΜ 0,39184 0,02118 0,17361 2,58451 -0,17913 0,92950 0,27210 
ΑΤΛΑ 1,68882 0,05016 0,21621 4,18957 -0,00111 0,23210 0,00000 
ΑΤΤΙΚ 0,34887 0,24687 0,41148 4,52483 0,00629 3,12588 0,05314 
ΑΤΤΙΚΑ 0,00800 0,00000 0,00000 4,75867 -0,76039 0,54754 1,43728 
ΑΧΟΝ 0,42237 2,18081 0,71729 3,83467 0,08744 4,89467 0,09030 
ΒΑΡΓ 0,46745 0,22039 0,27532 2,03753 -0,02796 1,07761 -0,00474 
ΒΑΡΔΑ 0,64438 0,02336 0,09002 3,31642 0,04291 0,56573 0,00000 
ΒΑΡΝΗ 0,47494 0,30876 0,40109 1,69775 -0,13516 0,43570 -0,15274 
ΒΙΟΣΚ 0,54440 0,22988 0,26402 2,38697 -0,18390 0,59374 0,00000 
ΒΙΟΤ 0,28747 0,12386 0,24716 4,15249 0,02172 -0,07129 0,04712 
ΒΟΣΥΣ 0,56841 0,33531 0,38743 2,82659 0,07808 1,08357 0,62324 
ΒΟΧ 0,62886 0,00000 0,00000 3,02490 0,08667 3,05657 0,00000 
ΒΥΤΕ 0,81327 0,27810 0,36498 3,94887 0,08078 1,34023 0,37386 
ΒΩΒΟΣ 0,04587 0,02510 0,04487 6,89847 -0,72759 0,34419 5,78097 
ΓΑΛΑΞ 0,61508 0,07983 0,17998 2,70274 0,08222 0,41829 0,21718 
ΓΕΒΚΑ 0,74947 0,18560 0,31228 3,02973 0,04312 1,82760 0,12967 
ΓΕΚΤΕΡΝΑ 0,51689 0,58085 0,55532 6,37730 0,04151 1,80332 1,38748 
ΔΑΙΟΣ 0,16847 0,25568 0,41112 4,55808 0,05416 1,71561 0,35247 
ΔΕΗ 0,42358 0,32058 0,41685 8,40165 0,01032 0,00000 3,27363 
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ΔΙΟΝ 1,00631 0,13747 0,37502 2,86488 0,01305 1,12396 0,19346 
ΔΙΧΘ 0,65559 0,09089 0,22184 3,78378 0,12913 0,14720 0,44091 
ΔΟΛ 0,46694 0,33595 0,45703 5,45558 0,03265 0,88104 0,00000 
ΔΟΜΙΚ 0,29684 0,29917 0,34962 3,73519 -0,04024 1,80609 0,36682 
ΔΟΥΡΟ 0,48436 0,49570 0,39324 1,70580 -0,02457 1,52135 0,14150 
ΔΡΟΜΕ 0,34349 0,47312 0,41042 3,48544 0,06094 1,18660 0,06799 
ΔΡΟΥΚ 0,78643 0,12704 0,28395 3,95226 0,06423 1,64133 0,61827 
ΕΒΖ 0,80196 0,41708 0,44369 4,85112 -0,04851 0,71359 0,02618 
ΕΒΡΟΦ 0,57929 0,08413 0,18418 3,19764 -0,02380 0,61833 0,16866 
ΕΔΡΑ 0,56526 0,13394 0,31415 3,58880 0,00247 0,86539 0,24154 
ΕΔΡΙΠ 0,24386 0,33728 0,41147 4,00494 0,00065 1,26769 0,00000 
ΕΚΤΕΡ 0,25488 0,55493 0,42677 2,64351 0,01249 1,55414 0,22211 
 
UK 2007 
Code SATETS RESTS RESSFU CASH ROCE CFM NPM 
AAL 0,57344 -0,82675 999,80000 0,54323 0,53429 0,34731 0,23876 
ABF 0,97564 0,02314 0,03599 0,41364 0,09298 0,12122 0,05874 
ACL 1,55959 0,00827 0,01468 0,23593 0,07872 0,04777 0,02216 
ACR 1,79557 0,32531 0,42353 0,00000 -0,04297 -0,06433 -0,06433 
AEP 0,49169 0,11243 0,09237 0,53566 0,14055 0,35887 0,29323 
AGA 0,71449 1,12404 0,56891 0,00000 0,03918 0,07858 0,07858 
AGK 0,95018 0,02825 0,06592 0,70151 0,24602 0,32602 0,11592 
AHT 0,57033 0,05160 0,16854 0,27027 0,06779 0,28528 0,00871 
AIE 0,78268 0,15441 0,36173 0,00000 0,16934 0,09821 0,09821 
AIP 0,35641 0,00800 0,03356 0,00000 0,55587 0,02742 0,02742 
AKT 0,02096 0,47952 0,35190 0,00000 -0,21076 999,80000 999,80000 
ALU 1,31937 0,37923 0,52083 0,33983 0,10802 0,10815 0,05829 
ALY 1,71800 0,26782 0,37093 0,27051 0,17105 0,08670 0,05892 
AMEC 1,29690 0,07348 0,13010 0,00000 0,10622 0,05157 0,05157 
ANTO 0,65885 1,34440 0,49283 1,20275 0,16027 0,63118 0,54740 
APF 0,19212 0,43149 0,32995 1,04352 0,13135 0,86899 0,86854 
ARM 0,40308 -0,02969 -0,03408 0,20372 0,07067 0,29707 0,13602 
ASBE 0,69819 1,16245 0,63398 0,56116 0,05486 0,03734 0,00000 
ATK 1,94061 0,01503 -0,67143 0,55634 0,38095 0,09016 0,05222 
AVON 1,08338 0,56624 0,39055 0,39666 -0,24710 -0,10566 -0,19939 
AVV 0,78180 0,07148 0,09249 1,01693 0,33264 0,31571 0,26847 
AXN 2,91742 0,44466 0,36794 0,00000 0,08645 0,02458 0,02458 
AYM 0,00000 0,30942 0,37717 0,00000 0,45370 0,00000 0,00000 
AZN 0,63152 0,07904 0,11403 0,76984 0,15839 0,30796 0,18583 
BA 0,71658 0,23302 0,44175 0,49176 0,07647 0,12646 0,06199 
BAB 1,06766 0,11770 0,30735 0,53608 0,10860 0,07892 0,04480 
BAG 1,19950 0,01733 0,02431 0,97327 0,20194 0,18542 0,11348 
BATS 0,54733 0,06232 0,14470 0,43118 0,19277 0,27501 0,22371 
BBA 0,85958 0,19372 0,23053 0,74436 0,08908 0,15052 0,08903 
BBY 1,92498 0,16404 0,53288 0,28402 0,04470 0,04038 0,02614 
BDEV 0,58875 0,20343 0,28622 0,29588 0,05208 0,02777 0,02431 
BG 0,53873 0,69171 0,42607 0,96118 0,09776 0,38144 0,21710 
BHY 0,40325 0,00723 0,01432 0,26702 0,13787 0,27563 0,22453 
 272 
BISI 0,55172 0,30747 0,37722 0,57848 -0,01271 0,11513 0,00550 
BKG 0,75299 -0,75108 3,85935 0,00000 -0,99026 0,14377 0,13901 
BLT 0,79223 0,02120 0,01919 0,22739 0,23141 0,39440 0,26551 
BMS 1,13025 0,33991 0,41460 0,75572 0,18766 0,11663 0,09826 
BMY 0,94106 0,01350 0,02108 1,27021 0,16022 0,08608 0,07858 
BNZL 1,72041 0,06335 0,21691 0,13906 0,15267 0,05407 0,03632 
BOY 0,64576 0,04430 0,08291 0,35077 0,09061 0,20913 0,08332 
BP 1,28295 0,32051 0,28055 0,33412 0,10277 0,14735 0,07264 
BPI 1,97808 0,06437 0,18158 0,11351 0,09482 0,06616 0,02004 
BQE 1,36032 0,20096 0,23785 0,67208 0,19367 0,18599 0,10704 
BRAM 1,59452 0,05073 0,21419 0,14584 0,12695 0,04379 0,02753 
BRBY 1,04427 0,06676 0,10612 0,49158 0,32463 0,19103 0,13582 
BRSN 0,68513 0,17560 0,31514 0,51775 0,07967 0,37855 0,07736 
BSY 1,21313 0,40584 0,26865 0,00000 0,08494 -0,02565 -0,02565 
BT.A 0,79550 0,01525 0,06451 0,37080 0,13397 0,31041 0,08255 































Table 5– Statistical Tests of each Hypothesis 
Hypotheses Statistical Tests Briefly information on Target 
H1: The introduction of IFRS has 
decreased falsified financial 
statements and improved auditing 
quality. 
Test 1a:Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Detect FFS performance for more than two 
consecutive years 
Test 1b:Binary Logistic Regression Outline FFS firms’ ratio characteristics 
Test 2:Multilevel Longitudinal Analysis Time series accruals’ examination 
Test 3:Partial Index Calculation 
Examine the individual standard’s 
proportionality on accruals 
Test 4a,b:Linear Regression 
Estimate the relationship between specific 
ratios and accruals for Big- 4 and/or rotated 
auditors  
H2: Under IFRS firms demonstrate 
a decrease in speculative insider 
trading cases. 
Test 1a,b,c:Binary Logistic Regression 
Detect any increase or decrease in trading 
action and the number of insiders from 
2004 to 2006 
Test 2:Linear Regression 
Explain the relation between accruals and 
directors activity 
Test 3:Linear Regression 
Explore any relation between insider 
trading and abnormal returns 
H3: Under IFRS firms exhibit 
lower cost of equity, without 
resorting to earnings management 
procedures. 
Test 1:Binary Logistic Regression Exhibit the cost of equity performance 
Test 2:Linear Regression 
Describe any relationship between accruals 
and cost of equity capital 
Test 3:Linear Regression 
Detect any correlation between the cost of 
capital abnormal returns 
H4: The SEC’s acceptance 
decision to allow IFRS for foreign 
firms has increased the proportion 
of the converging process. 
Test: Indexes Calculation 
Examine the proportion of the convergence 
process after SEC’s decision  
H5: Financial statement effects 
under IFRS for firms that used to 
follow US GAAP. 
Test 1:Binary Logistic Regression Financial statement effects from 2006-2008 
Test 2:Analysis of Variance 
Detect volatility cases in accounting 
measures  
H6: Under IFRS, firms listed in US 
markets tend to exhibit less 
earnings management. 
Test 1:Analysis of Variance 
Explore the volatility of ΔNP/TA & 
ΔNP/ΔOCF measures 
Test 2a:Pearson Correlation 
Follow the correlation between accruals 
(DAC) and operating cash flows (OCF) 
Test 2b:Linear Regression Focus on explanatory power of the R² 
Test 2c:Linear Regression 
Examine the relation between accruals and 
profitability, leverage and size ratios 
Test 3a,b:Binary Logistic Regression 
Explore the performance of SPP and LNL 
cases under IFRS 
H7: The outbreak of the crisis has 
negatively affected stock 
performance in the banking and 
insurance sector in Europe, 
Australia and the US. 
Test: Market Model  
Calculate any firm’s abnormal returns 
against a specific event 
H8: The use of the reclassification 
option has resulted in financial 
statement effects, increasing 
accruals in many cases, but adding 
market value. 
Test 1:Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Effects after the reclassification option for 
reclassified, non-reclassified and US firms 
(three categories) 
Test 2a:Binary Logistic Regression 
Detect any decrease of accruals for 
reclassified companies 
Test 2b:Linear Regression 
Observe the performance of accruals for all 
three firms' categories  
Test 3: Linear Regression 
Detect the market reaction to the 
announcement of the reclassification option 
H9: The amendments of both IFRS 
and US GAAP, have improved the 
accuracy of the shadow banking 
sector. 
Test 1a:Analysis of Variance 
Detect volatility cases in accounting 
measures. The higher the volatility, the 
lower the information asymmetry 
Test 1b:Linear Regression Focus on explanatory power of the R² 
Test 2:Binary Logistic Regression Explore the impact of the accounting 
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improvements on firms’ value  
Test 3a:Pearson Correlation 
Explore the correlation between 
discretionary accruals (DAC) and cash 
flows from operating activities (OCF) 
Test 3b:Binary Logistic Regression 
Examine accruals performance before and 
after the amendments 














































Table 6 – Timetable of IFRS standards and amendments 
Pronouncement Issued Date Effective date 
IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
Original issue 2003 
First IFRS financial statements for a period 
beginning on or      after 1 January 2004 
Amendment relating to IFRS 6 2005 Annual periods beginning on or after Jan. 2006 
Amendment relating to cost of an investment on 
first-time adoption 
May 2008 Annual periods beginning on or after Jan. 2009 
Revised and restructured Nov. 2008 Annual periods beginning on or after July 2009 
Amendments relating to oil and gas assets and lease. July 2009 Annual periods beginning on or after Jan. 2010 
Limited Exemption from Comparative IFRS 7 
Disclosures for First-time Adopters 
January 2010 Annual periods beginning on or after  July 2010 
Annual Improvements to IFRSs May 2010 Annual periods beginning on or after Jan. 2011 
Replacement of 'fixed dates' for certain exceptions 
with 'the date of transition to IFRSs' 
Dec. 2010 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2011 
Additional exemption for entities ceasing to suffer 
from severe hyperinflation 
Dec. 2010 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2011 
Amendments for government loans with a below-
market rate of interest when transitioning to IFRSs 
March 2012 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Annual Improvements 2009-2011 Cycle May 2012 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 Annual Improvements 2011-2013 Cycle  Dec. 2013 Amendment to the basis for conclusions only 
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment  
Original issue 2004 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2005 Amendment relating to vesting conditions and 
cancellations 
2008 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2009 
Amendments resulting from April 2009 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
April 2009 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2009 
Amendments relating to group cash-settled share-
based payment transactions 
June 2009 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2010 
Annual Improvements 2010-2012 Cycle Dec. 2013 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2014 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations 
Original issue 2004 Business combinations after 31 March 2004 
Comprehensive revision on applying the acquisition 
method 
2008 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2009 
Amendments resulting from May 2010 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
May 2010 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2010 
Annual Improvements 2010-2012 Cycle Dec. 2013 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2014 
Annual Improvements 2011-2013 Cycle Dec. 2013 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2014 
IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts 
Original issue 2004 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2005 Amendment for financial guarantee contracts 2005 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2006 IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations 
Original issue 2004 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2005 
Amendments resulting from May 2008 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
May 2008 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2009 
Amendments resulting from April 2009 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
April 2009 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2010 
Amendments resulting from September 2014 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
Sept. 2014 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2016 
IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Assets 
Original issue 2004 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2006 IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 
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Original issue 2005 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2007 
Amendments enhancing disclosures about fair value 
and liquidity risk 
March 2009 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2009 
Amendments resulting from May 2010 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
May 2010 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2011 
Amendments enhancing disclosures about transfers 
of financial assets 
AASB 2010-6 - Amendments to Australian– 




Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 201 




Amendments related to the offsetting of assets and 
liabilities 
Dec. 2011 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 and interim periods within those periods 
Deferral of mandatory effective date of IFRS 9 and 
amendments to transition disclosures 
Dec. 2011 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2015 
 
Additional hedge accounting disclosures (and 
consequential amendments) resulting from the 
introduction of the hedge accounting chapter in 
IFRS 9 
Nov. 2013 Applies when IFRS 9 is applied 
Amendments resulting from September 2014 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
Sept. 2014 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2016 
IFRS 8 Operating Segments 
Original issue 2006 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2009 Amendments resulting from April 2009 Annual 
Improvements to IFRSs 
April 2009 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2010 
Annual Improvements 2010-2012 Cycle  Dec. 2013 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2014 
IFRS 9 Financial Instruments 
Original issue (Classification and measurement of 
financial assets) 
Nov. 2009 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
 Reissue to include requirements for the classification 
and measurement of financial liabilities and 
incorporate existing derecognition requirements 
October 2010 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
(For annual reports beginning on or after the end 
of 2012 for Australian companies, AASB9) 
Deferral of mandatory effective date of IFRS 9 and 
amendments to transition disclosures 
Dec. 2011 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2015 
 Reissue to incorporate a hedge accounting chapter 
and permit the early application of the requirements 
for presenting in other comprehensive income the 
'own credit' gains or losses on financial liabilities 
designated under the fair value option without early 
applying the other requirements of IFRS 9 
Nov. 2013 Contains no stated effective date 
Finalised version, incorporating requirements for 
classification and measurement, impairment, general 
hedge accounting and derecognition. 
July 2014 
 
Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2018 
 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements 
Original issue 
May 2011 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Amendments to transitional guidance 
June 2012 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Amendments for investment entities 
October 2012 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2014 
Amendments regarding the application of the 
consolidation execption 
Dec. 2014 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2016 
Amendments deferring the effective date of the 
September 2014 amendments 
Dec. 2015 Immediately 
 277 
IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements 
Original issue May 2011 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Amendments to transitional guidance June 2012 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Amendments regarding the accounting for 
acquisitions of an interest in a joint operation 
May 2014 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2016 
IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities 
Original issue May 2011 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Amendments to transitional guidance June 2012 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Amendments for investment entities October 2012 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2014 
Amendments regarding the application of the 
consolidation execption 
Dec. 2014 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2016 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement 
Original issue May 2011 
Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2013 
Annual Improvements 2010-2012 Cycle  Dec. 2013 Amendments to basis for conclusions only 
Annual Improvements 2011-2013 Cycle  Dec. 2013 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2014 
IFRS 14 Regulatory Deferral Accounts 
Original issue 
January 2014 
Applies to an entity's first annual IFRS financial 
statements for a period beginning on or after 1 
January 2016 
IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers 
Original issue May 2014 
Applies to an entity's first annual IFRS financial 
statements for a period beginning on or after 1 
January 2017 2018 (see below) 
Amendments to defer the effective date to 1 January 
2018 
Sept. 2015 Annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2018 



















Table 7 - Summary of key differences between IFRS and old GAAP from UK, 
Germany, Greece and Australia 




(a) statement of 
financial position, 
(b) statement of 
comprehensive income 
(presented as either a 
single statement or an 
income statement 
followed by a statement 
of other comprehensive 
income),  
(c) cash flow statement, 
(d) statement of 
changes in equity 
(presenting a 
reconciliation of equity 
items between the 
beginning and end of 
the period) and  
(e) notes. 
Requires: 
(a) balance sheet,  
(b) profit and loss 
account, 
(c) statement of total 
recognised gain and 
losses,  
(d) cash flow 
statement and 
(e) notes comprising 







(a) Balance sheet,  
(b) profit and loss 
account, 
(c) notes.  
Medium-sized 
and large entities are 
required additionally 
to present a (d) 
management report. 
For publicly traded 
companies, the 
preparation of a cash 
(e) flow statement 
and a (f) statement of 
changes in equity is 
required. 
Requires: 
(a) Balance sheet  
(b) profit and loss 
account  
(c) cash flow statement 
and  
(d) notes.  
There is no separate 
statement of changes in 
equity, but there is an 
indirect reference of it 
in the earnings’ 
distribution table   
Requires similar to 
IFRS statements, 
although referred to by 
different names, as for 
example the statement 
of financial 
performance 




Requires a number of 
disclosures, but does 
not prescribe the exact 
line items in the 
statement. Interest and 
dividends may be 
classified as operating 
or as investing (if 
received) or financing 
(if paid). Taxes usually 
are classified as 
operating. Cash flows 
from extraordinary 
items are classified as 




movement of cash 
(defined as cash in 
hand and deposits 
repayable on demand, 
less overdrafts) to be 
reported in the cash 
flow statement. There 
is no concept of ‘cash 
equivalents’. Cash 
flows are reported in 
greater detail (under 
nine standard 
headings) than under 
IFRS. 
A statement of cash 
flows is required 
only for listed 
companies. A 
specific format of the 
statement of cash 
flows is required. 
Cash flows from 
interest received and 
paid, dividends 
received and income 
taxes generally are 
classified as cash 
flows from operating 
activities. Cash flows 
from extraordinary 




A statement of cash 
flows is required only 
for listed companies 
and has a specific 
format and specific 
disclosure 
requirements.  
Similar to IFRS. 
Additional disclosures 
are required along with 
a number of filters. 
They are categorised in 
numerical order. There 
are listed AUS specific 






Does not prescribe a 
standard format, 
although expenditure 
must be presented in 
one of two formats 
(function or nature). 
Certain items must be 
presented on the face of 
the income statement. 






are nonexistent by 




presented in one of 
two prescribed 
formats. Generally 
only realised gains 
may be recognised in 
the income 
statement. Items of 
income and expense 
cannot be offset. 
There is specific format 
and required 
information disclosed. 
There is specific format 
and required 
information disclosed. 
Consolidation Consolidation is based 
on the power to control. 
A subsidiary is not 
consolidated if it is 
acquired and held 
exclusively for disposal 
in the near future, or if 
severe long-term 
restrictions significantly 
impair the transfer of 
funds to the parent. 
Subsidiaries cannot be 
excluded on the basis of 
dissimilar activities. 






the exercise of the 
rights of the parent 
over the assets or 
management of the 
subsidiary, or the 
parent’s interest 
is being held 
exclusively with a 
Consolidation can be 
based on actual 
control in practice. A 
subsidiary is 
excluded if its 
operations are so 
different from those 





Are only consolidated 
the subsidiary 





No specific exclusions, 
but may be able to 
exclude entities that 
operate under severe 
longterm restrictions if 
ability to control is 
impaired. 
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For tangible and 
intangible assets, there 
is an accounting policy 
choice between the cost 
model and the 
revaluation (fair value) 
model. Intangibles with 
indefinite live are 
reviewed annually for 
impairment and are not 
amortised. Non 
financial assets with 
definite live are 
amortised and tested for 
impairment only where 
there is an indication of 
impairment.  
A cost or valuation 
model may be used 
for tangible and 
intangible assets; but 
a valuation model 
may only be used 
where an intangible 
asset has a readily 
ascertainable market 




intangible assets have 
a useful economic life 







cannot be capitalised. 
Amortisation is tax 
driven and not 
necessarily based on 
the useful life of an 
asset. Revaluations 
are not permitted. 
Tangible and intangible 
assets are recognised at 
cost. Revaluation is 
possible only for land 
and buildings, which 
allows revaluation 
every 4 years following 
indices provided by 
Law. The increase in 
value is recognised 
within equity as the 
company issues free 
shares to the 
shareholders. The Law 
does not consider 
indefinite useful life. 
 
Tangibles and 
intangibles can choose 
between cost and fair 
value. It is not 
permitted an asset to be 
carried at deemed cost, 
being the previous 
revalued, it the entity 
reverts from the fair 
value to the cost basis. 
The reversal of a 
decrease previously 
recognised as an 
expense in respect of 
the same class of asset 
is recognised as 
income. There is no 
limitation on the 
recognition of the fair 
value of an intangible 
provided that the fair 




Impairment exists if an 
assets carrying amount 
exceeds the greater of 
its net selling price and 
value in use (net 
present value of future 
cash flows); this excess 
is the amount of the 
impairment loss. 
Detailed guidance 
provided for calculating 
the impairment of an 
asset particularly when 
such assessment has to 
be done by cash 
generating unit rather 
than individual asset. 
Impairment is 
measured for an 
income-generating 
unit when indicators 
of impairment exist. 
Non-financial assets 
are tested for 
impairment only if 
there is an indication 
of impairment. All 
impairment losses 
(including on 
goodwill) may be 
reversed in future 
periods if relevant 




only if the carrying 
amount of a fixed 
asset permanently 
exceeds its current 
value. 
Greek GAAP require a 
company to recognise 
impairments of assets. 
If an asset is 
considered to be 
permanently impaired, 
the impairment is 
recognised so that the 
asset’s value is shown 
at the lower of cost and 
fair value. This 
impairment can be 
reversed. The reversal 
is optional and is 
treated as exceptional 
revenue. 
There is no detailed 
guidance for 
calculating the 
impairment of an asset. 
Entities entering the 
development stage are 
not tested for 
impairment. 
Recoverable amount is 
defined as the amount 
that is expected to be 
recovered through cash 
inflows and outflows 
from the continued 
use and subsequent 
disposal of the asset.  
An impairment write-
down should be 
recognised as an 
expense in so far as it 
exceeds the amount 
held in the revaluation 
surplus relating to the 
same asset. 
Depreciation Allows straight-line, 




when asset components 
have different benefit 
patterns. Depreciation 
is based on the useful 
life of an asset. 
There is no 
requirement to 
separately depreciate 
parts of an asset. 
Depreciation ceases 
at the end of the 
useful life or on 
disposal of the asset. 
If no depreciation is 
charged (as 
immaterial) or the 
remaining useful life 
of asset exceeds 50 
years, a mandatory 
annual impairment 
review is required. 
Depreciation is tax 
driven and not 
necessarily based on 
the useful life of an 
asset. 
The coefficient of 
annual depreciation 
that use the enterprises 
are determined by Law. 
These indices are not in 
line with the assets’ 
useful life. 
 
The Standard requires 
non-current assets that 
have limited useful 
lives (depreciable 
assets) to be 
depreciated over those 
useful lives and 
specifies the manner in 
which this is to be 
done. 
Goodwill Require capitalizing the 
goodwill and 
Goodwill is 
amortised over 20 
Goodwill is 
recognised as 
It is valued similarly to 
IFRS and it is 
Capitalised and 
amortised over its 
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amortizing it over a 
period not to exceed 20 
years, along with an 
annual test for 
impairment. IFRS 
permits the charging of 
goodwill to owners’ 
equity in the year of 
acquisition. Negative 
goodwill is recognised 
immediately. 
Impairment losses on 
goodwill are not 
reversed. Any negative 
goodwill is recognised 
in profit or loss in the 
period in which the 
non-monetary assets are 
recovered, with any 
excess recognised over 
the period expected to 
benefit. 
years and tested for 
impairment annually. 
Goodwill with an 
indefinite life is not 
amortised. Any 
negative goodwill is 
recognised in profit 
or loss in the period 
in which the non-
monetary assets are 
recovered, with any 
excess recognised 
over the period 
expected to benefit.  
an intangible asset 
with a finite useful 
life. For all 
subsidiaries where 
goodwill has been 
charged to group 
equity in accordance 
with the prior choice 
for the treatment of 
goodwill, this 
treatment may be 
retained. It may be 
written off against 
equity. 
 
depreciated only once. 
Goodwill arising on an 
acquisition should 
either be expensed in 
the period incurred or 
amortised in equal 
tranches over a 
maximum period of 5 
years. 
useful life, but this 
period cannot exceed 
20 years. Straight-line 
basis of amortisation 
required. Negative 
goodwill must be 
accounted for by 
reducing 
proportionately the fair 




must be recognised as 
revenue in the profit 
and loss account. 
Reversal of the 
impairment of 




Expense research costs 
as incurred. 
Development costs 
must be capitalised and 
amortised where 
stringent criteria are 
met. 
Similar to IFRS, 
although 
development costs 
may be expensed as 
incurred. They may 
be capitalised and 
amortised if specific 
criteria are met (as an 
accounting policy 
choice). 
R&D costs are 
excluded from 
capitalization. 
R&D is posted in the 
account of expenses, 
similarly with the 
expenses of growth. 
They can also be 
recognised as 
intangible assets and 
are amortised over a 
period of 3 years. 
The Law does not 
explicitly distinguish 
between research and 
development phases 
and permits 
capitalisation of both. 
R&D can only be 
separately recognised 
as part of an 
acquisition where 
research and 
development costs are 
expected beyond any 
reasonable doubt to be 
recoverable. 
Inventories Payments received on 
account of orders are 
recognised as liabilities. 
The determination of 
net realisable value is 
based on the estimated 
selling price. Carry at 
lower of cost and net 
realisable value. Use 
FIFO or weighted 
average method to 
determine cost. LIFO is 
prohibited. Reversal is 
required for subsequent 
increase in value of 
previous write-downs. 
Similar to IFRS with 
the exception of use 
of net realisable value 
for agricultural and 
forest products and 
mineral ores where 
there is no similar 
exclusion from scope 
in SSAP 9. 
Payments received 
on account of orders 
may be deducted 
from inventories. 
Purchase market 
prices generally are 
considered to be 
more relevant than 
sales market prices in 
assessing the current 
market price (net 
realisable value) of 
inventory. 
LIFO is permitted. 
Write-downs of 
inventories are not 
recognised but 
disclosed in the notes. 
Similar to IFRS, with 
some minor differences 
with respect to 
disclosure, while LIFO 




generally is based on 
the substance of an 
arrangement. Not 





guidance. Based on 
several criteria, 
which require the 
recognition of revenue 
Revenue arising in an 
exchange transaction 
with a customer, e.g., 
on the sale of goods, 
should be recognised 
when the entity has 
the right to 
consideration in 




are generally similar, 
The legal structure of 
a transaction is more 
important than under 
IFRS. Revenue from 
construction and 
fixed price service 
contracts generally 
are recognised 
using the completed 
contract method. 




revenue when there is a 
transaction of a good or 
a service regardless on 
whether this 
transaction is paid or 
not.  
 
Based on the transfer 
of control. Proceeds 
from disposal 
recognised as a 
component of revenue. 
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when risks and 
rewards have been 
transferred and the 
revenue can be 
measured reliably. 
but less prescriptive. transactions. 
Earning-per-
Share 
Does not average the 
individual interim 
period calculations. 
Basic and diluted EPS 
must be disclosed on 
the face of the income 
statement. Use 
weighted average 
potential dilutive shares 
as denominator for 
diluted EPS. Use 
‘treasury share’ method 
for share options/ 
warrants. 
Similar to IFRS. 
Listed are required to 
disclose earnings per 
share in their 
financial statements.  
It uses weighted 
average of ordinary 
shares.  
EPS is not required 
to be disclosed. 
EPS is not required to 
be disclosed. 
Similar to IFRS.  They 
additionally state that 
potential ordinary 
shares resulting from 
mandatory conversion 






Deferred tax is 
recognised on all 
temporary differences 
between the tax base 
and carrying value of 
assets and liabilities, 
including those arising 
from revaluation of 
assets, on gains rolled 
over into replacement 
assets and on 
unremitted earnings of 
investments where the 
Group does not control 
the timing of 
distributions. 
 
Deferred tax is 
provided on all 
timing differences, 
subject to certain 
exceptions. 
Accordingly, deferred 
tax is not provided on 
revaluation gains and 
gains rolled over into 
replacement assets 
unless there exists a 
binding agreement 
for sale, nor on 
unremitted earnings 
of investments except 
to the extent of 
accrued dividends or 
where there exists a 
binding agreement to 
distribute earnings. 
Deferred tax is 
provided in respect 
of timing differences, 
which are focused on 
the income 
statement. 
In practice deferred 
tax assets, seldom 
are recognised. In 
practice deferred tax 
often is provided 
using an enterprise’s 
average effective tax 
rate rather than the 
statutory rate. 
Deferred tax cannot 
be recognised 
directly in equity. 
There is no distinction 
between current and 
deferred tax. The 
concept of deferred tax 
does not exist. 
Income Statement 
Approach is used for 
provision for all timing 
differences. Realisation 
of a deferred tax 
benefit for all timing 
differences must be 






Do not specify an 
accounting method. 
IFRS permit a choice 




A transaction that is 
to be settled at a 
contracted rate is 
translated at that rate, 
and where a trading 
transaction is covered 
by a related or 
matching forward 
contract, the rate of 
exchange specified in 
that contract may be 
used. With separate 
predictions according 
to the nature of the 
transaction.  
Foreign currency 
monetary items, and 
foreign currency 
non-monetary items 
carried at fair value 
following a write-
down, are not 
retranslated if this 




adjustments are carried 
at fair value and 
classified on either on 
expenses account, on 
passive or on profit and 
loss account.  
 
Foreign currency 
transactions carried at 
current spot rate with 
exchange differences 
and costs or gains on 
entering the hedge 
deferred as an asset or 
liability until the 
transaction occurs. 
Hedge of net 
investment are similar 
to IFRS, except no 
requirement to account 
for any ineffectiveness 
separately. 
Pensions Permit the use of both 
accrued-benefit and 
projected benefit 
valuation methods and 
require the use of long-
term assumptions. They 
have no requirement to 
recognize any liability 
for under funded plans. 
The cost of providing 
defined benefit 
retirement benefits is 
The cost of retirement 
benefits based upon a 
consistent percentage 
of employees’ 




in regular pension 
costs are amortised 
over the average 
expected service life 
Valuations for 
defined benefit plans 
should be done 
annually and must be 
based on conditions 




as future salaries is 
not permitted. The 
interest rate used for 
The enterprise is 
compelled to 
accounting forecasts 
for personnel with 
rights of retirement, as 
it has the obligation to 
pay a lump sum to the 
employees who are 
made redundant or 
retire, depending on the 
service years, the 
salary etc. These 
There is currently no 
Australian accounting 
standard that deals with 
accounting for 
retirement benefits and 
an expense is generally 
brought to account as 
contributions are paid 




recognised over the 
service life of scheme 
members. This cost is 
calculated by an 
independent qualified 
actuary, based on 
estimates of long-term 
rates of return on 
scheme assets and 
discount rates on  
scheme liabilities. 
of current employees 
on a straight line 
basis. Scheme assets 
and liabilities are not 




discounting by most 
enterprises is six per 
cent due to tax 
rules. There is no 
guidance in respect 
of plan assets. 
Actuarial gains and 
losses are recognised 
immediately as 
expense or income. 
 
liabilities are definition 
under Greek law and 
should be recognised in 
the balance sheet.  
 
 
Assets held for 
sale 
Assets are classified as 
held for sale when their 
value will be recovered 
through a sale 
transaction rather than 
continuing use and its 
sale is considered 
highly probable. 
Financial assets held for 
trading purposes carried 
at fair value with 
unrealised gains and 
losses recognised in 
profit or loss. 
 
There is no held for 





No specific regulations No specific guidance. 
Financial assets are 
generally not carried at 
fair value unless they 
are trading assets or are 
noncurrent assets being 
revalued through the 
asset revaluation 
reserve. Where 
revalued assets are 
sold, the asset 
revaluation reserve is 
not recognised in 
current profit or loss 
but may be transferred 




Under IFRS, the results 
of operations arising 
from assets classified as 
held for sale are 
classified as 
discontinued operations 
when the results relate 
to a separate line of 
business, or 
geographical area of 
operations, or where 
there is a coordinated 
plan to dispose of a 
separate line of 
business or 






the sale or 
termination of 
operations is 
completed in the 
reporting period, or 
before approval of the 
financial statements. 
In addition, the 
operations concerned 
must have a material 
effect on the nature 
and focus of 
operations resulting 
in either a withdrawal 
from a particular 
class of business or 
geographical market 
or a material 
reduction in turnover 
in a continuing 
market. 
There is no concept 
of discontinuing 
operations. A gain/ 
loss on the sale or 
abandonment of a 
major part of an 
enterprise sometimes 
is presented as an 
extraordinary item. 
There is no concept of 
discontinuing 
operations. 
They don’t prohibit a 
discontinuing operation 
from being classified as 
an extraordinary item 
and don’t requires the 
amount of gain or loss 
before income tax 
expense/revenue 
recognised on disposal 
of assets or settlement 
of liabilities attributed 
to each discontinuing 
operation to be 
disclosed on the face of 






recognised as an 
appropriation of 
reserves in the period in 




recognised as an 
expense in the period 




The disclosure of 
dividends generally 
comprises only 
dividends paid. A 
simple proposal of 
dividend is not 
generally sufficient 
for recognition of the 
related liability. 
Dividends recognised 
when proposed and are 
recognised as a 
liability. 
A liability must be 
recognised for 
dividends declared, 
determined or publicly 
recommended on or 
before the reporting 
date. 
 Source: Ernst & Young 
Global Limited and 
PwC 
Source: Ernst & 
Young Global 
Limited and PwC 




Table 8 - Summary of key differences and impacts between IFRS and US GAAP 
 US GAAP IFRS Impact 
Inventory 
Valuation 
Permit LIFO, FIFO, 
weighted average cost, or 
specific identification. 
Inventory carried at lower 
of cost or market. 
Permits FIFO or weighted 
average cost; LIFO not 
permitted.Inventory carried 
at lower of cost or net 
realizable value. 
Companies that use LIFO must 
revalue inventory, which could 
result in major tax liabilities due 




Two-step impairment. Single-step impairment. Write-downs are more likely 
under IFRS. 
Goodwill Until recently, required 
capitalizing goodwill and 
amortizing it over a period 
not to exceed 40 years. The 
goodwill must be reviewed 
for impairment each year. 
 
Require capitalizing the 
goodwill and amortizing it 
over a period not to exceed 
20 years, along with an 
annual test for impairment. 
IFRS permits the charging 
of goodwill to owners’ 
equity in the year of 
acquisition. 
Additional differences in the 
impairment testing 
methodologies could create 
further variability in the timing 




Assets can be written 
down, but not written up. 
PP&E is valued at 
historical cost. 
Allows upward revaluation 
when an active market 
exists for intangibles; 
allows revaluation of 
PP&E to fair value. 
Book values are likely to 
increase under IFRS. This 
upward revision would also 
result in additional depreciation 
expense. 
Depreciation Methods allowed: straight-
line, units of production, or 
accelerated methods (sum 
of digits or declining 
balance). Component 
depreciation allowed but 
not commonly used. 
Allows straight-line, units 
of production, and both 
accelerated methods. 
Component depreciation 
required when asset 
components have different 
benefit patterns. 
Assets with different 
components will have differing 
depreciation schedules, which 
may increase or decrease assets 
and revenue. 
Contingencies Contingent liabilities must 
be disclosed. 
Can limit disclosure of 
contingent liabilities if 
severely prejudicial to an 
entity’s position. 
May result in fewer disclosures. 
Debt 
Covenants 
Permits curing debt 
covenant violations after 
fiscal year end. 
Debt covenant violations 
must be cured by fiscal 
year end. 
Debt covenants may need to be 




R&D costs must be 
expensed under U.S. 
GAAP. 
Allows capitalization of 
R&D costs if certain 
criteria are met. 
Development costs will be 
deferred and amortized. 
Entity 
Consolidation 
Consolidation is based on 
who has the controlling 
financial interest. Prefer a 
risks-and-rewards model 
Consolidation is based on 
which entity has the power 
to control. Prefer a control 
model. 
Some entities have to be 
shown separately under 
IFRS. 
Companies are likely to 
consolidate more entities. 
Securitization Allows certain securitized 
assets and liabilities to 
remain off a corporation’s 
books. 
IFRS requires most 
securitized assets and 
liabilities to be placed on 
the balance sheet. 
May result in very different 




Fair value based on a 
negotiated price between a 
willing buyer and seller; 
not based on entry price. 
Several fair value 
measurements. Fair value 
generally seen as the price 
at which an asset could be 
exchanged. 
Financial assets and liabilities 
will be measured differently. 
Statement of 
Income 
Extraordinary items shown 
below the net income. 
Extraordinary items are not 
segregated in the income 
statement. 
Under IFRS an entity can present 




Provides very specific 
general and industry 
guidance about what 
constitutes revenue, how 
revenue should be 
Not specific about the 
timing and measurement of 
recognition; lacks industry-
specific guidance. 
Revenues are likely to increase 
with less detailed guidance. 
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measured, and the effect of 
timing on recognition. 
Earning-per-
Share 
U.S. GAAP averages the 
individual interim period 
incremental shares. 
IFRS does not average the 
individual interim period 
calculations 
This difference could result in 
different denominators being 
utilized in the diluted earnings-




Require recognition of 
deferred income taxes on a 
comprehensive basis for all 
temporary differences and 
require the use of tax rates 
that reflect future tax rates 
and laws. 
Allow managers not to 
recognize deferred assets/ 
liabilities if the book/tax 
difference is not expected 
to reverse in the 
foreseeable future. Also 
allow managers to choose 
whether or not to adjust 
deferred amounts for 
changes in tax rates and 
laws. 
 
Companies reporting under IFRS 
generally will have greater 
volatility in their deferred tax 
accounts over the life of the 
awards due to the related 
adjustments for stock price 
movements in each 
reporting period. Companies 
reporting under US GAAP could 
have greater volatility upon 
exercise arising from the 
variation between the estimated 
deferred taxes recognized and 





Foreign exchange gains and 
losses on forward contracts 
and hedges are recognized 
in net income or a 
component of equity in the 
period in which they occur. 
The United States requires 
the use of the current 
exchange rate when 
translating goodwill and 
fair value adjustments on 
foreign acquisitions. 
Do not specify an 
accounting method. IFRS 
permit a choice between 
current and historical 
exchange rates. 
 
The treatment of foreign 
exchange gains and losses on 
available-for-sale debt securities 
will create more income 
statement volatility under IFRS. 
Pensions Require the use of the 
accrued-benefit method and 
current market-based 
assumptions. They require 
recognition of a minimum 
pension liability for under 
funded plans. 
Permit the use of both 
accrued-benefit and 
projected benefit valuation 
methods and require the 
use of long-term 
assumptions. They have no 
requirement to recognize 
any liability for under 
funded plans. 
May result in an increased 
benefit obligation under IFRS. 


















Table 9 -  Key US GAAP amendments 2009-2015 
Update 
Number 
Pronouncement Effective date for public 
companies 
Updates Issued in 2009 
No.2009–01 
Topic 105 - Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 168 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending after 15 September 2009 
No. 2009–05 
Topic 820 - Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures: 
Measuring Liabilities at Fair Value 
For the first reporting period 
beginning after issuance. 
No. 2009-06 
Topic 740 - Income Taxes: Implementation Guidance on 
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes and Disclosure 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending after 15 September 2009 
No. 2009-12 
Topic 820 - Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures: 
Investments in Certain Entities That Calculate Net Asset 
Value per Share (or Its Equivalent) 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending after 15 December 2009 
No. 2009-13 
Topic 605 - Revenue Recognition: Multiple-Deliverable 
Revenue Arrangements — a consensus of the FASB 
Emerging Issues Task Force 
Beginning on or after 15 June 2010 
No. 2009-14 
Topic 985 - Software: Certain Revenue Arrangements That 
Include Software Elements — a consensus of the FASB 
Emerging Issues Task Force 
Beginning on or after 15 June 2010 
No. 2009-16 
Topic 860 - Transfers and Servicing: Accounting for 
Transfers of Financial Assets 
December 2009 
No. 2009-17 
Topic 810 - Consolidations: Improvements to Financial 
Reporting by Enterprises Involved with Variable Interest 
Entities 
December 2009 
Updates Issued in 2010 
No. 2010-01 
Topic 505 - Equity: Accounting for Distributions to 
Shareholders with Components of Stock and Cash 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2009 
No. 2010-02 
Topic 810 - Consolidation: Accounting and Reporting for 
Decreases in Ownership of a Subsidiary 
Beginning in the period that an entity 
adopts Statement 160 or for interim 
or annual reporting period 
ending on or after 15 December 2009 
for first statement 160 users 
No. 2010-03 
Topic 932 - Extractive Activities: Oil and Gas Reserve 
Estimation and Disclosures 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 31 December 2009 
No. 2010-05 
Topic 718 - Stock Compensation: Escrowed Share 
Arrangements and the Presumption of Compensation 
From 15 January 2010 
No. 2010-06 
Topic 820 - Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures: 
Improving Disclosures about Fair Value Measurements 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2009 
No. 2010-07 
Topic 958 - Not-for-Profit Entities: Not-for-Profit Entities: 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
From January 2010 
 
No. 2010-09 
Topic 855 - Subsequent Events: Amendments to Certain 
Recognition and Disclosure Requirements 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or 15 June 2010 
No. 2010-10 
Topic 810 - Consolidation: Amendments for Certain 
Investment Funds 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or 15 November 2009 
No. 2010-11 
Topic 815 - Derivatives and Hedging: Scope Exception 
Related to Embedded Credit Derivatives 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or 15 June 2010 
No. 2010-12 
Topic 740 - Income Taxes: Accounting for Certain Tax 
Effects of the 2010 Health Care Reform Acts 
From April 2010 
No. 2010-13 
Topic 718 - Stock Compensation: Effect of Denominating 
the Exercise Price of a Share-Based Payment 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2010 
No. 2010-15 
Topic 944 - Financial Services and Insurance: How 
Investments Held through Separate Accounts Affect an 
Insurer’s Consolidation Analysis of Those Investments 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2010 
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No. 2010-16 
Topic 924 - Entertainment: Accruals for Casino Jackpot 
Liabilities 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2010 
No. 2010-17 
Topic 605 - Revenue Recognition - Milestone Method: 
Milestone Method of Revenue Recognition 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or 15 June 2010 
No. 2010-18 
Topic 310 - Receivables: Effect of a Loan Modification 
When the Loan Is Part of a Pool 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or 15 July 2010 
No. 2010-19 Topic 830 - Foreign Currency: Foreign Currency Issues From November 2010 
No. 2010-20 
Topic 310 - Receivables: Disclosures about the Credit 
Quality of Financing Receivables and the Allowance for 
Credit Losses 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 
2010 
No. 2010-23 
Topic 954 - Health Care Entities: Measuring Charity Care 
for Disclosure Issues Task Force 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2010 
No. 2010-24 
Topic 954 - Health Care Entities: Presentation of Insurance 
Claims and Related Insurance Recoveries 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2010 
No. 2010-25 
Topic 962 - Plan Accounting - Defined Contribution 
Pension Plans: Reporting Loans to Participants by Defined 
Contribution Pension Plans 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2010 
No. 2010-26 
Topic 944 - Financial Services - Insurance: Accounting for 
Costs Associated with Acquiring or Renewing Insurance 
Contracts 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
No. 2010-27 
Topic 720 - Other Expenses: Fees Paid to the Federal 
Government by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 31 December 2010 
No. 2010-28 
Topic 350 - Intangibles—Goodwill and Other: When to 
Perform Step 2 of the Goodwill Impairment Test for 
Reporting Units with Zero or Negative Carrying Amounts 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2010 
No. 2010-29 
Topic 805 - Business Combinations: Disclosure of 
Supplementary Pro Forma Information for Business 
Combinations 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 
2010 
Updates Issued in 2011 
No. 2011-01 
Topic 310 - Receivables: Deferral of the Effective Date of 
Disclosures about Troubled Debt Restructurings in Update 
No. 2010-20 
Effective upon issuance 
No. 2011-02 
Topic 310 - Receivables: A Creditor’s Determination of 
Whether a Restructuring Is a Troubled Debt Restructuring 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or 15 June 2011 
No. 2011-03 
Topic 860 - Transfers and Servicing: Reconsideration of 
Effective Control for Repurchase Agreements 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
No. 2011-04 
Topic 820 - Fair Value Measurement: Amendments to 
Achieve Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure 
Requirements in U.S. GAAP and IFRSs 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
No. 2011-05 
Topic 220 - Comprehensive Income: Presentation of 
Comprehensive Income 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
No. 2011-06 
Topic 720 - Other Expenses: Fees Paid to the Federal 
Government by Health Insurers 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 31 December 2013 
No. 2011-07 
Topic 954 - Health Care Entities: Presentation and 
Disclosure of Patient Service Revenue, Provision for Bad 
Debts and the Allowance for Doubtful Accounts for Certain 
Health Care Entities 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
No. 2011-08 
Topic 350 – Intangibles - Goodwill and Other: Testing 
Goodwill for Impairment 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
No. 2011-09 
Subtopic 715-80 – Compensation - Retirement Benefits - 
Multiemployer Plans: Disclosures about an Employer’s 
Participation in a Multiemployer Plan 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
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No. 2011-10 
Topic 360 - Property, Plant, and Equipment: Derecognition 
of in Substance Real Estate—a Scope Clarification 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 June 2012 
No. 2011-11 
Topic 210 - Balance Sheet: Disclosures about Offsetting 
Assets and Liabilities 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 01 January 2013 
No. 2011-12 
Topic 220 - Comprehensive Income: Deferral of the 
Effective Date for Amendments to the Presentation of 
Reclassifications of Items Out of Accumulated Other 
Comprehensive Income in Accounting Standards Update 
No. 2011-05 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2011 
Updates Issued in 2012 
No. 2012-01 
Topic 954 - Health Care Entities: Continuing Care 
Retirement Communities—Refundable Advance Fees 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2012 
No. 2012-02 
Topic 350 - Intangibles—Goodwill and Other: Testing 
Indefinite-Lived Intangible Assets for Impairment 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 September 2012 
No. 2012-05 
Topic 230 - Statement of Cash Flows: Not-for-Profit 
Entities: Classification of the Sale Proceeds of Donated 
Financial Assets in the Statement of Cash Flows 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 June 2013 
No. 2012-06 
Topic 805 - Business Combinations : Subsequent 
Accounting for an Indemnification Asset Recognized at the 
Acquisition Date as a Result of a Government-Assisted 
Acquisition of a Financial Institution 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2012 
No. 2012-07 
Topic 926 – Entertainment-Films: Accounting for Fair 
Value Information That Arises after the Measurement Date 
and Its Inclusion in the Impairment Analysis of 
Unamortized Film Costs 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2012 
Updates Issued in 2013 
No. 2013-01 
Topic 210 - Balance Sheet: Clarifying the Scope of 
Disclosures about Offsetting Assets and Liabilities 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 01 January 2013 
No. 2013-02 
Topic 220 - Comprehensive Income: Reporting of Amounts 
Reclassified Out of Accumulated Other Comprehensive 
Income 
For interim and Annual periods 
ending on or after 15 December 2012 
No. 2013-03 
Topic 825 - Financial Instruments: Clarifying the Scope and 
Applicability of a Particular Disclosure to Nonpublic 
Entities 
Effective upon issuance (February 7, 
2013). 
No. 2013-04 
Topic 405 - Liabilities: Obligations Resulting from Joint 
and Several Liability Arrangements for Which the Total 
Amount of the Obligation Is Fixed at the Reporting Date 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 15 December, 2013 
No 2013-05 
Topic 830 - Foreign Currency Matters: Parent’s Accounting 
for the Cumulative Translation Adjustment upon 
Derecognition of Certain Subsidiaries or Groups of Assets 
within a Foreign Entity or of an Investment in a Foreign 
Entity 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 15 December, 2013 
No. 2013-06 
Topic 958 - Not-for-Profit Entities: Services Received from 
Personnel of an Affiliate 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 15 July, 2014 
No. 2013-07 
Topic 205 - Presentation of Financial Statements: 
Liquidation Basis of Accounting 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 15 December, 2013 
No. 2013-08 
Topic 946 - Financial Services-Investment Companies: 
Amendments to the Scope, Measurement, and Disclosure 
Requirements 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 15 December, 2013 
No. 2013-09 
Topic 820 - Fair Value Measurement: Deferral of the 
Effective Date of Certain Disclosures for Nonpublic 
Employee Benefit Plans in Update No. 2011-04 
Effective upon issuance (July 8, 
2013) for financial statements that 
have not been issued 
No. 2013-10 
Topic 815 - Derivatives and Hedging: Inclusion of the Fed 
Funds Effective Swap Rate (or Overnight Index Swap Rate) 
as a Benchmark Interest Rate for Hedge Accounting 
Purposes 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 17 July, 2013 
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No. 2013-11 
Topic 740 - Income Taxes: Presentation of an Unrecognized 
Tax Benefit When a Net Operating Loss Carry forward, a 
Similar Tax Loss, or a Tax Credit Carry forward Exists 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 15 December, 2013 
Updates Issued in 2014 
No. 2014-01 
Topic 323 - Investments—Equity Method and Joint 
Ventures: Accounting for Investments in Qualified 
Affordable Housing Projects 
For annual and interim reports 
beginning after 15 December, 2014 
No. 2014-02 
Topic 350 - Intangibles—Goodwill and Other: Accounting 
for Goodwill 
Applied prospectively to goodwill 
existing as of the beginning of the 
period of adoption and new goodwill 
recognized in annual and interim 
periods beginning after 15 December 
15, 2014 
No. 2014-03 
Topic 815 - Derivatives and Hedging: Accounting for 
Certain Receive-Variable, Pay-Fixed Interest Rate Swaps—
Simplified Hedge Accounting Approach 
For annual periods beginning after 15 
December, 2014 
No. 2014-04 
Subtopic 310-40 - Receivables—Troubled Debt 
Restructurings by Creditors: Reclassification of Residential 
Real Estate Collateralized Consumer Mortgage Loans upon 
Foreclosure 
For annual periods beginning after 15 
December, 2014 
No. 2014-05 Topic 853 - Service Concession Arrangements 
For annual periods beginning after 15 
December, 2014 
No. 2014-07 
Topic 810 - Consolidation: Applying Variable Interest 
Entities Guidance to Common Control Leasing 
Arrangements 
For annual periods beginning after 15 
December, 2014 
No. 2014-08 
Topic 205 - Presentation of Financial Statements and  Topic 
360 - Property, Plant, and Equipment: Reporting 
Discontinued Operations and Disclosures of Disposals of 
Components of an Entity 
Effective in the first quarter of 2015 
for public companies with calendar 
year ends. 
No. 2014-09 Topic 606 - Revenue from Contracts with Customers 
For annual reporting periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2016 
No. 2014-10 
Topic 915 - Development Stage Entities: Elimination of 
Certain Financial Reporting Requirements, Including an 
Amendment to Variable Interest Entities Guidance in Topic 
810, Consolidation 
For annual periods beginning after 15 
December, 2015. 
No. 2014-11 
Topic 860 - Transfers and Servicing: Repurchase-to-
Maturity Transactions, Repurchase Financings and 
Disclosures 
For interim or annual reports 
beginning after 15 December, 2014 
No. 2014-12 
Topic 718 - Compensation—Stock Compensation: 
Accounting for Share-Based Payments When the Terms of 
an Award Provide That a Performance Target Could Be 
Achieved after the Requisite Service Period 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
No. 2014-13 
Topic 810 - Consolidation: Measuring the Financial Assets 
and the Financial Liabilities of a Consolidated 
Collateralized Financing Entity 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
No. 2014-14 
Subtopic 310-40 – Receivables-Troubled Debt 
Restructurings by Creditors: Classification of Certain 
Government-Guaranteed Mortgage Loans upon Foreclosure 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
No. 2014-15 
Subtopic 205-40 - Presentation of Financial Statements: 
Disclosure of Uncertainties about an Entity’s Ability to 
Continue as a Going Concern 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2016 
 
No. 2014-16 
Topic 815 - Derivatives and Hedging: Determining Whether 
the Host Contract in a Hybrid Financial Instrument Issued 
in the Form of a Share Is More Akin to Debt or to Equity 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
No. 2014-17 Topic 805 - Business Combinations: Pushdown Accounting From 18 November 2014 
No. 2014-18 
Topic 805 - Business Combinations: Accounting for 
Identifiable Intangible Assets in a Business Combination 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
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Updates Issued in 2015  
No. 2015-01 
Subtopic 225-20 - Income Statement-Extraordinary and 
Unusual Items: Simplifying Income Statement Presentation 
by Eliminating the Concept of Extraordinary Items 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
 
No. 2015-02 
Topic 810 - Consolidation: Amendments to the 
Consolidation Analysis 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
No. 2015-03 
Subtopic 835-30 – Interest-Imputation of Interest: 
Simplifying the Presentation of Debt Issuance Costs 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
2015-04 
Topic 715 – Compensation-Retirement Benefits: Practical 
Expedient for the Measurement Date of an Employer’s 
Defined Benefit Obligation and Plan Assets 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
2015-05 
Subtopic 350-40 – Intangibles, Goodwill and Other 
Internal-Use Software: Customer’s Accounting for Fees 
Paid in a Cloud Computing Arrangement 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
2015-06 
Topic 260 - Earnings Per Share: Effects on Historical 
Earnings per Unit of Master Limited Partnership Dropdown 
Transactions 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
2015-07 
Topic 820 - Fair Value Measurement: Disclosures for 
Investments in Certain Entities That Calculate Net Asset 
Value per Share (or Its Equivalent) 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
2015-08 Topic 805 - Business Combinations: Pushdown Accounting From August 2015 
2015-09 
Topic 944 - Financial Services-Insurance: Disclosures about 
Short-Duration Contracts 
For annual periods beginning after 15 
December, 2015 and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2016. 
2015-11 
Topic 330 - Inventory: Simplifying the Measurement of 
Inventory 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2016 
2015-12 
Topic 960 - Plan Accounting: Defined Benefit Pension 
Plans, Topic 962 - Defined Contribution Pension Plans,  
Topic 965 - Health and Welfare Benefit Plans: (Part I) Fully 
Benefit-Responsive Investment Contracts, (Part II) Plan 
Investment Disclosures, (Part III) Measurement Date 
Practical Expedient 
For annual and interim periods 
beginning after 15 December, 2015 
2015-13 
Topic 815 - Derivatives and Hedging: Application of the 
Normal Purchases and Normal Sales Scope Exception to 
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Table 10 - Countries’ Financial Profiles 
Financial Profile of Australia 
Production 
and income 
Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 





















5,6 4,5 4,6 7,1 6,8 1,3 4,9 3,7 0,9 1,5 .. 
Economic 
growth 
















%  of 
GDP 




Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Government 
deficit 
%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 
35,1 34,8 34,5 34,6 37,0 38,2 36,8 37,0 36,3 36,6 .. 
 
Financial Profile of United Kingdom 
Production 
and income 






















0,4 2,2 1,1 2,6 0,9 3,3 0,7 -2,1 2,6 -1,1 -0,7 
Economic 
growth 
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Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Government 
deficit 
%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 
43,1 44,0 44,3 42,8 46,6 49,6 48,8 46,9 46,8 44,9 43,9 
  
Financial Profile of Greece 
Production 
and income 






















4,4 3,4 5,1 .. .. 0,0 -11,0 -9,8 -7,6 -8,4 .. 
Economic 
growth 
















%  of 
GDP 




Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Government 
deficit 
%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 
114,2 114,5 107,9 103,9 102,6 134,7 128,4 110,7 167,0 181,7 179,8 
General 
government 
%  of 
GDP 






%  of 
GDP 
45,4 43,8 42,9 44,4 48,3 54,1 52,5 54,2 55,2 60,8 49,9 
  
Financial Profile of Germany 
Production 
and income 






















0,2 0,6 1,1 0,0 0,6 -0,6 0,4 0,9 0,5 0,5 1,3 
Economic 
growth 
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Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Government 
deficit 
%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 
47,2 46,9 45,3 42,8 43,6 47,6 47,3 44,7 44,4 44,5 44,3 
 
 Financial Profile of United States 
Production 
and income 
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GDP 




Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Government 
deficit 
%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 




%  of 
GDP 
36,0 36,2 36,0 36,9 39,4 43,0 42,9 41,8 40,0 38,7 38,0 


























Appendix III: < Research Results > 
 
Table 1  - Applied Ratios 
The research capture the aspects of firms using the following ratios 
1. Market Value-SIZE 2. Investement 
SALESHA Sales per share DIVSH Dividend per share 
NAVSH Net Asset Value per share DIVYI Dividend yield (div per share/share price) 
SALETAS Turnover/Total Assets DIVCOV Dividend Cover (Net profit/dividend) 
RESTAS Reserves/Total Assets PE P/E 
RESSFU Res/Shareholders Funds HOLTA Holdings/Total Assets 
LNMV Natural Argorithm of MV     
  
3. Growth 4. Profitability 
MVBV Market to Book Value PLOWB 
Plowback Ratio (Retained Profit/Operating 
Profit) 
EPSG Earnings per Share Growth OPM Operating Profit Margin (oper profit/sales) 
PEG PE Ratio/Annual EPS growth NPM Net Profit Margin (net profit/sales) 
DIVSHG Dividend per Share Growth ROSC (Profit after tax/Equity+Reserves) 
  EPS EPS 
  ROCE (PBIT/Equity+Reserves+Lt loans) 
  
5. Liquidity 6.Leverage 
CUR Current Ratio DEBT debtor turnover (sales/debtors) 
CASH Cash Ratio ETL Equity/Total Liabilities 
QUI Quick Ratio TLSFU Total Liabilities/Shareholders Funds 
CFSH 
Operating Cash Flow per share [(Oper 




CFM Cash Flow Margin (earnings + dep/sales) CLSFU Current Liabilities/Shareholders Funds 
WCR 
Working Capital Ratio (Sales/Working 
Capital) 
INTCOV Operating Profit/Interest Charge 
STOCKT Stock turnover (cost of sales/stock) IGEAR Interest Charge/Operating Profit 
   DEBTE Debt/Equity 















Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:IFRS vs Old GAAP Pair-wise t-tests for 
equality of means 
















Accruals -0,0906 2,2111 0,0770 1,5966 0,1898 2,2569    
FFS 0,1689 0,3750 0,1645 0,3711 0,1447 0,3522    




1,7893 11,6519 2,5555 12,7078 4,0355 26,8641 * * * 
COC 1,0834 3,9036 0,9810 3,2706 0,9246 3,6472    
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 1,4981 2,1880 1,4928 2,2933 1,3652 2,0536    
NAVSH 1,4952 3,1354 1,7611 4,4103 1,3937 2,5089   * 
SALETAS 1,0698 1,7468 0,9206 1,3916 0,7958 0,8425 * *** * 
RESTAS 0,0518 0,4128 0,0861 0,5612 0,1213 0,7729  *  
RESSFU 0,0837 0,4360 0,0185 0,6599 0,0688 0,5735 **  * 
LNMV 3,2182 3,0454 3,3588 3,0391 3,7479 3,0207  *** * 
Investment  
DIVSH 0,0770 0,3000 0,0635 0,3115 0,0632 0,2402    
DIVYI 0,0243 0,1353 0,0535 0,4349 0,0322 0,2836 *   
DIVCOV 1,0533 7,7775 0,7931 4,2952 1,1972 2,7760   * 
PE 4,4037 21,4701 4,2731 20,62983 4,9607 21,6254    
HOLTA 0,0289 0,1210 0,0394 0,1132 0,0385 0,1013 * *  
Growth  
MVBV 3,1676 13,8328 3,6739 9,7222 2,8267 6,5761   * 
Profitability  
PLOWB 3,0469 13,9822 2,6041 13,4560 3,7078 12,7515   * 
OPM -0,4100 2,0474 -0,7943 2,9266 -0,6778 1,7437 ** **  
NPM -1,2767 3,3331 -1,1059 2,7556 -1,3988 3,2771   * 
ROSC -0,1795 1,5714 -0,0279 1,5006 -0,0832 1,5358 *   
EPS 0,0280 0,8998 -0,0079 1,4313 0,0087 0,8508    
ROCE -0,0726 1,0343 -0,0865 1,0151 -0,0333 1,0013    
Liquidity  
CUR 3,6724 5,1550 3,6221 4,7293 3,9968 6,2189    
CASH 1,9784 5,2730 1,3600 3,4553 1,4362 3,9644 ** *  
QUI 2,6516 3,6306 3,2067 5,1986 3,5588 6,3378 * ***  
CFSH 0,1747 0,7993 0,1821 2,0221 0,1820 0,9873    
CFM -1,5360 7,1409 -1,3395 8,3051 -1,6685 9,8605    
WCR 4,0357 15,9593 3,0024 11,5861 2,2015 14,0555  * * 
STOCKT 6,2317 11,4941 7,8350 14,4088 8,1828 16,1229 * **  
Leverage  
DEBT 10,8076 14,7790 8,8864 10,5082 8,9864 13,2470 ** **  
ETL 6,4336 12,7492 5,9760 11,6494 7,0681 17,4741    
TLSFU 0,8442 1,7473 0,8608 2,3639 0,6900 1,9576    
CGEAR 0,5179 1,3154 0,5173 2,0807 0,6430 2,6665    
 296 
CLSFU 0,7078 4,9077 0,5390 1,3408 0,3968 1,3955  * * 
INTCOV 1,0958 20,6600 0,9108 12,0199 2,0298 19,3118    
IGEAR 0,0531 0,3903 0,0595 0,3511 0,0530 0,7410    
DEBTE 0,2657 1,3784 0,2872 0,9961 0,3525 1,0674  *  
DSFU 0,2858 1,3688 0,2806 1,0738 0,3086 1,0313    
 
2.Germany 2004 2005 2006 Pair-wise t-tests for 

















Accruals -0,0429 0,2920 0,0053 0,3082 0,0184 0,3383     
FFS 0,0594 0,2367 0,0223 0,1478 0,0173 0,1306 *** ***   




1,1573 6,6654 2,9769 13,2930 3,5736 16,7914 ** ***   
COC 0,3526 0,7099 0,3009 0,4235 0,2762 0,3222  **   
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 5,1935 3,8847 4,6151 3,4375 3,8905 2,7648 ** *** *** 
NAVSH 10,1539 13,8326 9,9852 15,5563 9,2153 12,0599     
SALETAS 1,1909 0,6925 1,0913 0,6274 1,1289 0,6426 **    
RESTAS 0,3713 0,3104 0,2669 0,4656 0,2511 0,4401 *** ***   
RESSFU 0,3286 0,2621 0,3138 0,2792 0,3120 0,4465     
LNMV 4,3441 2,2974 4,6534 2,2473 4,7716 2,3533 * ***   
Investment  
DIVSH 1,0744 12,4940 1,5134 17,1322 0,6715 3,4273    
DIVYI 0,0324 0,2936 0,0166 0,0740 0,0130 0,0371 *   
DIVCOV 1,2111 4,6444 1,1650 4,0218 1,7317 6,6815   * 
PE 9,6265 24,4322 13,6744 22,3777 13,2751 20,0454 ** **  
HOLTA 0,0575 0,2434 0,0447 0,1325 0,0521 0,1511    
Growth          
MVBV 2,6567 16,2334 2,2561 9,4690 2,1885 16,4268    
Profitability  
PLOWB 1,0062 6,7901 0,5735 4,6634 0,8261 3,4996    
OPM 0,0209 0,4137 0,0540 1,7974 0,0538 0,3636  *  
NPM -0,0137 1,2876 0,0597 1,7909 0,0545 4,3353    
ROSC 0,0212 0,5963 0,0876 0,7240 0,1016 1,4894 *   
EPS 0,7262 8,2000 1,7206 8,7721 1,6248 5,5413 * *  
ROCE 0,0682 0,2644 0,0668 0,6327 0,0823 1,0789    
Liquidity  
CUR 2,3739 3,8277 2,1762 2,9171 2,0519 3,3706  *  
CASH 4,8018 52,1461 1,1168 4,0035 1,1986 8,1140 *   
QUI 2,3580 8,0834 1,6036 2,2552 1,6254 2,2342 * *  
CFSH 2,9196 12,4347 3,1290 9,1808 3,2641 9,2151    
CFM 0,0230 0,3566 0,0825 1,1762 0,1093 3,4495    
WCR 4,4883 22,3785 4,2666 35,4448 3,1197 24,6049    
STOCKT 3,1959 2,4432 3,2559 2,4351 3,0594 2,3690    
Leverage  
 297 
DEBT 4,3000 2,6894 4,5162 2,5553 4,7006 2,3900 * **  
ETL 1,1380 1,7128 1,2964 1,8163 1,3166 1,8184 * *  
TLSFU 1,5262 4,1129 1,3149 2,8102 1,4999 4,4906    
CGEAR 0,8723 2,1179 0,8534 4,6739 0,7546 1,3957    
CLSFU 0,7317 1,7005 0,9005 5,5067 0,7914 2,6375    
INTCOV 3,9855 15,9924 7,6858 45,1589 4,9733 16,7322 *   
IGEAR 0,1326 1,0552 0,2447 2,6023 0,1120 1,1162    
DEBTE 0,9320 2,5839 0,7991 2,1255 0,7458 1,8639  *  
DSFU 0,6801 2,3694 0,6085 1,9593 0,6416 2,4416    
 
3.Greece              2004 2005               2006 Pair-wise t-tests for 

















Accruals 0,0056 0,0586 0,0372 0,8296 0,0031 0,7608    
FFS 0,2585 0,4389 0,1805 0,3855 0,1756 0,3814 * **  




0,8996 4,5619 3,5291 19,2287 7,3408 33,8000 * *** * 
COC 0,0933 0,2160 0,1259 0,4935 0,1074 0,2562    
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 4,8732 13,4929 4,9739 13,1713 4,8516 12,7620    
NAVSH 3,3048 8,3533 3,3184 5,5931 2,6335 5,7629   * 
SALETAS 0,7167 0,7393 0,8149 1,3676 0,8069 1,3219    
RESTAS 0,1295 0,1486 0,3022 0,2472 0,2774 0,2669 *** *** * 
RESSFU 0,1633 0,3973 0,3504 0,1838 0,3296 0,1950 *** *** * 
LNMV 4,0834 1,1808 3,8145 1,6018 4,1548 1,5820 *  ** 
Investment  
DIVSH 0,0782 0,2265 0,1147 0,2904 0,1171 0,3350  *  
DIVYI 0,0166 0,0197 0,0320 0,0644 0,0220 0,0738 ***  * 
DIVCOV 2,9541 4,9360 1,2277 9,1653 0,7750 11,0371 ** **  
PE 12,1049 25,3921 15,1925 28,6980 14,7543 29,5498    
HOLTA 0,1794 0,2251 0,0909 0,3272 0,1046 0,4548 ***   
Growth  
MVBV 1,8881 1,8909 6,1334 11,2420 8,0356 13,7108 ***  * 
Profitability  
PLOWB 0,1561 5,3153 0,6781 9,7952 2,6754 25,8401    
OPM 0,0124 0,8451 1,3762 14,5055 0,2498 4,7509   * 
NPM -0,0165 1,0716 0,0673 0,8550 0,2473 3,1252    
ROSC 0,1151 0,7960 0,0236 0,1974 -0,9995 14,6643 *  * 
EPS 0,3020 1,3395 0,2051 0,8908 0,1895 0,7616    
ROCE 0,1263 0,4456 0,0547 0,1687 0,0685 0,1305 ** *  
Liquidity  
CUR 2,5085 5,3267 6,8317 11,7128 1,8849 2,4848 *** * *** 
CASH 0,6026 4,9610 0,3689 2,9970 0,0931 0,2313  *  
QUI 1,8680 4,7763 6,3509 11,6404 1,3867 1,9338 *** * *** 
CFSH 0,5881 1,5807 0,6311 1,7858 0,6221 1,6340    
 298 
CFM -0,1053 3,3770 0,3067 1,6832 0,2448 1,3055 *   
WCR 2,5353 8,3135 0,9329 14,3258 1,3559 11,4887    
STOCKT 7,4685 12,4272 6,8800 11,6817 8,3223 12,7237    
Leverage  
DEBT 3,0945 3,9656 3,1091 3,9783 2,6477 3,7611    
ETL 4,5689 17,9645 2,8758 9,1012 1,6826 6,8325  ** * 
TLSFU 0,6256 2,6378 0,8356 1,1763 1,2759 1,5098  *** *** 
CGEAR 0,4663 0,3376 0,4846 0,3817 0,6152 0,5549  *** *** 
CLSFU 0,4176 2,5438 0,5863 0,9452 0,8687 1,2403  ** ** 
INTCOV 7,2911 18,8463 3,6028 10,3199 2,7258 8,6334 ** ***  
IGEAR 1,1259 5,3321 0,7079 6,4158 0,3221 3,2480  *  
DEBTE 0,2568 0,4490 0,3711 1,0691 2,0293 21,5315 *   
DSFU 0,2080 0,3682 0,2493 0,3808 1,8975 21,5288    
 
4.UK              2004 2005               2006 Pair-wise t-tests for 

















Accruals 0,0311 0,7466 0,0086 2,3575 0,0024 0,1600    
FFS 0,0471 0,2123 0,0505 0,2194 0,0640 0,2451    




1,3135 4,3457 1,1472 2,4824 2,6733 6,4041  *** *** 
COC 0,2278 0,2896 0,2289 0,3028 0,2309 0,2848    
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 1,9733 1,4965 2,8917 2,3239 2,9164 2,3473 *** ***  
NAVSH 1,2388 1,1499 1,3160 1,3422 1,3466 1,3413    
SALETAS 1,0327 0,6542 1,0941 0,7261 1,0398 0,6606   * 
RESTAS 0,2116 0,2669 0,1580 0,3003 0,1589 0,3369 ** **  
RESSFU 0,3141 0,2522 0,2075 0,7363 0,2060 0,5424 ** ***  
LNMV 5,7945 2,1177 5,9253 2,1891 6,0976 2,0789  *  
Investment  
DIVSH 0,2761 0,2723 0,2866 0,2777 0,2961 0,2691    
DIVYI 0,2271 0,2050 0,3071 0,2697 0,2938 0,2564 *** ***  
DIVCOV 1,6002 2,1958 1,3855 2,2811 1,4120 2,3310    
PE 2,0453 4,7893 12,9472 14,6634 12,9394 13,8582 *** ***  
HOLTA 0,2216 0,2716 0,1662 0,2563 0,0245 0,0779 ** *** *** 
Growth  
MVBV 0,3491 1,3963 1,7296 3,8446 1,8504 3,7847 *** ***  
Profitability  
PLOWB 1,8012 5,7793 1,3186 10,1666 1,2752 3,1193    
OPM 0,1063 0,3611 0,1563 0,3924 0,1737 0,3214 * **  
NPM 0,0657 0,1947 0,0862 0,2797 0,0904 0,2888    
ROSC 0,1481 0,2295 0,2449 0,6635 0,2740 0,6759 ** ***  
EPS 0,2184 0,3538 0,3007 0,8473 0,3708 1,1832 * ** * 
ROCE 0,1072 0,1346 0,1240 0,1325 0,1309 0,1935 * *  
Liquidity  
 299 
CUR 1,3930 0,4754 1,1784 0,5157 1,5212 0,4968 *** *** *** 
CASH 0,4248 0,3463 0,4356 0,3810 0,3977 0,3353    
QUI 1,1035 0,3208 1,1462 0,3694 1,1501 0,4694 *   
CFSH 0,3679 0,4652 0,6868 0,9549 0,7774 1,1444 *** ***  
CFM 0,1001 0,2300 0,1561 0,2844 0,1573 0,2978 *** ***  
WCR 0,4146 4,4972 4,6145 13,7949 6,3122 12,6316 *** *** * 
STOCKT 2,8815 2,7506 2,8320 2,7462 2,8339 2,6905    
Leverage 
DEBT 3,5798 1,6586 3,6734 1,7023 3,6243 1,7533    
ETL 0,8979 0,7559 0,9357 1,0334 1,1587 1,6848  ** * 
TLSFU 1,1192 1,3001 1,3161 4,4436 1,2891 2,4869    
CGEAR 0,7741 1,6042 1,0748 3,2764 1,0355 2,0116 * *  
CLSFU 0,6794 1,5879 0,7033 4,2240 0,6713 1,3941    
INTCOV 2,8593 3,2790 3,3227 4,9571 3,3083 4,5732 * *  
IGEAR 0,1312 0,2830 0,2073 0,5154 0,1688 0,3860 ** *  
DEBTE 0,5729 0,6653 0,8249 1,5687 0,7058 1,6465 **   
DSFU 0,5191 1,9342 0,6246 2,1744 0,5344 1,0554    
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel B:IFRS vs Crisis 
Pair-wise t-tests for 
equality of means 
1.Australia 


















Accruals -0,0217 1,4976 -0,3383 1,7506 0,6015 0,5783  * ** 
FFS 0,1798 0,3845 0,2522 0,4347 0,1952 0,3968 ***   
Big 4 0,5329 0,4995 0,5285 0,4997 0,5351 0,4993    
Insider Trading 
Value (ITV) 
2,6753 10,2749 3,1140 28,7405 2,4114 12,6097    
COC 1,0697 8,4806 1,4989 13,2700 0,4277 1,3294   * 
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 1,4812 2,2613 1,4753 2,2290 1,3424 2,0841  * * 
NAVSH 1,5050 3,0242 1,4477 3,2272 1,7188 6,0998    
SALETAS 0,7827 0,7706 0,8849 1,0749 0,8015 1,0867 *  * 
RESTAS 0,3204 2,1300 0,4476 2,7488 0,6234 3,8599  *  
RESSFU 0,0768 0,4808 0,1039 0,8163 0,1187 0,3435  *  
LNMV 3,9924 2,9765 3,2803 2,9180 3,7862 2,9504 *** * *** 
Investment  
DIVSH 0,0603 0,1329 0,0563 0,1249 0,0606 0,2920    
DIVYI 0,0142 0,0313 0,0348 0,1158 0,0309 0,2030 *** **  
DIVCOV 1,0735 2,7269 0,8794 3,1596 0,6206 5,8144 * * * 
PE 7,0045 24,9862 3,6764 14,9594 4,8436 28,4246 ** *  
HOLTA 0,0445 0,2039 0,0363 0,1064 0,0365 0,1046    
Growth  
 300 
MVBV 2,8111 6,7729 1,6064 6,2610 3,7492 12,9698 *** * *** 
Profitability  
PLOWB 4,9041 14,5731 4,9387 16,1344 5,9215 22,9240    
OPM -0,5306 1,6650 -0,7258 1,8770 -0,9531 3,6191 * ** * 
NPM -1,0414 2,4801 -1,3380 3,1667 -1,2253 3,2128 *   
ROSC -0,0781 0,9708 -0,3172 1,4843 -0,1854 1,3061 *** * * 
EPS -0,0016 0,8713 0,0131 0,8127 0,0601 0,6288  *  
ROCE -0,1076 1,5639 -0,2853 3,8990 -0,1368 0,8334    
Liquidity  
CUR 4,0579 6,8339 3,9347 7,9909 3,6301 5,2447  *  
CASH 1,0350 3,2166 0,9065 3,2699 0,8429 2,2056  *  
QUI 3,6582 6,6652 3,4815 7,6661 3,5456 6,6232    
CFSH 0,1621 0,9403 0,1203 1,1030 0,2289 1,2199   * 
CFM -0,8125 2,8276 -1,1623 3,1993 -0,9149 4,3117 *  * 
WCR 4,9853 14,0087 1,9704 13,8906 3,9043 13,8157 *** * ** 
STOCKT 7,5936 13,2374 7,7222 14,7155 7,3381 14,1887    
Leverage  
DEBT 8,6022 10,8707 9,6493 12,3658 9,4058 12,5149 *   
ETL 5,6207 10,5587 5,6250 12,1035 6,5515 14,3817  * * 
TLSFU 0,7778 2,3849 0,9506 3,0601 0,7723 2,4155 *   
CGEAR 0,7518 3,5987 0,8249 8,8329 0,7082 2,1742    
CLSFU 0,4797 1,6670 0,5750 3,6071 0,5005 1,5643    
INTCOV 1,3739 17,4252 0,1887 14,7271 0,1001 18,3680 * *  
IGEAR 0,1987 1,9732 -0,0344 0,9764 0,3182 3,3021 **  ** 
DEBTE 0,3309 0,8076 0,3916 1,0132 0,2280 0,9472  * ** 
DSFU 0,2944 1,0094 0,3418 1,2411 0,2560 0,9042   * 
 
 
Pair-wise t-tests for 
equality of means 
2.Germany 


















Accruals 0,0019 0,8005 0,0741 0,6160 0,0503 0,4867    
FFS 0,0817 0,2742 0,0965 0,2957 0,0990 0,2990    
Big 4 0,5545 0,4976 0,5644 0,4965 0,5817 0,4939    
Insider Trading 
Value (ITV) 
8,3099 74,4376 7,9268 74,2057 6,2980 100,6435    
COC 0,3139 0,3951 0,4655 0,6061 0,2772 0,4918 ***  *** 
Control variables 
Size 
SALESHA 3,6203 2,4982 3,9456 2,7626 3,9057 2,7720  *  
NAVSH 9,3706 11,7850 9,1309 11,3985 8,1815 10,5589  * * 
SALETAS 1,1206 0,6040 1,1620 0,6639 1,0536 0,6147 * * ** 
 301 
RESTAS 0,2772 0,7274 0,3038 1,0509 0,2662 0,8603    
RESSFU 0,3266 0,8312 0,3148 0,3712 0,3191 0,3901    
LNMV 4,8958 2,3891 4,3621 2,3949 4,5654 2,4093 *** *  
Investment  
DIVSH 0,6084 2,1850 0,7491 2,5639 0,9377 5,6672    
DIVYI 0,0177 0,0612 0,0342 0,1024 0,0271 0,1231 ***   
DIVCOV 1,1648 2,8238 0,8656 3,0045 0,8896 6,3313 *   
PE 11,3875 20,6887 7,6974 20,1307 8,2726 24,1211 ** **  
HOLTA 0,0513 0,1423 0,0484 0,1370 0,0634 0,2118   * 
Growth  
MVBV 2,3591 11,1471 1,1955 10,1666 1,7576 9,3409 *   
Profitability  
PLOWB 0,8857 12,6483 1,6108 11,3878 0,6815 15,2545    
OPM 0,0417 0,4461 -0,0132 0,5811 -0,0039 1,0167 *   
NPM 0,0229 0,4255 -0,0297 0,5746 0,0009 0,9010 *   
ROSC 0,1264 1,0063 0,0438 0,4705 0,0138 0,8498 * *  
EPS 1,4928 6,3676 1,1320 6,5662 0,9985 6,9618    
ROCE 0,0850 0,1753 0,0714 0,1805 0,0352 0,2985  *** ** 
Liquidity  
CUR 2,0557 2,6818 1,9609 2,3059 2,5960 8,4439    
CASH 0,5712 1,0395 0,5815 1,0221 0,9406 3,6436  **  
QUI 1,4177 2,4245 1,4610 3,9511 1,4988 1,9079    
CFSH 2,1556 3,8807 2,2058 4,8408 1,3499 2,5510  *** ** 
CFM 0,0785 0,5432 0,0309 0,5242 0,0682 0,8355    
WCR 5,7431 18,8014 5,1682 22,6433 5,6216 34,5769    
STOCKT 3,0718 2,2290 3,2191 2,4173 2,8879 2,2949   ** 
Leverage  
DEBT 4,8081 2,4569 4,9690 2,7402 4,8111 2,8340    
ETL 1,2362 1,6431 1,2111 2,7922 1,2300 1,6255    
TLSFU 1,5811 5,3596 1,5058 4,3876 1,3822 5,5139    
CGEAR 0,7495 2,7015 0,7846 3,1492 0,8030 1,4374    
CLSFU 0,7858 3,5227 0,8492 4,0600 0,7502 3,1606    
INTCOV 6,5106 19,6079 4,1361 19,0525 3,1489 19,6758 * ** * 
IGEAR 0,1360 0,6011 0,1002 1,3169 0,1088 4,2143    
DEBTE 1,1060 4,1608 1,2068 3,8639 1,5156 8,3443    
DSFU 0,6873 4,8295 0,5629 4,4039 0,6123 2,8944    
 
 
Pair-wise t-tests for 
equality of means 
3.Greece 


















Accruals 0,0201 0,7280 0,0056 0,3425 0,0000 0,8917    
 302 
FFS 0,1171 0,3223 0,1366 0,3442 0,1756 0,3814  *  
Big 4 0,2049 0,4046 0,2049 0,4046 0,2098 0,4081    
Insider Trading 
Value (ITV) 
7,4974 27,2510 7,6791 33,2413 2,6640 13,2739  ** ** 
COC 0,1027 0,1906 0,4950 1,4927 0,3653 1,0259 *** ***  
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 6,0291 9,4701 5,7142 6,8565 4,7810 13,3387    
NAVSH 3,4883 5,5179 3,3523 5,9556 2,6530 6,4583  *  
SALETAS 0,8071 0,7819 0,8324 0,8914 2,6800 26,7177    
RESTAS 0,2366 0,1830 0,2253 0,1889 1,6697 19,6846    
RESSFU 0,4429 0,1676 0,4399 0,1703 0,3506 0,2065  *** *** 
LNMV 4,2876 1,5989 3,3806 1,6190 3,4760 1,7108 *** ***  
Investment  
DIVSH 0,1243 0,3516 0,1455 0,3982 0,1123 0,5578    
DIVYI 0,0242 0,1203 0,0603 0,2122 0,0355 0,1301 **  * 
DIVCOV 0,9755 6,1683 0,2396 10,6356 -0,8311 8,0265  **  
PE 17,4977 29,9540 9,6418 24,8139 5,8320 28,8944 *** *** * 
HOLTA 0,1411 1,0459 0,0952 0,5360 0,1430 0,6218    
Growth  
MVBV 2,3826 9,5384 0,9521 2,7503 1,4022 6,4495 **  * 
Profitabily  
PLOWB 1,0692 13,6773 0,4804 11,0049 0,4222 13,0814    
OPM -0,2239 9,6973 -0,0481 1,0654 0,1678 2,3907   * 
NPM -0,0785 2,7157 -0,0827 0,5885 -0,0758 1,1127    
ROSC 0,0757 0,1794 0,0332 0,4652 0,0037 0,2171  ***  
EPS 0,2110 0,9046 0,0454 0,6167 0,0405 0,6292 ** **  
ROCE 0,0795 0,1462 0,0282 0,1793 0,0462 0,2462 * *  
Liquidity  
CUR 1,7497 1,3267 1,6761 1,3032 2,9910 4,2543  *** *** 
CASH 0,5674 2,6310 0,3201 1,0830 0,5790 1,3572   ** 
QUI 1,3108 1,3123 1,2451 1,2019 2,3967 4,7023  *** *** 
CFSH 0,5964 2,0977 0,4306 1,5296 0,3635 1,3647    
CFM 0,1986 1,5616 0,0133 0,2944 0,3292 1,8841 *  ** 
WCR 2,4370 13,8111 4,0441 14,7373 -0,1834 20,3203  * ** 
STOCKT 7,2417 8,7443 8,2060 9,8764 6,8154 10,3790   * 
Leverage  
DEBT 3,7773 3,4575 3,7558 3,1117 3,5885 4,5771    
ETL 0,7657 1,4914 0,6887 1,1459 1,6853 2,5863  *** *** 
TLSFU 1,7028 1,5063 1,9760 1,9648 1,0890 1,8522 * *** *** 
CGEAR 0,7888 0,4998 0,8064 0,4666 0,5479 0,7579  *** *** 
CLSFU 1,0667 1,0604 1,2171 1,3409 0,7008 1,4974  *** *** 
INTCOV 2,2289 7,0110 0,9233 4,7741 0,9078 7,1681 ** *  
 303 
IGEAR -0,1395 3,2933 0,3252 2,4668 0,1987 3,3352 *   
DEBTE 1,2553 1,6124 1,5603 2,3450 0,5386 0,8955 * *** *** 
DSFU 0,6076 0,6432 0,7589 0,9501 0,3882 0,5230 * *** *** 
 
 
Pair-wise t-tests for 
equality of means 
4.UK 


















Accruals -0,0092 0,1553 0,1702 0,2096 -0,0562 0,1425    
FFS 0,0673 0,2510 0,1044 0,3063 0,1953 0,3971 * *** *** 
Big 4 0,8818 0,3234 0,8788 0,3269 0,8822 0,3230    
Insider Trading 
Value (ITV) 
2,2142 8,0645 1,5154 4,4922 2,1794 10,3269    
COC 0,1951 0,3287 0,6309 2,1901 0,3857 1,9616 *** * * 
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 2,9663 2,3666 3,2329 2,4576 3,0199 2,3884 *   
NAVSH 1,7862 2,0619 1,7306 1,8243 1,6883 1,9169    
SALETAS 1,0143 0,6761 1,0588 0,7290 1,0283 0,7112    
RESTAS 0,2143 0,6402 0,1339 0,2647 0,1427 0,3251 ** *  
RESSFU 0,2242 0,5876 0,2965 1,8123 0,2223 1,2777    
LNMV 5,9440 2,1509 5,2514 2,2909 5,6840 2,2688 *** * ** 
Investment  
DIVSH 0,2408 0,2218 0,3039 0,2868 0,2673 0,2974 ***   
DIVYI 0,3400 0,2910 0,3169 0,2947 0,2981 0,2944  **  
DIVCOV 0,9669 1,6420 0,6240 2,1533 0,6564 2,5054 ** **  
PE 11,9978 19,0841 6,1535 16,3231 10,0661 22,9346 ***  ** 
HOLTA 0,2093 0,2695 0,1968 0,2731 0,0525 0,1728  *** *** 
Growth  
MVBV 2,4537 14,7323 0,7512 14,3459 1,0175 14,2823 *   
Profitability  
PLOWB 1,2538 3,9567 1,0835 6,9015 0,8924 12,0564    
OPM 0,1480 0,9416 0,0711 0,3896 0,0935 0,2821 *   
NPM 0,0469 0,4709 0,0184 0,2243 0,0270 0,2348    
ROSC 0,2546 0,5352 0,0984 0,5862 0,1657 0,5829 *** * * 
EPS 0,3509 1,0318 0,1715 0,8916 0,1822 0,7046 ** **  
ROCE 0,1206 0,2715 0,0773 0,2235 0,0923 0,1835 ** *  
Liquidity  
CUR 1,4871 0,5078 1,4952 0,6156 1,4749 0,5361    
CASH 0,4178 0,3413 0,3585 0,2929 0,4122 0,3253 **  ** 
QUI 1,1501 0,4680 1,1340 0,4209 1,1221 0,4364    
CFSH 0,7359 0,8588 0,7064 1,7137 0,7076 1,4960    
 304 
CFM 0,1251 0,1854 0,0864 0,2589 0,1005 0,2452 ** *  
WCR 5,9920 19,1633 6,7702 15,6804 6,9549 19,8159    
STOCKT 2,7492 2,6516 2,7520 2,6564 2,6989 2,6648    
Leverage  
DEBT 3,3747 1,6221 3,4578 1,7529 3,5589 1,7747  *  
ETL 1,1880 1,8164 1,0084 1,5471 1,0759 1,6334 *   
TLSFU 1,3366 2,1369 1,1215 6,8125 1,3917 3,2855    
CGEAR 0,9573 1,6562 1,2487 2,7880 1,1232 1,7964 *   
CLSFU 0,7065 1,1798 0,6645 2,0228 0,6816 1,6397    
INTCOV 6,3387 11,2326 3,9382 13,1282 4,0268 7,5237 ** ***  
IGEAR 0,1727 0,3255 0,1457 2,1330 0,1966 2,1494    
DEBTE 0,7189 1,4527 0,8665 3,1022 0,8422 4,4277    
DSFU 0,5207 0,7484 0,6849 1,7760 0,6870 2,1055 * *  
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel C: All Countries (2004-2009) 
Pair-wise t-tests for equality of means 
  
  
































Accruals -0,0114 1,7388 0,0126 0,5080 0,0158 0,6711 0,0138 1,0175       
FFS 0,1842 0,3877 0,0627 0,2425 0,1740 0,3792 0,0881 0,2835 ***  *** *** *** *** 





2,7635 18,7463 5,0400 60,1067 4,9329 24,4435 1,8403 6,5675 * *** **  ** *** 
COC 0,9976 6,9412 0,3310 0,5124 0,2149 0,7964 0,3165 1,2332 *** *** *** ***  ** 
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 1,4425 2,1856 4,1951 3,1020 2,7112 2,2620 2,8333 2,2866 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
NAVSH 1,5536 3,9219 9,3396 12,6464 3,1251 6,3460 1,5175 1,6544 *** ***  *** *** *** 
SALETAS 0,8759 1,2022 1,1246 0,6426 1,1097 10,9503 1,0445 0,6929 ***  ***  ***  
RESTAS 0,2752 2,1716 0,2895 0,6935 0,4734 8,0402 0,1699 0,3796   **  ***  
RESSFU 0,0784 0,5733 0,3192 0,4697 0,3461 0,2517 0,2450 1,0156 *** *** *** * *** *** 
LNMV 3,5640 3,0035 4,5987 2,3555 3,8661 1,5920 5,7831 2,1976 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Investment  
DIVSH 0,0635 0,2459 0,6406 3,1358 0,1154 0,3742 0,2787 0,2726 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
DIVYI 0,0316 0,2393 0,0213 0,0816 0,0318 0,1206 0,2971 0,2722 **  *** *** *** *** 
DIVCOV 0,9362 4,7916 1,1419 4,8151 0,8901 8,6770 1,1093 2,2300       
PE 4,8607 22,4035 10,6553 22,1388 12,5039 28,1676 9,3747 16,7427 *** *** *** ** ** *** 
HOLTA 0,0373 0,1301 0,0529 0,1748 0,1257 0,5958 0,1451 0,2443 *** *** *** *** ***  
Growth 
MVBV 2,9724 9,8673 2,0683 12,4978 3,4657 9,1149 1,3592 10,4840 ***  *** *** ** *** 
Profitabilit 
PLOWB 4,1889 16,0375 0,9306 10,0211 0,9136 14,5501 1,2704 7,6953 *** *** ***    
OPM -0,6819 2,4259 0,0255 0,9221 0,2557 7,4707 0,1248 0,5020 *** *** ***  ***  
NPM -1,2310 3,0528 0,0157 2,0396 0,0102 1,8532 0,0558 0,2973 *** *** ***    
 305 
ROSC -0,1452 1,4121 0,0657 0,9176 -0,1247 6,0008 0,1978 0,5686 ***  ***  *** ** 
EPS 0,0167 0,9479 1,2819 7,1607 0,1656 0,8940 0,2659 0,8778 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
ROCE -0,1204 1,8913 0,0682 0,5457 0,0672 0,2458 0,1087 0,1966 *** *** ***  *** *** 
Liquidity    
CUR 3,8190 6,1300 2,2024 4,4417 2,9403 5,9440 1,4239 0,5390 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
CASH 1,2598 3,6996 1,5331 21,6682 0,4219 2,6959 0,4077 0,3384  *** *** * **  
QUI 3,3506 6,1616 1,6615 4,1127 2,4264 5,8597 1,1344 0,4175 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
CFSH 0,1750 1,2437 2,5006 7,8516 0,5386 1,6810 0,6633 1,1856 *** *** *** *** *** ** 
CFM -1,2384 6,5048 0,0654 1,5653 0,1646 1,9182 0,1210 0,2542 *** *** *** *   
WCR 3,3502 13,9731 4,7366 27,1421 1,8536 14,3355 5,1773 15,2927 ** *** *** ***  *** 
STOCKT 7,4839 14,1000 3,1150 2,3669 7,4890 11,0576 2,7913 2,6906 ***  *** *** *** *** 
Leverage    
DEBT 9,3896 12,4729 4,6842 2,6222 3,3288 3,8502 3,5449 1,7122 *** *** *** *** *** ** 
ETL 6,2125 13,3423 1,2381 1,9417 2,0445 8,8637 1,0445 1,4661 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
TLSFU 0,8159 2,3584 1,4686 4,5334 1,2508 1,8895 1,2626 3,8597 *** *** ***    
CGEAR 0,6609 4,2627 0,8029 2,8143 0,6182 0,5344 1,0357 2,2792   *** ** *** *** 
CLSFU 0,5331 2,7693 0,8015 3,6277 0,8095 1,5525 0,6844 2,2516 *** *** **   * 
INTCOV 0,9498 17,3322 5,0785 24,9232 2,9466 10,6849 3,9564 8,2925 *** *** *** *** * *** 
IGEAR 0,1081 1,6658 0,1391 2,1971 0,4234 4,2568 0,1704 1,2749  ***  ***  ** 
DEBTE 0,3093 1,0499 1,0525 4,4245 1,0019 8,8931 0,7552 2,4809 *** *** ***  **  
DSFU 0,2945 1,1149 0,6324 3,3248 0,6849 8,8077 0,5955 1,7217 *** ** ***    
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel D:IFRS in US Pair-wise t-tests for 
equality of means 
  
  




















ΔNP/ΔOCF 1,2398 5,2268 0,2605 8,2668 0,7054 13,4514  * * 
Accruals -0,0163 0,0523 -0,0188 0,0489 -0,0271 0,0632    
OCF -0,2489 3,3118 0,1247 0,6612 0,0965 0,4082 * *  
LNL 0,0392 0,1946 0,0294 0,1694 0,0392 0,1946 *   
SPP 0,0637 0,2449 0,1029 0,3046 0,1324 0,3397    
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 6,3755 6,6614 5,1657 4,6842 5,7634 4,9065 ** ** * 
NAVSH 3,8700 3,7502 3,7282 3,5341 4,1245 4,4827    
SALETAS 0,7526 0,4408 0,7442 0,4642 0,7900 0,4733    
RESTAS -0,0448 0,9438 -0,0262 0,9782 -0,0448 1,0343    
RESSFU 0,1007 1,3726 -0,0115 1,4462 0,1724 1,5306   * 
Investment  
DIVSH 0,3291 0,5008 0,4118 0,5419 0,3835 0,5274 *   
DIVYI 0,1047 0,1561 0,0140 0,0360 0,0287 0,0673 *** *** *** 
DIVCOV 1,6246 1,7349 2,0997 4,5990 0,9954 2,0745  *** *** 
PE 0,3630 0,6833 0,3513 0,9337 0,2494 1,9770    
HOLTA 0,0129 0,0149 0,0190 0,0213 0,0182 0,0200 *** ***  
Growth  
 306 
MVBV 1,3805 7,5271 3,9436 5,2949 3,1402 5,8878 *** ** * 
Profitability  
PLOWB 1,6989 2,2698 2,7776 5,6659 1,6249 5,1562 **  ** 
OPM 0,1177 0,1636 0,1093 0,1829 0,0571 0,1939  *** *** 
NPM 0,0927 0,1394 0,0802 0,1983 0,0365 0,1522  *** ** 
ROSC 0,1799 1,2195 0,1777 0,5806 0,0636 1,1529    
EPS 1,0483 1,4914 1,2400 1,9173 1,0355 2,5095 * * * 
ROCE 0,1515 0,4402 0,1458 0,5388 0,1232 0,4102    
Liquidity  
CUR 0,9069 0,5862 2,0026 3,5788 1,2742 0,6746 *** *** *** 
CASH 0,3619 0,3014 0,3858 0,3577 0,5268 0,4727  *** *** 
QUI 3,9965 4,3084 6,0238 8,2109 3,6424 3,6913 ***  *** 
CFSH 1,3684 1,6741 1,9886 2,6352 1,8856 2,9137 *** **  
CFM 0,1527 0,1842 0,1468 0,2283 0,0948 0,2026  *** ** 
WCR 1,6138 4,0302 0,3467 2,5336 0,0200 2,1134  ***  
STOCKT 3,3925 2,4596 3,4070 2,6225 3,2502 2,3826    
Leverage  
DEBT 4,6150 2,3493 5,2159 2,8533 4,7356 2,5511 **  * 
ETL 1,1936 1,3568 0,6404 0,4906 0,5879 0,4668 *** ***  
TLSFU 1,5389 2,2998 1,8722 6,0808 1,6348 4,3461    
CGEAR 1,5915 5,4155 1,5070 5,5188 1,8397 6,8371    
CLSFU 0,7739 1,2277 0,8321 1,9380 0,7938 5,9079    
INTCOV 5,9204 11,2331 6,4715 12,6248 4,5755 11,9053   * 
IGEAR 0,1356 0,2294 0,1536 0,3995 0,1388 3,2133    
DEBTE 0,4320 0,4711 0,5755 1,1903 0,6784 1,3479 * **  
DSFU 0,5124 0,8900 0,4848 0,7564 0,5259 1,3144    
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Panel E: 
1. European & Australian Banking sector (IFRS) Pair-wise t-tests for 
equality of means 
  
  




















Accruals 0,0626 0,9070 -0,0065 0,0566 -0,0445 0,1472    
CAR 0,0087 0,0484 -0,0318 0,1376 -0,0103 0,0281 ** *** * 
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 9,4460 12,8377 8,6042 14,8736 10,1828 15,8281  * * 
NAVSH 8,2184 12,9330 8,7666 14,0453 9,3707 15,7120    
SALETAS 0,2154 0,3142 0,2034 0,3433 0,2101 0,3042    
RESTAS 0,0434 0,1136 0,0589 0,1645 0,0503 0,1390    
 307 
RESSFU 0,1609 0,1947 0,1801 0,2100 0,1758 0,2055    
LNMV 8,8493 3,3781 8,2710 3,3995 8,5300 3,4497 *  * 
Profitability  
PLOWB 1,1404 2,9759 1,9705 7,1520 2,0736 3,7609  *  
OPM 0,3594 1,6289 0,0143 2,0810 -0,0053 0,5873 * **  
NPM 0,3110 1,6245 0,0150 1,9452 -0,0047 0,5327 *   
ROSC 0,1877 0,1751 0,0683 0,2294 0,0800 0,2421 ***   
EPS 1,6286 4,1021 0,4753 1,9504 0,7385 4,4497 ** *  
ROCE 0,1476 0,2497 0,1114 0,2176 0,0836 0,2030   * 
Leverage  
DEBT 3,7011 5,4081 2,3358 7,9177 3,7385 6,9544 *  * 
ETL 1,1730 4,3141 1,2940 4,8429 1,3997 5,5359    
TLSFU 12,4919 11,4362 13,6810 13,1320 11,5572 10,3651   * 
CGEAR 5,6656 9,6875 5,7180 9,7924 5,1781 10,6149    
CLSFU 4,5918 6,9796 4,9426 7,9342 4,9324 8,4543    
INTCOV 4,5224 8,9029 3,6307 10,7104 3,8816 10,5894    
IGEAR 2,1836 3,4455 2,0347 12,8117 1,8294 5,4628    
DEBTE 3,7580 7,4263 3,6511 6,5135 3,2350 5,5741    
DSFU 2,9608 5,7496 2,8284 5,1374 2,5110 4,4178  *  
 
2.Banking sector US (US GAAP) Pair-wise t-tests for 





















Accruals 0,0290 0,0160 -0,0333 0,0255 0,0548 0,0242    
CAR 0,0110 0,0111 -0,0094 0,0322 0,0092 0,0239 ***  *** 
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 14,0267 12,9493 13,2962 12,2992 13,5868 14,2227    
NAVSH 17,5529 14,0432 18,2511 14,0597 18,9237 14,7459    
SALETAS 0,0770 0,0403 0,0690 0,0434 0,0666 0,0444 ** ***  
RESTAS 0,0628 0,0755 0,0464 0,0518 0,0625 0,0645 ***  *** 
RESSFU 0,3162 0,1460 0,2788 0,3562 0,3396 0,1579 *** * *** 
LNMV 5,6346 1,9954 5,2289 2,1793 5,1102 2,2424 ** ***  
Profitability  
PLOWB 5,0176 8,5125 4,9501 16,3546 3,3625 16,3536   * 
OPM 0,1586 0,1206 0,0357 0,2925 0,0339 1,1710 *** *  
NPM 0,1175 0,1519 0,0161 0,2496 0,0061 0,7693 *** **  
ROSC 0,0866 0,0693 -0,0129 0,7339 -0,0080 0,1401 ** ***  
EPS 2,0720 9,5006 -1,2138 10,5334 -2,0086 10,0603 *** *** * 
ROCE 0,0785 0,0579 0,1290 1,2829 0,0632 0,0745  ***  
 308 
Leverage  
DEBT 4,3062 10,1947 3,8830 8,6429 5,5565 16,4834   * 
ETL 0,2147 1,3567 0,1290 0,1882 0,1280 0,1798    
TLSFU 6,6356 3,0753 7,0992 4,4357 6,4547 2,6911 *  ** 
CGEAR 4,5214 3,1173 5,0769 4,6387 4,5149 2,8354 *  * 
CLSFU 1,2721 2,3009 1,2322 3,0084 1,4046 2,5596    
INTCOV 0,9942 5,5750 0,4632 4,1263 0,2244 2,6517  **  
IGEAR 2,8734 10,3516 2,6766 11,5962 1,0250 10,5676  **  
DEBTE 1,0596 2,3173 1,1205 2,4683 1,1544 2,9577    
DSFU 0,7396 1,6447 0,9668 3,5510 0,7261 1,7581    
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Panel F 




1. Europe     
& 
Australia 




















Tobin’s q 0,9761 2,1608 -0,0770 0,4893 0,1566 0,4767 0,2834 0,8232 *** * 
Accruals 0,0325 0,8651 -0,0022 0,3418 0,0140 0,2509 -0,0182 0,2064   
OCF -0,3276 3,5184 0,4007 2,4265 -0,2061 7,9176 -1,1311 7,1782 **  
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 2,4995 6,8140 1,7553 3,2208 1,5935 3,3716 2,1995 5,5660 * * 
NAVSH 3,2858 4,6439 3,3188 4,8343 2,6308 3,4083 3,6753 6,2373  ** 
SALETAS 0,3580 0,4895 0,3932 0,5493 0,3569 0,4704 0,3807 0,7781   
RESTAS 0,1416 0,3844 0,1562 0,3927 0,4615 3,9679 0,4391 3,3969   
RESSFU 0,1631 0,3641 0,2414 0,6585 0,2390 1,0429 0,3922 2,4008 *  
LNMV 4,2516 2,5032 4,0669 2,5423 4,1261 2,6217 4,3301 2,6733   
Investment  
DIVSH 0,1565 0,3908 0,1997 0,4655 0,1560 0,3656 0,2398 0,7625  * 
DIVYI 0,0434 0,2284 0,1313 0,8562 0,0615 0,3146 0,3131 3,0782 *  
DIVCOV 2,6583 4,6197 0,7022 8,5390 1,4454 3,6099 3,3562 5,1494 * *** 
PE 4,6224 12,8750 4,2632 15,0398 5,8444 14,6305 7,5869 18,8559   
HOLTA 0,4045 0,3724 0,3753 0,3642 0,3588 0,3621 0,3798 0,3761   
Growth  
MVBV 2,5026 3,9412 2,3390 6,1450 1,9688 3,3373 3,4750 9,0268  ** 
Profitability  
PLOWB 2,7562 5,6355 3,4022 10,0953 1,4610 6,8146 1,8668 9,0823   
OPM 0,2703 1,4899 0,3530 3,0212 -0,6920 4,8534 -1,5424 7,6635  * 
NPM 0,2232 1,4688 0,3195 2,9938 -0,7384 4,4794 -1,5563 7,6013  * 
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ROSC 0,0706 1,0639 0,1026 0,7535 0,0245 0,5187 -0,1673 1,5831  * 
EPS 0,2681 1,2223 0,0941 0,9998 0,0430 2,0113 0,3334 1,6086 * * 
ROCE 0,0366 0,2326 0,0813 0,4434 0,0206 0,4875 -0,0899 0,6486  * 
Liquidity  
CUR 3,6911 5,7514 5,3105 13,4922 5,7880 9,2804 8,6917 19,5506 * * 
CASH 3,5678 10,3184 3,0409 7,9431 2,6508 6,6836 3,0537 7,1423   
CFSH 0,4127 1,3762 0,2059 1,0990 0,3034 1,0906 0,4614 1,7480 *  
CFM 0,5978 6,3433 0,2795 3,0208 -0,0665 5,9241 -2,4482 13,1110  ** 
WCR 0,4412 2,6590 0,7384 6,0068 1,1733 8,2958 1,1960 6,4237   
Leverage  
DEBT 4,1126 7,3584 5,1023 10,0280 3,7403 5,8653 4,7260 10,2962   
ETL 3,5995 10,8018 3,7849 7,3954 4,8511 6,7386 7,1994 13,4620  ** 
TLSFU 0,4369 8,3872 -0,0543 14,1141 1,2695 5,0495 1,3572 4,7638   
CGEAR 0,7641 1,7216 0,7070 1,6432 0,7722 3,6078 0,7831 2,8314   
CLSFU 0,3274 1,9696 0,2408 3,1624 0,3701 2,2452 0,4809 2,7412   
INTCOV 4,6820 9,3912 4,5365 16,0057 3,0828 9,5009 4,8006 17,2822   
IGEAR 0,4061 2,7655 0,0478 2,0834 0,1917 0,8442 0,0967 1,1067 *  
DEBTE 0,8661 3,2858 0,8829 3,0187 0,7605 2,4032 1,3020 4,7912  * 
























Test Variables  
Tobin’s q 0,3806 0,9293 0,1009 0,3881 0,2672 0,5202 0,4195 0,9144 *** ** 
Accruals -0,0252 0,1206 0,0208 0,6571 0,0299 0,5773 -0,0147 0,1469   
OCF 0,0777 0,1961 0,0635 0,2628 0,0647 0,1547 0,1371 0,7936  * 
Control variables 
Size  
SALESHA 9,9029 10,8065 8,1300 7,8484 8,3826 8,5415 9,5764 10,9833 * * 
NAVSH 14,9496 15,7529 14,3562 11,1738 13,8841 10,6841 15,6440 13,6162  * 
SALETAS 0,4596 1,5334 0,5441 2,6398 0,4710 1,8407 0,3773 1,0468   
RESTAS 0,4491 0,6882 0,4328 0,4712 0,4267 0,4459 0,4103 0,3447   
RESSFU 0,4472 0,2801 0,4556 0,2233 0,4607 0,2396 0,4537 0,2116   
LNMV 6,9994 1,9321 6,8808 1,8973 7,0810 1,8693 7,3570 1,7819  * 
Investment  
DIVSH 1,5147 3,4131 1,1565 1,6606 1,1095 1,0856 1,3395 2,4611 * * 
DIVYI 0,0625 0,1525 0,0686 0,1868 0,0801 0,2418 0,0524 0,1306  * 
DIVCOV 0,3272 8,0780 0,7682 3,1023 0,6072 1,8374 1,2453 2,3262  *** 
PE 11,2206 28,0425 10,0009 21,9310 10,8266 28,5366 19,1688 25,9597  *** 
HOLTA 0,1729 0,2569 0,1734 0,2585 0,1820 0,2685 0,1566 0,2473   
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Growth  
MVBV 2,2187 4,3864 1,6618 2,5499 1,8736 3,0659 2,5167 5,0445 * * 
Profitability  
PLOWB 0,4926 17,5764 1,8518 10,0812 1,1128 11,7616 1,8362 18,6106   
OPM 0,3738 1,8029 0,1435 0,4902 0,1380 0,5178 0,2816 1,9560 *  
NPM 0,1642 0,6524 0,0919 0,3355 0,1163 0,2834 0,1241 1,4846 *  
ROSC 0,1816 0,9440 0,1599 0,9441 0,0920 0,2977 0,1540 0,7496   
EPS 1,0345 6,1476 1,2666 4,7187 1,1949 2,5525 1,5937 2,6941  * 
ROCE 0,0637 0,3519 0,1360 0,9100 0,0410 0,1409 0,0865 0,4534  * 
Liquidity  
CUR 2,1270 3,0401 1,7802 2,2448 1,7503 2,3482 2,0818 3,0610 * * 
CASH 0,8118 1,6535 0,6514 1,1195 0,7193 1,5329 0,7571 1,4911   
CFSH 2,2626 4,3376 1,8860 4,1456 2,3649 3,3595 2,8581 3,6546  * 
CFM 0,3278 0,6403 0,2577 0,9349 0,2077 2,2912 0,3104 1,5076   
WCR -0,0241 5,6413 -0,0222 3,4482 0,1858 10,4779 -0,6713 3,9930   
Leverage  
DEBT 2,2743 3,1870 1,8998 2,0280 2,3980 4,0269 2,0485 2,5955   
ETL 1,2921 2,1782 1,3355 2,2500 1,3051 2,4328 1,2988 2,3937   
TLSFU 1,7590 4,1988 1,9657 6,4936 1,7623 6,2984 1,7548 4,0080   
CGEAR 1,1359 2,5038 0,8716 1,2608 0,8240 2,5143 0,7815 1,0279 *  
CLSFU 0,7125 3,7392 0,8876 2,2867 0,8519 2,0988 0,8289 2,4160   
INTCOV 6,1354 23,6873 2,6423 16,8249 4,6584 18,3497 4,7883 9,9091 *  
IGEAR 0,2503 3,5386 0,0891 4,5429 0,0984 4,5515 0,5727 2,5750  * 
DEBTE 1,0032 1,7897 1,1632 2,2921 1,0381 2,6933 1,0267 4,2688   
DSFU 0,4864 0,9899 0,7369 1,4637 0,6824 1,9402 0,6506 2,0856 **  





















Table 3 – H1 Results 
Panel A:Test 1a - Multinomial Logistic Regression 
1.Australia 







Cases Included in Analysis 2.555 
Missing Cases 181 
Total 2.736 
Accuracy Rate  43,4 % 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Vari
able 
    Coef.     Sig.   Exp(B)    Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)     Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)    Coef.    Sig.   Exp(B)     Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B) 
FFS -0,579 ** 0,56 -0,414 * 0,661 0,759 *** 2,137 0,497 ** 1,644 0,415 * 1,514 
 (0,249)   (0,253)   (0,240)   (0,224)   (0,233)   
 
2.Germany 






Cases Included in Analysis 2.222 
Missing Cases 202 
Total 2.424 
Accuracy Rate 47,8% 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Vari
able 
  Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)    Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)   Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)   Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)   Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B) 
FFS -0,907 * 0,404 -0,796 * 0,451 0,887 ** 2,429 0,819 ** 2,269 0,838 ** 2,311 
 (0,466)   (0,486)   (0,347)   (0,341)  0,334    
 
3.Greece 







Cases Included in Analysis 1.222 
Missing Cases 8 
Total 1.230 
Accuracy Rate  48,9% 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Vari
able 
  Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)   Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)   Coef.   Sig. Exp(B)   Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B)   Coef.   Sig.   Exp(B) 
FFS -0,518 * 0,596 -0,634 ** 0,53 -1,376 *** 0,253 -1,435 *** 0,238 -1,174 *** 0,309 
 (0,285)   (0,289)   (0,327)   (0,329)   (0,296)   
 
4. UK 









Cases Included in Analysis 1.572 
Missing Cases 210 
Total 1.782 
Accuracy Rate  42,4% 




    Coef.    Sig.   Exp(B)    Coef.    Sig.   Exp(B)    Coef.    Sig.   Exp(B)    Coef.    Sig.   Exp(B)    Coef.    Sig.   Exp(B) 
FFS 0,947 * 2,579 1,399 *** 4,049 1,271 ** 3,563 1,734 *** 5,655 2,923 *** 18,598 
 (0,500)   (0,494)   (0,492)   (0,463)   (0,453)   
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Panel B: Test 1b - Logistic Regression 
1.Australia 
2004 2005 2006 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 437 Cases Included in Analysis 405 Cases Included in Analysis 443 
Missing Cases 19 Missing Cases 51 Missing Cases 13 
Total 456 Total 456 Total 456 
Accuracy Rate   83,10% Accuracy Rate   87,20% Accuracy Rate  85,60% 
   Variables  Coefficients Sig.   Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients  Sig.    Exp(B)     Variables   Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
SALESHA -1,341 *** 0,262 SALESHA -1,132 *** 0,323 SALESHA -1,271 *** 0,281 
 (0,396)    (0,351)    (0,481)   
NAVSH -0,715 *** 0,489 SALETAS -0,337 ** 0,714 LNMV -1,060 *** 0,347 
 (0,222)    (0,150)    (0,156)   
LNMV -0,774 *** 0,461 LNMV -0,846 *** 0,429 ROSC -0,281 ** 0,755 
 (0,134)    (0,133)    (0,114)   
HOLTA 2,122 *** 8,350 DIVCOV -0,186 ** 0,831 EPS -1,107 ** 0,331 
 (0,722)    (0,090)    (0,510)   
OPM -0,126 ** 0,881 OPM -0,053 *** 0,948 CFM -0,017 * 0,983 
 (0,049)    (0,018)    (0,009)   
EPS -3,243 *** 0,039 EPS -0,948 *** 0,388 CGEAR 0,333 *** 1,395 
 (0,831)    (0,304)    (0,102)   
ROCE -0,740 ** 0,477 QUI -0,188 *** 0,829 CLSFU 1,051 * 2,861 
 (0,295)    (0,069)    (0,596)   
CUR -0,133 ** 0,876 WCR -0,008 ** 0,992 Constant 0,782 * 2,185 
 (0,059)    (0,004)    (0,402)   
CFSH -3,730 *** 0,024 CGEAR 1,039 *** 2,827     
 (1,197)    (0,328)       
WCR -0,030 *** 0,971 CLSFU 0,359 ** 1,432     
 (0,010)    (0,147)       
CLSFU 0,874 * 2,397 Constant -0,048  0,954     
 (0,469)    (0,396)       
DEBTE 0,841 ** 2,318         
 (0,350)           
Constant -0,846 ** 0,429         
 (0,417)           
2007 2008 2009 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 456 Cases Included in Analysis 437 Cases Included in Analysis 435 
 313 
Missing Cases 0 Missing Cases 19 Missing Cases 21 
Total 456 Total 456 Total 456 
Accuracy Rate 82,00% Accuracy Rate  74,60% Accuracy Rate  81,60% 
    Variables Coefficients Sig.   Exp(B)     Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B)      Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B) 
SALESHA -2,681 *** 0,069 SALESHA -1,471 *** 0,230 SALESHA -2,875 *** 0,056 
 (0,667)    (0,323)    (0,630)   
NAVSH -1,395 *** 0,248 NAVSH -0,839 *** 0,432 LNMV -0,860 *** 0,423 
 (0,450)    (0,191)    (0,123)   
LNMV -1,038 *** 0,354 LNMV -1,024 *** 0,359 HOLTA -3,212 * 0,040 
 (0,155)    (0,146)    (1,726)   
ROSC -0,851 ** 0,427 ROSC -0,494 *** 0,610 ROSC -0,364 *** 0,695 
 (0,342)    (0,163)    (0,130)   
EPS -3,442 *** 0,032 EPS -3,782 *** 0,023 EPS -0,079 *** 0,924 
 (0,995)    (0,772)    (0,030)   
CFM -0,048 *** 0,954 CUR -0,014 * 0,987 CFSH -4,903 *** 0,007 
 (0,018)    (0,009)    (1,269)   
ETL -0,087 *** 0,917 ETL -0,102 *** 0,903 CGEAR 0,151 ** 1,163 
 (0,030)    (0,028)    (0,069)   
TLSFU -3,104 *** 0,045 CLSFU -1,769 *** 0,171 CLSFU 0,745 *** 2,107 
 (1,064)    (0,556)    (0,253)   
Constant 1,816 *** 6,150 DEBTE -1,919 *** 0,147 Constant 0,391  1,478 
 (0,446)    (0,531)    (0,319)   
    Constant 2,199 *** 9,016     
     (0,423)       
  
2.Germany 
2004 2005 2006 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 372 Cases Included in Analysis 364 Cases Included in Analysis 387 
Missing Cases 32 Missing Cases 40 Missing Cases 17 
Total 404 Total 404 Total 404 
Accuracy Rate  93,50% Accuracy Rate  98,10% Accuracy Rate  98,20% 
   Variables Coefficients Sig.  Exp(B)   Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B)   Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B) 
SALESHA -0,296 *** 0,744 DIVCOV -0,252 * 0,777 SALESHA -0,101 * 0,904 
 (0,114)    (0,172)    (0,054)   
NAVSH -0,149 *** 0,861 PLOWB 0,130 ** 1,139 RESTAS -1,662 ** 0,190 
 (0,054)    (0,059)    (0,791)   
SALETAS -1,331 ** 0,264 ROSC 1,873 *** 6,510 PLOWB 0,565 *** 1,759 
 (0,545)    (0,432)    (0,174)   
OPM -4,030 *** 0,018 CUR -0,923 ** 0,397 CUR -3,159 ** 0,042 
 (1,362)    (0,435)    (1,242)   
CASH -0,702 ** 0,496 ETL 0,735 *** 2,085 INTCOV -0,022 * 0,978 
 (0,327)    (0,226)    (0,012)   
ETL -0,623 ** 0,536 Constant -4,986 *** 0,007 Constant -1,369 ** 0,254 
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 (0,263)    (0,975)    (0,686)   
CLSFU -1,045 *** 0,352         
 (0,285)           
Constant -2,097 ** 0,123         
 (1,037)           
2007 2008 2009 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 378 Cases Included in Analysis 374 Cases Included in Analysis 383 
Missing Cases 26 Missing Cases 30 Missing Cases 21 
Total 404 Total 404 Total 404 
Accuracy Rate  91,30% Accuracy Rate  89,60% Accuracy Rate  89,60% 
  Variables Coefficients Sig.   Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B) 
LNMV -0,821 *** 0,440 SALESHA 0,292 ** 1,339 SALETAS 0,871 ** 2,390 
 (0,305)    (0,143)    (0,442)   
OPM -3,503 ** 0,030 RESTAS 2,593 *** 13,365 RESTAS 0,528 ** 1,695 
 (1,757)    (0,914)    (0,239)   
CASH 1,029 ** 2,799 DIVSH 0,556 ** 1,744 RESSFU 1,663 ** 5,274 
 (0,414)    (0,257)    (0,697)   
QUI 2,059 ** 7,834 NPM -3,898 * 0,020 DIVCOV -0,085 * 0,918 
 (0,871)    (1,996)    (0,045)   
STOCKT 0,412 ** 1,510 CUR -0,645 ** 0,525 PLOWB -0,029 ** 0,972 
 (0,184)    (0,277)    (0,011)   
ETL 0,785 ** 2,193 CFSH -0,278 * 0,757 NPM -5,815 *** 0,003 
 (0,336)    (0,148)    (2,168)   
CGEAR 0,630 ** 1,878 DEBT -0,415 ** 0,660 EPS -0,150 * 0,861 
 (0,310)    (0,172)    (0,084)   
CLSFU 0,437 ** 1,548 TLSFU -0,376 *** 0,687 ROCE -3,046 ** 0,048 
 (0,179)    (0,130)    (1,279)   
Constant -1,513  0,220 INTCOV -0,040 *** 0,961 TLSFU -0,849 *** 0,428 
 (1,215)    (0,014)    (0,230)   
    Constant -1,348  0,260 CGEAR -0,430 ** 0,650 
     (1,154)    (0,217)   
        Constant -4,464 *** 0,012 
         (0,720)   
  
3.Greece 
2004 2005 2006 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 196 Cases Included in Analysis 198 Cases Included in Analysis 201 
Missing Cases 6 Missing Cases 7 Missing Cases 4 
Total 205 Total 205 Total 205 
Accuracy Rate  
 
 
74,00% Accuracy Rate  82,80% Accuracy Rate  83,10% 
  Variables Coefficients Sig.   Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B) 
 315 
SALETAS -1,604 ** 0,201 NAVSH -0,359 ** 0,698 LNMV -0,583 ** 0,558 
 (0,669)    (0,181)    (0,272)   
LNMV -0,455 ** 0,634 SALETAS -1,147 * 0,318 DIVCOV 0,060 ** 1,061 
 (0,211)    (0,652)    (0,026)   
NPM -7,532 *** 0,001 PE -0,019 ** 0,982 MVBV -0,231 * 0,794 
 (2,450)    (0,009)    (0,119)   
QUI -0,748 * 0,473 MVBV -0,375 *** 0,687 CUR -2,653 *** 0,070 
 (0,445)    (0,119)    (0,920)   
CFSH -1,238 ** 0,290 CUR -1,960 ** 0,141 CFSH -6,037 *** 0,002 
 (0,577)    (0,884)    (1,759)   
ETL -0,234 ** 0,791 CASH -8,065 ** 0,000 TLSFU 0,667 ** 1,949 
 (0,107)    (3,484)    (0,277)   
CGEAR -3,212 *** 0,040 WCR -0,037 ** 0,963 Constant 0,827  2,288 
 (1,200)    (0,017)    (1,170)   
Constant 2,330 ** 10,282 IGEAR -0,223 ** 0,800     
 (1,036)    (0,105)       
    DSFU -2,005 ** 0,135     
     (1,025)       
    Constant 1,014  2,756     
     (0,925)       
2007 2008 2009 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 202 Cases Included in Analysis 204 Cases Included in Analysis 203 
Missing Cases 3 Missing Cases 4 Missing Cases 2 
Total 205 Total 205 Total 205 
Accuracy Rate  89,60% Accuracy Rate  86,10% Accuracy Rate  82,30% 
  Variables Coefficients Sig.   Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B) 
CUR -1,593 *** 0,203 NAVSH -0,584 ** 0,558 SALETAS -4,577 *** 0,010 
 (0,466)    (0,251)    (1,605)   
CFSH -6,985 *** 0,001 DIVCOV 0,052 ** 1,053 OPM -3,020 *** 0,049 
 (1,777)    (0,020)    (0,863)   
CGEAR 1,374 ** 3,951 MVBV -1,345 *** 0,261 EPS -3,456 *** 0,032 
 (0,583)    (0,460)    (1,065)   
Constant -1,899 ** 0,150 NPM -3,973 *** 0,019 CFM -0,604 ** 0,547 
 (0,808)    (1,444)    (0,235)   
    CUR -0,813 ** 0,444 CGEAR -1,046 ** 0,352 
     (0,361)    (0,521)   
    CFSH -4,198 *** 0,015 Constant -0,599  0,550 
     (1,236)    (0,934)   
    CGEAR -2,545 *** 0,078     
     (0,881)       
    CLSFU -3,183 *** 0,041     
     (1,049)       
    Constant 2,218 * 9,186     
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     (1,138)       
  
4.UK 
2004 2005 2006 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 288 Cases Included in Analysis 288 Cases Included in Analysis 270 
Missing Cases 9 Missing Cases 9 Missing Cases 27 
Total 297 Total 297 Total 297 
Accuracy Rate  95,50% Accuracy Rate  94,80% Accuracy Rate  93,00% 
     Variables Coefficients Sig.   Exp(B)    Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B)      Variables Coefficients Sig.    Exp(B) 
SALETAS -3,063 ** 0,047 SALESHA 0,156 *** 1,169 NAVSH -0,561 * 0,571 
 (1,429)    (0,060)    (0,301)   
ROCE -12,571 *** 0,000 NPM -9,383 ** 0,000 SALETAS -1,331 * 0,264 
 (4,194)    (4,100)    (0,745)   
ETL -0,464 *** 0,628 EPS -2,824 * 0,059 LNMV -0,535 *** 0,586 
 (0,167)    (1,524)    (0,185)   
Constant -3,300 *** 0,037 QUI 1,106 *** 3,023 MVBV 0,217 ** 1,242 
 (1,104)    (0,307)    (0,106)   
    DEBT -1,628 *** 0,196 ROSC -2,962 *** 0,052 
     (0,492)    (1,087)   
    ETL -1,271 ** 0,281 DEBT -0,763 *** 0,466 
     (0,524)    (0,253)   
    Constant -1,826 * 0,161 IGEAR -1,421 ** 0,242 
     (1,000)    (0,679)   
        
Constant 3,173 *** 
23,87
6 
         (1,001)   
2007 2008 2009 
Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS Dependent variable FFS 
Cases Included in Analysis 286 Cases Included in Analysis 253 Cases Included in Analysis 271 
Missing Cases 11 Missing Cases 44 Missing Cases 26 
Total 297 Total 297 Total 297 
Accuracy Rate  93,00% Accuracy Rate  88,10% Accuracy Rate  78,60% 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variables Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variables Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
NAVSH -0,714 ** 0,490 NAVSH -0,305 ** 0,737 RESSFU -1,090 *** 0,336 
 (0,356)    (0,148)    (0,407)   
SALETAS -4,462 *** 0,012 RESSFU -0,468 ** 0,626 LNMV -0,189 * 0,828 
 (1,380)    (0,207)    (0,099)   
RESSFU -3,257 ** 0,039 LNMV -0,208 * 0,812 DIVSH -1,828 * 0,161 
 (1,565)    (0,119)    (1,005)   
LNMV -1,415 *** 0,243 OPM -2,870 *** 0,057 DIVYI -1,496 * 0,224 
 (0,418)    (0,970)    (0,788)   
NPM -7,298 *** 0,001 CUR -1,480 *** 0,228 HOLTA -9,799 * 0,000 
 (2,615)    (0,506)    (5,664)   








































 (1,183)    (0,183)    (1,532)   
ETL -1,200 *** 0,301 Constant 1,955 * 7,064 CASH -2,643 *** 0,071 
 (0,447)    (1,032)    (0,782)   
TLSFU -0,516 ** 0,597     STOCKT -0,132 * 0,876 
 (0,262)        (0,073)   
Constant 6,359 ** 5,774     ETL -0,256 * 0,774 
 (2,486)        (0,135)   
        Constant 1,516 ** 4,553 
         (0,595)   






Table 4 - Jones Model 
Level-2 Longitudinal analysis  
Model Dimension Number of Levels Covariance Structure Number of Parameters 
Fixed Effects 
Intercept 1  1 
FFS 2  1 
Time 1  1 
FFS * Time 2  1 
Random 
Effects 







Total   14   9 
  Australia Germany Greece UK 
Number of 
Subjects 






















3.543,07 853,46 2.088,71 2.600,52 
 
Panel A: Estimates of fixed effects1 
Parameter Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. 
Time 0,050 *** -0,038 *** -0,010 ** -0,076 *** 
  (0,013)  (0,010)  (0,004)   (0,025)  
[FFS=0] -0,069 * -0,049  -0,008   -0,344  
  (0,042)  (0,030)  (0,015)   (0,100)  
[FFS=1] 0,000  0,000  0,000   0,000  
  (0,000)  (0,000)  (0,000)   (0,000)  
[FFS=0] * 
Time 
-0,065 *** 0,042 *** 0,003   0,082 *** 
  (0,014)  (0,010)  (0,005)   (0,026)  
[FFS=1] * 
Time 
0,000  0,000   0,000   0,000  
 319 
  (0,000)  (0,000)   (0,000)   (0,000)  
Intercept 0,108 *** 0,046   0,007   0,324 *** 
  (0,039)   (0,030)   (0,013)   (0,097)   
1Dependent Variable: Accruals 
 
Panel B:Pairwise Comparisons2 















FFS(1) - FFS 
(0) 
0,232 *** -0,056 *** -0,004  0,139 *** 
  (0,026)  (0,019)  (0,010)  (0,051)  
2Dependent Variable: Accruals 










































Table 5 - Results of H1/Test 3 
















between            
-0.099 – 
-0,05 
Partial     
Index 











IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
433(94,96%) 0,161 1,991 * 150 21 100 17 145 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




439(96,27%) -0,182 2,771 * 168 29 88 16 155 
IAS 18-Revenue 436(95,61%) 0,282 3,380 * 133 19 154 16 114 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









443(97,15%) 0,535 6,182 * 167 10 33 12 221 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
434(95,18%) 0,452 6,331 * 171 7 69 21 166 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
439(96,27%) -0,168 2,111 * 110 43 187 26 73 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
333(73,03%) 0,179 1,706 * 70 24 150 16 73 
2006 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
436(95,61%) -0,254 3,071 * 157 17 97 27 138 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




442(96,63%) 0,190 2,548 * 128 23 118 22 165 
IAS 18-Revenue 449(98,46%) -0,310 3,260 ** 142 21 187 18 81 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









432(94,74%) 0,515 5,156 ** 192 10 30 10 190 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 




454(99,56%) 0,289 2,140 *** 97 35 135 36 151 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
335(73,46%) -0,229 1,728 ** 92 20 145 15 63 
2007 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
436(95,61%) -0,232 2,874 * 167 19 95 19 136 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




442(96,93%) 0,219 3,006 * 130 19 137 16 154 
IAS 18-Revenue 441(96,71%) 0,280 3,366 * 94 25 195 16 111 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









438(96,05%) 0,592 6,548 * 196 10 18 7 207 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
435(95,39%) 0,456 5,170 * 147 15 77 17 179 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
451(98,90%) 0,334 2,667 *** 72 30 178 30 141 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
336(73,68%) 0,215 2,422 * 87 14 135 8 92 
2008 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
437(95,83%) 0,201 1,957 ** 126 32 112 20 147 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




439(96,27%) 0,236 2,691 * 127 29 110 18 155 
IAS 18-Revenue 443(97,15%) 0,259 2,868 * 122 16 206 18 81 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









430(94,30%) -0,362 5,733 0,192 195 9 23 6 197 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
417(91,45%) 0,800 5,621 *** 129 13 57 16 202 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
455(99,78%) 0,128 1,368 ** 89 21 159 45 141 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
336(73,68%) 0,299 2,561 ** 65 19 145 23 84 
2009 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 








439(96,27%) 0,243 2,635 ** 133 23 120 16 164 
IAS 18-Revenue 454(99,56%) 0,370 3,233 ** 76 22 204 13 139 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









432(94,74%) 0,313 3,307 ** 163 9 29 15 216 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
433(94,96%) 0,805 6,540 ** 142 17 68 15 191 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
454(99,56%) -0,043 0,500 * 86 39 268 22 39 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
336(73,68%) 0,212 1,754 ** 71 18 153 12 82 
 

































IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
381(94,31%) -0,511 5,721 * 173 9 32 11 156 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




397(98,27%) -0,523 5,058 ** 172 11 51 17 146 
IAS 18-Revenue 399(89,76%) 0,116 1,409 * 86 22 218 19 54 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









389(96,29%) 0,281 2,385 ** 95 33 111 21 129 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
393(87,28%) -0,198 2,240 * 93 26 174 26 74 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
399(98,76%) 0,285 3,303 * 139 17 60 14 169 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
390(96,53%) -0,289 3,573 * 125 23 104 16 122 
2006 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
324(80,20%) -0,463 4,693 * 149 8 30 10 127 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 





394(97,52%) -0,325 4,407 * 143 13 64 9 165 
IAS 18-Revenue 401(99,26%) 0,201 2,709 * 50 17 251 16 67 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









401(99,26%) 0,319 3,758 * 157 24 73 22 125 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
391(96,78%) -0,282 3,241 * 101 20 144 18 108 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
400(99,01%) -0,180 1,602 ** 96 15 165 27 97 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
386(95,54%) -0,357 4,221 * 124 16 80 16 150 
2007 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
330(81,68%) 0,401 3,832 * 138 7 29 15 141 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




403(99,75%) -0,448 4,822 * 172 15 54 12 150 
IAS 18-Revenue 403(99,75%) -0,078 0,908 * 64 20 265 14 40 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









403(99,75%) 0,166 2,112 * 110 34 123 25 111 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
392(97,03%) -0,215 2,350 * 94 25 145 26 102 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
403(99,75%) 0,153 1,868 * 90 14 183 21 95 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
389(96,29%) 0,666 5,582 ** 126 25 71 18 149 
2008 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
328(81,19%) 0,327 3,541 * 134 10 39 3 142 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




400(99,01%) -0,240 3,266 * 145 15 57 6 177 
IAS 18-Revenue 401(99,26%) 0,054 0,711 * 60 23 252 14 52 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 










400(99,01%) 0,063 0,757 * 90 38 150 28 94 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
397(98,27%) -0,142 1,481 * 81 28 208 21 59 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
402(99,50%) 0,097 0,836 ** 60 18 289 17 18 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
392(97,03%) 0,248 2,752 * 127 19 94 16 136 
2009 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
328(81,19%) 0,436 3,325 ** 94 11 48 12 163 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




395(97,77%) -0,209 2,705 * 115 19 92 17 152 
IAS 18-Revenue 403(99,75%) -0,029 0,290 ** 50 22 264 22 45 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









402(99,50%) -0,123 1,391 * 77 27 163 50 85 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
394(97,52%) -0,064 0,804 * 79 33 207 19 56 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
402(99,50%) 0,099 1,166 * 90 9 143 23 137 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
391(96,78%) -0,205 2,960 * 121 16 90 19 145 
 
































IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
202(98,54%) 0,607 4,387 * 84 6 20 2 90 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




202(98,54%) -0,462 3,431 * 73 8 27 9 85 
IAS 18-Revenue 202(98,54%) 0,235 1,650 ** 43 9 72 18 60 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 










200(97,56%) 0,345 2,029 ** 88 5 13 6 88 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
202(98,54%) -0,256 1,669 ** 52 10 93 10 37 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
198(96,59%) 0,345 2,614 * 67 6 8 2 115 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
168(81,95%) 0,552 3,654 * 58 6 35 8 61 
2006 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
166(80,98%) -0,174 1,280 * 32 7 80 9 38 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




204(99,51%) -0,074 0,615 * 35 15 83 25 46 
IAS 18-Revenue 203(99,02%) -0,098 0,721 * 35 16 129 6 17 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









205 (100%) 0,182 1,256 ** 44 6 44 15 96 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
203(99,02%) 0,038 0,339 * 30 12 116 10 35 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
160(78,05%) 0,058 0,433 * 30 14 64 11 41 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
171(83,41%) -0,073 0,435 ** 25 8 103 12 23 
2007 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
164 (80,00% -0,357 2,237 ** 85 16 20 3 40 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




202(98,54%) -0,172 1,503 * 75 12 29 11 75 
IAS 18-Revenue 202(98,54%) 0,215 1,743 * 57 14 81 12 38 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 













204(99,51%) -0,023 0,177 * 19 7 157 7 14 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
160(78,05%) 0,095 0,497 ** 26 8 52 24 50 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
177(86,34%) -0,118 0,778 ** 41 11 93 6 26 
2008 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
165(80,49%) -0,201 1,547 * 63 9 33 9 51 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




202(98,54%) 0,244 1,766 * 64 13 68 9 48 
IAS 18-Revenue 201(98,05%) 0,251 1,119 *** 29 7 89 23 53 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 














0,041 0,220 *** 8 10 159 11 17 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
161(78,54%) 0,172 1,246 * 44 15 42 15 45 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
180(87,80%) 0,259 2,069 * 42 10 79 12 37 
2009 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
162(79,02%) 0,552 3,722 * 67 5 19 3 68 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




198(96,59%) -0,238 1,811 * 71 8 39 8 72 
IAS 18-Revenue 203(99,02%) 0,110 0,878 * 59 10 69 10 55 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









199(97,07%) -0,825 5,695 ** 85 7 5 2 100 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
203(99,02%) -0,097 0,623 ** 28 8 129 13 25 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
157(76,59%) -0,190 1,289 * 56 9 39 10 43 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
179(87,32%) -0,348 2,607 * 49 6 78 8 38 
 

































IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
280(94,28%) -0,592 4,605 ** 162 12 23 7 76 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




295(99,33%) 0,608 4,818 ** 77 6 34 15 163 
IAS 18-Revenue 296(99,66%) -0,087 0,899 * 30 12 229 5 20 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









282(94,95%) 0,077 0,666 * 84 24 60 21 93 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
285(95,96%) 0,233 2,252 * 66 19 122 21 57 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 





-0,530 3,374 *** 132 12 72 9 69 
2006 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
294(98,99%) 0,349 2,998 ** 103 2 68 7 114 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 








0,007 0,065 * 6 6 270 5 10 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









294(98,99%) 0,057 0,609 * 66 26 124 25 53 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
289(97,31%) -0,174 1,278 ** 59 14 153 13 50 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
295(99,33%) 0,035 0,345 * 46 21 145 26 57 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
295(99,33%) -0,186 1,533 ** 105 18 92 13 67 
2007 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 












0,049 0,465 * 15 2 251 9 20 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









294(98,99%) 0,236 2,220 * 80 27 103 18 66 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
289(97,31%) -0,086 0,675 ** 51 19 173 12 34 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
294(98,99%) 0,152 1,150 ** 62 19 134 22 57 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
290(97,64%) 0,319 2,898 * 89 19 83 4 95 
2008 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
287(96,63%) 0,521 4,860 * 108 9 63 7 100 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




290(97,64%) -0,600 5,800 * 119 10 48 5 108 
IAS 18-Revenue 296(99,66%) 0,054 0,562 * 10 13 251 7 15 
IAS 23-Borrowing 
Costs 









292(98,32%) 0,249 2,500 * 77 24 73 21 97 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 
291(97,98%) 0,408 2,797 ** 33 16 174 19 49 
IAS 36-Impairment 
of assets 
294(98,99%) -0,142 1,342 * 67 20 125 19 63 
IAS 38-Intangible 
assets 
293(98,65%) 0,271 2,591 * 91 13 87 14 88 
2009 Individual Standards 
IAS 7-Statement of 
Cash Flows 
296(99,66%) 0,334 3,360 * 92 9 73 11 111 
IAS 12-Income 
Taxes 




296(99,66%) -0,331 3,321 * 74 14 122 11 75 
IAS 18-Revenue 296(99,66%) -0,029 0,300 * 16 10 248 9 13 











294(98,99%) -0,158 1,626 * 62 25 101 35 71 
IAS 33-Earnings 
Per Share 










0,158 1,516 * 49 11 165 12 60 













































Table 6 - Auditors’ size and rotation 
H1 Test 4a :OLS Regression of Accruals on Firm Financial Measures 
Panel A (DV=1 for Big-4 Auditors, DV=0 otherwise) 
1. Australia  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,071 *** DV 0,059 ** DV -0,102 *** 
 (0,018)   (0,026)   (0,029)  
SALETAS 0,032 *** SALETAS 0,040 *** SALETAS 0,039 ** 
 (0,010)   (0,012)   (0,015)  
OPM 0,045 *** OPM 0,007 *** EPS 0,041 ** 
 (0,003)   (0,001)   (0,020)  
DEBTE -0,252 *** DEBTE 0,003 * DSFU -0,212 *** 
 (0,043)   (0,002)   (0,044)  
Constant -0,005  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,001  
 (0,006)   (0,008)    (0,009)  










2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,065 *** DV 0,085 *** DV 0,045  
  (0,016)   (0,027)   (0,061)  
SALETAS 0,038 *** LNMV -0,009 ** LNMV -0,039 *** 
  (0,007)   (0,004)   (0,009)  
OPM 0,001 *** EPS 0,012 * EPS 0,335 *** 
  (0,000)   (0,007)   (0,048)  
DEBTE -0,037 *** DEBTE -0,067 * DEBTE -0,534 *** 
  (0,014)   (0,035)   (0,085)  
Constant -0,007  Constant 0,001  Constant 0,024  
  (0,005)    (0,009)    (0,017)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,066 * DV -0,034 *** DV 0,038 * 
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  (0,040)   (0,011)   (0,021)  
RESSFU -0,069 * SALETAS 0,012 *** SALETAS 0,036 *** 
  (0,039)   (0,005)   (0,010)  
NPM 0,200 * NPM -0,069 *** NPM -0,383 *** 
  (0,105)   (0,006)   (0,054)  
DEBTE 0,018 *** DSFU 0,012 *** DSFU 0,018 *** 
  (0,006)   (0,003)   (0,004)  
Constant 0,009  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,007  
  (0,007)    (0,003)    (0,005)  










2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,045 * DV 0,016 ** DV -0,079 *** 
  (0,025)   (0,008)   (0,020)  
LNMV 0,008 ** SALETAS 0,012 *** SALETAS 0,045 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,004)   (0,006)  
NPM -0,330 *** OPM 0,037 *** EPS 0,004 ** 
  (0,069)   (0,008)   (0,002)  
DEBT 0,006 *** IGEAR 0,001 * IGEAR 0,004 * 
  (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,012  Constant 0,008  Constant 0,008  
  (0,005)    (0,002)    (0,006)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,025 *** DV -0,042 * DV -0,109 ** 
  (0,009)   (0,029)   (0,051)  
RESSFU -0,252 *** SALETAS 0,019 * SALETAS 0,049 *** 
  (0,052)   (0,010)   (0,010)  
EPS 0,012 *** EPS 0,098 *** NPM -0,043 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,021)   (0,007)  
IGEAR 0,002 *** DEBTE -0,027 ** IGEAR 0,010 *** 
  (0,000)   (0,012)   (0,004)  
Constant 0,001  Constant 0,001  Constant 0,001  
  (0,000)    (0,002)    (0,002)  










2007 2008 2009 
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Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,415 *** DV 0,176 *** DV 0,147 *** 
  (0,073)   (0,061)   (0,039)  
SALETAS 0,050 ** SALETAS 0,033 ** SALETAS -0,138 *** 
  (0,020)   (0,014)   (0,016)  
NPM -0,137 * OPM 0,161 ** NPM -0,089 *** 
  (0,075)   (0,063)   (0,014)  
DEBTE -0,049 *** DEBT 0,007 ** IGEAR 0,008 *** 
  (0,015)   (0,003)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,003  Constant 0,003  Constant 0,002  
  (0,002)    (0,002)    (0,001)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,183 *** DV -0,245 *** DV -0,071 * 
  (0,029)   (0,048)   (0,044)  
LNMV 0,027 *** LNMV 0,033 *** LNMV 0,011 ** 
  (0,003)   (0,007)   (0,006)  
NPM -0,157 *** NPM -0,343 *** NPM -0,043 *** 
  (0,020)   (0,060)   (0,007)  
CLSFU -0,015 ** CLSFU -0,022 *** CLSFU 0,012 ** 
  (0,006)   (0,007)   (0,006)  
Constant 0,023  Constant 0,023  Constant 0,018  
  (0,011)    (0,020)    (0,017)  










2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,177 *** DV -0,054 * DV 0,044 ** 
  (0,039)   (0,034)   (0,017)  
SALETAS 0,020 *** LNMV 0,010 ** LNMV -0,005 ** 
  (0,006)   (0,004)   (0,002)  
NPM -0,068 *** NPM -0,092 *** EPS 0,027 ** 
  (0,020)   (0,027)   (0,011)  
CLSFU -0,013 ** ETL 0,007 * IGEAR -0,002 * 
  (0,006)   (0,004)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,011  Constant 0,024  Constant 0,003  
  (0,016)    (0,016)    (0,007)  











(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
H1 Test 4b :OLS Regression of Accruals on Firm Financial Measures 
Panel B (DV=1 for Auditors Change, DV=0 otherwise) 
1. Australia  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,175 *** DV 0,350 *** DV -0,055 ** 
  (0,040)   (0,019)   (0,023)  
LNMV 0,023 *** LNMV -0,012 *** LNMV -0,016 *** 
  (0,006)   (0,004)   (0,003)  
NPM -0,104 *** NPM -0,257 *** NPM -0,006 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,016)   (0,001)  
DEBT -0,007 *** DEBTE 0,095 *** DEBT 0,001 ** 
  (0,001)   (0,016)   (0,000)  
Constant 0,006  Constant 0,003  Constant 0,004  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,002)  










2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,143 *** DV 0,183 ** DV -0,048 *** 
  (0,030)   (0,072)   (0,018)  
LNMV 0,034 *** LNMV 0,031 ** LNMV -0,024 *** 
  (0,005)   (0,012)   (0,003)  
NPM -0,027 *** NPM 0,003 *** NPM -0,005 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,001)   (0,001)  
DEBT -0,027 *** DEBT 0,012 *** DEBT 0,004 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,002)   (0,001)  
Constant 0,001  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  
  (0,002)    (0,004)    (0,001)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,246 *** DV 0,272 *** DV -0,215 *** 
  (0,017)   (0,015)   (0,033)  
LNMV -0,021 *** LNMV -0,028 *** LNMV 0,049 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,002)   (0,005)  
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NPM -0,200 *** NPM 0,582 *** EPS -0,027 *** 
  (0,052)   (0,052)   (0,005)  
TLSFU -0,011 * TLSFU 0,068 *** TLSFU 0,052 ** 
  (0,007)   (0,019)   (0,023)  
Constant 0,002  Constant 0,001  Constant 0,002  
  (0,001)    (0,000)    (0,001)  










2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,176 *** DV 0,254 *** DV -0,304 *** 
  (0,011)   (0,021)   (0,044)  
LNMV 0,015 *** SALETAS -0,080 *** LNMV 0,025 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,017)   (0,006)  
NPM -0,062 *** NPM -0,255 *** NPM 0,006 *** 
  (0,012)   (0,059)   (0,001)  
TLSFU 0,137 *** DSFU -0,108 *** TLSFU 0,129 *** 
  (0,009)   (0,041)   (0,032)  
Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,003  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,018 *** DV 0,307 *** DV -0,380  
  (0,005)   (0,026)   (0,055)  
SALETAS 0,005 ** SALETAS 0,225 *** RESTAS 0,025 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,018)   (0,036)  
EPS 0,010 ** EPS -0,492 *** PLOWB -0,008 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,041)   (0,002)  
CLSFU -0,021 *** CLSFU -0,167 *** CLSFU 0,057 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,014)   (0,009)  
Constant 0,001  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  
  (0,000)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,273  DV 0,093  DV -0,034  
  (0,040)   (0,017)   (0,006)  
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SALETAS 0,018 *** SALESHA -0,003 *** SALETAS -0,014 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,002)  
PLOWB 0,004 *** PLOWB -0,001 *** PLOWB 0,002 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,000)   (0,001)   
CLSFU 0,020 *** DSFU 0,065 *** DSFU 0,025 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,012)   (0,004)  
Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,177 *** DV 0,124 *** DV -0,089 *** 
  (0,016)   (0,008)   (0,017)  
LNMV -0,012 *** SALETAS -0,014 *** SALESHA -0,012 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,004)   (0,002)  
OPM 0,202 *** OPM -0,017 ** OPM 0,029 *** 
  (0,014)   (0,007)   (0,003)  
CLSFU -0,032 *** DEBT -0,02 *** CLSFU 0,075 *** 
  (0,008)   (0,002)   (0,007)  
Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,484 *** DV -0,043 *** DV -0,243 *** 
  (0,026)   (0,014)   (0,011)  
LNMV 0,040 *** LNMV 0,043 *** LNMV 0,014 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,002)   (0,001)  
OPM 0,081 *** OPM -0,500 *** OPM 0,291 *** 
  (0,009)   (0,039)   (0,021)  
DEBT -0,038 *** DEBT -0,043 *** TLSFU 0,042 *** 
  (0,005)   (0,003)   (0,006)  
Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  Constant 0,002  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  



















Table 7 - H2/Test 1 Results 
Panel A:Austalia 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 872 Cases Included in Analysis 907 
Missing Cases 40 Missing Cases 5 
Total 912 Total 912 
Test 1a:  Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51,50% Accuracy Rate  50,30% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
HBVALUE 0,468 ** 1,597 HBVALUE 0,336 * 1,399 
 (0,234)    (0,204)   
LBVALUE 0,241 * 1,273 LBVALUE -0,268 * 0,765 
 (0,145)    (0,148)   
Test 1b: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51,30% Accuracy Rate  50,30% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
HSVALUE 0,454 * 1,575 HSVALUE  0,438 ** 1,549 
 (0,251)    (0,210)   
LSVALUE -0,284 * 0,753 LSVALUE 0,287 * 1,332 
 (0,176)    (0,175)   
Test 1c: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51,60% Accuracy Rate  50,30% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
BID 0,700 ** 1,072 BID No sig. results 
 (0,032)       
SID No sig. results SID 0,128 * 1,137 
          (0,070)   
 
Panel B:Germany 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 759 Cases Included in Analysis 755 
Missing Cases 49 Missing Cases 53 
Total 808 Total 808 
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Test 1a: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51% Accuracy Rate  51,70% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
HBVALUE 1,329 *** 3,778 HBVALUE -0,484 * 0,616 
 (0,359)    (0,283)   
LBVALUE 0,430 ** 1,538 LBVALUE 0,299 * 1,348 
 (0,175)    (0,161)   
Test 1b: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51,00% Accuracy Rate  51,80% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
HSVALUE  1,034 *** 2,811 HSVALUE  -0,373 * 0,689 
 (0,239)    (0,207)   
LSVALUE 0,718 *** 2,05 LSVALUE -0,340 * 0,712 
 (0,190)    (0,182)   
Test 1c: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51% Accuracy Rate  51,80% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
BID 0,187 *** 1,205 BID No sig. Results 
 (0,060)       
SID 0,248 *** 1,281 SID -0,069 * 0,934 
  (0,066)     (0,041)   
 
Panel C:Greece 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 384 Cases Included in Analysis 397 
Missing Cases 26 Missing Cases 13 
Total 410 Total 410 
Test 1a: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51% Accuracy Rate  50,40% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
HBVALUE 1,411 ** 4,101 HBVALUE 0,848 ** 2,335 
 (0,549)    (0,322)   
LBVALUE 1,518 *** 4,564 LBVALUE 0,402 * 1,495 
 (0,377)    (0,235)   
Test 1b: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51,00% Accuracy Rate  50,40% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
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HSVALUE  1,018 ** 2,769 HSVALUE  1,163 *** 3,2 
 (0,455)    (0,296)   
LSVALUE 1,865 *** 6,455 LSVALUE 0,623 ** 1,864 
 (0,461)    (0,254)   
 
Test 1c: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  51% Accuracy Rate  50,40% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
BID 0,610 *** 1,841 BID 0,161 * 1,175 
 (0,204)    (0,087)   
SID 0,422 ** 1,525 SID 0,161 ** 1,175 
 (0,193)    (0,079)   
 
Panel D:UK 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 558 Cases Included in Analysis 569 
Missing Cases 36 Missing Cases 25 
Total 594 Total 594 
Test 1a: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  50,50% Accuracy Rate  51,50% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
HBVALUE 1,268 *** 3,553 HBVALUE -0,895 ** 0,409 
 (0,478)    (0,430)   
LBVALUE -0,325 * 0,722 LBVALUE 0,586 *** 1,797 
 (0,194)    (0,177)   
Test 1b: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  50,50% Accuracy Rate  51,00% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
HSVALUE  0,429 * 1,536 HSVALUE  0,339 * 1,403 
 (0,261)    (0,209)   
LSVALUE 0,405 * 1,499 LSVALUE -0,347 * 0,707 
 (0,215)    (0,203)   
Test 1c: Logistic Regression 
Accuracy Rate  50,70% Accuracy Rate  51,50% 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
BID -0,094 * 0,911 BID 0,093 ** 1,098 
 (0,055)    (0,043)   
SID 0,118 ** 1,125 SID 0,123 *** 1,131 
 (0,055)    (0,036)   
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Table 8 - H2 Test 2:OLS Regression of Accruals on Firm Financial Measures 
Panel A. Australia  
Test 2a:Insider trading vs Not  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,199 ** DV 0,121 * DV 0,232 ** 
 (0,100)   (0,064)   (0,101)  
SALETAS -0,002 *** LNMV 0,022 ** RESTAS 0,119 * 
 (0,001)   (0,011)   (0,071)  
OPM 0,120 *** OPM 0,004 *** OPM 0,032 *** 
 (0,022)   (0,001)   (0,001)  
DEBT 0,002 *** TLSFU 1,296 *** ETL -0,004 * 
 (0,000)   (0,066)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,360  Constant 0,077  Constant 0,027  
 (0,048)   (0,038)   (0,006)  










Test 2b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,059 * DV 0,134 *** DV 0,111 *** 
 (0,033)   (0,019)   (0,011)  
LNMV 0,007 ** LNMV -0,011 *** LNMV -0,003 ** 
 (0,003)   (0,003)   (0,002)  
OPM 0,131 *** OPM -0,003 *** ROSC 0,052 *** 
 (0,007)   (0,000)   (0,021)  
CGEAR -0,157 ** CGEAR 0,039 *** DSFU 0,203 ** 
 (0,073)   (0,010)   (0,203)  
Constant 0,007  Constant 0,003  Constant 0,006  
 (0,002)   (0,002)   (0,002)  










Test 2c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,133 *** DV 0,176 *** DV 0,071 *** 
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 (0,046)   (0,033)   (0,025)  
LNMV 0,024 *** LNMV -0,012 ** SALETAS 0,036 *** 
 (0,008)   (0,005)   (0,009)  
EPS 0,283 ** OPM 0,011 * OPM 0,071 *** 
 (0,112)   (0,007)   (0,018)  
DEBT -0,002 *** DEBTE -1,150 ** DSFU 0,197 * 
 (0,001)   (0,557)   (0,123)  
Constant 0,006  Constant 0,037  Constant 0,038  
 (0,005)   (0,005)   (0,007)  










Test 2d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,040 * DV 0,084 *** DV 0,184 *** 
 (0,021)   (0,015)   (0,016)  
SALESHA -0,009 *** SALESHA -0,004 ** SALESHA -0,005 ** 
 (0,004)   (0,001)   (0,002)  
OPM 0,038 *** OPM 0,004 *** OPM 0,027 *** 
 (0,004)   (0,000)   (0,001)  
IGEAR -0,028 * CGEAR 0,057 *** TLSFU -0,155 ** 
 (0,020)   (0,011)   (0,078)  
Constant 0,023 ** Constant 0,029  Constant 0,038  
 (0,012)   (0,002)   (0,002)  











Panel B. Germany  
Test 2a:Insider trading vs Not  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,034 ** DV -0,046 *** DV -0,059 ** 
 (0,016)   (0,017)   (0,026)  
SALETAS -0,014 ** RESSFU 0,183 *** RESTAS 0,049 *** 
 (0,007)   (0,051)   (0,014)  
OPM 0,145 *** EPS -0,008 *** OPM 0,086  
 (0,028)   (0,001)   (0,036)  
CLSFU -0,011 ** CLSFU -0,052 *** TLSFU 0,081 *** 
 (0,005)   (0,012)   (0,018)  
Constant 0,003  Constant 0,027  Constant 0,004  
 (0,001)   (0,009)   (0,002)  











Test 2b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -1,004 *** DV -0,041 * DV -0,075 ** 
 (0,239)   (0,022)   (0,029)  
SALESHA 0,017 *** SALESHA 0,006 ** SALETAS 0,019 ** 
 (0,006)   (0,002)   (0,010)  
OPM 4,711 *** EPS 0,007 *** EPS 0,047 *** 
 (0,807)   (0,002)   (0,014)  
DEBT 0,034 *** DEBT -0,007 *** DEBT 0,008 ** 
 (0,034)   (0,002)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,019  Constant 0,028  Constant 0,011  
 (0,002)   (0,003)   (0,002)  










Test 2c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,113 * DV -0,052 * DV 0,099 *** 
 (0,065)   (0,032)   (0,037)  
LNMV -0,024 *** LNMV 0,010 *** LNMV 0,008 * 
 (0,007)   (0,004)   (0,004)  
EPS 0,015 *** EPS 0,005 ** OPM 0,263 *** 
 (0,004)   (0,002)   (0,030)  
CGEAR -0,064 *** CLSFU 0,022 *** TLSFU 0,054 * 
 -(0,064)   (0,006)   (0,030)  
Constant 0,008  Constant 0,008  Constant 0,022  
 (0,005)   (0,004)   (0,005)  










Test 2d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,271 *** DV -0,036 ** DV 0,016 * 
 (0,008)   (0,020)   (0,009)  
LNMV 0,017 *** LNMV 0,004 * LNMV 0,002 ** 
 (0,001)   (0,002)   (0,001)  
OPM -0,325 *** OPM 0,004 *** EPS 0,003 ** 
 (0,035)   (0,001)   (0,002)  
TLSFU 0,067 *** DSFU 0,031 *** TLSFU 0,031 *** 
 (0,003)   (0,009)   (0,006)  
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Constant 0,003  Constant 0,006  Constant 0,006  
 (0,001)   (0,001)   (0,001)  











Panel C. Greece  
Test 2a:Insider trading vs Not  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,033 ** DV -0,070 * DV 0,125 * 
  (0,016)   (0,037)   (0,070)  
SALESHA -0,013 *** LNMV 0,025 *** LNMV 0,041 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,025)   (0,009)  
OPM 0,335 *** ROCE -0,359 *** ROCE -0,473 *** 
  (0,030)   (0,087)   (0,119)  
CLSFU 0,030 *** CLSFU 0,060 *** DEBT -0,021 *** 
  (0,008)   (0,060)   (0,005)  
Constant 0,002  Constant 0,010  Constant 0,019  
  (0,001)    (0,007)    (0,015)  










Test 2b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,082 *** DV 0,079 *** DV -0,123 *** 
  (0,008)   (0,010)   (0,062)  
SALETAS -0,063 *** SALETAS -0,012 *** NAVSH 0,014 ** 
  (0,005)   (0,004)   (0,006)  
OPM -0,418 *** NPM -0,183 *** EPS -0,059 ** 
  (0,059)   (0,029)   (0,024)  
ETL 0,014 *** ETL 0,010 *** ETL 0,014 ** 
  (0,003)   (0,002)   (0,007)  
Constant 0,006  Constant 0,009  Constant 0,005  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,004)  










Test 2c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,232 *** DV 0,107 *** DV 0,117 *** 
  (0,043)   (0,024)   (0,027)  
SALESHA -0,018 *** SALESHA 0,003 *** LNMV 0,005 * 
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  (0,003)   (0,001)   (0,003)  
EPS 0,121 *** EPS 0,318 *** EPS 0,024 ** 
  (0,027)   (0,024)   (0,010)  
DSFU -0,147 *** DSFU -0,040 ** DSFU 0,104 *** 
  (0,036)   (0,021)   (0,023)  
Constant 0,019  Constant 0,004  Constant 0,004  
  (0,002)    (0,001)    (0,002)  










Test 2d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
No cases in this category 
DV 0,171 *** DV 0,051 *** 
 (0,009)   (0,013)  
LNMV 0,020 *** SALESHA -0,003 *** 
 (0,001)   (0,001)  
EPS -0,019 * EPS 0,017 ** 
 (0,011)   (0,007)  
CLSFU -0,010 *** CLSFU -0,009 *** 
 (0,003)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,004  Constant 0,017  
  (0,001)    (0,001)  








Panel D. UK  
Test 2a:Insider trading vs Not  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,241 * DV -0,354 *** DV -0,076 *** 
  (0,144)   (0,035)   (0,018)  
NAVSH 0,114 ** LNMV 0,028 *** SALETAS 0,018 ** 
  (0,044)   (0,004)   (0,008)  
Prof. 
Ratios 
No sig. results OPM 0,431 *** OPM 0,046 *** 
     (0,054)   (0,015)  
ETL 0,176 ** DEBT -0,010 * DEBT -0,008 *** 
  (0,076)   (0,006)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,018  Constant 0,014  Constant 0,039  
  (0,008)    (0,012)    (0,007)  











Test 2b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,021 *** DV -0,049 ** DV -0,045 *** 
  (0,005)   (0,020)   (0,008)  
RESTAS 0,015 * SALESHA 0,004 ** RESTAS 0,861 *** 
  (0,009)   (0,002)   (0,021)  
OPM 0,632 *** EPS 0,080 *** EPS 0,641 *** 
  (0,034)   (0,024)   (0,016)  
ETL -0,182 *** ETL 0,036 ** DEBT -0,141 *** 
  (0,014)   (0,014)   (0,004)  
Constant 0,006  Constant 0,006  Constant 0,007  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










Test 2c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,116 * DV -0,172 *** DV -0,229 *** 
  (0,060)   (0,032)   (0,050)  
LNMV 0,009 * LNMV 0,016 *** LNMV 0,007 * 
  (0,004)   (0,003)   (0,005)  
EPS 0,092 *** EPS 0,032 * EPS -0,014 * 
  (0,020)   (0,018)   (0,009)  
TLSFU -0,649 * ETL -0,025 *** CLSFU 0,041 *** 
  (0,385)   (0,008)   (0,014)  
Constant 0,068  Constant 0,019  Constant 0,097  
  (0,006)    (0,003)    (0,007)  










Test 2d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,035 * DV -0,109 *** DV -0,052 ** 
  (0,021)   (0,021)   (0,020)  
SALESHA 0,008 *** SALESHA 0,003 ** LNMV 0,005 ** 
  (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,002)  
EPS -0,073 *** EPS -0,022 *** EPS -0,017 *** 
  (0,010)   (0,005)   (0,004)  
DEBTE 0,019 ** DEBTE -0,058 *** DEBT -0,009 *** 
  (0,008)   (0,010)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,013  Constant 0,015  Constant 0,046  
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  (0,001)     (0,001)    (0,002)   
R2 adj. 0,689  R2 adj. 0,574  R2 adj. 0,419   
Sample 
size 
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(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
Table 9 - H2 Test 3 :OLS Regression of A.R. on Firm Financial Measures 
Panel A. Australia  
Test 3a:Insider trading vs Not  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,022 *** DV 0,012 *** DV -0,066 *** 
  (0,007)   (0,003)   (0,006)  
RESTAS -0,001 ** SALESHA 0,001 ** LNMV 0,005 *** 
  (0,000)   (0,001)   (0,001)  
ROCE -0,003 * EPS -0,002 * PLOWB -0,003 * 
  (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,001)  
TLSFU -0,045 *** DEBTE -0,005 ** TLSFU 0,010 *** 
  (0,017)   (0,002)   (0,004)  
Constant 0,027  Constant 0,009  Constant 0,006  
  (0,006)    (0,003)    (0,004)  










Test 3b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,022 *** DV 0,010 *** DV -0,021 *** 
  (0,005)   (0,002)   (0,004)  
SALETAS 0,011 *** SALETAS 0,005 *** LNMV 0,004 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,001)  
NPM -0,001 *** EPS -0,006 *** EPS 0,023 *** 
  (0,000)   (0,001)   (0,004)  
TLSFU -0,086 *** DSFU 0,029 *** TLSFU -0,164 *** 
  (0,014)   (0,007)   (0,019)  
Constant 0,023  Constant 0,005  Constant 0,026  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










Test 3c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,052 *** DV 0,010 *** DV -0,220 *** 
  (0,013)   (0,004)   (0,039)  
SALETAS 0,011 ** SALESHA 0,010 * LNMV 0,020 *** 
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  (0,005)   (0,001)   (0,005)  
OPM -0,026 ** OPM 0,003 ** OPM 0,453 *** 
  (0,011)   (0,001)   (0,099)  
CLSFU -0,012 * CLSFU 0,409 *** CLSFU 0,065 ** 
  (0,007)   (0,082)   (0,028)  
Constant 0,017  Constant 0,007  Constant 0,077  
  (0,003)    (0,001)    (0,006)  










Test 3d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,037 *** DV 0,051 *** DV -0,038 *** 
  (0,005)   (0,019)   (0,005)  
LNMV 0,004 *** LNMV -0,015 *** SALETAS -0,002 ** 
  (0,001)   (0,003)   (0,001)  
OPM 0,014 ** OPM 0,047 *** EPS 0,031 *** 
  (0,007)   (0,014)   (0,004)  
DSFU 0,005  DSFU -0,433 *** CLSFU 0,024 *** 
  (0,003) *  (0,036)   (0,008)  
Constant 0,007  Constant 0,004  Constant 0,012  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  











Panel B. Germany  
Test 3a:Insider trading vs Not  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,025 *** DV 0,011 *** DV -0,025 *** 
  (0,006)   (0,003)   (0,005)  
RESTAS 0,004 ** SALETAS -0,002 * SALETAS 0,008 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,003)  
OPM -0,012 * OPM 0,004 ** ROSC -0,020 ** 
  (0,008)   (0,002)   (0,009)  
DEBT 0,002 *** DSFU -0,001 *** DSFU 0,004 ** 
  (0,001)   0,001   (0,002)  
Constant 0,031  Constant 0,013  Constant 0,010  
  (0,002)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










Test 3b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2007 2008 2009 
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Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,006 ** DV 0,011 *** DV -0,031 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,003)   (0,006)  
NAVSH 0,040 *** RESSFU -0,011 ** LNMV 0,003 *** 
  (0,007)   (0,044)   (0,001)  
OPM 0,062 *** NPM -0,039 *** EPS -0,009 *** 
  (0,020)   (0,013)   (0,001)  
TLSFU 0,003 *** DEBTE 0,002 *** TLSFU 0,008 ** 
  (0,001)   (0,000)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,016  Constant 0,019  Constant 0,036  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,010)  










Test 3c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,017 *** DV 0,007 *** DV -0,079 *** 
  (0,006)   (0,002)   (0,011)  
RESTAS -0,022 * RESTAS -0,042 *** RESTAS 0,065 * 
  (0,012)   (0,004)   (0,036)  
OPM 0,041 ** OPM -0,036 *** OPM -0,004 ** 
  (0,020)   (0,007)   (0,002)  
DEBT 0,002 *** DEBT 0,003 *** TLSFU 0,191 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,000)   (0,032)  
Constant 0,036  Constant 0,017  Constant 0,048  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










Test 3d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,015 *** DV 0,023 *** DV 0,005 * 
 (0,004)   (0,005)   (0,002)  
SALETAS 0,005 ** SALETAS -0,002 ** RESSFU -0,013 *** 
 (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,005)  
OPM 0,048 *** ROCE -0,037 *** OPM -0,003 *** 
 (0,014)   (0,007)   (0,001)  
TLSFU 0,037 *** TLSFU -0,005 *** TLSFU 0,035 ** 
 (0,004)   (0,001)   (0,014)  
Constant 0,021  Constant 0,005  Constant -0,001 *** 
 (0,001)   (0,002)   (0,000)  












Panel C. Greece  
Test 3a:Insider trading vs Not  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,164 *** DV -0,065 ** DV -0,041 *** 
 (0,020)   (0,025)   (0,010)  
RESSFU -0,092 *** RESSFU 0,106 ** LNMV -0,016 *** 
 (0,033)   (0,051)   (0,002)  
ROSC -0,047 ** ROSC -0,039 *** EPS 0,024 ** 
 (0,018)   (0,015)   (0,010)  
CGEAR 0,051 *** DSFU 0,059 ** CLSFU 0,012 *** 
 (0,013)   (0,023)   (0,004)  
Constant 0,056  Constant 0,041  Constant 0,021  
 (0,007)   (0,007)   (0,003)  










Test 3b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,276 *** DV -0,082  DV -0,226 *** 
  (0,025)   (0,020)   (0,028)  
RESSFU 0,141 *** RESTAS 0,342 *** SALETAS 0,113 *** 
  (0,045)   (0,071)   (0,015)  
EPS 0,076 *** OPM -0,366 *** EPS -0,124 *** 
  (0,024)   (0,034)   (0,029)  
CLSFU 0,037 *** CLSFU 0,013 *** DSFU 0,252 *** 
  (0,011)   (0,004)   (0,034)  
Constant 0,037  Constant 0,011  Constant 0,028  
  (0,004)    (0,003)    (0,002)  










Test 3c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,271 *** DV 0,115 *** DV 0,051 ** 
  (0,019)   (0,031)   (0,024)  
RESSFU 0,130 *** RESSFU 0,435 *** SALETAS 0,017 *** 
  (0,034)   (0,068)   (0,004)  
OPM -0,174 *** EPS -0,176 *** EPS 0,042 * 
  (0,060)   (0,031)   (0,025)  
CGEAR 0,057 *** CGEAR -0,553 *** CLSFU -0,178 *** 
  (0,013)   (0,055)   (0,032)  
Constant 0,051  Constant 0,022  Constant 0,044  
  (0,005)    (0,002)    (0,004)  
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Test 3d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,221 *** DV 0,046 *** DV -0,041 ** 
  (0,015)   (0,010)   (0,016)  
RESSFU 0,071 *** RESSFU 0,066 *** SALETAS 0,036 ** 
  (0,025)   (0,016)   (0,016)  
ROSC -0,021 * OPM -0,076 *** OPM -0,014 *** 
  (0,014)   (0,018)   (0,001)  
DEBT 0,012 *** CGEAR -0,105 *** CLSFU -0,054 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,011)   (0,015)  
Constant 0,010  Constant 0,013  Constant 0,014  
  (0,002)    (0,001)    (0,001)  











Panel D. UK  
Test 3a:Insider trading vs Not  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,016 *** DV -0,174 *** DV -0,023 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,055)   (0,008)  
LNMV -0,002 *** SALETAS 0,145 *** LNMV 0,002 ** 
  (0,000)   (0,033)   (0,001)  
NPM -0,006 *** NPM 0,160 * OPM -0,017 ** 
  (0,002)   (0,089)   (0,009)  
IGEAR 0,005 ** DEBTE 0,027 *** CLSFU -0,002 * 
  (0,002)   (0,006)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,016  Constant 0,207  Constant 0,011  
  (0,002)    (0,036)    (0,003)  










Test 3b:Large vs Small Purchases  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,020 *** DV 0,049 *** DV -0,028 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,003)   (0,004)  
LNMV -0,003 *** LNMV -0,005 *** LNMV 0,003 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,000)   (0,001)  
NPM -0,020 *** OPM -0,011 *** NPM 0,042 *** 
  (0,007)   (0,003)   (0,006)  
IGEAR 0,007 *** CGEAR 0,001 ** CLSFU -0,002 ** 
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  (0,002)   (0,000)   (0,001)  
Constant 0,027  Constant 0,014  Constant 0,017  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










Test 3c:Large vs Small Disposal  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,017 *** DV 0,026  DV -0,033 *** 
  (0,006)   (0,005)   (0,005)  
LNMV -0,003 *** LNMV -0,004 *** LNMV 0,003 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,000)   (0,001)  
NPM -0,004 ** OPM -0,010 * ROSC -0,017 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,005)   (0,004)  
DEBTE -0,002 *** DEBTE -0,002 *** CLSFU 0,006 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,001)   (0,001)  
Constant 0,004  Constant 0,006  Constant 0,035  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  










Test 3d:Large vs Small Number of Insiders  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,011 *** DV 0,038 *** DV -0,029 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,004)   (0,004)  
RESTAS -0,008 ** LNMV -0,005 *** LNMV 0,003 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,000)   (0,001)  
NPM -0,073 *** OPM -0,007 ** NPM 0,022 *** 
  (0,014)   (0,003)   (0,005)  
TLSFU 0,046 *** CLSFU 0,003 *** DEBTE -0,001 *** 
  (0,013)   (0,001)   (0,000)  
Constant 0,007  Constant 0,010  Constant 0,008  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)  
























Table 10 - Results of H3 
Panel A: H3 Test 1- Logistic Regression 
2004-2005 2005-2006 
1.Austalia 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 867 Cases Included in Analysis 985 
Missing Cases 45 Missing Cases 17 
Total 912 Total 912 
Accuracy Rate  50,60% Accuracy Rate  50,90% 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
COC -0,059 * 0,943 COC 0,087 * 1,091 
  (0,034)    (0,052)   
 
2.Germany 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 759 Cases Included in Analysis 745 
Missing Cases 49 Missing Cases 63 
Total 808 Total 808 
Accuracy Rate  51% Accuracy Rate  51,90% 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
COC -0,332 * 0,717 COC -0,408 * 0,665 
  (0,179)     (0,243)   
 
3.Greece 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 403 Cases Included in Analysis 406 
Missing Cases 7 Missing Cases 4 
Total 410 Total 410 
Accuracy Rate  50,90% Accuracy Rate  50,50% 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
COC -1,745 * 0,175 COC 1,214 * 0,367 
  (0,947)     (0,734)   
 
4.UK 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 550 Cases Included in Analysis 555 
Missing Cases 44 Missing Cases 39 
Total 594 Total 594 
Accuracy Rate  50,00% Accuracy Rate  50,80% 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
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COC -0,855 ** 0,425 COC 0,834 * 0,304 
  (0,426)    (0,453)   
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level 
respectively. 
 
Panel B: H3 Test 2:OLS Regression of Accruals on Firm Financial Measures 
1. Australia  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,455 *** DV 0,134 *** DV -0,294 *** 
  (0,087)   (0,017)   (0,072)  
LNMV 0,065 *** RESTAS -0,403 *** LNMV 0,033 *** 
  (0,016)   (0,026)   (0,012)  
OPM 0,170 *** NPM -0,006 *** OPM 0,027 *** 
  (0,018)   (0,001)   (0,001)  
CLSFU 0,091 ** CLSFU -0,045 ** CLSFU -0,511 *** 
  (0,035)   (0,017)   (0,163)  
Constant 0,034  Constant 0,020  Constant 0,230  
  (0,027)    (0,009)    (0,022)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,055 *** DV 0,034 * DV -0,029 * 
  (0,014)   (0,022)   (0,017)  
LNMV -0,007 *** SALETAS -0,019 ** LNMV 0,007 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,008)   (0,002)  
OPM 0,316 *** OPM 0,058 *** ROCE 0,083 *** 
  (0,041)   (0,010)   (0,024)  
IGEAR -0,009 * IGEAR 0,004 ** CGEAR 0,012 *** 
  (0,005)   (0,002)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,009  Constant 0,020  Constant 0,009  
  (0,003)    (0,005)    (0,004)  
R2 adj. 0,584  R











3. Greece  
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,012 ** DV -0,045 *** DV -0,142 *** 
  (0,006)   (0,016)   (0,040)  
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RESSFU -0,075 *** RESTAS 0,045 ** RESTAS 0,109 * 
  (0,014)   (0,022)   (0,065)  
ROCE 0,069 *** OPM -0,037 *** OPM 0,009 * 
  (0,008)   (0,001)   (0,005)  
CGEAR 0,143 *** CGEAR 0,073 ** DEBT -0,010 *** 
  (0,014)   (0,028)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,012  Constant 0,025  Constant 0,106  
  (0,002)    (0,003)    (0,011)  












2004 2005 2006 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,155 *** DV -0,440 *** DV -0,124 *** 
  (0,031)   (0,034)   (0,031)  
LNMV 0,016 *** LNMV 0,045 *** LNMV -0,010 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,005)   (0,004)  
EPS -0,078 *** OPM 0,550 *** EPS 0,051 *** 
  (0,025)   (0,090)   (0,018)  
TLSFU -0,032 *** DEBTE -0,018 ** DEBT 0,008 * 
  (0,009)   (0,008)   (0,005)  
Constant 0,033  Constant 0,023  Constant 0,029  
  (0,007)    (0,009)    (0,006)  










(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Panel C: H3 Test 3:OLS Regression of Abnormal Returns on Firm Financial Measures 
1. Australia  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,038 *** DV 0,014 * DV -0,051 *** 
  (0,009)   (0,008)   (0,006)  
LNMV 0,003 * RESSFU -0,038 * LNMV 0,003 ** 
  (0,001)   (0,022)   (0,001)  
ROCE -0,017 *** ROSC 0,035 ** ROSC -0,014 ** 
  (0,002)   (0,016)   (0,006)  
CLSFU 0,375 *** CLSFU 0,147 ** DEBTE 0,040 ** 
  (0,035)   (0,068)   (0,014)  
Constant 0,013  Constant 0,039  Constant 0,041  
  (0,003)    (0,004)    (0,003)  











2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,027 * DV -0,029 *** DV -0,009   
  (0,016)   (0,008)   (0,003)   
RESSFU -0,030 ** RESSFU -0,013 * LNMV 0,002   
  (0,015)   (0,006)   (0,000)   
ROCE -0,052 * ROCE 0,087 *** ROCE -0,008 * 
  (0,030)   (0,024)   (0,005)   
CLSFU -0,019 *** CLSFU 0,016 *** 
No sig. Results for Leverage 
  
  (0,007)   (0,004)    
Constant 0,023  Constant 0,018  Constant 0,016   
  (0,003)    (0,002)    (0,001)   
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3. Greece  
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,109 ** DV -0,044 ** DV -0,024 * 
  (0,045)   (0,022)   (0,013)  
LNMV -0,008 * SALETAS -0,010 ** LNMV -0,014 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,004)   (0,002)  
EPS 0,032 * EPS -0,015 * OPM -0,003 *** 
  (0,028)   (0,009)   (0,001)  
DEBT 0,002 * DEBTE -0,017 ** CLSFU 0,011 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,008)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,095  Constant 0,032  Constant 0,041  
  (0,005)    (0,003)    (0,003)  
R2 adj. 0,648  R











2007 2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,015 *** DV 0,028 *** DV -0,016 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,003)   (0,004)  
SALETAS -0,007 *** LNMV -0,004 *** SALESHA 0,002 ** 
  (0,002)   (0,000)   (0,001)  
ROCE -0,027 *** ROSC -0,015 *** NPM 0,023 ** 
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  (0,006)   (0,003)   (0,011)  
CLSFU 0,004 *** DSFU 0,002 *** CLSFU -0,005 * 
  (0,002)   (0,001)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,005  Constant 0,005  Constant 0,014  
  (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,002)  
R2 adj. 0,540  R2 adj. 0,664  R
2 adj. 0,516  
Sample 
size 




















































Table 11 - Results of H4 
Convergency test 
Pair-wise t-tests for equality of 
means 

















DIFF(NI) 0,1199 0,1143 0,0701 0,0711 0,0820 0,1336 *   
DIFF(ΝΑ) 0,1799 0,2255 0,3495 0,4318 0,1565 0,1949 *  ** 
DIFF(ROΝΑ) 0,1178 0,2131 0,4477 0,9542 0,1318 0,2480 *  * 
DIFF(EPS) 0,4680 0,5143 0,2395 0,2471 0,2227 0,2351 * **  








































Table 12 – H5 Financial Statement Effects 
Panel A:Logistic Regression 2006-2007 Panel B:Logistic Regression 2007-2008 
Dependent variable year dummy Dependent variable year dummy 
Cases Included in Analysis 393 Cases Included in Analysis 405 
Missing Cases 15 Missing Cases 3 
Total 408 Total 408 
Accuracy Rate  51,40% Accuracy Rate  50,10% 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variables Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
SALETAS -1,104 *** 0,332 LNMV 0,301 * 1,352 
  (0,402)    (0,035)   
LNMV -0,540 *** 0,583 DIVCOV -0,083 * 0,92 
  (0,066)    (0,045)   
DIVSH 0,782 ** 2,186 MVBV -0,057 ** 0,945 
  (0,394)    (0,026)   
MVBV 0,262 *** 1,3 PEG -0,119 * 0,888 
  (0,054)    (0,069)   
PEG -0,087 * 0,917 PLOWB -0,058 ** 0,944 
  (0,052)    (0,025)   
DIVSHG -1,702 *** 0,182 OPM -1,672 ** 0,188 
  (0,691)    (0,733)   
PLOWB 0,147 *** 1,159 CUR -0,230 ** 0,795 
  (0,043)    (0,100)   
ROSC 0,652 *** 1,92 CASH 1,002 *** 2,723 
  (0,243)    (0,327)   
CUR 1,619 *** 5,046 QUI -0,109 *** 0,896 
  (0,371)    (0,028)   
QUI 0,124 *** 1,132 DEBT -0,117 ** 0,89 
  (0,041)    (0,050)   
CFSH 0,250 ** 1,284 Constant -0,282  0,754 
  (0,106)    (0,355)   
WCR -0,171 *** 0,843     
  (0,053)       
DEBT 0,275 *** 1,316     
  (0,079)       
ETL -2,066 *** 0,127      
  (0,444)        
DSFU -0,414 * 0,661      
  (0,233)        
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Constant 1,580 ** 4,857      
  (0,672)        
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Table 13 – H5 Volatility in income statement and balance sheet values 
 Panel A Panel B 
 2006 2007 2008 
Pair-wise F-test 
for equality of 
variances 













Size          
SALESHA 6,37551 6,66143 5,16566 4,68424 5,76340 4,90646 ***  
NAVSH 3,87002 3,75021 3,72820 3,53414 4,12446 4,48268  ** 
SALETAS 0,75259 0,44080 0,74420 0,46421 0,79002 0,47327   
RESTAS -0,04482 0,94384 -0,02624 0,97822 -0,04482 1,03433   
RESSFU 0,10074 1,37256 -0,01145 1,44616 0,17240 1,53060   
Investment 
DIVSH 0,32906 0,50077 0,41181 0,54194 0,38348 0,52744   
DIVYI 0,10469 0,15613 0,01403 0,03605 0,02872 0,06733 ** *** 
DIVCOV 1,62463 1,73485 2,09973 4,59897 0,99537 2,07454 *** *** 
PE 0,36297 0,68327 0,35130 0,93371 0,24937 1,97702 *  
HOLTA 0,01289 0,01495 0,01905 0,02132 0,01817 0,01997 ***  
Growth 
MVBV 1,38051 7,52705 3,94362 5,29489 3,14018 5,88780   
EPSG 0,29078 1,44912 0,28594 5,33395 -0,24138 3,12616   
PEG 1,26812 4,81105 0,12099 1,45390 -0,28179 2,18778 *** ** 
DIVSHG 0,11515 0,22666 0,02533 0,26382 0,03042 0,30685  * 
Profitability 
PLOWB 1,69894 2,26980 2,77757 5,66592 1,62486 5,15622 ***  
OPM 0,11767 0,16357 0,10926 0,18289 0,05706 0,19389   
NPM 0,09267 0,13937 0,08020 0,19833 0,03654 0,15217 ** * 
ROSC 0,17994 1,21950 0,17771 0,58060 0,06361 1,15292   
EPS 1,04832 1,49137 1,24003 1,91733 1,03546 2,50946 *** * 
ROCE 0,15146 0,44016 0,14583 0,53882 0,12318 0,41018   
Liquidity 
CUR 0,90687 0,58619 2,00257 3,57877 1,27420 0,67458 *** *** 
CASH 0,36189 0,30140 0,38582 0,35767 0,52682 0,47266 ** *** 
QUI 3,99649 4,30838 6,02380 8,21090 3,64236 3,69135 *** *** 
CFSH 1,36842 1,67405 1,98856 2,63516 1,88562 2,91371 ***  
CFM 0,15268 0,18418 0,14678 0,22833 0,09483 0,20265   
WCR 1,61378 4,03024 0,34670 2,53363 0,01998 2,11339 ***  
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STOCKT 3,39249 2,45957 3,40696 2,62246 3,25017 2,38259  * 
Leverage  
DEBT 4,61497 2,34932 5,21586 2,85328 4,73557 2,55109   
ETL 1,19364 1,35684 0,64038 0,49062 0,58790 0,46682 ***  
TLSFU 1,53894 2,29977 1,87220 6,08082 1,63482 4,34613 **  
CGEAR 1,59147 5,41552 1,50701 5,51884 1,83969 6,83706   
CLSFU 0,77387 1,22769 0,83213 1,93798 0,79379 5,90788  ** 
INTCOV 5,92040 11,23310 6,47149 12,62482 4,57547 11,90530   
IGEAR 0,13560 0,22935 0,15359 0,39948 0,13881 3,21325 *** ** 
DEBTE 0,43196 0,47109 0,57554 1,19027 0,67840 1,34788 ***  
DSFU 0,51244 0,88999 0,48485 0,75645 0,52587 1,31439  *** 










































Table 14 – H6 Results 
Panel A: Test 1 - Earnings Volatility Pair-wise F-tests for 
equality of variance 













Δ(NP/TA) 0,0988 1,2036 -0,0677 2,3198 0,7559 14,2594 * ** 
Δ(NP/OCF) 1,2398 5,2268 0,2605 8,2668 0,7054 13,4514 * * 
Sample size 186  188  200    
 
Panel B: Accruals and Quality 
Test 2a:Accruals-OCF 




-0,504 *** 0,125 * -0,278 ***  
  
Sample size 197  197  203     
 
Test 2b: Earnings Quality  
 2006- US GAAP 2007- IFRS 2008- IFRS    
Test Variables Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig.    
R2 adj. 0,181  0,288  0,156     
F test  44,198 *** 80,109 *** 38,262 ***    
OCF -0,285 *** 2,314 *** 4,343 ***    
  (0,403)  (0,259)  (0,702)     
Sample size 197  197  203     
 
Panel C: Test 2c - OLS Regression of Accruals on Firm Financial Measures 
2006 - US GAAP 2007 - IFRS 2008 - IFRS 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
SALETAS -0,007 ** NAVSH -0,001 * SALESHA -0,001 ** 
  (0,004)   (0,000)   (0,000)  
RESTAS -0,003 * SALETAS -0,01 *** SALETAS -0,021 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,003)   (0,003)  
LNMV 0,001 * RESTAS -0,006 *** PLOWB 0,001 ** 
  (0,000)   (0,001)   (0,000)  
OPM 0,19 *** RESSFU -0,002 ** OPM 0,362 *** 
  (0,018)   (0,001)   (0,021)  
NPM 0,425 *** OPM 0,118 *** NPM 0,095 *** 
  (0,028)   (0,021)   (0,020)  
ROCE 0,006 * NPM 0,215 *** ROSC 0,004 *** 
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  (0,003)   (0,028)   (0,001)  
CGEAR 0,001 *** ROSC 0,006 ** ROCE 0,009 *** 
  (0,000)   (0,003)   (0,003)  
INTCOV 0,001 ** EPS 0,018 *** DEBT -0,001 ** 
  (0,000)   (0,002)   (0,000)  
Constant -0,005  DEBT -0,002 *** Constant 0,007 * 
  (0,005)   (0,000)   (0,004)  
    CLSFU -0,003 ***    
     (0,001)     
    IGEAR -0,007 *    
     (0,003)     
    Constant 0,024 ***    
     (0,004)     
R2 adj. 0,787  R2 adj. 0,756  R2 adj. 0,803  
Sample size 170  Sample size 175  Sample size 184  
Panel D: Test 3 
a) Logistic Regression (SPP) 
2006-2007 2006-2008       
Cases Included in Analysis 393 Cases Included in Analysis 394     
Accuracy Rate  51,40% Accuracy Rate  51,50%     
Variable Coefficients Sig. Variable Coefficients Sig.     
SPP -2,130 ** SPP -1,146 **     
  (0,870)   (0,565)      
b) Logistic Regression (LNL) 
2006-2007 2006-2008     
Cases Included in Analysis 393 Cases Included in Analysis 394     
Accuracy Rate  51,40% Accuracy Rate  51,50%     
Variable Coefficients Sig. Variable Coefficients Sig.     
LNL 1,722 *** LNL 1,614 **     
  (0,631)   (0,623)      

























 5-day  10-day   
Event-
day 
 5-day  10-day  
Australia AR Sig CAR Sig CAR Sig UK AR Sig CAR Sig CAR Sig 
AMP -5,89% *** 9,62% ** 9,45% ** ADM  -0,49%  9,54%  16,37% * 
 (-2,956)  (2,257)  (2,218)   (-0,209)  (0,978)  (1,678)  
ANZ 0,12%  19,62% *** 23,91% *** AML  -0,26%  12,08% *** 22,59% *** 
 (0,056)  (4,217)  (5,14)   (-0,142)  (3,267)  (6,111)  
AUB 0,74%  9,29%  17,69% ** AV. -2,18%  16,90% *** 21,57% *** 
 (0,46)  (1,605)  (3,057)   (-1,214)  (3,746)  (4,781)  
BOQ 0,63%  -4,85%  -10,81% * BARC -2,80%  22,66% * 26,95% ** 
 (0,282)  (-0,79)  (-1,762)   (-1,18)  (1,811)  (2,154)  
CIX -0,83%  -13,85% * -2,73%  BGEO -3,63%  -27,29% ** -42,77% *** 
 (-0,219)  (-1,754)  (-0,346)   -(1,114)  (-1,984)  (-3,109)  
NAB -4,62% ** 3,92%  15,89% *** CBG 1,44%  20,98% * 4,48%  
 (-2,218)  (0,749)  (3,035)   (0,516)  (1,925)  (0,41)  
NHF 10,72% *** 3,47%  16,53%  CTR  0,11%  -7,41% * -6,52%  
 (4,174)  (0,253)  (1,207)   (0,059)  (-1,739)  (-1,531)  
QBE -3,24%  15,73% ** 15,23% ** GACB  -1,47%  -1,88%  -4,95% * 
 (-1,473)  (2,372)  (2,296)   (-1,099)  (-0,632)  (-1,669)  
SUN -4,53% * -16,83% *** -8,14%  HSBA  0,65%  6,33% * 13,85% *** 
 (-1,69)  (-3,038)  (-1,469)   (0,56)  (1,738)  (3,804)  
TWR -4,23% ** -19,22% *** -22,53% *** III -3,83%  -6,36%  -16,74% ** 
 (-2,052)  (-3,325)  (-3,898)   (-0,779)  (-0,897)  (-2,36)  
WBB 3,49% ** 0,97%  -2,17%  IPO -1,67%  -7,54%  -10,81% ** 
 (2,177)  (0,268)  (-0,598)   (-0,663)  (-1,64)  (-2,352)  
Germany       LGEN -2,47%  18,04% *** 20,37% *** 
ALV -2,54% * -6,82%  -3,63%   (-1,347)  (3,56)  (4,021)  
 (-1,926)  (-1,37)  (-0,728)  LLOY  7,73% *** 5,34%  -3,62%  
ARL -5,10% *** 3,03%  -2,39% ***  (3,441)  (0,58)  (-0,393)  
 (-3,253)  (0,481)  (-5,07)  PAG -10,12% * -7,83%  -13,81%  
CBK -2,84%  -9,45%  -42,95% ***  (-1,679)  (-0,383)  (-0,675)  
 (-1,1)  (-1,115)  (-8,261)  PFG  4,11% ** 3,29%  2,02%  
COM -4,90% ** -18,15% *** -39,64% ***  (2,265)  (0,457)  (0,28)  
 (-2,244)  (-3,783)  (-3,851)  PRU -3,27% * 15,52% *** 16,90% *** 
DBK 0,35%  -13,36% ** -21,20%   (-1,831)  (3,401)  (3,703)  
 (0,215)  (-2,427)  (-0,379)  RBS -4,38% * 12,59%  12,60%  
DPB -3,95% * -14,41%  -33,71% ***  (-1,797)  (1,306)  (1,307)  
 (-1,813)  (-1,58)  (-3,698)  RSA  5,52% *** 10,62% ** 15,68% *** 
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DRN -1,12%  -12,00% * -19,59% ***  (3,445)  (1,999)  (2,952)  
 -(0,549)  (-1,688)  (-2,757)  SL. -4,00% * 6,08%  9,92%  
GLJ -6,59% ** 5,64%  -0,67%   (-1,916)  (0,999)  (1,63)  
 (-2,227)  (0,711)  (-0,084)  STAN  2,47% * 12,09% ** 7,73%  
MUV2 -2,70% * 2,73%  9,87% **  (1,657)  (2,394)  (1,53)  
 (-1,9)  (0,667)  (2,415)  STJ 2,97% *** 28,42% *** 22,79% *** 
OLB -0,61%  7,95% *** 7,57% ***  (4,152)  (4,03)  (3,232)  
 (-0,464)  (3,333)  (3,173)  SVI  -0,93% * 10,16% ** -3,22%  
OTP -1,14%  -8,02%  -9,20% *  (-1,942)  (2,21)  (-0,7)  
 (-0,483)  (-1,537)  (-1,763)  Greece       
VVV3 6,13% * -9,29%  -15,48% ** ALFA -3,22% * -7,34% ** -4,61%  
 (1,86)  (-1,329)  (-2,213)   (-1,946)  (-2,285)  (-1,437)  
WUW 0,25%  -5,46%  -11,67% ** ETE 1,31%  7,28%  15,36% ** 
 (0,133)  (-0,979)  (-2,091)   (0,827)  (1,071)  (2,261)  
       EUPIK -1,40%  -9,71% * 0,64%  
        (-0,843)  (-1,924)  (0,127)  
       TBANK -10,89% *** -24,51% *** -25,43% *** 
        (-5,607)  (-3,127)  (-3,245)  
       TGEN -3,65% ** -6,58%  -11,66% ** 
        (-2,035)  (-1,149)  (-2,036)  
       TT -3,07%  -6,84%  -13,55% * 





 5-day  10-day  Code 
Event-
day 
 5-day  10-day  
NASDAQ AR Sig CAR Sig CAR Sig NYSE AR Sig CAR Sig CAR Sig 
AAME 0,32%  -20,94% * -29,64% *** AFL 0,50%  10,72% ** 0,20%  
 (0,058)  (-1,838)  (-2,602)   (0,363)  (2,37)  (0,044)  
MBVT -2,69% * -1,36%  -1,42%  AIZ -5,58% *** -9,87% * -5,77%  
 (-1,754)  (-0,284)  (-0,297)   (-3,447)  (-1,645)  (-0,961)  
MCBC 1,69%  26,29% ** 8,66%  BAC -10,90% *** 30,21% ** 33,50% ** 
 (0,452)  (1,978)  (0,651)   (-3,821)  (2,248)  (2,493)  
METR 0,15%  13,99% ** 8,68%  BANC 1,46%  12,28% ** 17,82% *** 
 (0,067)  (2,418)  (1,501)   (0,593)  (2,008)  (2,915)  
MFSF -0,33%  7,67%  12,27% ** BBT 4,26% * 40,01% *** 30,84% ** 
 (-0,129)  (1,23)  (1,967)   (1,8018)  (3,297)  (2,541)  
MSFG -1,65%  18,82% *** 28,89% *** BBX -5,89% ** 51,42% ** 307,30% *** 
 (-0,612)  (3,086)  (4,738)   (-2,317)  (2,041)  (12,2)  
NBBC -19,04% *** 22,41% ** 31,66% *** BHLB -1,09%  16,70% *** 14,21% *** 
 (-5,511)  (1,993)  (2,816)   (-0,449)  (2,989)  (2,545)  
NECB -2,78% *** -2,97%  -13,82% *** BOH 3,07%  12,02% *** 17,46% *** 
 (-2,803)  (-1,002)  (-4,659)   (1,48)  (2,91)  (4,227)  
NFBK -3,05% * 7,46% ** 6,96% ** BXS 4,33%  26,32% *** 29,35% *** 
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 (-1,861)  (2,158)  (2,013)   (1,572)  (3,073)  (3,428)  
NHTB -4,33% * 0,25%  -9,35%  C -4,53%  22,02% ** 24,21% *** 
 (-1,762)  (0,042)  (-1,62)   (-1,536)  (2,5)  (2,748)  
NPBC -0,18%  28,17% ** 30,16% ** CFR 2,12% * 4,43%  6,37%  
 (-0,058)  (2,111)  (2,261)   (1,85)  (0,925)  (1,332)  
NWLI 0,73%  14,92% ** 16,38% *** CIA 6,66% * 18,76% ** 30,83% *** 
 (0,246)  (2,376)  (2,609)   (1,827)  (2,463)  (4,049)  
OCFC -5,97% ** 5,17%  10,29% * CM 7,91% * 15,82%  38,05% *** 
 (-2,578)  (0,932)  (1,854)   (1,932)  (1,602)  (3,853)  
OKSB 2,95%  31,03% ** 32,55% ** CMA 3,24%  46,85% *** 41,15% *** 
 (0,969)  (2,322)  (2,436)   (1,002)  (6,111)  (5,368)  
ONB 4,77% * 32,47% ** 33,56% *** COF 8,18% *** 34,58% *** 29,57% *** 
 (1,774)  (2,58)  (2,667)   (3,04)  (4,657)  (3,981)  
OPOF 5,05% * -2,32%  15,73% *** CPF 11,55% ** 59,12% *** 77,16% *** 
 (1,805)  (-0,56)  (3,839)   (2,396)  (3,602)  (4,701)  
OSBC 6,39% ** 39,71% * 39,08% ** CYN 4,70% * 26,80% *** 24,23% *** 
 (2,285)  (1,924)  (1,894)   (1,735)  (2,977)  (2,692)  
OZRK 3,08%  32,51% *** 30,32% *** FCF 2,16%  15,99% * 23,32% *** 
 (0,9)  (2,789)  (2,601)   (0,798)  (1,859)  (2,711)  
PACW 2,19%  60,65% *** 59,13% *** FFG -1,31%  41,42% *** 49,65% *** 
 (0,664)  (3,234)  (3,153)   (-0,509)  (5,915)  (7,09)  
PCBK -6,52% ** 24,74% ** 19,29% * FNB 4,73% * 36,33% *** 42,77% *** 
 (-2,049)  (2,243)  (1,749)   (1,837)  (5,077)  (5,977)  
PEBO 4,84% * 32,90% *** 32,59% *** HTH 0,17% * 4,10%  8,19% *** 
 (1,777)  (4,65)  (4,606)   (1,931)  (1,415)  (2,824)  
PGC -4,13% *** 14,43% * 10,95%  IHC -6,42% * -0,69%  -5,25%  
 (-2,611)  (1,81)  (1,374)   (-1,874)  (-0,101)  (-0,766)  
PNBK 0,24%  3,89%  -10,05% *** JPM -1,02% *** 19,63% *** 33,61% *** 
 (0,113)  (1,197)  (-3,089)   (-2,7)  (2,999)  (5,133)  
PNFP 5,47% ** 34,25% *** 42,78% *** LNC 1,83%  6,82% * 3,52%  
 (1,997)  (4,356)  (5,44)   (1,201)  (1,89)  (0,974)  
PROV -2,20%  57,01% *** 47,02% *** MET -3,50% *** 16,18% *** -2,43%  
 (-0,727)  (3,623)  (2,988)   (-2,651)  (5,552)  (-0,832)  
PVTB 1,37%  47,06% *** 58,71% *** MFC 2,74% ** 5,61% ** 14,93% *** 
 (0,512)  (5,675)  (7,08)   (2,063)  (2,093)  (5,568)  
PWOD -0,63%  3,12%  19,61% *** MSL 2,52%  15,98% *** 1,91%  
 (-0,302)  (1,141)  (7,164)   (0,947)  (2,631)  (0,315)  
RBPAA 13,57% ** 52,58% ** 56,29% *** MTB 4,10% * 33,28% *** 32,24% *** 
 (2,438)  (2,585)  (2,767)   (1,716)  (5,371)  (5,203)  
RNST 1,89%  32,36% *** 33,58% *** NYCB 4,42% ** 16,10% ** 8,22%  
 (0,697)  (2,79)  (2,896)   (2,075)  (2,553)  (1,303)  
SASR -2,91%  32,62% ** 44,18% *** PB 3,65%  14,48% ** 21,90% *** 
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 (-1,183)  (2,118)  (2,868)   (1,492)  (2,458)  (3,718)  
SBBX -9,09% ** 6,04%  10,16%  PFG -1,21%  14,81% *** 14,57% *** 
 (-2,122)  (0,709)  (1,191)   (-0,641)  (3,105)  (3,054)  
SBCF 1,12%  38,45% *** 39,59% *** PFS 4,07% * 14,13% *** 15,27% *** 
 (0,249)  (3,289)  (3,387)   (1,669)  (2,883)  (3,115)  
SBNY 4,65%  29,68% *** 34,95% *** PL -9,25% *** -4,59%  -12,80% *** 
 (1,606)  (2,795)  (3,291)   (-6,035)  (-1,245)  (-3,471)  
SBSI -5,42% ** 18,52%  28,28% ** PNC 3,37% * 11,99%  10,37%  
 (-2,403)  (1,434)  (2,189)   (1,65)  (1,601)  (1,385)  
SFNC 3,97% * 33,87% *** 33,12% *** PRU -3,38% * 16,04% ** 7,27%  
 (1,645)  (5,411)  (5,29)   (-1,775)  (2,521)  (1,143)  
SFST 1,03%  8,95%  19,64% ** RF 7,24% * 91,49% *** 56,52% *** 
 (0,294)  (0,914)  (2,006)   (1,821)  (7,393)  (4,567)  
SHBI 2,46%  19,78% *** 21,13% *** SFG -1,27%  9,32% ** 3,71%  
 (0,858)  (3,43)  (3,665)   (-0,676)  (2,36)  (0,94)  
SLCT -2,57%  -29,34% * -28,76% * SLF 1,29%  0,49%  7,80% ** 
 (-0,52)  (-1,84)  (-1,809)   (0,912)  (0,148)  (2,376)  
SNBC -6,22% ** 34,01% *** 36,07% *** SNV 6,08% * 22,82% *** 35,34% *** 
 (-2,452)  (2,691)  (2,854)   (1,865)  (2,842)  (4,402)  
SOCB -9,49% *** -16,55% ** -27,62% *** STI 6,21% * 41,30% *** 23,74% * 
 (-4,007)  (-2,399)  (-4,004)   (1,89)  (3,302)  (1,898)  
SSB 6,01% ** 24,68% *** 35,49% *** STT 4,41% * -6,41%  -18,50% ** 
 (2,379)  (3,688)  (5,304)   (1,889)  (-0,78)  (-2,252)  
STBA 0,99%  12,75%  23,19% *** TCB 4,29% * 38,81% ** 33,67% ** 
 (0,458)  (1,448)  (2,635)   (1,651)  (2,442)  (2,118)  
SUBK 1,16%  16,35% ** 18,34% *** TMK 0,80%  4,18% ** 10,83% *** 
 (0,585)  (2,411)  (2,704)   (0,76)  (2,226)  (5,772)  
SUSQ 8,15% *** 38,49% ** 46,28% ** USB 4,59% ** 17,05% *** 20,80% *** 
 (2,912)  (2,157)  (2,593)   (2,215)  (2,69)  (3,283)  
SVBI -2,45%  16,66% ** 6,99%  VLY 4,78% ** 15,80% * 16,32% * 
 (-0,749)  (1,985)  (0,833)   (1,982)  (1,751)  (1,808)  
SYBT 2,28%  14,97%  19,75% **        
 (0,862)  (1,612)  (2,127)         
TBBK -1,54%  37,66% *** 54,09% ***        
 (-0,357)  (2,658)  (3,818)         
TCBI 4,87% * 39,63% *** 39,93% ***        
 (1,853)  (8,966)  (9,034)         
TCBK 7,43% ** 57,07% *** 67,17% ***        
 (2,255)  (3,491)  (4,109)         
TFSL -1,02%  12,32% ** 6,92%         
 (-0,631)  (2,574)  (1,445)         
THFF -4,80% * 20,65% ** 25,50% ***        
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 (-1,878)  (2,308)  (2,85)         
TRCB -9,19% ** -2,82%  -5,44%         
 (-2,048)  (-0,294)  (-0,56)         
TRMK 5,87% ** 48,49% *** 36,99% ***        
 (2,245)  (6,903)  (5,267)         
TRST 4,76% ** 30,61% *** 43,00% ***        
 (2,047)  (2,626)  (3,69)         
TSBK 9,23% ** 3,81%  18,22%         
 (2,396)  (0,291)  (1,39)         
UBFO -0,52%  29,05% *** 25,49% ***        
 (-0,154)  (4,197)  (3,682)         
UBSH -5,34% * 25,48% ** 30,30% ***        
 (-1,776)  (2,325)  (2,765)         
UBSI 4,48% * 38,79% *** 51,28% ***        
 (1,651)  (4,146)  (5,48)         
UCBI 11,56% *** 46,62% ** 8,50%         
 (2,709)  (2,147)  (0,391)         
UMBF -6,03% *** 12,75% *** 17,69% ***        
 (-2,987)  (2,809)  (3,895)         
UMPQ 5,69%  35,11% ** 37,28% **        
 (1,437)  (2,444)  (2,594)         
UNB 1,84% * -3,22%  -1,50%         
 (1,901)  (-1,308)  (-0,609)         
UVSP 6,67% * 29,61% ** 36,27% **        
 (1,793)  (1,931)  (2,366)         
VPFG 2,90% * 14,68% *** 17,98% ***        
 (1,791)  (3,584)  (4,39)         
WABC 6,09% *** 17,87% * 27,72% ***        
 (2,603)  (1,839)  (2,852)         
WAFD 1,75%  34,70% *** 33,32% ***        
 (0,678)  (2,914)  (2,797)         
WASH -3,49%  16,48% ** 21,53% ***        
 (-1,404)  (2,03)  (2,652)         
WFD -2,14%  2,69%  10,11% *        
 (-1,568)  (0,5)  (1,881)         
WSBC 0,51%  29,66%  35,87% *        
 (0,149)  (1,436)  (1,737)         
WSBF 3,95% * 9,29% * 13,39% **        
 (1,742)  (1,784)  (2,572)         
WSFS -0,39%  16,06% * 16,50% *        
 (-0,177)  (1,896)  (1,948)         
WTBA -6,00%  16,21%  31,01% **        
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 (-1,65)  (1,082)  (2,071)         
WTFC 5,99% ** 57,26% *** 55,07% ***        
 (2,097)  (3,808)  (3,661)         
ZION 6,75% * 87,48% *** 76,97% ***        
 (1,705)  (5,381)  (4,735)         

















































Table 16 - H8 Test 1/Multinomial Logistic Regression 
2007 2008 
Reference Category Non Reclassified Firms Reference Category Non Reclassified Firms 
Cases Included in Analysis 356 Cases Included in Analysis 365 
Missing Cases 33 Missing Cases 24 
Total 389 Total 389 
Accuracy Rate  91,60% Accuracy Rate  88,80% 
Likelihood Ratio test  173,488 Likelihood Ratio test  215,425 
Reclassified Firms US Firms Reclassified Firms US Firms 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
RESTAS -5,499 * NAVSH 0,109 * NAVSH 0,076 * NAVSH 0,092 ** 
 (3,307)   (0,062)   (0,045)   (0,045)  
ROSC 9,493 * PLOWB 0,184 *** ROSC 5,739 ** PLOWB 0,022 ** 
 (5,652)   (0,068)   (2,780)   (0,009)  
CGEAR -0,176 * ETL 0,456 ** DEBT 0,037 ** ETL -8,786 *** 
 (0,106)   (0,232)   (0,020)   (2,929)  
Intercept -0,221  Intercept 10,044 *** Intercept -2,538 ** Intercept 9,085 *** 
  (1,729)    (2,542)    (1,205)    (1,586)  
2009             
Reference Category Non Reclassified Firms        
Cases Included in Analysis 366        
Missing Cases 23        
Total 389        
Accuracy Rate  91,50%        
Likelihood Ratio test  181,913        
Reclassified Firms US Firms        
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig.        
NAVSH 0,078 ** NAVSH 0,082 **        
 (0,039)   (0,036)         
NPM 9,367 * PLOWB 0,023 *        
 (6,782)   (0,015)         
CGEAR -0,579 *** ETL -10,215 **        
 (0,204)   (4,567)         
Intercept -2,215 * Intercept 10,862 ***        
 (1,342)   (2,132)         









Table 17 - Results of H8/Tests 2-3 
Panel A:H8 Test 2a-Logistic regression for Reclassified Firms 
Dependent variable Year Dependent variable Year 
Cases Included in Analysis 75 Cases Included in Analysis 71 
Missing Cases 19 Missing Cases 11 
Total 94 Total 82 
Accuracy Rate  50,70% Accuracy Rate  50,70% 
2007-2008 2007-2009 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) Variable Coefficients Sig. Exp(B) 
DAC -2,566 *** 0,077 DAC -0,739 ** 0,478 
  (0,896)    (0,351)   
Constant -1,697   Constant 0,337   
  (1,169)    (0,306)   
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Panel B 
H8 Test 2b:OLS Regression of Accruals on Firm Financial Measures 
1. Reclassified firms vs Not 
2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,050 *** DV -0,014 *** 
  (0,010)   (0,007)  
LNMV -0,008 *** RESTAS 0,528 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,102)  
OPM -0,023 *** OPM -0,322 *** 
  (0,007)   (0,049)  
ETL -0,097 *** ETL -0,049 *** 
  (0,017)   (0,009)  
Constant 0,009  Constant 0,057  
  (0,002)    (0,001)  
R2 adj. 0,664  R2 adj. 0,713  
Sample size 84  Sample size 83  
 
2. US Firms vs Reclassified 
2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,006 *** DV 0,024 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,003)  
SALETAS -0,046 *** LNMV -0,001 *** 
  (0,016)   (0,000)  
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OPM 0,006 * OPM 0,002 *** 
  (0,003)   (0,001)  
IGEAR 0,004 ** TLSFU 0,004 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,003)  
Constant 0,002  Constant -0,012 *** 
  (0,001)    (0,002)  
R2 adj. 0,472  R2 adj. 0,515  
Sample size 331  Sample size 334  
 
3. US Firms vs not Reclassified 
2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,006 * DV 0,004 *** 
  (0,004)   (0,002)  
SALETAS -0,050 * SALETAS -0,038 *** 
  (0,026)   (0,011)  
ROCE 0,027 *** ROCE 0,024 *** 
  (0,006)   (0,007)  
INTCOV 0,004 * INTCOV 0,005 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,002  Constant -0,001 * 
  (0,002)    (0,001)  
R2 adj. 0,314  R2 adj. 0,316  
Sample size 334  Sample size 341  




H8 Test 3:OLS Regression of A.R. on Firm Financial Measures 
1. Reclassified firms vs Not 
2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV -0,282 ** DV 0,011 *** 
  (0,111)   (0,004)  
SALETAS 0,677 ** NAVSH 0,013 *** 
  (0,268)   (0,004)  
OPM -0,096 * NPM 0,101 *** 
  (0,077)   (0,035)  
CGEAR 0,028 * DEBTE 0,007 *** 
  (0,016)   (0,002)  
Constant 0,060  Constant 0,014  
  (0,016)    (0,001)  
R2 adj. 0,574  R2 adj. 0,742  
Sample size 84  Sample size 84  
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2. US Firms vs Reclassified 
2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,076 ** DV 0,051 *** 
  (0,033)   (0,013)  
LNMV -0,005 *** SALETAS -0,168 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,038)  
EPS 0,001 *** ROSC -0,121 *** 
  (0,000)   (0,015)  
No sig. result for Leverage  TLSFU -0,003 *** 
     (0,001)  
Constant -0,044 *** Constant -0,009 *** 
  (0,010)    (0,003)  
R2 adj. 0,325  R2 adj. 0,603  
Sample size 331  Sample size 334  
 
3. US Firms vs not Reclassified 
2008 2009 
Variables Coefficients Sig. Variables Coefficients Sig. 
DV 0,042 *** DV 0,055 *** 
  (0,012)   (0,015)  
LNMV -0,005 *** LNMV 0,003 *** 
  (0,002)   (0,001)  
ROSC -0,019 * ROSC -0,124 *** 
  (0,011)   (0,016)  
TLSFU -0,003 * TLSFU -0,003 *** 
  (0,001)   (0,001)  
Constant -0,020 *** Constant -0,012 *** 
  (0,008)    (0,003)  
R2 adj. 0,326  R2 adj. 0,575  
Sample size 334  Sample size 341  



















Table 18 – H9 Results 
Panel A: Results of Test 1a 
Australia 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Pair-wise F-test 



















SALESHA 0,35609 0,70127 0,70709 1,89878 0,26989 0,46806 0,61429 1,80067 ** ** 
NAVSH 0,89565 1,31228 0,89870 1,28365 0,64516 0,80347 0,79997 1,20466  * 
SALETAS 0,29960 0,31779 0,40479 0,55121 0,35063 0,39333 0,45254 1,03191 *  
RESTAS 0,03700 0,46797 0,06028 0,46105 0,03587 0,47543 0,08189 0,41822   
RESSFU 0,10506 0,22607 0,23863 0,94190 0,26865 1,65146 0,64177 3,86850 *  
LNMV 3,81792 2,29806 3,56234 2,38313 3,67069 2,41680 3,96044 2,38969   
Investment 
DIVSH 0,07642 0,23555 0,08733 0,27518 0,07729 0,20523 0,05362 0,11952   
DIVYI 0,01322 0,01732 0,02547 0,03448 0,02659 0,03541 0,01414 0,01752 *** *** 
DIVCOV 1,02954 4,13951 -1,50749 10,94006 0,70371 0,86724 1,58895 2,35221  ** 
PE 2,00102 13,41952 0,33854 3,32617 9,32012 17,11151 10,55722 22,03322 * ** 
HOLTA 0,40422 0,36568 0,37828 0,36287 0,32715 0,34376 0,35364 0,35920   
Growth 
MVBV 4,01088 5,53435 2,59030 4,67312 3,04244 3,62545 4,85093 9,16314 * ** 
Profitability 
PLOWB 3,49403 7,51467 4,16176 12,80474 1,45446 6,98415 0,74224 11,37536 * * 
OPM -0,10043 1,83437 0,17114 3,79912 -0,69374 2,70753 -1,56045 5,49045  ** 
NPM -0,15016 1,82060 0,11798 3,78999 -0,75957 2,69612 -1,63757 5,39983  ** 
ROSC -0,13489 0,77980 0,20936 1,14506 -0,03644 0,53487 -0,18681 1,05011  ** 
EPS 0,11169 0,28192 0,07975 0,24738 0,01600 0,14557 0,05524 0,19215   
ROCE 0,01079 0,26386 0,08112 0,61916 -0,03573 0,52390 -0,22975 0,85461  * 
Liquidity 
CUR 2,39123 5,20219 2,70762 9,34648 8,47532 13,02886 13,23829 27,96148  ** 
CASH 4,36117 12,79833 2,33102 3,51797 2,45732 4,03304 4,13556 8,91140 ** ** 
QUI 2,39123 5,20219 2,70762 9,34648 8,47532 13,02886 13,23829 27,96148  ** 
CFSH 0,16586 0,41297 0,13457 0,37968 0,11281 0,40067 0,14449 0,44803   
CFM -0,10793 1,80566 0,29660 3,69966 0,49548 7,68706 -3,99484 17,90465  ** 
WCR 0,60513 2,05868 0,45049 4,20555 0,83290 4,98644 2,03772 6,31571 *  
Leverage 
DEBT 6,47850 10,60776 7,47502 14,07296 3,17156 3,06983 3,91895 7,67643   
ETL 3,62634 16,71694 1,47782 5,06827 6,55221 8,15292 8,61235 13,42283 * ** 
TLSFU -0,10876 13,35518 -2,06878 22,48338 1,70210 6,83483 1,51956 5,37952   
CGEAR 0,83544 1,57488 0,72916 1,69476 0,82592 5,47029 0,85299 3,96331   
CLSFU 0,46025 3,09896 -0,17675 4,76957 0,34675 1,10987 0,42291 1,03059   
INTCOV 3,20094 8,51782 3,95295 16,06414 0,11623 8,16940 2,65308 19,61893 * *** 
 373 
IGEAR 0,06859 0,54260 -0,03460 2,61278 0,19575 0,81966 0,03618 1,46517   
DEBTE 0,99199 4,06155 0,82449 3,48298 0,54087 1,85767 1,28147 4,70864  ** 
DSFU 0,50443 1,23136 -1,89203 18,00289 1,35534 6,42273 1,09665 4,92777 *  
 
 
Germany 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Pair-wise F-test 



















SALESHA 6,37949 11,37305 4,02894 4,64062 3,81774 5,32318 4,97658 9,22660 * * 
NAVSH 6,56211 6,62271 5,04877 4,87637 3,97987 3,70093 5,18672 6,45398  * 
SALETAS 0,52637 0,69083 0,52053 0,65676 0,46663 0,61321 0,43639 0,72619   
RESTAS 0,25707 0,36714 0,27906 0,40344 1,26113 6,92532 1,10252 5,88648   
RESSFU 0,18015 0,44160 0,25418 0,23110 0,25816 0,23624 0,27653 0,24393   
LNMV 2,80340 2,12482 2,61319 1,97437 2,53830 2,07463 2,56254 2,11747   
Investment 
DIVSH 0,27856 0,63787 0,36654 0,74987 0,20421 0,59306 0,51184 1,34277  ** 
DIVYI 0,08676 0,42103 0,34681 1,57551 0,10387 0,57739 1,00448 5,68740 * * 
DIVCOV 2,48860 2,31951 3,86232 9,62519 3,60790 4,44728 3,44114 6,67090   
PE 4,99277 11,44885 8,52830 16,58760 2,31325 13,42251 3,25570 21,39848 * ** 
HOLTA 0,34252 0,32411 0,30640 0,30073 0,30431 0,30846 0,31380 0,32799   
Growth 
MVBV 1,43224 1,75057 1,18279 1,63876 0,73646 0,80481 1,15554 1,31809   
Profitability 
PLOWB 1,81112 4,00981 3,27794 6,52031 1,56924 5,59235 3,38352 7,92177 ** ** 
OPM 0,32607 1,32588 0,57471 3,03981 -1,16163 6,68168 -3,35431 11,61465 * * 
NPM 0,27273 1,26838 0,54365 3,00142 -1,32733 6,35340 -3,32406 11,60908  * 
ROSC 0,29040 1,64347 0,00028 0,37992 -0,03677 0,44951 -0,40212 2,50441  * 
EPS 0,13633 1,98230 -0,03755 1,60404 -0,36370 3,51930 0,05121 2,47624   
ROCE 0,03016 0,24673 0,04847 0,25788 -0,03649 0,36740 -0,01446 0,34174   
Liquidity 
CUR 6,94702 6,72043 9,70117 18,82794 5,58677 5,58770 7,69598 10,76265 * * 
CASH 4,16347 10,49637 5,11818 13,31893 4,45949 11,26285 2,01752 3,21901  *** 
QUI 6,94702 6,72043 9,70117 18,82794 5,58677 5,58770 7,69598 10,76265 * * 
CFSH 0,44502 2,25729 0,16646 1,75409 0,29532 1,62766 0,26341 2,74255   
CFM 1,37996 11,17900 0,17311 3,24329 -0,80027 5,10529 -3,27513 11,62933  ** 
WCR 0,63420 2,88309 1,40660 6,99424 2,76793 13,13265 1,61608 7,43698 *  
Leverage 
DEBT 3,36134 3,83121 4,81655 7,10260 5,89608 9,32104 5,64413 9,53010 **  
ETL 4,76354 5,03637 6,01758 7,84534 4,46961 6,25693 6,52694 13,45421 * ** 
TLSFU 0,74032 2,20111 1,02385 2,64180 0,68880 0,93881 1,28939 2,88781  ** 
CGEAR 0,68880 2,26222 0,65017 1,95007 0,70506 1,94717 0,83406 2,32185   
CLSFU 0,15402 0,32199 0,47530 1,56069 0,25219 0,43793 0,52551 1,50513 * * 
INTCOV 2,20524 8,56600 0,89079 15,14612 0,15686 9,65815 -0,28725 16,23109 ** * 
IGEAR 0,13499 0,98087 0,27540 1,42302 0,11284 0,54008 0,17249 0,98820   
DEBTE 0,60985 2,69962 0,89250 2,78404 0,88111 2,64863 1,76614 6,22696  * 
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DSFU 0,27693 2,79358 0,54694 1,82506 0,60490 1,96751 1,47917 5,86864  * 
 
 
UK 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Pair-wise F-test 



















SALESHA 1,42626 1,87635 0,90418 1,18228 1,10258 1,40456 1,57381 2,10540 ** * 
NAVSH 3,25342 2,91361 4,87325 6,33165 3,88213 3,97432 6,06620 8,33761 ** ** 
SALETAS 0,24480 0,33731 0,23587 0,35218 0,24263 0,34654 0,22199 0,27340   
RESTAS 0,15181 0,20913 0,14628 0,21030 0,13309 0,21786 0,15650 0,24176   
RESSFU 0,21871 0,40798 0,23039 0,53253 0,17780 0,35600 0,19326 0,38522   
LNMV 6,31772 1,71715 6,23975 1,76159 6,36292 1,80485 6,62446 1,85301   
Investment 
DIVSH 0,14301 0,12057 0,18540 0,16711 0,21454 0,18101 0,22058 0,19590 *  
DIVYI 0,04313 0,03160 0,06649 0,06628 0,06879 0,07870 0,04777 0,03856 * * 
DIVCOV 3,80570 5,38215 0,32449 4,32205 1,19517 4,25153 4,66020 5,51311  ** 
PE 7,84164 12,95414 5,42610 21,03140 4,82284 11,23845 7,96659 7,58842 * * 
HOLTA 0,47427 0,42467 0,44810 0,42013 0,46161 0,42336 0,48962 0,43027   
Growth 
MVBV 1,82254 2,58508 3,32355 9,91163 1,95003 4,20044 4,30430 12,73122 ** ** 
Profitability 
PLOWB 2,88271 4,22061 2,53396 9,43067 1,34642 7,92674 1,62919 6,47813 *  
OPM 0,70007 0,95930 0,35681 1,44930 -0,15286 4,70464 0,50987 2,66434   
NPM 0,66314 0,95856 0,34745 1,36340 -0,03668 3,78681 0,53222 2,29164   
ROSC 0,09874 0,12282 0,07774 0,24328 0,17516 0,55060 0,12601 0,20006 ** * 
EPS 0,61218 0,94370 0,24529 0,84573 0,48645 1,01349 0,99307 1,42097  ** 
ROCE 0,07829 0,15931 0,11907 0,32073 0,16028 0,53780 0,00957 0,57618 *  
Liquidity 
CUR 2,33762 4,10305 4,49478 10,97620 2,41277 2,86499 3,59121 7,70302 ** * 
CASH 1,95639 5,33458 1,95949 4,06089 1,22481 1,76420 2,58360 7,10516  ** 
QUI 2,33762 4,10305 4,49478 10,97620 2,41277 2,86499 3,59121 7,70302 ** * 
CFSH 0,71553 0,97936 0,34204 0,90703 0,57007 1,03395 1,08947 1,43310  * 
CFM 0,70699 0,96601 0,37290 1,33724 0,00948 3,64827 0,57604 2,20379   
WCR 0,00585 3,07367 0,35866 6,84636 -0,19272 2,68673 -0,39855 5,02422 * * 
Leverage 
DEBT 1,71102 1,72557 2,21752 2,69868 2,48885 3,76062 4,94188 13,64583 ** ** 
ETL 2,23328 2,27740 4,29891 8,64991 3,03094 4,37669 6,09287 13,67522 ** ** 
TLSFU 0,82500 1,30295 1,38737 3,31607 1,35769 5,08927 1,21916 5,63843 *  
CGEAR 0,75494 1,12893 0,74249 1,15457 0,77743 1,27496 0,63250 1,05407   
CLSFU 0,34446 0,75251 0,52725 1,31934 0,53546 3,98214 0,50707 4,73983 **  
INTCOV 8,42453 9,93636 8,58923 16,22567 8,57869 8,23333 11,23228 13,93386 * * 
IGEAR 1,15135 4,93985 -0,09711 1,93220 0,27630 1,12574 0,09050 0,57089  * 
DEBTE 0,98507 2,73885 0,94932 2,65887 0,91418 2,76145 0,80036 2,55038   
DSFU 0,86839 2,76625 0,83858 2,68128 0,82223 2,77225 0,71209 2,55484   
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US 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Pair-wise F-test 



















SALESHA 9,90287 10,80645 8,12996 7,84843 8,38255 8,54154 9,57645 10,98327 ** * 
NAVSH 14,94961 15,75285 14,35624 11,17384 13,88408 10,68414 15,64397 13,61620 * * 
SALETAS 0,45962 1,53340 0,54412 2,63982 0,47099 1,84067 0,37727 1,04678   
RESTAS 0,44906 0,68816 0,43280 0,47117 0,42665 0,44594 0,41025 0,34471   
RESSFU 0,44721 0,28009 0,45564 0,22327 0,46071 0,23962 0,45375 0,21155   
LNMV 6,99940 1,93212 6,88083 1,89726 7,08103 1,86930 7,35697 1,78191   
Investment 
DIVSH 1,51469 3,41311 1,15650 1,66060 1,10948 1,08562 1,33954 2,46112 ** * 
DIVYI 0,06255 0,15246 0,06857 0,18679 0,08009 0,24181 0,05240 0,13061  * 
DIVCOV 0,32724 8,07798 0,76822 3,10233 0,60722 1,83744 1,24533 2,32621 * * 
PE 11,22064 28,04251 10,00086 21,93105 10,82662 28,53658 19,16880 25,95973 **  
HOLTA 0,17285 0,25695 0,17343 0,25847 0,18201 0,26853 0,15661 0,24729   
Growth 
MVBV 2,21874 4,38640 1,66177 2,54990 1,87358 3,06590 2,51674 5,04452 ** ** 
Profitability 
PLOWB 0,49264 17,57637 1,85184 10,08118 1,11279 11,76157 1,83618 18,61057 *  
OPM 0,37384 1,80291 0,14350 0,49019 0,13804 0,51779 0,28159 1,95600 ** * 
NPM 0,16417 0,65243 0,09188 0,33550 0,11633 0,28340 0,12414 1,48455   
ROSC 0,18160 0,94395 0,15988 0,94412 0,09197 0,29770 0,15402 0,74955  ** 
EPS 1,03446 6,14759 1,26662 4,71867 1,19494 2,55248 1,59370 2,69411   
ROCE 0,06370 0,35194 0,13600 0,90996 0,04096 0,14085 0,08648 0,45336 * ** 
Liquidity 
CUR 2,12702 3,04007 1,78025 2,24478 1,75029 2,34824 2,08176 3,06104 * ** 
CASH 0,81183 1,65351 0,65141 1,11947 0,71926 1,53286 0,75706 1,49112 **  
QUI 2,12702 3,04007 1,78025 2,24478 1,75029 2,34824 2,08176 3,06104 * ** 
CFSH 2,26258 4,33761 1,88598 4,14560 2,36487 3,35953 2,85813 3,65459   
CFM 0,32780 0,64026 0,25774 0,93487 0,20772 2,29117 0,31042 1,50756   
WCR -0,02410 5,64126 -0,02224 3,44819 0,18585 10,47791 -0,67127 3,99300 ** * 
Leverage 
DEBT 2,27428 3,18699 1,89981 2,02795 2,39803 4,02688 2,04847 2,59545 ** * 
ETL 1,29214 2,17815 1,33547 2,25001 1,30512 2,43277 1,29883 2,39366   
TLSFU 1,75897 4,19882 1,96565 6,49356 1,76231 6,29842 1,75485 4,00803   
CGEAR 1,13586 2,50377 0,87156 1,26079 0,82398 2,51430 0,78149 1,02790 ** * 
CLSFU 0,71246 3,73921 0,88761 2,28667 0,85189 2,09876 0,82887 2,41596   
INTCOV 6,13541 23,68729 2,64226 16,82492 4,65839 18,34971 4,78832 9,90915 ** ** 
IGEAR 0,25034 3,53862 0,08910 4,54287 0,09835 4,55149 0,57272 2,57496  * 
DEBTE 1,00316 1,78971 1,16322 2,29212 1,03811 2,69326 1,02672 4,26878   
DSFU 0,48638 0,98994 0,73695 1,46366 0,68240 1,94025 0,65060 2,08556 **  
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively.   
 
 376 
Panel B:Test 1b-OLS Regression of Price on BVPS and NPPS 
Australia 2010 Sig. 2011 Sig. 2012 Sig. 2013 Sig. 
R²  0,688  0,834  0,673  0,647  
BVPS 2,630 *** 2,040 *** 3,413 *** 4,223 *** 
NPPS 5,388 ** 5,332 *** 7,698 ** 11,34 * 
Sample Size  57  57  57  57  
 
Germany 2010 Sig. 2011 Sig. 2012 Sig. 2013 Sig. 
R²  0,560  0,518  0,540  0,653  
BVPS 1,224 *** 1,109 *** 1,562 *** 2,448 *** 
NPPS 2,407 *** 1,366 ** 0,657 ** 1,241 *** 
Sample Size  42  42  42  42  
 
UK 2010 Sig. 2011 Sig. 2012 Sig. 2013 Sig. 
R²  0,725  0,819  0,800  0,909  
BVPS 0,558 *** 0,595 *** 0,516 *** 0,349 *** 
NPPS 0,721  0,677 * 1,078 * 1,564 ** 
Sample Size  40  40  40  37  
 
US 2010 Sig. 2011 Sig. 2012 Sig. 2013 Sig. 
R²  0,599  0,684  0,557  0,566  
BVPS 0,329 *** 0,261 *** 0,491 *** 0,901 *** 
NPPS 2,683 *** 3,165 *** 2,386 *** 2,851 *** 
Sample Size  158  164  166  172  
 
Panel C:Test 2- Logistic Regressions 
Australia 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
ΔTq -1,459 * 0,939 ** 
 (0,774)  (0,461)  
Included Cases 106  109  
 
Germany 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
ΔTq -1,415 *** 1,473 ** 
 (0,424)  (0,707)  
Included Cases 89  93  
 
UK 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
ΔTq -2,069 *** -2,483 * 
 (0,758)  (1,285)  
Included Cases 83  76  
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US 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
ΔTq -1,030 *** 0,393 ** 
 (0,333)  (0,181)  
Included Cases 320  338  
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% 
and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Panel D: Test 3a-Pearson Correlation between Accruals-OCF  
Australia 2010 Sig 2011 Sig 2012 Sig 2013 Sig 
DAC-OCF -0,563 *** 0,366 *** 0,312 ** 0,582 *** 
Sample Size 57  57  57  57  
   
Germany 2010 Sig 2011 Sig 2012 Sig 2013 Sig 
DAC-OCF -0,357 ** -0,287 ** 0,289 ** 0,393 *** 
Sample Size 49  49  49  49  
 
UK 2010 Sig 2011 Sig 2012 Sig 2013 Sig 
DAC-OCF -0,308 ** 0,527 *** 0,469 *** 0,495 *** 
Sample Size 43  43  43  43  
 
US 2010 Sig 2011 Sig 2012 Sig 2013 Sig 
DAC-OCF -0,221 *** 0,521 *** 0,366 *** 0,157 ** 
Sample Size 172  172  172  172  
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
 
Panel D: Test 3b: Logistic Regression of Accruals 
Australia 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
DAC -3,538 * -8,887 * 
  (1,942)  (5,131)  
Included Cases 73  71  
 
Germany 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
DAC 3,226 * 4,997 * 
  (1,906)  (2,996)  
Included Cases 60  88  
 
UK 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
DAC 3,251 *** -10,180 ** 
  (0,862)  (3,953)  
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Included Cases 76  66  
 
US 2010-2011 2012-2013 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
DAC 0,979 * -1,977 * 
  (0,559)  (1,041)  
Included Cases 249  280  
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level 
respectively. 
 
Panel D: Test 3c - Earnings Quality 
Australia 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Test Variables Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
R2 adj. 0,253  0,222  0,160  0,424  
F test  18,980 *** 16,409 *** 10,326 *** 37,864 *** 
OCF 0,003 *** 0,226 *** -0,018 *** -0,104 *** 
  (0,001)  (0,056)  (0,006)  (0,017)  
Sample size 54  55  50  51  
 
Germany 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Test Variables Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
R2 adj. 0,443  0,148  0,315  0,214  
F test  36,761 *** 7,769 *** 20,340 *** 9,980 *** 
OCF -0,451 *** -0,097 *** 0,282 *** 0,028 *** 
  (0,074)  (0,035)  (0,062)  (0,009)  
Sample size 46  40  43  34  
 
UK 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Test Variables Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
R2 adj. 0,442  0,309  0,187  0,200  
F test  34,308 *** 18,882 *** 9,049 *** 9,778 *** 
OCF -2,206 *** -1,814 *** -0,126 *** -0,191 *** 
  (0,377)  (0,418)  (0,042)  (0,061)  
Sample size 43  41  36  36  
 
US 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Test Variables Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
R2 adj. 0,180  0,178  0,118  0,169  
F test  38,605 *** 36,686 *** 23,292 *** 35,462 *** 
OCF 4,858 *** -1,382 *** 0,232 *** 2,760 *** 
  (0,782)  (0,228)  (0,048)  (0,464)  
Sample size 172  166  168  170  
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistically significant factors at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level respectively. 
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